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Abstract 
 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of the role of European Union policy in 
national level governance of the audiovisual media sectors in small states in South 
East Europe. It compares the Republics of Slovenia and Macedonia, two countries of 
similar size and population that emerged from the same former-Yugoslav media 
system. Slovenia is a new EU member state and Macedonia is a candidate country, 
therefore both are formally bound by EU audiovisual media policy. Europeanization 
research, particularly in new Member States and candidate countries, has focused on 
compliance with transposition deadlines and the implementation of specific EU 
Directives. This study takes a bottom-up approach, making media governance its 
object of study based on a conceptualisation of governance by Jan Kooiman (2003), 
but still focused on identifying the role of the EU within that national level 
governance. It draws on interviews with stakeholders in both countries, examination 
of secondary data available on the respective media markets, and accounts from civil 
society actors and regulators to arrive at an overall picture of media governance.  
 
It finds that in these two cases the role of Europeanization, defined in this thesis in 
relation to the EU, centres on the use of EU rules by domestic actors in order to 
forward their strategic interests. It argues that the media sectors in these two cases 
are largely resistant to Europeanization because of their small size and the particular 
relations between media and political elites. This thesis suggests that the media 
sector may be different from other sectors such as transport, environmental 
protection, or labour in terms of Europeanization and governance because the role of 
media in domestic politics. However, this is not a simple story of the democratic and 
governance failures often attributed to Southern European countries. This thesis 
shows the complexity in which Europeanization takes place, and highlights the 
importance of market conditions and market players to this process. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes 
the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”  
Copenhagen Criteria (June 1993) 
 
 
 
In early 2012 Swedish Modern Times Group (MTG) announced that it was pulling 
out of the Slovenian broadcasting market, despite its TV3 having increased audience 
share from 1% to 11% in three years. TV3 was the first station to receive a national 
license in Slovenia, but was quickly overtaken by a network formed of local stations 
that eventually became PopTV. MTG had bought into TV3 in 2006 as the station 
was floundering in the face of competition from PopTV and the public service 
broadcaster (PSB). MTG explained its departure and closure of the station by the 
inability of TV3, which was nevertheless Slovenia’s third most popular national 
commercial station, to turn increased ratings into higher advertising income. MTG 
argued that the reason was domestic regulators’ failure to ensure fair competition 
(STA, 2012a). Shortly afterwards, the Norwegian company Norkring announced it 
was closing Slovenia’s only commercial digital terrestrial television (DTT) network, 
having gone as far as to press criminal charges against the PSB in relation to unfair 
competition (STA, 2012b). These closures left Slovenia with only one DTT network 
in the hands of its PSB with implications for media pluralism. They also point to 
serious barriers to free and fair competition in the audiovisual media sector of 
Slovenia, a country that has been a member of the EU since 2004 and whose laws 
were formally brought in line with EU rules for television and for 
telecommunications in 2001.   
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Is this a situation of failing Europeanization? It might be tempting to dismiss these 
problems as results of Southern European corruption and cronyism, or the famously 
inefficient bureaucracies. I argue that to do so would be taking an overly simplistic 
view of the roots of these problems that would limit the potential for dealing with 
them. There are those who are looking to the EU to get more involved in the 
regulation of media pluralism, but can further Europeanization play a role? A 
European Citizens Initiative is pushing for the Commission to start developing a new 
Directive on media freedom and pluralism,1 but what role do existing directives play 
in these countries? The European Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee adopted a 
resolution calling for more EU involvement in media freedom and concentration 
monitoring, 2  and the EC launched a consultation in response to a report it 
commissioned on media freedom and pluralism.3 The EU already has rules about free 
competition and common standards in audiovisual media services, so how do they 
function in these countries? I argue that the important question to ask at this time, 
and the one I address in this thesis is: What is the role of Europeanization in 
audiovisual media governance? 
 
Europeanization research in other policy areas has produced a variety of theories 
explaining variations in compliance with EU Directives or the impact of EU at the 
domestic level. These have been largely based on institutional factors and an 
assumption that the EU causes change at the domestic level. However, these 
variable-based approaches take Europeanization as a given and look at factors 
affecting it, rather than consider its role in national level governance. They therefore 
fail to take into account some of the complexity in these environments. For one 
thing, EU integration is not the only process going on in the last two decades for 
these countries. Media scholars, particularly from the region (e.g. Bajomi-Lázár, 
2008; Jakubowicz, 2007b, 2008; Splichal, 1999, 2001), describe emancipatory 
reactions to the state controlled systems of the previous regime as well as the 
pressures of globalization and commercialization in the media. Secondly, these 
scholars argue that media governance in this region has been typified by the efforts 
                                                 
1
 http://www.mediainitiative.eu/  
2
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20130218IPR05922/html/Media-
freedom-MEPs-call-for-annual-EU-monitoring-of-member-states%E2%80%99-media-laws  
3
 http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/public-consultation-independent-report-hlg-media-freedom-
and-pluralism  
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of domestic political elites to maintain control of the media and characteristics of the 
market, namely the lack of professionalism and clientelism. Neither the role of 
political parties nor characteristics of the markets to which EU policy applies have 
been thoroughly considered in Europeanization studies. There is also an empirical 
gap in the Europeanization literature in that there has been little research in the media 
sector, and there is much more to be understood about the process in Southern 
Europe and the new Member States (NMS).  
 
Focusing on South East Europe (SEE), this thesis examines Europeanization through 
an investigation into media governance in Slovenia and Macedonia. Some of the 
reasons Europeanization research remains limited are that the institutionalist 
approaches over-emphasize structures (Schmidt, 2010) and fall prey to institutional 
determinism while neglecting complexity (Dente, Dossi, & Radaelli, 2011). 
Attempting to overcome these limitations, I have taken a bottom-up approach 
(Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2008) to this investigation. I 
have made the interactions of governance among the state, the market and civil 
society (Kooiman, 2003) the subject of my research. Although I use a theoretical 
framework based on neo-institutionalism, I have combined agent-centred and 
structure-centred theories about how institutions work in order to avoid over-
emphasizing structure.  
 
This thesis contributes to the field of Europeanization research in three ways. Firstly, 
it highlights the importance of markets – their size, condition, and the strategic 
interests of their actors – in relation to Europeanization. Secondly, it gives further 
support to claims that the extent to which Europeanization affects change at the 
domestic level is related to the ability and willingness of domestic actors (Jacquot & 
Woll, 2004). Finally, it provides detailed information from two countries on the role 
Europeanization is playing in the audiovisual media sector, a policy area that remains 
understudied by this field. The evidence from these two cases indicates that size does 
matter. As I will argue, my findings in this regard have serious implications for what 
can be expected from Europeanization in this region, at least in relation to 
audiovisual media policy.   
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This thesis finds that Europeanization played only a small role in media 
governance in these two countries, when domestic actors used EU rules or the 
authority of the EU to change the distribution of power and resources at the 
national level in their strategic interest. In addition it shows that the audiovisual 
media sectors in these two countries were generally resistant to Europeanization 
and their small size contributed greatly to this resistance. 
 
Before setting out how each of the proceeding chapters contributes to these findings, 
I will first briefly clarify how Europeanization is defined in this thesis, and in 
particular what it means in the audiovisual media sectors.   
 
1.1 Europeanization 
 
The term Europeanization does not have one stable meaning, but has been used to 
describe a variety of processes occurring in Europe (for example see Börzel & Risse, 
2006; Bulmer, 2008; Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse, 2001; Falkner, Hartlapp, Leiber, & 
Treib, 2004; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2003). Olsen (2002) outlines five phenomena 
related to changes in Europe for which the term can be used. He lists the changes in 
territorial boundaries, political unification and the development of European level 
formal governance institutions, as well as the penetration of national levels of 
governance and export of forms of political organization and governance typical to 
Europe. His five phenomena capture both the process of the formation of the EU 
level of governance and top down transfer or diffusion from the EU level to the 
national.  However, as Sedelmeier (2006) points out, for the most part the literature 
in this field uses the term as shorthand for the influence or domestic impact of the 
EU at the state level. He rightly argues that equating ‘Europe’ with the EU is 
problematic in Europeanization studies, and it has also been argued that the 
processes most often referred to as ‘Europeanization’ should actually be named ‘EU-
ization’ (Flockhart, 2010).  
 
One could include in the study of Europeanization the role of the Council of Europe 
(CoE), its conventions and other policy instruments such as recommendations, or of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or other pan-
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European organizations. As other scholars have shown these organisations have 
played a role in media governance in SEE and CEE states, particularly before or in 
the early stages of the accession process (e.g. Harcourt, 2003b; Sparks, 1995). One 
could consider the more general diffusion of norms and models from Western 
European countries. However, my project relates specifically to national level media 
governance in the context of the countries’ relations with the EU. It is concerned 
primarily with the role of the EU and its policies. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
thesis, Europeanization is defined in reference to the EU or as what others might 
call EU-ization. I use the following definition from Radaelli (2002), which defines 
the process in relation the EU and captures the phenomena in a precise manner that 
can be taken into an empirical project:  
 
“Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization 
of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics 
and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies.” (p. 108) 
 
Part “(a) construction”, or the process of policy formation at the EU level will not be 
dealt with in the scope of this investigation. This thesis is concerned with diffusion 
and institutionalization processes, and the extent to which the EU formal and 
informal rules or norms play a role in media governance or are incorporated in 
domestic institutions or public policies. The Europeanization described here is a top-
down process, but I do not assume that this process impacts the national level, which 
is an assumption that leads to seeking factors to explain variations in this impact. 
Instead, I investigate this top-down process by looking from the bottom-up – by 
examining media governance and looking for evidence of Europeanization. I will 
finish introducing the problematic of this thesis by explaining what “formal and 
informal rules” as well as “shared beliefs and norms” have been consolidated at the 
EU level and therefore may be diffused or incorporated in Slovenia and Macedonia. 
This will help to define what Europeanization means for the audiovisual media 
sectors in particular.   
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1.2 The EU and Audiovisual Media 
 
At the core of the shared beliefs and norms of the EU are adherence to liberal human 
rights and the principles of “social pluralism, the rule of law, democratic political 
participation and representation, private property, and a market-based economy” 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 59). This normative dimension, with its emphasis on 
democracy, human rights and rule of law is expressed in treaties and other 
documents, and in relation to the audiovisual media sector there appears to be a 
consensus on normative goals related to the public interest function of media and 
pluralism. For example, the preambles of the Television Without Frontiers Directive 
(TWFD) and Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) that replaced it 
justify the application of specific rules to audiovisual media services because of: 
 
“Their growing importance for societies, democracy – in particular by 
ensuring freedom of information, diversity of opinion and media 
pluralism – education and culture…” (Preamble (5), Council of 
European Communities, 2010) 
 
In the AVMSD and TWFD there are also references to “the protection of cultural 
diversity”. Schlesinger (1993, 1997) has argued that EU policy in this sector attempts 
to translate national level assumptions about media and culture to the EU level. 
Among other reasons, he find this problematic because of the dominant economic 
logic behind the Union, pointing out that “cultural diversity is more than just a set of 
consumption practices susceptible to rationalization by the policy process” (1997, p. 
384). Nevertheless, as Harcourt (2005) argues the policy output of the EU has been 
determined by legal constraints in the treaties, which limit it to interventions based 
on economic arguments. Despite the references to culture and democracy in the 
various preambles, the rules of EU media policy identify it as an industrial policy 
governing audiovisual media services within the common market (see Harrison & 
Woods, 2007; Sophia Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 1996). The rules are interventions intended 
to achieve core aims, defined and agreed at the EU level, of fair competition in a free 
market and of nurturing the competitiveness of the common market on a global level. 
The removal of barriers to free competition and the establishment of common 
standards within Europe are therefore combined with EU-wide protectionism against 
competition from the rest of the world.  
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The 1989 Television without Frontiers Directive (TWFD) that opened national 
television markets to cross-border transmission and investment within the EU was 
adopted:  
 
“to permit and ensure a transition from national markets to a common 
programme production and distribution market and to establish 
conditions of fair competition without prejudice to the public interest 
role to be discharged by television broadcasting services;” (Preamble 
Council of European Communities, 1989) 
 
The shared beliefs in the open markets and fair competition on a level playing-field 
within the EU, as reflected in the EU’s audiovisual media policy, operate alongside 
commitments to the protection and promotion of the “common programme 
production and distribution market” (Council of European Communities, 1989, 
2010). At the core is EU competition policy that requires the opening of national 
borders and negative integration through the removal of barriers to trade 
(Humphreys, 2005; Levy, 1999), which has been done not just through sector 
specific policy but also through general competition policy (see Harcourt, 2005: 
Chapter 8). Ensuring that all players are operating under the same rules is the 
standardization of programme standards, including advertising limits, through 
negative content regulations aimed at protecting audiences from harmful or offensive 
content and too much or surreptitious advertising (Harrison & Woods, 2007). On the 
other hand are positive content regulations that were put in place “to protect the 
European Community, culturally and economically, from US hegemony in the 
audiovisual sector” (McGonagle, 2008, p. 208) and are clear forms of protectionism 
(Bekkali, 2006; Dolmans, 1995; Tunstall & Machin, 1999). This is mainly the 
requirement that television stations broadcast 50% European works and 10% works 
from independent European producers (Council of European Communities, 2010).  
 
Several scholars argue that European quotas are more about protecting the 
audiovisual industry than the European cultural diversity objectives referred to in 
directives, green papers, and other documents (Harrison & Woods, 2001; Hitchens, 
2006; Motto, Polo, Rey, & Roller, 1997). There is also much debate as to whether or 
not they are successful in either (Broughton Micova, 2013). Nevertheless, combined 
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with the EU level subsidies for the audiovisual media sector, these content 
regulations represent the EU’s efforts to protect the ‘European’ audiovisual media 
sector against foreign competition.  
 
In summary, though the language of preambles may imply that a key aim of EU 
media policy is “to safeguard cultural diversity and foster European culture” (B. 
Peters, 2008, p. 182), the rules for the sector set out in Treaties and Directives derive 
from the economic management of the common market. The more detailed rules and 
norms carried through in EU media policy as expressed in its documents can be 
grouped under the following three core rules. (Council of European Communities, 
1989, 2007, 2010; European Union, 2009):  
 
 There should be a common market for audiovisual media services in which 
there is free and open competition, with special allowances for PSB (for 
discussion see Humphreys, 2005, 2007); 
 Common rules and minimum standards should apply to all audiovisual media 
services (for discussion see Harrison & Woods, 2007: chapter 10); 
 The European audiovisual media sector should be protected and nurtured (for 
discussion see Papathanassopoulos & Negrine, 2011). 
 
In keeping with the bottom-up approach of this investigation, I did not select EU 
policy instruments or implementation mechanisms at the outset of the project. This 
thesis did not start with a particular directive, court decision, accession instrument or 
competition ruling and look for its impact at the national level. Instead, it asked 
many questions about media governance in each country and discovered where EU 
policy and the mechanisms aimed at implementing it were playing a role. It was 
expected that key directives such as TWFD/AVMSD and competition rules would 
appear in the data, but some arose unexpectedly like the insistence on copyright 
protection in EU Progress Reports in Macedonia. The thesis is thus organised around 
the three core elements listed above as a way to manage the complexity found in the 
empirical work that examined audiovisual media governance in Slovenia and 
Macedonia in search of any role played by the EU rules and norms relevant to this 
sector I now give a brief overview of how the following chapters provide evidence of 
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the resistance identified in these two cases and answer the question of what is the 
role of Europeanization in these cases.  
1.3 The chapters 
 
Europeanization in this thesis relates to the EU and its policies. Above, I described 
what it means specifically in the audiovisual media sector. The story of the 
unceremonious exit of Norkring and MTG from the Slovenian market with which I 
began suggests that Europeanization in this sector may be incomplete, ineffective or 
failing in some way. Chapter 2 elaborates several explanations for variations in 
compliance with transposition of EU rules, and to some extent their implementation 
offered by the literature from Europeanization studies. I discuss the contribution of 
this literature and its limitations, particularly in light of the literature on post-socialist 
and post-communist media systems. I discuss the limitations in the field some of 
which stem from divisions between structure-centred and agency-centred 
explanations. I also point out that the arguments of media scholars writing about the 
region complicate the explanations of Europeanization scholars with accounts of how 
the strategic actions of political elites impact media governance and media markets.  
 
This thesis is an investigation of national level media governance based on a 
conceptualization of governance used to define it as an object of study. In Chapter 3, 
I discuss some of the literature on governance and specifically two models of media 
governance that have been provided by McQuail (2005) and Puppis (2007) 
Following a short critique of these models, this chapter elaborates a 
conceptualization of governance as interactions among the state, the market and civil 
society from Kooiman (2003) I describe how, within these three broad categories, 
governance actors can be regulatory bodies, media companies, activist groups, and 
others. I explain that within this conceptualization interactions take place among 
actors and between actors and structures, as well as at various levels. This chapter 
then returns to the new institutionalism common to the Europeanization research 
reviewed in the previous chapter, constructing a theoretical framework based on the 
concepts of institutional fit and opportunity structures. Although my investigation 
focuses on identifying the role of Europeanization within national level media 
governance in these cases I suggest that using these concepts within a bottom-up 
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investigation of governance can help overcome some of the limitations of the top-
down, EU-centric approach that can confine empirical studies in this field (Dente et 
al., 2011; Radaelli, 2002; Schmidt, 2010).  
 
I explain how the investigation was operationalized in Chapter 4. This chapter 
describes the mixed methodology engaged in this investigation that made use of 
semi-structured interviews, secondary data from administrative records and research 
by regulators and private agencies, reports from civil society groups, and the relevant 
laws in each country. I elaborate the logic and strategy of the comparison between 
the two cases, and also discuss the value and the challenges of using a bottom-up 
governance approach in an empirical investigation. The aim this approach was to 
identify the role of Europeanization to the extent there was one, but by looking at 
media governance as a whole. Therefore after a chapter covering the history up to the 
situation at the time of my fieldwork the empirical chapters are organised around the 
core elements of EU audiovisual media policy mentioned above: common rules and 
standards, European and national protectionism, and free and open competition 
within the common market. 
 
The presentation of data and findings from the empirical work of this project begins 
in Chapter 5. This chapter recounts the histories of the audiovisual media sectors in 
the two countries since independence from Yugoslavia and describes the regulatory 
framework in place at the time of this study. It combines the few published accounts 
from civil society groups, administrative data from public bodies, secondary data 
from various sources and recollections from interviewees. An analysis of the laws 
that were in effect in 2011 gives a picture of the public bodies involved in 
governance in each case and their responsibilities and powers as conferred by law. 
The evidence in this chapter shows that liberalization began immediately following 
independence and cannot be linked to EU policy. The elaboration of the regulatory 
frameworks in each case suggests that the rules establishing the regulatory 
authorities and their powers allowed much room for the influence of political parties, 
and created weak regulatory bodies particularly in Slovenia.  
 
Chapter 6 looks at the transposition and enforcement of the common standards and 
rules for the audiovisual sector. A juxtaposition of media law changes with political 
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events combined with accounts from those involved in law-making show that in both 
cases media-related laws are used to establish or maintain political influence over the 
media. These interventions interfere with or over-ride those of the EU leading to 
delays in transposition or non-compliance.  In this chapter I also look at enforcement 
practice in each case. This is done by describing the behaviour of those charged with 
enforcement and through analysis of their data on actions taken. I present evidence 
that despite acceptance or even support for policy within the regulator and the 
market, there was resistance to its implementation as there was a lack of enforcement 
of rules for the sector in general. In Slovenia the evidence indicates that the 
regulatory system was set up to fail by those adopting the laws that established it, 
and in Macedonia the actions of decision makers within the NRA took actions that 
were conditioned by the entrenched relationships between political parties and the 
media. The lack of implementation of the common industry standards has negative 
implications for the establishment of a level playing field or fair competition in these 
cases. However in this chapter I also give evidence of domestic market players using 
the EU as a higher authority in order to rectify this where it was in their interests.  
 
In Chapter 7 I take up the issue of protectionism and look at the interactions involved 
in both European and national protectionist measures. EU level interventions such as 
the quotas for European works and EU subsidies are therefore looked at in relation to 
similar national level interventions. I find that there was some resistance to 
Europeanization in both cases and that the main point of resistance is misfit with the 
practices of those in the NRAs and the broadcasters. The evidence indicates that the 
practices identified were constrained mostly by the small size of these operations and 
the market in general.  This chapter shows that the state support to this sector 
functioned very differently in each of these cases. The differences between the two 
cases described in this chapter highlight the potential role of PSB as key to the 
capacity of the markets in these countries to benefit from EU protectionism. They 
also illustrate the political ramifications of the small size of the media in these 
countries and some of the mechanisms of control used by political elites within 
media governance.  
 
The last empirical evidence is presented in Chapter 8, which focuses on the fair 
competition in open markets fundamental to the EU’s common market. Once again, I 
 12 
find that the smallness of these two countries was a source of resistance to 
Europeanization. The limited human and financial resources within their markets 
make them resistant to full openness and their domestic actors are unable to fairly 
compete within the common market. At the same time, I show that embedded 
relationships at the level of organisations and even individuals also served to keep 
these markets closed to outside investors. It is in this chapter that the details of case 
of Norkring and MTG’s exits from Slovenia are explained along with the lack of 
openness in both the Slovenian and Macedonian markets.  Although there were no 
limits on foreign channels or content coming in from outside through re-
broadcasting, established relationships in these audiovisual sectors served as barriers 
to entry for investment in the domestic market. In Slovenia one dominant 
commercial broadcaster, with a foreign owner that entered early on, and the PSB are 
able to keep out competition. In Macedonia the relationships between political 
parties and individual broadcasters were such that media existed mainly as tool for 
achieving political and other business interests, while profit making was not 
necessarily expected or sought. This was a significant deterrent to new entrants not 
connected to domestic politics and also seems to be exacerbated by the financial 
constraints on media companies operating in the small market. 
 
In the final chapter, I conclude that both countries were resistant to Europeanization 
in the audiovisual media sector because of their small size, which limits their markets 
and media governance interactions in general, and because of the relationship 
between media and politics, particularly in Macedonia. I explain that the role of 
Europeanization, for which I found evidence, was in the way domestic strategic 
actors used EU rules or the EU as a higher authority to forward their interests. This 
chapter argues that the experiences of these cases indicate that the role of political 
parties as actors separate from the state or public administration should be considered 
not just in terms of their policy preferences, but also in terms their other interests and 
relationships in the sector. I also point out that smallness is neither a social construct 
that can be changed through social learning nor an institution created by agents to 
constrain the opportunities available to other actors, yet it has clear consequences for 
media governance in these two cases. I explain that these findings also have 
implications for the way we think about and model media governance, in particular 
how ‘the state’ or ‘government’ are considered.  
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In this closing chapter I also argue that the audiovisual media sector might be a 
special case in terms of Europeanization because of the role that media play in 
political life, and because the nature of media goods and consumption makes it 
difficult for market players, particularly in small states, to take advantage of 
economies of scale that the common market offers in other sectors. Finally I suggest 
that as the European Commission considers a possible directive on media freedom 
and pluralism, revisions to the AVMSD, and other policy changes for the audiovisual 
media services sector, there needs to more investigation in two areas. Firstly, the EU 
needs to reassess the effectiveness of its protectionist policies for small states in the 
context of globalization. I argue that it should invest more in developing these small 
markets at the national level, rather than supporting large productions to compete 
with American hits. Secondly, there is a need for careful assessment of what level of 
pluralism is conducive to media fulfilling its public interest role in markets of 
various sizes. I suggest that in small states public interest measure aimed at ensuring 
content diversity and balance might be more effective than measures aimed at 
encouraging a pluralism of market players.  
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Chapter 2: Europeanization of Media 
Systems  
2.1 Introduction 
 
Introducing this thesis I described recent developments in the Slovenian television 
market that seem to go against the EU’s norms and rules for this sector, despite the 
country being an EU member state. Although I slightly glibly asked if this was a case 
of failed Europeanization, the research question that I posed was: what is the role of 
Europeanization in media governance in this region. I formulate the question in this 
way in order to broaden the scope from what Europeanization research in relation to 
public policy has dealt with so far. The Europeanization research covered here has so 
far focused on the impact of changes in EU policy on national level policy and 
administrations. Scholars have investigated variations in the implementation of EU 
rules and policy in many sectors, identifying a number of variables explaining these 
differences among states. Despite its relatively short history, research in this field has 
been fruitful in terms of explanatory theoretical work on factors that influence 
Europeanization. As I will argue here, however, there remains much to be 
understood about this process. 
 
As per the definition of Europeanization given in the introduction, the body of 
literature that I will cover in this chapter deals with what could also be called EU-
ization. It does not include work done on the development (or not) of a European 
public sphere or European identity, nor does it cover the literature on the formation 
of EU or other European institutions (for types of Europeanizaton processes see 
Olsen, 2002). The body of work covered here focuses on the rules and norms of the 
EU’s public policies, and examines what happens with these policies at the national 
level. This literature is dominated by institutionalism and draws on empirical 
research in specific policy areas and often cross-national comparative studies. In the 
following section, I will present the main explanations it has generated and begin to 
discuss some of the limitations of the work so far. 
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The theories developed by these scholars serve as excellent starting points for this 
project; however, I argue that the field remains limited because the questions that 
have been asked and answered have assumed a central role for the EU and EU 
policy, with little attention to other mechanisms of governance or broader public 
policy dynamics. In addition, while empirical studies have examined 
Europeanization of labour policy (Falkner, Hartlapp, & Treib, 2007; Falkner, Treib, 
Hartlapp, & Lieber, 2005) and environmental policy (Luaces, 2002; D. Peters, 2001) 
and even covered EU Directives on transport (Héritier, 2001), packaging (Haverland, 
2000) and others, the media sector remains under-researched. A review of the 
literature on post-communist and post-socialist media systems describes 
environments in which old mechanisms of controlling media persist and where there 
are numerous constraints on the national administrations, regulators and market 
actors who would be engaged in the Europeanization process. 
 
Therefore in the third section of this chapter I examine the literature on media 
systems in Central and South Eastern Europe, most of which has been generated by 
scholars from the region. They write about media systems within the broader process 
of the post-communist or post-socialist transitions taking place within these 
countries. They discuss tendencies towards imitation or mimicry of Western 
European models, but point to severe problems in the choice of models and 
completeness of the imitation. Some see promise in EU membership and a potential 
for improvements in the problems they identify in these media systems. Their work 
highlights efforts by political elites to control the media and to some extent the 
structural characteristics of media in the region, including market conditions. As I 
argue below, neither of these issues is covered adequately by the current 
explanations offered by Europeanization studies, which have yet to thoroughly 
examine the media sector and media policy, and may even challenge some of the 
theories. 
 
In the conclusion I identify a gap in Europeanization research, particularly in terms 
of the media sector and in light of the arguments of scholars studying media systems 
the region. I argue that the over-reliance on socially constructed structural variables 
by those belonging to the historical and sociological branches of institutionalism is 
not sufficiently balanced by the agency-related factors identified by those of the 
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rational choice school. I maintain that the current Europeanization literature is further 
limited by its empirical focus on national administrations or civil servants and 
transposition records, which leaves out those in the market to whom most EU policy 
applies. Finally, in light of the disappointment that many media scholars from this 
part of Europe express about the state of the media sectors, I conclude that further 
understanding of the role of Europeanization in the sector is required before 
stakeholders turn to the EU to improve this state. 
2.2 Europeanization Studies: Explaining Variation 
 
Europeanization studies since the late 1990s have undeniably provided evidence that 
levels of domestic policy and administrative change vary significantly across the 
Union (Cowles et al., 2001; Duina, 1999; Falkner et al., 2005; Luetgert & Dannwolf, 
2009; Toshkov, 2008).
4
 Research in this field began as a quest to explain the 
differences in the implementation of European policy and compliance with 
transposition deadlines across the Union (Luetgert & Dannwolf, 2009), and to date, it 
has provided several theories explaining the great differences among Member States. 
As Radaelli (2002) argues, this strain of research has been largely top down, starting 
with rules or policy changes at the EU level and attempting to account for differences 
in implementation or change at the national level. Much of the empirical work in the 
field draws on historical and sociological instuitionalism, with a heavy reliance on 
institutional structures as explanatory variables. Here concepts such as path 
dependency and the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998) form the basis 
for theories on why some states are more ‘Europeanized’ than others. 
 
These scholars focus on the interaction between EU policy and socially constructed 
rules and practices at the national level that are either path dependent (historical) or 
based on norms, culture and perceptions of identity (sociological). Rational choice 
institutionalism provides explanations based on the policy preferences of mostly 
political actors and the extent to which they resist EU inspired changes. In recent 
work on the new Member States, rational choice institutionalism appeared 
particularly useful in explaining variance based on the conditionality intrinsic to the 
                                                 
44
 Works cited use either original data from large scale multi-state studies or compiled data from 
several case studies. See references for additional examples including individual sector or national 
case studies. 
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Eastward enlargement. Scholars of this branch of institutionalism emphasised 
decisions based on the cost/benefit calculations of political actors, which were 
largely clear during the accession process. However, since accession two trends have 
challenged the explanations of these scholars. On the one hand, high rates of 
compliance in the transposition of EU directives continued among NMS despite the 
absence of accession related incentives. On the other hand, accounts from qualitative 
empirical studies have found several implementation failure examples similar to the 
Slovenian cases of the Norkring and MTG exits, though in other sectors. These 
indicate that the on-time and thorough transposition of EU policy – in the Slovenian 
Norkring case in relation to competition – does not necessarily lead to 
implementation. The identification of these trends seems to have forced a marriage 
between agent or rational actor explanations and structural ones, but one that is still 
in the early stages and poses questions that may require investigations bridging the 
rationalist/constructivist divide in order to answer. 
2.2.1 Fit and misfit 
 
One of the first theories developed to explain differences in compliance with the 
implementation of or adaptation to EU Directives and policy was the theory of 
fit/misfit. Duina (1999) suggested that variation in the implementation of EU 
regulations and directives can be explained by the degree to which the policies 
coming from Brussels differ from existing national policies. However this idea was 
quickly broadened to include other factors in institutional change at the domestic 
level. A more sophisticated version of the fit/misfit theory was forwarded by Knill 
(2001), who argued that implementation depends less on sectoral policy fit and more 
on likeness to values and practice of national administrations. This is based on earlier 
work that isolated regulatory approach, style and practice as well as embedded 
arrangements in the sector act as key factors in domestic adaptation (Knill, 1997). 
This was an important step beyond policy characteristics, leading to a distinction that 
Börzel and Risse (2003) would later make between “policy fit” and “institutional 
fit”. Nevertheless, it still considered administrative style and culture in terms of its fit 
with EU rules and regulatory approaches, such as in environmental policy (Knill & 
Lenchow, 2001a), rather than in terms of enabling or frustrating reforms in general. 
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The original fit/misfit theory was quickly qualified even further by scholars 
identifying intervening variables to explain different reactions to misfit. Héritier and 
her colleagues examined the fate of EU Transport Directives in several Member 
States. They argued that, at least for utilities sectors, the stage of liberalization in the 
country also mattered, along with the overall attitude towards liberalization among 
decision makers and what they termed “reform capacity” (Héritier & al., 2001, pp. 
257-259). According to them this meant essentially the number of positions within 
the decision-making institutions; for instance whether it involved a federalist or 
decentralised system, or multi-party coalitions. The volume edited by Cowles, Risse 
and Caporaso (2001) continued in this direction with a series of empirical studies 
that drew on the idea that institutional change is path dependent and therefore 
implementation depends on the goodness of fit between the EU level and existing 
domestic rules, norms and practices. The simple logic presented was that if there is a 
good fit with existing domestic structures there will be smooth implementation that 
does not require much change at the national level. On the other hand, if the fit is not 
good then there will be high “adaptational pressure” for domestic level change, 
which may inspire a path changing “critical juncture” or could lead to resistance to 
implementation. 
 
Though they did not give up on misfit or adaptational pressure being key, the studies 
in this volume made two important contributions. Firstly, they gave more convincing 
evidence for the notion that EU rules and policy not only interact with domestic level 
policy or law in any given sectors, but also with the norms and practice of the 
national level institutions dealing with that sector. Secondly, they identified several 
“mediating factors” (Cowles & Risse, 2001) that can impact upon how the 
adaptational pressure is handled, or the extent to which domestic level change 
occurs. Among these are some factors based on sociological institutionalism, namely 
the extent to which changes are considered appropriate within domestic institutional 
culture or the degree of “learning” of EU norms that takes place, particularly among 
elites (Checkel, 2001). Others draw more from historical and rational choice 
perspectives: the existence of multiple veto points, or actors that have a say in the 
processes, and the extent to which there is change in the relative power of those 
actors. These last two factors appear to be an attempt to incorporate some of the 
alternative theories that evolved in the same period. 
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The theories based on institutional fit are structure-centred explanations (Checkel, 
1999b) for the variations in Europeanization at the national level. Though mediating 
factors are mentioned, at the core of these explanations is how EU level policy or EU 
level change interacts with domestic level institutional structures – be they values, 
administrative culture, or core norms and practices. One could also think of this as 
the extent to which the domestic institutions are resistant to change. The empirical 
work supporting these theories relies heavily on investigations of domestic law and 
national administrations or state bodies and draws on the constructivist tradition. It 
therefore remains limited in the types of structures considered, mostly leaving out 
ones outside of these institutions or perhaps characteristic of the countries in 
general.5 Enough intervening variables or mediating factors were identified that it 
makes sense to question whether policy fit is really the proper starting point at all 
(see Mastenbroek, 2005). As I explain below, subsequent empirical work does not 
support this hypothesis. The notion of institutional fit retains some value. It can be 
seen later in the more recent literature on CEE and SEE, which considers the extent 
to which domestic institutions accept as appropriate or learn and adopt EU rules and 
norms. 
2.2.2 Preferences and veto players 
 
Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999, 2003) argued that domestic change depends on the 
mechanism of Europeanization and that “institutional compatibility”, their version of 
fit, only mattered when the mechanism of Europeanization was institutional 
compliance. However they maintained that other mechanisms work differently. One 
such mechanism they described was operating to change the domestic opportunity 
structure or the distribution of resources and power among actors. This they argued 
was particularly relevant to policy that involved the removal of national level 
regulation in the interest of the common market, such as the elimination of barriers to 
cross border broadcasting contained in the 1989 TWFD. By removing rules that 
defined the distribution of resources and power at the national level, EU policy can 
change the outcomes and consequences domestic actors can expect from their actions 
                                                 
5
 The “stage of liberalization” factor in the transport sector identified by Héritier et al. (2001) was a 
notable exception. 
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or decisions. Another mechanism, slightly more vague, was “Europeanization 
through the framing of domestic beliefs” in which EU policy either provides ideas to 
or influences the expectations of “key actors who can potentially veto reform 
initiatives” (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2003, p. 273 ). Though the first of these theories 
refers specifically to structure, both of them seem in essence to refer to the strategic 
actions of domestic actors or agents, and whether they may oppose or support EU 
policy implementation. 
 
These kinds of preference-related explanations (Luetgert & Dannwolf, 2009) draw 
on the veto player concept of Tsebelis (1995, 1999). This is the idea that within 
democracies there are certain players such as opposition political parties, coalition 
partners or others who are involved in policy decisions and have the power to “veto” 
policy change. Veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement is 
needed in order to change the status quo (Tsebelis, 1995, p. 289) and are often 
considered in terms of the way political systems are organised. For example, 
Haverland (2000) found the pace and quality of implementation of the Packaging 
Waste Directive linked to the number of opposition parties or coalition partners that 
could veto the necessary changes. His data led him to completely reject the fit/misfit 
theory. Peters (2001) in his study on environmental directives included both the 
number of veto players and the extent to which each country’s delegation in Brussels 
is aware of the positions of the domestic veto players during the negotiations on the 
directives. Except in the case of Portugal, he found a strong correlation between 
implementation of the Directives and the combination of few veto players and high 
awareness within delegations. Tightly defined, as in these cases, the concept of veto 
players refers mainly to political parties in government or parliament. 
 
However, in some policy areas, actors such as trade unions, industry groups, even 
civil servants or others have been shown to influence implementation. These groups 
may serve as “norm entrepreneurs” (Börzel & Risse, 2000) or change agents pushing 
for reforms in line with EU policy, or may oppose its implementation. For example, 
a powerful union or industry lobby may serve as a veto player despite not being a 
part of the decision-making bodies of government. The European policy agenda may 
either alter the positions that such domestic actors have on the relevant issues or the 
power they have to influence the outcome of policy reform or implementation 
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processes (Knill, 2001; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2003). Luaces (2002), for example, found 
evidence of this in Spain’s implementation of certain environmental directives. 
Looking at the implementation of two environmental directives, she found that their 
enactment at the EU level forced co-operation among certain public bodies and 
created “participation channels” for NGOs and consumer groups in favour of 
implementation (Luaces, 2002, p. 102). In addition, the use of EU funds dedicated to 
supporting implementation changed the distribution of financial resources among 
regional and central governments also encouraging co-operation and implementation. 
She concludes:  
 
“domestic actors have generally produced effective implementation 
responses when a change in their (usually) non-co-operative strategies 
was likely to result in positive payoffs and improved results for all the 
involved actors. These two case studies suggest that this has only been 
the case when EU economic resources were present, facilitating effective 
and complete implementation responses to the requirements of the 
directives.”(Luaces, 2002, p. 104) 
 
In this example one can see both the EU policy changing the domestic opportunity 
structure by creating previously non-existent avenues of influence for groups in 
favour of change and by changing the positions of potential veto players in different 
layers of governments. Sudbery (2010) similarly found changes in the domestic 
opportunity structure for NGOs in Poland working on gender equality issues, 
whereas McCauley (2011) recently found that the EU context offered potential for 
change, of which not all French NGOs campaigning against GMO wanted or were 
able to make use. 
 
These preference-related explanations are agent-centred ones (Checkel, 1999b), 
whether those agents are political parties in government or opposition, trade unions, 
or event NGOs encouraging reform. Nevertheless, these theories only consider the 
agents’ preferences in relation to EU policy or perhaps related reform processes. The 
extent to which EU policy is implemented depends on the number and influence of 
actors interested in resisting the policy. This leaves out other actions or preferences 
of these actors that are not related to opposition to or support for EU rules and 
norms, but may be integral to the governance of the sector. Could there not be 
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actions taken by political or other actors that impact Europeanization without 
representing a veto or support for anything related to the EU? 
 
2.2.3 Worlds of compliance and beyond transposition 
 
One limitation common to both groups of literature cited above is that the empirical 
studies, upon which the theories are based, generally follow implementation up to the 
point of transposition into domestic legislation. They assess compliance based on 
meeting the deadlines prescribed in EU directives and in some cases, the 
completeness of that transposition. In addition, these studies largely focus on one or 
two related Directives in one or a few Member States. The first large-scale study to 
do otherwise was that of Falkner et al. (2006; 2007; 2005). They looked at 6 
Directives related to EU labour policy in 15 Member States. They compared 
transposition compliance across the sample, but also included interviews with 
stakeholders that provided data about enforcement and other forms of follow up post-
transposition. Their findings clearly challenged the idea that misfit with existing 
policy hinders the transposition of EU rules. They also found only weak correlation 
between compliance and fit/misfit with the existing norms and practices of the 
national administration and nearly no connection with the number of veto players. 
Instead they found it more relevant whether or not people in administrations and 
political veto players had a general desire to comply with the EU than whether the 
policy itself was a good fit or supported by those actors. 
 
The authors constructed a typology of countries based on this characteristic and 
argued that different explanations are valid in each type. They grouped the 15 
countries studied, the Member States before 2004, into clusters that they called 
“worlds” each with a “specific typical pattern of reacting to EU-induced reform 
requirements, hence a specific national culture of appraising and processing 
adaptation requirements” (Falkner et al., 2007, p. 404 emphasis in original). They 
identified three types: the world of law observance, the world of domestic politics, 
and the world of transposition neglect. The key difference among them is the 
“culture of compliance” and general desire to comply with the EU: 
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“In the world of law observance, abiding by EU rules is usually the 
dominant goal in both the administrative and the political systems. The 
same is only true for the administrative system when it comes to the 
world of domestic politics. There, the process can easily be blocked or 
diverted during the phase of political contestation. In the world of 
transposition neglect, by contrast, not even the administration acts in a 
dutiful way when it comes to the implementation of EU Directives. 
Therefore, the political process is typically not even started when it 
should be. It needs to be mentioned, however, that politicians in the 
world of transposition neglect also do not tend to take compliance with 
EU law very seriously – otherwise the bureaucrats could not get away 
with such behaviour, at least in the longer run.” (Falkner et al., 2007, p. 
407) 
 
According to Falkner and her colleagues, the veto player explanation is more useful 
than the fit/misfit theory; however it only works in the world of domestic politics 
where administrations move things forward, but then progress can be halted by 
political veto players. In the world of law observance, any objections to EU policy by 
potential veto players are made irrelevant because of a common culture of 
compliance. They explain that in such cases, the drive to comply over-rides potential 
objections based on policy preferences. Preferences of veto players are made 
irrelevant also in the world of transposition neglect because of the inertia of national 
administrations.  
 
In these cases, according to Falkner and her colleagues, implementation is stalled 
before it gets to the decision-making points where political actors come into play. 
Falkner et al. (2005) also attempted to include enforcement in their large-scale study 
of a number of elements of European social policy, because they argue a distinction 
should be made between transposition and enforcement phases of implementation. 
Relying on information from interviews within ministries and labour inspectorates, 
they were able to identify several cases in which rapid or on time transposition was 
followed by negligent enforcement. This work did two important things to move the 
field forward. Firstly, it showed that non-policy related factors should be considered, 
namely general cultures of compliance and structural characteristics such as the 
capacity or efficiency of administrations. Secondly, it began to generate data on post-
transposition implementation and flags the potential that dutiful transposition does 
not necessarily mean effective enforcement. 
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In an excellent example, Versluis (2007) picked up the call to broaden the concept of 
implementation beyond transposition (Falkner et al., 2006; Mastenbroek, 2005), 
adding enforcement by domestic regulatory authorities and compliance by 
companies in relevant industries to her investigation of the implementation of the 
Safety Data Sheets Directive in four Western European states. In three out of her 
four cases, correct and on time transposition was followed by little enforcement or 
compliance by industry. She explains this by the lack of salience in that the data 
sheets issued never received media attention or were associated with any known 
incident, and she reports that inspectors and industry representatives claimed the data 
sheets regulations did not stand out among all the legislation that had to be 
implemented. According to her, implementation after transposition was weak 
“simply because it is not considered to be important enough” (Versluis, 2007, p. 63). 
This explanation would have to be tested in cases in which the Directives were more 
important or involved in more high profile or controversial subject matter. 
Nevertheless, she demonstrated the fruitfulness of looking beyond transposition into 
the practice of those charged with enforcing EU rules. 
 
Following up on their earlier research, Falkner and Treib (2008) did this when they 
expanded their worlds of compliance typology to the NMS. They looked again at 
labour policy related directives, this time in four of the NMS. They identified a world 
of dead letters (Falkner & Treib, 2008, p. 310) in which the often literal transposition 
of directives is followed by insufficient enforcement. Two explanations they give for 
these post-transposition implementation problems are the lack of individual litigation 
and support for employees from civil society groups such as trade unions. These two 
may be specific to this type of policy; however the authors also cite the lack of 
capacity in the state bodies charged with monitoring and enforcement, as well as 
shortcomings in the judiciary. The latter two explanations could apply to a broad 
range of policy areas or sectors. The Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 with 
Bulgaria and Romania following in 2007 opened up a whole new direction for 
Europeanization research (see Sedelmeier, 2006). It was new for many reasons, 
including the way the accession process was conducted, the sheer number of 
countries involved, and the post-communist or post-socialist heritage of the NMS. 
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2.2.4 External incentives and conditionality 
 
In 1994 Hungary and Poland were the first countries from CEE and SEE to apply for 
EU membership. The others soon followed suit launching a process in which these 
countries were individually assessed in relation to the Copenhagen Criteria and 
compliance with the acquis communautaire, or the body of EU laws. The 2004 
enlargement negotiations have been referred to as “little more than a process of 
checking off a massive and essentially non-negotiable list of EU laws and 
regulations” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005, p. 18). However, because of the political and 
economic conditions of the Copenhagen Criteria, the accession process also involves 
rules and areas over which EU institutions have no formal competencies in Member 
States (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 4). The conditions for entry into the EU are therefore the 
approximation of domestic laws to those of the EU, as well as meeting the more 
abstract political and economic criteria, and these form the basis for the 
“conditionality” of the accession process. The perception of power imbalance 
between the EU and applicant countries is a core aspect of the concept of 
conditionality (Hughes, Sasse, & Gordon, 2004, p. 524), and fundamental to its 
operation are the cost/benefit analysis of domestic actors weighing the benefits of 
membership and costs of being left out against the domestic costs of meeting the 
membership conditions (see Schimmelfennig, Engert, & Knobel, 2003; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). It is essentially a carrot and a stick.   
 
Compliance with the transposition of EU Directives regulations was of course high 
among those states with ambitions of entering the Union. Scholars from the rational 
actor branch of institutionalism explained the variations that did appear among 
countries prior to accession in terms of external incentives, “in particular with the 
credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption” 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 671). They claimed that governments were 
most compliant in terms of transposition when they felt the offer of membership or 
threat of exclusion was most credible and outweighed the domestic costs of adopting 
the EU rules. 
 
Several authors aptly pointed out that in some cases changes required by the EU 
came up against institutional choices or commitments made in the early days of 
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transition (Dimitrova, 2004; Hughes et al., 2004). Drawing on the concept of path 
dependency, they argued that paths taken early on in transition could be either 
enabling or constraining. It was suggested that this weakens any causal relationship 
between compliance and conditionality (Hughes et al., 2004). For example, the 
transposition of the TWFD was among the conditions for the NMS acceding in 2004. 
An argument could be made that the transposition of TWFD in these states was 
enabled where the process of the liberalization of television markets and spread of 
multi-channel services was already underway. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence 
that conditionality mattered during the accession process ending in 2004 at least 
partly because there was significant asymmetry between the EU and the candidates 
(Dimitrova, 2004; Grabbe, 2001, 2006). The veto player explanation fell by the 
wayside because the speed and the pressure of the process were so great. 
Negotiations mostly engaged the executive government empowering them in relation 
to other parts of government and civil society (M.-C. Fontana, 2011), and even pro-
reform civil society groups were largely shut out of the process (Börzel, 2010). The 
cost of staying out of the EU was simply too great (Vachudova, 2007) and therefore 
external incentives to meet the conditions of accession meant transposition 
compliance was high. Nevertheless, further empirical investigation quickly added 
more nuance to this seemingly simple agent-centred explanation. 
 
The volume edited by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) is the most extensive 
and theoretically cohesive collection of empirical studies on Europeanization in 
CEE. It provides a rich body of evidence generally supporting the external incentives 
explanation. The book sets the external incentives explanation against others and 
some of the contributors find that explanations can be complimentary. For example, 
Jacoby (2005) argues that in the early period when EU conditionality was weaker, 
the policy makers in CEE still drew lessons from within the EU. Several of the 
authors found the structure-centred social learning or norms resonance explanations 
mentioned above applicable to the early stages (Andonova, 2005), when 
conditionality is weak (Schwellnus, 2005), or when looking at compliance at 
multiple levels (Epstein, 2005). In a manner similar to Falkner and her colleagues, 
Epstein (2005) and Grabbe (2005) looked closely at lower level implementation of 
EU rules by central bank officials and those charged with border management. Each 
found that Europeanization was not just a matter of officials’ cost/benefit analyses, 
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but also of social learning and an “acceptance of the policy paradigm underlying the 
EU’s rules” (Grabbe, 2005, p. 133). Outside of this volume there was more evidence 
for factors related to fit with domestic norms. 
 
The work of Kelley (2004) on minority policy and Hughes et al. (2004) on regional 
policy argued that normative pressure also plays a role alongside the external 
incentives vs. domestic costs calculations of conditionality. There is, therefore, 
ample evidence that the external incentives model alone does not explain the process 
of Europeanization in CEE and SEE. One group of scholars suggests that alongside 
external incentives there was normative pressure inherent in the accession process, 
while another group argues that through the accession process, social learning took 
place leading to the acceptance or adoption of EU norms and rules. The implications 
of these two explanations are very different. 
 
The conditionality and normative pressure combination would imply that post 
accession the countries in CEE and SEE would revert or perhaps even back track on 
Europeanization (see Dimitrova, 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004), while 
those still involved would continue to Europeanize as long as the potential for 
membership was credible. This has not happened. In terms of transposition of 
Directives and infringement cases the NMS continue to outperform the old ones 
quite remarkably (Knill & Tosun, 2009; Sedelmeier, 2008; Toshkov, 2008). This 
means that even without the carrot of membership these states generally continue to 
comply with EU rules, at least formally. Examining this surprising trend, Sedelmeier 
(2008) concedes that “socialisation” may also have been taking place during the 
accession process. One challenge to the conditionality plus social learning theory 
comes from the evidence from studies such as that of Falkner and Treib (2008), 
described above, demonstrating that in some policy areas there are gaps between 
formal transposition of EU rules and norms and enforcement or implementation at 
lower levels (see also Falkner, 2010). Dimitrova (2007, 2010) has suggested that EU 
regulations may become empty shells in the domestic context. Could this be what 
happened in Slovenia in relation to competition policy in the digital television market 
and resulted in the exit of Norkring and MTG? As Sedelmeier (2008) and Dimitrova 
(2010) suggest, more systematic qualitative research is needed to understand if and 
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why there may be formal compliance, yet deficient application or enforcement. This 
may require some new approaches to Europeanization research. 
 
2.2.5 Europeanization research gaps 
 
Scholars in the field of Europeanization have yet to study the process in relation to 
the media sector and EU media policy. Alison Harcourt has made the most important 
contribution and her findings highlight the limitations of Europeanization research to 
date. In her 2005 book she argued that because of the EU, many Member States were 
forced to allow greater liberalisation than their governments would otherwise have 
chosen (Harcourt, 2005, Ch. 7). Her investigation showed the influence of not just 
EU Directives, but also European Courts of Justice and the Merger Task Force on 
national level media policy. This differed somewhat from what Humphreys had 
found in relation to the telecommunications industry specifically, in which he 
concluded that the EU was only an intervening variable in the face of direct pressure 
from private corporate interests and globalisation (Humphreys, 2002). Both of these 
studies focused on Western Europe, but Harcourt also looked at media policy in 
CEE. She argued that although there were multiple influences on media policy in 
CEE during the 90s, in the end the EU was most influential because of the accession 
process (see Harcourt, 2003a, 2003b). Her findings at this stage supported the 
relevance of EU conditionality to the media sector. However, most recently she 
finds:  
 
“Although European policy models were adopted on paper which include 
provisions of public service broadcasting and subsidies for independent 
and national production, states in Central and Eastern Europe faced 
coercive pressure particularly from the US and the private media not to 
adopt these provisions but to follow a ‘liberal’ market model. The result 
is that although on paper regulatory models resemble those of Western 
Europe, in practice a more liberal market model is operating in these 
states.” (Harcourt, 2012, pp. 152-153)  
 
Though she does not make a connection to the empty shells referred to by Dimitrova, 
Harcourt’s findings point to a discrepancy between the adoption of EU policy “on 
paper” and actual practice in the media sectors in these countries. As I argued above, 
current understanding of the dynamics of Europeanization are limited by the fact that 
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most research has empirically equated the process with on time and correct 
transposition of EU Directives.  
 
Media scholar, Hedwig de Smaele (2004, 2007), in her look at audiovisual media 
policy in the NMS of the 2004 accession, found that these states mainly amended 
their media laws to be compliant with TWFD between 2000 and 2002 in the context 
of the pressure to comply with the acquis. Her evidence supports the arguments of 
Europeanization scholars that conditionality played a role in compliance with the 
transposition of EU policy into law in this period; however, she further suggests that 
due to limited cross-border distribution among these states and small independent 
production sectors, there may be problems with implementation of these laws. 
Ognyanova (2009) ventured past the transposition of EU Directives in her account of 
Europeanization of audiovisual media policy in Bulgaria. Although she does not look 
systematically at enforcement or behaviour of the NRA, she recounts related legal 
changes and some key actions by the NRA claiming that it amounts to an empty shell 
in terms of post-transposition implementation. The extent to which the variables used 
to explain variations in transposition compliance are applicable to the situation 
Harcourt describes or to cases where compliance in law is not matched in practice is 
not yet clear. In the literature cited above, there does seem to be enough evidence 
that both actors or agents and structures should be considered. 
 
Another limitation I mentioned is the narrowness of both agent and structure centred 
factors considered. To some extent this can be seen as a problem of institutional 
determinism. This results from the model of institutional causation used that 
associates institutional variation with policy variation (see Dente et al., 2011, p. 7). 
This limitation may also be a product of the rationalist/constructivist division evident 
in the Europeanization literature, and its empirical focus on transposition records, 
governments and national administrations or civil servants. As actor-centred factors, 
rationalists have focused on the policy preferences of political actors as veto players 
or governments’ strategic decisions in the face of external incentives. This leaves 
little room for the potential role of other actors, including those subject to the 
regulations or provisions contained in EU Directives. The sociological, or 
constructivist institutionalist literature covered here makes a good case for the 
examination of institutional fit. However, in considering the structures against which 
 30 
appropriateness, and therefore fit, is determined, current literature focuses primarily 
on norms, identity and even an overall “culture of compliance” (Falkner et al., 2007) 
or lack thereof. Despite the fact that many of the EU policy areas covered in 
qualitative case studies directly involve specific markets or the economy as a whole, 
conditions of the market or industry in question have barely been touched on. I found 
examples only in the work of Falkner and her colleagues and Versluis. 
 
To what extent can goodness of fit or veto player theories explain Slovenia’s non-
compliance with competition policy and the apparent barriers to an open and 
common terrestrial television market described in the introduction? What does 
Europeanization have to do with the influence of transnational media companies 
highlighted by Harcourt (2012)? As I have just described, Europeanization literature 
so far takes the institutional causality of the EU as a point of departure and explains 
variations in the impact or changes caused by the EU. Europeanization research 
therefore has generated valuable theories about factors that might influence this 
process. However, in order to provide scholars, policy makers and media sector 
stakeholders with a better understanding of what might be accomplished through EU 
policy in the media sector, I argue that it is important to investigate what role the 
Europeanization process has in these national media systems. Media scholars writing 
about the region generally describe and explain the problems they see in media 
governance and media markets. Europeanization is only part of the picture they 
paint, and many of the problems they describe seem to run counter to the rules and 
norms of the EU. I therefore turn to a more in-depth review of the literature on media 
systems in this region to give an overview of the environments in which 
Europeanization may be taking place and draw out some of the challenges their 
findings pose for existing Europeanization theories. 
2.3 Post-Communist Media Systems 
 
The end of communism in Europe brought about rapid change in political, economic 
and social systems, and for some states also in borders, identity and name. This has 
provided a fertile ground for academic study from various disciplines, but I will 
focus on the literature that discusses the changes in the media systems. First, 
however, there is a need for some geographic clarification. The fall of the Berlin 
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Wall and break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia left many new states behind, all of 
which can fall into the category of post-communist states. Karol Jakubowicz in his 
seminal work Rude Awakening, looks at media systems in states from his native 
Poland to Tajikistan. He divides these into two categories based on the factors 
contributing to their transition (see Jakubowicz, 2007b, pp. 98-102) and the political 
system that followed (see ibid. Chapter 5), all of which helps to clarify some of the 
vast differences in the way these countries have developed. However, most of his 
examples, and the work of the other scholars discussed here, cover the countries west 
of the Ural Mountains. I use Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to refer to the region 
from the Baltic States down to Hungary and Romania and from Poland to Russia, not 
including the Caucases or Central Asian republics. By South East Europe (SEE) I 
mean the successor states of the former Yugoslavia plus Albania and Bulgaria. 
 
The literature on post-communist media systems largely deals with CEE states, often 
with the inclusion of Slovenia, which may be because the rest of former Yugoslavia 
spent the first several years after the break-up involved in conflict. The Yugoslav 
experience was different from that of countries in CEE not only because of the 
bloody conflicts, but also because the system in place before the transition was more 
open than those of the Warsaw Pact countries. Yugoslavia was non-aligned and its 
citizens could travel freely. Foreign terrestrial channels were not blocked and in the 
late 1980s some samizdat, self-publishing, collectives were allowed and even 
encouraged, particularly in Slovenia (Bašić-Hrvatin & Milosavljević, 2001). The 
literature on media systems in CEE is still relevant to this study on Slovenia and 
Macedonia for three reasons.  
 
Firstly, as mentioned earlier, neither Macedonia nor Slovenia was deeply involved in 
the Yugoslav wars. Macedonia’s internal violent conflict did not take place until 
2001, was limited in scope, and lasted only a matter of weeks.6 Secondly, in terms of 
broadcasting and audiovisual media, the system from which Slovenia and Macedonia 
emerged was not so different from that of the rest of CEE. The greater degree of 
freedom that could be seen in the print media in the later years of Yugoslavia was not 
                                                 
6
 I do not mean to belittle the events of 2001 in which several people did lose their lives and which did 
have a lasting impact on the political and social fabric of the country. However, it was minimal 
compared to the conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo. It also took place well after the legal 
and institutional basis for the media system was established. 
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present in the broadcasting sector, in which the state held a monopoly. Finally, there 
is the commonality of the EU trajectory. With the exception of Russia, Belarus and 
Moldova, the CEE countries are all now members or at some stage of stabilisation 
and association with the EU. The same goes for the countries of SEE. Therefore, in 
the audiovisual media sector, the experience of moving from a state controlled 
system into the EU in CEE can be quite relevant for the countries of SEE as well. 
 
The literature on post-communist media systems attempts to answer questions about 
what this region is transitioning towards and the role of various factors in this 
transition (Bašić-Hrvatin, Kucić, & Petković, 2004; Downey & Mihelj, 2012; 
Jakubowicz, 2007b; Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008b; Splichal, 1994, 2001). Although 
the term Europeanization is not often used directly by the authors, the role of the EU 
and the accession processes is ever present. Models from Western Europe play a big 
part however they cannot necessarily be equated with the norms and rules of EU 
media policy described in the introduction to this thesis. Scholars from the region 
draw also on endogenous norms and beliefs about how media should be governed 
and operate as they express disappointment in the fact that media systems in the 
region fail to approximate ideal models. These are ideals that most authors 
acknowledge are not necessarily achieved in the West either. There is even criticism 
of some of the basic tenets of EU policy and concern that the common market for 
audiovisual media helps move these media systems farther from that ideal.  
 
Nevertheless, in explanations as to why media systems in CEE and SEE are still very 
far off, domestic political elites have the starring roles. Media scholars offer agent-
centred explanations that involve political elites not as veto players to EU policy, but 
acting on other interests and highly influential in media governance (Jakubowicz, 
2007b; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008; Splichal, 2001). Some authors also place blame on the 
characteristics of the media markets, on the informal rules and culture within the 
sector (Bašić-Hrvatin & Milosavljević, 2001; Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012; Dobek-
Ostrowska & Glowacki, 2008; Downey, 2012; Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008b). These 
could be seen as existing parallel to the similar structure-centred explanations for 
change in national administrations found in the Europeanization literature. 
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2.3.1 Copying from the West, but not quite 
 
One of the key observations of media scholars from CEE is the stark difference 
between the vision that the dissidents and intellectuals behind the overthrow of 
communism had for the media and the situation that followed. Jakubowicz (2007b) 
refers to this vision as the idealistic orientation and describes it as one based on 
communicative empowerment, participation, independence, pluralism, localisation 
and the concept of a “real public media sphere” (pp. 175-176). It was one that grew 
out of the dissident self-publishing culture and valued the “social management” of 
media and media freedom (Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008a, p. 17). Jakubowicz points 
out that it was immediately obvious that the new governments that took over after 
communism were not prepared to fully invest in a participative democratic model. At 
best, he argues “lip service” was paid to some of those ideas, and some formal legal 
guarantees put in place, but reality was very different. 
 
Splichal (1994) was one of the first to systematically lament what he called at the 
time, the Italianisation of media systems in CEE, in which parts of the broadcasting 
system – public and private – were in the control of political parties (see also 
Splichal, 1999). According to him, this occurred through the uncontrolled 
privatisation of broadcasting combined with continued political control of PSB. 
Admitting that this early theory based on the characteristics of one nation-state was 
limited, Splichal (2001) later describes the changes in post-communist systems as 
imitative revolutions. His imitative revolutions idea is similar to what Jakubowicz 
(2004, 2007b, 2008) later describes as a mimetic orientation, however one difference 
can be seen in the way he finds fault with the fundamental principles that are being 
imitated: 
 
“In the ECE [CEE] countries, however, the transition started with an 
abrupt break with the past primarily based on the ideas that were 
revolutionary in the nineteenth century, such as freedom of enterprise, 
private property, freedom of political association, parliamentary 
democracy, and national liberation. The imitative nature of the newly 
emerging systems may represent an immense obstacle to the 
development of more democratic systems in the region.”(Splichal, 2001, 
p. 35) 
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In his critique, he seems to place some of the blame for the situation in CEE media 
systems on the model imported from the West and suggests that new elites should 
have resisted simply adopting the liberal economic model. However he also rightly 
acknowledges the influence of the past. He suggests that CEE countries have been 
uninventive about looking for new models and that has resulted in an imitation of 
both the West and the past. In his breakdown of this imitation, Splichal explains a 
combination of trends. These are: re-nationalisation (from the past), privatisation, 
commercialisation and transnationalisation of the opening of markets (from the 
West), and cross-fertilisation (mostly with Italy) in terms of its rapid and unregulated 
development of private television. Re-nationalisation he describes as the use of the 
strategies of the old regimes for political control of the media, mostly apparent in 
broadcasting but also used in the print press. He argues that this combination has 
resulted in “the establishment of a kind of ‘political capitalism’ and created a system 
of ‘paternalist commercialism’ in the media” in which there is no differentiation 
between the state and the market or between political parties and civil society 
(Splichal, 2001, p. 52). Splichal seems to find that CEE states have simply copied the 
worst from both Western systems and their communist past. It is important to note 
that the processes Splichal describes began before EU accession processes or even 
applications to the EU. 
 
Jakubowicz instead makes a distinction between a mimetic orientation and an 
atavistic orientation. His mimetic orientation refers to copying models from the West 
and he outlines specific aspects of media policy that he argues have been copied: de-
regulation and re-regulation, meaning the abolishing of monopoly in favour of an 
open market and establishment of regulatory bodies; and transformation of the PSB 
including changing its legal status and structure and securing stable financing 
(Jakubowicz, 2007b, p. 177). There are obvious parallels between what Jakubowicz 
describes as being copied from Western European models and the EU media policy 
outlined in the introduction, though he does not connect it specifically with the 
implementation of EU rules and norms. The atavistic orientation he describes is 
rooted in the need that new political elites had to establish themselves and the new 
system. Whereas Splichal argues that new elites copied old control mechanisms 
because they continued to have an “old authoritarian conception of the polity” 
(Splichal, 2001, p. 34), Jakubowicz suggests that new elites maintained existing 
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systems of control because they both felt insecure in their power base and they felt 
they deserved to use the media to support the process of reform (Jakubowicz, 2007b, 
pp. 180-181). The new elites may come from a dissident, freedom-fighting tradition, 
but when faced with the task of governing they decided to keep a hold of some old 
ways of controlling the media.  
 
I suggest there is an important distinction in that Jakubowicz seems to imply that 
new elites may have held a more democratic view of the media, but chose to resist 
changes to old systems of control because of the structural constraints and political 
conditions in which they found themselves (see Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008a, pp. 
22-23). This would point to the strategic behaviour of agents, central to the factors 
impacting Europeanization identified by rational actor institutionalism (for example 
Haverland, 2000; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). On the other hand, Splichal 
seems to find that values and beliefs about the role of the media left over from the 
past made the elites resistant to change. His view is more aligned with the structure-
centred factors elaborated by sociological institutionalists (Börzel & Risse, 2000; 
Checkel, 2001). The difference between these two views has implications for what 
might change the situation that both authors seem to find disappointing. If it is a 
matter of actor-centred strategic choices then change will depend on incentives, costs 
and opportunities. If changing the relationship that political elites have with the 
media depends on altering their values and norms, then social learning or 
socialisation (Checkel, 2001, 2005) is needed. 
 
Two aspects of the new political elites in CEE and SEE further complicate both these 
interpretations of the reasons behind the continuation of old control mechanisms. 
Firstly, Sparks (2008, p. 47) found elite continuity in many CEE countries, meaning 
that a significant portion of the new elite is actually the old elite, and that old 
connections between people in media and politics are often used, particularly for 
things such as getting broadcasting licenses. This perhaps gives credence to 
Splichal’s suggestion that old conceptions of the media were still dominant, while 
undermining Jakubowicz’s idea that new elites chose to reject dissident visions of 
democratic media. Secondly, in some countries a large portion of the new elite is 
neither old elite nor former dissidents with ideas about participatory and social 
management of media.  
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In Slovenia and Macedonia, as well as many other countries in CEE and SEE, those 
currently in power at the time of writing were right-wing nationalists. Although they 
were not part of the old systems of control and ideologically their parties are aligned 
with the neo-liberal free market stance, civil society groups and international 
organisations have accused them of attempts to control the media while in power7. 
There is also the issue that in some of the descriptions of political control tactics used 
by the new elites, there are several that would not have been part of the repertoire of 
the old regime such as the use of regulatory loopholes, state sponsored advertising 
and frequency allocation (see Sükösd & Bajomi-Lázár, 2003, pp. 13-14). This 
complex situation raises questions about the role of agents such as political elites in 
shaping or at least helping to constitute the structures with which EU rules and norms 
might fit or not fit. 
2.3.2 Mimetic approach, both conditional and convenient 
 
Media scholars have not embarked on an exploration of the role of EU conditionality 
per se, but there is ample discussion of the extent to which the countries of CEE and 
SEE had a choice about what they imitated from the West, especially once EU 
accession was underway. Above, I explained how Splichal argues that those forming 
policy and institutions after the fall of communism uncritically accepted certain key 
principles and trends from the West. I also mentioned that Jakubowicz names de-
regulation and PSB transformation as key policies adopted from the West, both of 
which are among the EU norms and rules for the media sector. However, the West 
includes both Western Europe and the US, which have very different media systems. 
As Sparks (1995) describes, there was a period of competition between European 
and US models during which US actors and various European institutions were 
heavily engaged in providing expert assistance and lobbying post-communist 
countries. Harcourt (2003b) studied the involvement of international actors in the 
drafting of broadcasting and media laws in four CEE countries and found that the 
                                                 
7
 For example: Janez Janša was a known dissident and journalist, but came from a position of anti-
communism in favour of Slovenian nationalism and the free market. As will be evidenced in Chapter 
4, his 2004 government still changed the RTV Slovenia law in order to take control of PSB. Nikola 
Gruevski was a liberal economist and his party is aligned with centre-right parties in Europe. His 
government stands accused of using inspections to close down and harass media and using 
government advertising to “buy” media in Macedonia (European Commission, 2011b; OSCE, 2011a, 
2011b). 
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CoE, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), OECD and the EU were instrumental 
in these processes. In the late 1990s and early 2000s when these countries began 
accession and fulfilment of the aquis, the EU became the dominant player. To some 
extent a mimetic approach to media policy was unavoidable once these countries 
decided to join the Union because “thinking outside the EU box was actively 
discouraged” (Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008a, p. 18). However, it was not the only 
factor. 
 
Both Sparks and Harcourt find that the European dual system of having both private 
and public broadcasters also suited the interests of the political elite at the time. For 
one thing, it gave them something to do with the large state broadcasters they 
inherited from the previous regime (Harcourt, 2003b, p. 337). It also suited them that 
the European model was characterised by high government intervention (Sparks, 
1995), and the role of the PSB in the European model allowed for a more atavistic 
approach (see Jakubowicz, 2008). So while there was pressure on post-communist 
countries to imitate Western European systems of media governance and policy and 
they could not resist adoption of EU rules contained in the acquis, the systems they 
mimicked also allowed political elites to resist dismantling some of the old manners 
of control. These findings suggest that Europeanization at this stage was less a matter 
of goodness of fit with existing policy or norms, but instead fit with the instrumental 
needs of the political agents in decision making positions at the time. 
2.3.3 Political parallelism and media systems 
 
It should not be surprising that adoption of the European model allowed political 
elites to continue old mechanisms of control, or, as I suggest, use new ones. Hallin 
and Mancini (2004, 2008) identified similar tendencies in the media systems of 
Southern Europe, classifying them as polarised pluralist media systems. In exploring 
the problems they saw in their countries, scholars in CEE and SEE understandably 
turned to the models of Hallin and Mancini. Polarised pluralist media systems are 
characterised by political parallelism in which the media each represent one of 
several divergent political positions. In such systems “instrumentalization of the 
media by the state, parties and private owners with political ties is relatively 
common” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 139), as well as clientelism and low levels of 
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professionalisation. One of the ways this manifests is in political influence over 
regulators and PSB as it is ensured that the composition of boards and governing 
bodies reflect the parliamentary balance of power (Jakubowicz, 2007a, p. 306). The 
embedded relationships between political parties and the media in polarised pluralist 
systems have implications for Europeanization. For one thing it suggests that the 
domestic opportunity structure may have particular characteristics because of the 
close connection between those charged with implementing policy and those being 
regulated by it. It also could mean that the structures – norms, culture and practices - 
that EU policy confronts at the national level go well beyond those within national 
administrations. 
 
Jakubowicz (2008) in his study of PSB in CEE finds a great deal of similarity 
between the polarised pluralist systems of Southern Europe and those of post-
communist states, particularly the feature of political clientelism. He argues that like 
in the rest of Europe, while the institutional arrangements established in these 
countries for public service broadcasting are similar, they produce different results in 
different countries depending on the political culture. He concludes “the decisive 
element is not the fact of involvement by politicians, e.g. in the appointment of the 
governing bodies of PSB organisations or other relations with them (as this is 
common in all systems), but the quality of that involvement or relations” (emphasis 
in the original Jakubowicz, 2008, p. 108). In another study, Bašić-Hrvatin and 
Petković (2007) examined the history and characteristics of the Slovenian media 
market in relation to Hallin and Mancini’s polarised pluralist model. They find that it 
fit the characteristics of this model, namely political instrumentalism, clientelism and 
weak development of the journalistic profession. Looking at the Polish media 
system, Dobek-Ostrowska (2012) finds it to be a hybrid, but closest to the polarised 
pluralist model. She identified specifically instrumentalisation of the PSB, low levels 
of professionalism, and relationships between media and political elites. According 
to Dobek-Ostrowska (2012, pp. 40-41), the concept of instrumentalisation of the 
media is particularly useful in reference to the media systems of the region and that 
politicians do not see anything improper in this kind of relationship with the media. 
Her claim implies the kind of political influence over media based norms and values 
referred to by Splichal rather than just the strategic motivations of political elites 
described by Jakubowicz discussed above. 
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In expressing their disappointment with the situation in Slovenia, Bašić-Hrvatin and 
Petković (2007) argue that there must be an opposite to the polarised pluralist 
system, one that “should be sought in the media and journalism that are determined 
to serve the public interest, and are capable of developing and promoting the system 
of professional criteria as a defence against the attempts at instrumentalism and 
clientelism” (p. 200). This opposite pole seems to resemble most the democratic 
corporatist model of Northern Europe (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, 2008), in which 
there is a strong role for PSB, developed self-regulation, and professionalism, but it 
also draws on the collectivism and activism of the samizdat (self-publishing) 
tradition of the later communist period in CEE and SEE. Splichal, cited above, 
criticised the adoption of the liberal foundations upon which the EU is based. 
However, achieving the ideal model is still associated with becoming part of the EU 
and closer to Western Europe. Under communism, media were defined solely as 
political, cultural and educational institutions; therefore, Jakubowicz (2007b) argues 
that implementing the EU acquis brings in the “economic and technological 
dimensions” important for a “media industry” (p. 250). Bajomi-Lazar (2008) found 
overall decreases in the intensity of political pressure on the media in countries that 
had become members of the EU. Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008a) claim that the end 
of transition will be “when media of a post-communist country resemble those of 
Western democracies rather than those of a communist state” (p. 25). This means 
that they expect the processes of commercialisation and erosion of the public service 
role of media that are occurring in Western Europe as well, but without the added 
problems they identify as particular to post-communist systems. 
2.3.4 Economic conditions in small states 
 
The literature I have just covered highlights political actors as factors in media 
governance and the state of post-communist media systems. However, as Sparks 
(2012) recently pointed out, political and economic factors are closely intertwined in 
the region because of the specific nature of the transition from a centralised 
economy. His political economy study of CEE states shows “a picture of media 
operating in small and poor markets, where there is intense competition for 
resources” where “it is commonplace for enterprises to seek political support of one 
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kind or another in order to improve their relative competitive position” (p. 59; see 
also CEE country profiles in Terzis, 2007). This suggests that the economic 
constraints of the market may encourage the political parallelism characteristic of the 
polarised pluralist model described above. Downey (2012) argues that the dominant 
position of transnational companies in many of these markets may moderate the 
tendency towards polarised pluralism. He maintains that transnational companies 
initially depend on close contacts with domestic political elites, but then for long 
term commercial reasons try to disentangle themselves to avoid association with any 
one particular political group once they have achieved dominance (Downey, pp. 133-
134). Dominance may be particularly easy to achieve in small markets because as 
Trappel (2011) has argued, they tend towards concentration of ownership and media 
conglomerations. He points out that in CEE this has involved foreign, transnational 
owners such as the Central European Media Enterprise. CME is one of the major 
actors in the Slovenian media market and was a key player in the case described in 
the introduction involving the exit of Norkring and MTG from the terrestrial 
television market that raises questions about the position of transnational companies 
within the domestic opportunity structure. 
 
Many of the countries in CEE and SEE, Slovenia and Macedonia in particular, are 
small states by most accepted definitions (Baehr, 1975; Lowe & Nissen, 2011 in 
relation to media; Maas, 2009; see also Thorallsson & Wivel, 2006 for discussion on 
definition with EU). The characteristics of small states media systems were identified 
in the early 1990s by Trappel (1991), Meier (Meier & Trappel, 1991) and Burgelman 
and Pauwels (1992). They highlight the limitations of having small advertising 
markets and low production capacity. It has also been claimed that media in small 
states are less able to make use of cross-border distribution as their products are not 
attractive to external audiences (de Smaele, 2004, 2007). Puppis (2009) agrees with 
these characterisations, arguing also that though they tend towards interventionist 
approaches to media policy, small states are less able to intervene in the public 
interest than larger countries. This is partly due to the fact that small states are 
limited in their ability to raise funds for PSB through license fees or other levies 
(Picard, 2011). Puppis (2009) further maintains that small states’ media systems are 
more likely to be influenced by the decisions of supranational organisations like the 
EU or larger neighbours. Empirical evidence of this from the region is limited, but 
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Jõesaar’s (2009, 2011) study of the Estonian market supports claims that the 
liberalization of television markets demanded by EU policy exacerbated this 
problem, damaging the PSB and the state’s ability to protect the public interest 
function of the media (see also Wyka, 2009). While Jõesaar provides evidence for 
the challenges in protecting the public interest in small media markets, in light of the 
other characteristics of small state media systems and other potential liberalizing 
influences mentioned above, the link he makes to EU policy seems tenuous. 
 
The work of Sparks, Downey and Trappel suggests that transnational media 
companies may be important or even dominant players in small media systems, but 
the consequences for this in terms of Europeanization are not clear. Puppis and 
Jõesaar seem to suggest that small states will be highly influenced by EU policy and 
that this influence will have negative consequences for the protection of the public 
interest in those media systems. Europeanization scholars discussed above argued 
that one of the ways Europeanization leads to domestic change is by altering the 
domestic opportunity structure (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2003), so do the economic 
limitations and market conditions of these states make them conducive to such 
change and easily influenced by EU policy? In the example of Slovenia’s small 
television market, the outcome did not appear influenced by EU policy, which calls 
for open markets and fair competition; neither did it seem that the domestic actors, 
including one owned by CME, were prepared to allow the redistribution of power or 
resources within the system. 
2.3.5 Complicated environment for Europeanization 
 
The literature on media systems in CEE and SEE seems mainly driven by a need to 
explain the ills or failings that media scholars, mostly from the region, have 
observed. Highly normatively charged, this body of research places Europeanization 
among a group of parallel processes that also includes the transition from state 
controlled systems, globalisation, commercialisation and investment by transnational 
media companies. This makes it difficult to isolate within the literature the role of 
Europeanization as defined at the outset of this thesis. However, it does show that 
Europeanization should be considered in the context of these other processes. In 
addition, these scholars provide evidence of other external influences in media 
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governance in the region such as US bilateral pressure, the OSCE and CoE, and even 
foreign media companies that have achieved dominant positions. Together, these 
seem to make a convincing argument against limiting investigations or 
Europeanization by assuming the EU is the central source of change. 
 
There seems to be agreement among scholars that at least on the surface, i.e. in law 
and institutional arrangements, the countries of CEE and SEE have generally 
mimicked the systems of Western Europe. Nevertheless political parties’ 
maintenance of old systems of control over the media results in what these authors 
see as imperfect imitations. The comparisons to the polarised pluralist model indicate 
that political elites have interests in the audiovisual media sector that have little to do 
with EU policy, but may still have implications for its implementation. At the same 
time, influential private companies including foreign-owned ones may have 
commercial interests that interact with EU policy, although they are not usually 
considered by Europeanization research. These findings from media scholars 
complicate some of the agent-centred explanations for variations in Europeanization 
offered by Europeanization scholars. 
 
Most of the authors mentioned above express some form of disappointment with the 
current state of media systems in the region. Their work tends to come from a highly 
normative position based on strong beliefs in the public service function of media 
and that “media should serve democracy” and provide access to those other than the 
political and economic elites (Splichal, 2001, pp. 52-53). Scholars do not seem 
agreed, however, as to whether or not the problem of political control over the media 
identified by media scholars is rooted in structures such as norms and culture or the 
strategic decisions of political parties. At the same time, the literature surveyed 
above indicates that media policy at the national level is also shaped by material 
conditions of media markets. If structural factors related to size and economic 
conditions are important at the national level, they may also be part of what 
determines institutional fit in the context of Europeanization. However, unlike 
socially constructed norms and values, material conditions are not ones that can be 
changed through social learning or socialisation in case of misfit. 
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2.4 Conclusion  
 
My review of the Europeanization literature shows that much of the work on EU 
policy entering the national sphere has focused on explaining variations in 
implementation, mainly with the transposition of EU Directives (see also review in 
Sedelmeier, 2006). I argue that one of the limitations of this literature stems from the 
fact that much of it assumes that change at the domestic level is caused in some way 
by the EU and looks for factors that explain variations in these changes. This top-
down approach neglects “voluntary adjustments to the EU” that might take place at 
the national level (Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 6). It also risks missing out on non-European 
factors that may provide alternative explanations for change such as the macro-
political environment (Radaelli, 2002). The work of media scholars reviewed here 
indicated that the positions of political elites and the economic conditions in the 
small states of CEE and SEE have crucially shaped their media systems and resulted 
in ones that are highly imperfect imitations of Western European models.  
 
How economic conditions and the positions or relations of market players operating 
the sectors to which EU policy applies interacts with Europeanization has not been 
adequately explored. As I pointed out, Europeanization research has largely ignored 
material conditions such as economic limitations and other aspects of a state’s 
political economy. Europeanization scholars have empirically covered a variety of 
policy areas and sectors; however there has been almost no research into the media 
sector. Audiovisual media and television specifically is important to national culture 
and the “creation of political legitimacy” (Collins, 2002, p. 26) with which the 
governments of newly independent states such as Slovenia and Macedonia would be 
particularly concerned. As Schlesinger (1997) has argued, across Europe “existing, 
state-bounded spaces of national culture, identity and politics remain potent and 
crucially significant” (p. 387). This makes Europeanization in the media sector 
uniquely interesting to examine and such investigation may lead to different findings 
than in other sectors or policy areas.  
 
Nevertheless, Europeanization literature provides several places from which to start 
investigating the role of Europeanization in media governance. The extent of policy 
fit has been shown to be not so relevant to the implementation of EU policy at the 
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national level; however goodness of fit between EU norms and practices and those 
entrenched at the national level appears to be important. The idea of fit/misfit is 
based on the logic of appropriateness, in essence whether or not the implementation 
of EU policy is appropriate to domestic norms and practices. The rational actor 
institutionalists cited here, identify factors based on strategic actors involved in 
policy making and implementation. There was dispute within the literature as to 
whether or not the actual number of potential veto players that might oppose or 
champion EU policy impacts Europeanization. There were convincing arguments 
that the policy preferences of actors matter, particularly where policy is guided more 
by domestic politics than by the technocrats of national administrations. The work of 
Knill and others (Knill, 2001; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2003; Luaces, 2002) indicated that 
one possible role for Europeanization can be in changing the domestic opportunity 
structure for example, by empowering groups whose policy preferences align with 
EU policy. 
 
Divisions within Europeanization studies between rationalists and constructivists, or 
those offering agent-centred and those offering structure-centred explanations, is 
apparent in the literature. However, the literature reviewed here shows that 
empirically, these divisions have not held up. Structure-centred explanations were 
qualified by “mediating factors” (Cowles & Risse, 2001) that involve agents as veto 
points. Agent-centred explanations related to the decisions of political actors in the 
face of the external incentives of EU conditionality were then nuanced by 
“socialization” (Sedelmeier, 2008) or “social learning” (Epstein, 2005; Grabbe, 
2005). There have been calls to integrate rationalist and constructivist approaches 
despite the apparently incompatible assumptions about behaviour, and even claims 
the division is false. Knill and Lenchow (2001b) convincingly argue that the core 
difference between these two branches in the field of Europeanization lies in the 
level of abstraction. This argument bears up when considering the empirical foci of 
the literature reviewed here. When scholars looked at individuals acting within 
national administrations or civil service, they found structures to be important. For 
instance, Epstein (2005) and Grabbe (2005) found social learning of norms or 
Falkner and her colleagues (Falkner et al., 2006) found administrative culture. When 
scholars chose a high level of abstraction for example by looking at transposition 
records (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Sedelmeier, 2008; Toshkov, 2008) or 
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at the behaviour of NGOs (Parau, 2008; Sudbery, 2010), their findings explained 
change in terms of actors behaving strategically according to the logic of expected 
consequences. 
 
The two different perspectives or levels of abstractions nevertheless have different 
implications in terms of the possible role of Europeanization. At the lower level, a 
role for Europeanization would involve approximation of the norms, values and 
practices of individuals involved in media governance with those connected to EU 
audiovisual media policy. At the higher level, Europeanization would take place 
through EU level policy or rules changing or shaping the domestic opportunity 
structure. To continue with the Slovenian example with which this thesis started, the 
key question would be whether the lack of openness and fair competition identified 
in the Slovenian television market was a product of those involved in implementing 
competition policy not sharing those norms, the domestic distribution of power and 
resources being resistant to change, some combination of those, or something 
entirely different. These distinctions are important considering the dissatisfaction 
with the current state of media systems in SEE and CEE expressed by media scholars 
and recent efforts to push the EU to be even more involved in the media sector such 
as the European Citizens Initiative on Media Pluralism. 
 
The top-down research so far has assumed EU impact and identified various factors 
affecting this impact. However with some media scholars, journalists, activists and 
citizens looking to the EU to address problems in the media sector within the region, 
I argue we need to ask broader questions about the role of the EU and its policies in 
this sector. In order to understand the role of Europeanization in the audiovisual 
media sector in SEE, I suggest a bottom-up approach. This is an approach that 
examines the various actors and structures at the domestic level and clarifies more 
fully the role of Europeanization within this complex environment. In the next 
chapter I introduce the concept of governance, which defines the object of study in 
this bottom-up investigation. I also elaborate on the way both structure and agents, or 
appropriateness and expected consequences are engaged in the institutionalist 
conceptual framework used. 
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Chapter 3: A Governance approach to 
Studying Europeanization 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I made the case for research that asks what is the role of 
Europeanization rather than what is the impact of the EU or how can we explain 
differences in the implementation of EU rules, at least for the media sector. I pointed 
out several valuable contributions that Europeanization research has made, but also 
agreed with the argument of Radaelli (Dente et al., 2011; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2008) 
and others that this strain of research can suffer from institutional determinism 
because it is dominated by new institutionalist approaches. However, I argue the 
problem is less in the theories new institutionalist scholars put forward about how 
institutions work and more in the empirical approach of much of the Europeanization 
research to date. These scholars usually start with EU level change and look for 
institutional variables at the domestic level, thereby “ignoring complexity” (Dente et 
al., 2011, p. 11). In reviewing the literature by media scholars about media systems 
in the region, I found reason for my investigation to take a different approach. Media 
scholars paint a complex picture of media systems in CEE and SEE. Various actors 
have specific interests in the media related to political goals, and media systems are 
shaped by these relationships as well as by economic and cultural limitations. I 
claimed that a bottom-up approach to new institutionalist research was needed 
(Radaelli, 2002; see also Radaelli & Pasquier, 2008, pp. 41-44), rather than one that 
started with a particular EU policy and looked down to the national level. This 
presents a challenge in establishing the object of study. The goal of this chapter is to 
establish the conceptual and theoretical approach to my investigation answering the 
question: from where did I look up?  
 
Previous studies that have tried a bottom-up approach to Europeanization research 
have taken as their objects of study NGOs working in a particular policy field (e.g. 
McCauley, 2011; Sudbery, 2010); others have historically tracked policy changes 
over time in relation to specific policy areas (e.g. Parau, 2008; Suurna & Kattel, 
2010). I set as my object of study audiovisual media governance, as defined by a 
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conceptualisation of governance that I will explain in the proceeding pages. This 
investigation examines the governance of Slovenian and Macedonian media systems 
and attempts to isolate the role of EU policy. The term governance is often used in 
relation to the EU mostly as a way of describing what it is or what it does. In media 
studies the term is usually similarly descriptive. However, Puppis (2010) rightly 
argues that the term media governance should not be used as a “catch all” phrase to 
describe new regulatory mechanisms, such as co- and self-regulation (p. 136). He 
suggests that it is an important analytical concept that includes, but also goes beyond, 
statutory rules and encompasses a broad range of formal and informal rules operating 
at multiple levels. As I explain in this chapter, I use governance in an analytical 
capacity based on conceptual work from the broader field of public policy that 
includes both agents and structures. 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed both agent-centred and structure-centred factors 
that scholars have claimed influence Europeanization. One of the problems that I 
identified with most agent-centred factors was that they tend to conceive of domestic 
agents only in relation to their EU policy preferences, either as supporters or 
opposition. I argued that existing structure-centred explanations for variance in EU 
policy implementation focus overly on socially constructed structures such as norms, 
identity and culture, while media scholars point to material conditions as significant 
constraints on media policy for states like Slovenia and Macedonia. There is 
potential within new institutionalism for the exploration of both structure and 
agency, especially if an investigation operates at multiple levels of abstraction (Knill 
& Lenchow, 2001b). Here I further develop two theories about how institutions 
function: institutional fit and opportunity structure. Though I argue these too merit 
refinement, I suggest that using them in an examination of governance can bring in 
the complexity and breadth needed. 
 
In this chapter, I first look at governance as an analytical concept and how public 
policy and media scholars have defined it. Then I go into more detail on the social-
political governance perspective presented by Jan Kooiman (2003), which I find 
most appropriate. I argue that his model provides a clear conceptualisation of 
governance, one that includes structures and agents that he refers to as actors. 
Kooiman’s model therefore, establishes the object of my investigation at the 
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conceptual level. In the second section of this chapter, I discuss institutional fit and 
opportunity structure. I play particular attention to how these theories might account 
for the material conditions and various actors identified as typical of media systems 
in SEE. 
3.2 Governance: What is it? 
 
The term governance has its roots in economics and political science, but much of 
the conceptual work on governance comes from scholarly work in the areas of public 
policy and public administration (e.g. see Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997, 2000; Rhodes, 
2003; C. Scott, 2004). Uses range from the purely descriptive to the highly 
normative. In relation to the EU, scholars talk about multi-level governance and new 
governance and engage in debates about issues of legitimacy, accountability and the 
EU’s democratic deficit. Media scholars have also taken up the term governance in a 
manner that echoes these discussions. In this section, I first cover the use of 
governance in general and then look at media governance in particular, highlighting 
models by McQuail (2005) and Puppis (2007, 2010). I then elaborate Kooiman’s 
(2003) conceptual model of governance and apply it to the media sector. 
3.2.1 Multi-level and “new” governance 
 
The use of the term governance has been linked to a gradual change from the 
absolute power of the state to broader arrangements that include both the 
involvement of supranational institutions or arrangements and national level 
independent agencies or private entities. Scholars have yet to agree on a definition of 
governance, or reach consensus on the set of phenomena that might constitute it (A. 
Jordan, Wurzel, & Zito, 2005). The broadest definition comes from Pierre and Peters 
(2000), for whom the term governance covers the “whole range of institutions and 
relationships involved in the process of governing” (p. 1). Whereas others make 
specific reference to the actors involved, Rhodes (1997; see also 2000; 2003, p. 1) 
describes the hollowing out of the state, which has resulted in a concept that “blurs 
the distinction between the state and civil society” (1997, p. 57). In Rhodes’ view 
this leaves only “a collection of inter-organisational networks made up of 
governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer or regulate” 
(ibid. ). For Kohler-Koch and Ritberger (2006) “governance can be considered both a 
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process and a state whereby public and private actors engage in the intentional 
regulation of societal relationships and conflicts” (p. 28). A more structure-centred 
definition can be found in that of Scott (2004), who refers to the “post-regulatory 
state” and a shift from state laws to the “wider range of norms, institutions and 
processes” (p. 46) that exert some kind of control. These uses seem limited to 
describing various non-authoritarian systems in which a certain number of public 
functions are not exclusively in the hands of a central government. However, a few 
qualifiers on the term governance give it a more analytical character, particularly in 
relation to the EU. 
 
The EU is often considered one of the levels of multi-level governance, a term made 
popular in European studies by Hooghe and Marks in the mid-nineties (Hix, 1998; 
Hooghe, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996). Within 
systems of multi-level governance, decisions are made by actors at several levels – 
global, European, national, local – rather than monopolised by national governments 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2001, p. 3). The EU is one of those actors, as are national 
governments, but also civil society organisations and various independent regulatory 
agencies. There is not space here to go into detail about the concept (for more see 
Bache & Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010), but I introduce it because it purports that 
within Europe, agents at these various levels, including non-state actors, can interact 
with each other directly and not necessarily in a hierarchical manner. This is a 
contrast to the state-centric or inter-governmental approaches to the EU that ignore 
actors outside of formal government frameworks (S. George, 2004, p. 10 in 
electronic version; Van den Berg, 2011, p. 17). Multi-level governance describes, for 
example, how national regulatory authorities (NRAs) or industry self-regulatory 
bodies at the national level can also have direct interaction with the numerous 
committees of the EU or European Parliament and with the Commission and 
influence decision-making. 
 
The reliance on non-state actors, such as self-regulatory bodies created by the private 
sector or NRAs, is often referred to as new governance (Hix, 1998) or the use of new 
modes of governance. It creates democratic dilemmas about accountability and 
oversight (King, 2007, p. 90) because they are sheltered from scrutiny by any 
publicly elected body (see aslo Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2011). Some find such 
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mechanisms to be more flexible and open to stakeholder participation (Borrás & 
Ejrnæs, 2011; Mosher & Trubek, 2003). For others the fact that decisions are made 
by bodies not directly held accountable through elected representation, such as 
national NRAs or even the EC is cause for concern (Føllesdal, 2011; Føllesdal & 
Hix, 2006). Referring to it as “soft” governance, Harcourt (2008) finds that for the 
audiovisual media sector within the EU, the use of EU level committees and co-
ordination among NRAs on regulatory practice is widespread and lacking in 
“transparency, legitimacy and democratic input” (p. 23). Splichal (2009) argues that 
because public tasks and decision-making have been transferred to non-state actors, 
“issues previously subject to formal political scrutiny by more or less representative 
political bodies are relegated to market driven regulation” (p. 397). The democratic 
deficit he describes is not just a matter of legitimacy of the mechanisms of 
governance, but also about the protection of the public interest, something that 
market regulation alone might not provide. Mechanisms of new governance such as 
voluntary standards and NRAs are common in the media sector, along with all the 
democratic dilemmas that accompany them. For example, in the case of Norkring 
investment in the digital terrestrial televisions network in Slovenia and its problems 
with competition from the PSB network, the Agency for Post and Electronic 
Communications (APEK) had decision-making responsibilities in several instances. 
However, this thesis will show that several conditions influenced APEK’s role in that 
case towards its eventual conclusion, and that there were issues with how it was 
designed that could be considered contributors to a democratic deficit in media 
regulation in that country. 
3.2.2 Media governance 
 
Along the lines of Scott’s definition above, media scholar Denis McQuail (2005) 
defines governance as “the overall set of laws, regulations, rules and conventions 
which serve the purpose of control in the general interest,” and points out that this 
refers “not only to formal and binding rules, but also to numerous informal 
mechanisms, internal and external to the media, by which they are ‘steered’ towards 
multiple (and often inconsistent) objectives” (p. 234). McQuail maps elements of 
governance in two dimensions, external-internal and formal-informal. His map 
includes actors, such as state regulatory bodies, the management of individual media, 
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as well as lobby groups, which would be from the civil society (McQuail, 2005, p. 
235). It also includes elements such as codes of ethics, organisational culture, public 
opinion and professionalism. These can be seen to mirror some of the structures that 
Europeanization research identifies as factors in the implementation of EU policy. 
McQuail creates a useful typology of forms of governance shown below, but I find 
most interesting that he includes “market forces” as an informal external form of 
governance. Referring to them as structures, he suggests that the level of competition 
and ownership have some function in accountability (McQuail, 2005: chapter 8), but 
regrettably does not develop the role of market conditions in governance or consider 
other structural characteristics of the market. I argue that this is an area worth 
exploring in more depth. Although market players are considered as non-state actors 
that may influence policy and regulation in the discussions of governance and 
accountability or legitimacy described above, the conditions and characteristics of 
markets are neglected. 
 
Figure 3.1 The main forms of media governance 
 
Source: "figure 9.2 the main forms of media governance in McQuail 2005, p. 234 
 
Puppis (2010) provides a slightly different map of media governance, which he 
defines as “the entirety of forms of rules that aim to organise media systems” (p. 
138, italics in the original). He presents an integrated view on rules that includes 
what he calls collective and organisational rules. He maps them in terms of whether 
their scope is the society or industry as a whole or only the media organisation, and 
whether they are implemented inside or outside the media organisation. Although the 
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inside/outside distinction in his map mirrors McQuail’s external and internal 
categories, the dimension that Puppis adds is in distinguishing between rules that 
apply at an industry level and those that only apply to an organisation. According to 
Puppis, collective rules include both statutory regulation from the state and 
supranational levels and self- or co-regulatory arrangements within the industry such 
as press councils or similar. Organisational rules are those that apply only within an 
organisation such as internal codes of conduct and complaints boards or ombudsmen. 
Puppis’ model (2007, 2010) also looks at governance in a manner that is useful for 
identifying the different actors within a multi-level governance environment by 
placing the various levels in relation to state government. The figure below illustrates 
this model using the case of Macedonia: 
 
Figure 3. 2 Media governance in Macedonia as extensions of government 
 
Source: Based on "Figure 1 Media governance as horizontal and vertical extensions of government” in Puppis, 
2007, p. 331 
 
Though it is useful in multi-level context, the weakness of Puppis’ model is in the 
idea that other actors are “extensions” from government. One could easily argue that 
self-regulatory bodies extend from the market, albeit sometimes under threat of state 
regulation. This model seems to represent a hierarchical model of multi-level 
governance rather than the interconnected one of Hooghe and Marks (2001). While it 
may work for the formal institutions connected to the state, it fails to represent 
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informal rules or market initiated mechanisms. There is also no place for the market 
structures to which McQuail alludes.  
 
In casting his version of governance as an analytical concept, Puppis highlights the 
fact that the concept of media governance is also a normative one. It is this normative 
aspect of a media governance concept that Puppis argues “allows for criticizing 
shortcomings of existing rules and generating ideas for improvement” (Puppis, 2010, 
p. 145). However, he also points out that mostly the normative assumptions of 
governance remain undisclosed, which can lead to problematic conclusions regarding 
the extent to which governance structures are in the public interest. I suggest that it is 
not so much that the normative assumptions remain undisclosed as that they may be 
changing or under negotiation, for instance as part of the social learning or adoption 
of EU norms. This makes these normative dilemmas critical parts of an analytical 
concept of governance, and makes it important to examine the interactions through 
which they may be negotiated. 
 
Hamelink and Nordenstreng (2007) argue that communications rights, such as those 
contained in Article 19 of the Declaration of Human Rights, are fundamental to the 
norms of media governance. They further contend that civil society has a key role to 
play in advocating for these rights and protecting them within a media system . For 
Meier (2008), the accountability of individual media organisations to the public is an 
aspect of media governance. Drawing upon experience from corporate governance 
with transparency and cooperation with stakeholders, he sees engagement with civil 
society as one of the ways media can be accountable to their stakeholder, the public 
(Meier, 2008, p. 194). Meier suggests there is also direct interaction between civil 
society actors and actors in the market to hold them accountable to the public 
interest. Following this line with the Slovenian example, this would mean that 
observing behaviour from market players resulting in unfair competition with 
potentially detrimental consequences for the public in terms of media pluralism and 
inaction by the NRA, there should have been a reaction from civil society actors in 
Slovenia to hold those other actors to account. In later chapters this thesis will show 
the reasons why such a reaction was not happening in this case and the limitations on 
such engagement from civil society in Slovenia. 
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The literature on governance and EU governance is vast and I may not have done it 
justice here in this humble review. However the goal here was not to provide a 
thorough critique of the literature on governance, but to introduce the concept and 
some of the assumptions that define it as an object of study. Investigating governance 
means looking at all of the different actors, including those in state bodies and the 
market as well as other actors and at the formal and informal rules and practices of 
their interaction. Within governance, norms are not just variables that may impact 
policy implementation or may be changed through social learning. They are points of 
tension among the actors that also serve to define the roles that they play, such as in 
the manner Meier suggests above. While the models of media governance I 
presented are useful, I have also pointed out some of their limitations. Therefore, I 
will now explain a conceptualisation of governance that can provide the kind of 
“analytical precision” needed to take the concept into the empirical world (A. Jordan 
et al., 2005), and gives form to this investigation. 
3.2.3 The Interactions of Governance 
 
There are many options from where to draw more detailed conceptualisations of 
governance. Some scholars talk about modes of governance (see for example Héritier 
& Lehmkuhl, 2008; Treib, Bähr, & Falkner, 2007), while others about networked 
governance (A. Jordan & Schout, 2006; Stoker, 1998). I have been talking so far 
about agent-centred and structure-centred factors, and about actors and structures. In 
my review of literature from Europeanization and media scholars, I demonstrated 
that that there is evidence from existing literature that both should be considered. I 
also pointed out that among those actors and structures and those originating from 
within the market, in this case the one of audiovisual media, may have a role. I 
argued that existing models of media governance do not adequately account for the 
role of market conditions and market players, and therefore I chose a 
conceptualisation of governance that I determined could do so. Here the work of 
Kooiman (2003), seems most useful, and therefore I will devote some space to 
further elaboration on his ideas. 
 
Kooiman first describes governance as “the totality of theoretical conceptions on 
governing” which he defines:  
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“Governing can be considered as the totality of interactions, in which 
public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal 
problems or creating societal opportunities; attending to the institutions 
as contexts for these governing interactions; and establishing a normative 
foundation for all these activities.” (2003, p. 4) 
 
In what he calls social-political governance or interactive governance the concept of 
interaction has a central place. In his models he describes the actors, interactions, 
elements and modes of governance. As this is a rather complex arrangement, I will 
concentrate on the interactions at the heart of his model. Kooiman gives three 
categories of elements: images, instruments and actions. He also delineates three 
modes of governance: self-governance, co-governance and hierarchy. However, 
there are many different types of elements within those categories and much detail 
on the modes. Both elements and modes are locations of interactions. As my purpose 
here is not to re-tell his entire work, but to set the boundaries for my own bottom-up 
investigation, I focus on the interactions. 
 
Kooiman (2003) establishes three categories of actors: the state, the market and civil 
society. Since he equates the state with “a public task” (Kooiman, 2003, p. 5) rather 
than necessarily with a national government, this category also includes 
supranational institutions charged with public functions such as the EU. However it 
is the interactions among them, which he maintains provide insight into the dynamics 
and complexity of society. Kooiman’s (2003) interactions are mutually influencing 
relations (for an overview of interactions see pp. 19-24). He identifies three types of 
interactions. Interferences amount to the processes and procedures of daily life. 
Interplays are the relations and negotiations between individuals or organisations. 
The most formalised form of interactions are interventions such as rules and 
regulations, but also embedded social relations or resources. This way of thinking 
about interactions therefore includes ones originating from the agency of the actors 
as well as “the cultural, material and power conditions that constrain and enable the 
intentional or actor level interactions” (Kooiman, 2003, p. 16). These conditions are 
the structural interactions of governance. For example, an intentional interaction 
could be a rule or decision taken by a state body within a hierarchical mode of 
governance, while a structural interaction could be the “embedded” or “pre-
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existing” social relations among firms or organisations as part of self- or co-
regulation modes. The diagram below is an attempt to illustrate with examples, what 
might be found in the media sector in any given country:  
 
Figure 3.3 Illustration of actors and interactions with examples 
 
Source: by the author based on Kooiman 2003 
 
 
The three types of interactions occur among and within the state, the market and civil 
society. Intentional interactions drawing on the agency of those involved can be, 
according to Kooiman, formal interventions such as a law made by the state, or more 
horizontal interplays such as the establishment of professional associations or 
industry groups. At the levels of interventions and interplays on the other side of the 
diagram are structures that “constrain or enable” (Kooiman, 2003, p. 16) such as the 
tax base available to provide subsidies or funding for PSB, or the size of the 
advertising market. One would also locate the power dynamics among market 
players in relation to each other and to civil society or the state. If one thinks of 
Kooiman’s interaction in relation to the levels of abstraction described by Knill and 
Lenchow (2001b), these would be subjects of study at a higher level of abstraction. 
At a lower level of abstraction, could be considered the interferences of everyday life 
or business, such as the process of a station registering changes to its format with the 
NRA or advertisers making a contract with a broadcaster. Structural interferences 
come at the level of the everyday and can be things such as the professional culture 
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within the NRA or the internal culture of media organisations. Thinking of media 
governance in terms of both structural and intentional interactions allows one to 
examine at more than one level of abstraction. Interactions involve the values, 
identities and practices of the individuals within the organisations of the state, the 
market and civil society. They also occur among the NGOs, media companies and 
NRAs. This conceptualisation of governance, I suggest, sets out a clear place to start 
clarifying the role of Europeanization in the media sectors in Slovenia and 
Macedonia. 
3.2.4 Governance in the context of Europeanization in SEE media systems  
 
I explained at the outset that my strategy was to use a new institutionalist theoretical 
framework within a governance approach. I argued that as opposed to a purely 
institutionalist approach, using governance to define the conceptual starting point for 
a bottom-up investigation can provide an “organizing perspective” and “a language 
through which to identify key features of a complex reality” (Stoker, 1998, p. 27). In 
relation to Europe in particular governance has been qualified as multi-level and new. 
This means interactions can occur at local, national, European and global levels and 
not necessarily hierarchically. Governance includes new mechanisms such as IRA’s, 
voluntary industry standards and others. Kooiman’s (2003) social-political 
governance successfully provides a conceptual scheme of governance. His 
perspective captures the “whole range of institutions and relationships” (Pierre & 
Peters, 2000, p. 1) of governance. Defining governance in this way includes state 
bodies, political organisations, private companies and other actors at a higher level of 
abstraction that one finds in actor-centred factors in Europeanization. It also offers a 
potential location for normative negotiations and changes in culture or values, such 
as those that may be taking place during the kind of socialisation described by 
Europeanization scholars. 
 
It has been suggested that sociological institutionalism in particular, could be useful 
for looking at media governance at the empirical level (Puppis, 2010). However, as I 
demonstrated in my critique of the literature in the previous chapter, reliance on this 
branch of institutionalism alone risks over-emphasising structure (Schmidt, 2008). 
Instead, I combine theories about how institutions work from both sociological and 
 58 
rational choice institutionalism following the work of Knill and Lenchow (2001b) 
who argue that structure-based and agent-based institutionalism can be combined in 
a complementary way. In the next section, I explain the two institutionalist theories 
that provided the framework for this investigation of Europeanization in media 
governance. 
3.3 New Institutionalism as a Theoretical Framework 
 
Institutionalism is commonly used in comparative politics and public policy studies, 
but can also be found in the work of economists, anthropologists and other social 
scientists. It has been defined generally as “a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses 
concerning the relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, 
performance and change” (March & Olsen, 2005, p. 4). New institutionalism 
developed as a reaction to the overemphasis in “old” institutionalism on law and the 
organs of government and on how these structures shape behaviour (Dente et al., 
2011). Since its beginnings in the 1980s, three main strands have emerged in the 
field of public policy and governance. Although recent work by Schmidt (2008, 
2010) proposes a fourth discursive strand, there are usually considered to be three 
main strands of new institutionalism: rational choice, historical and sociological 
(sometimes referred to as organisational or constructivist). 
 
These three forms of new institutionalism share the theory that institutions, once 
created, have a life of their own (P. Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pollack, 1996), however 
they differ in terms of their starting theories about how institutions work. Another 
difference can be seen in the epistemological and ontological approaches of the three 
strands. As Aspinwall and Schneider (2000) point out, rational choice 
institutionalism relies on deductive strategies, often making use of cross country 
comparisons of quantitative data, whereas scholars from the historical and 
sociological branches, tend towards inductively searching for patterns through case 
studies. Ontologically, a difference can be seen in the assumptions made about 
institutions and behaviour. Rationalist institutionalist scholars view institutions as 
intervening variables between the preferences of agents and outcomes (Pollack, 
1996, p. 431). Created by agents through bargaining or selection they provide a 
“situative constraint” (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p. 7) on the consequences 
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actors can expect from their decisions or behaviour. On the other hand, those 
adhering to sociological, sometimes called constructivist, institutionalism view 
agents and institutions as co-determining (p. 3). As March and Olsen (1998) explain, 
within sociological institutionalism “an ‘institution’ can be viewed as a relatively 
stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific 
groups of actors in specific situations” (p. 948). These institutions are considered to 
be “embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation” (ibid.), or in 
other words socially constructed. Historical institutionalism has justifiably been 
described as “borrowing somewhat eclectically” from both of the other two with a 
particular focus on history (Knill & Lenchow, 2001b, p. 189). Some scholars have 
argued that the historical branch is compatible and shares fundamental tenets with 
the rationalists (e.g. Pollack, 1996), while others have grouped it with the 
sociological branch (e.g. Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000). 
 
Instead of focusing on ontological differences, Knill and Lenchow (2001b) suggest 
that a more useful distinction can be made between agency-based and structure-
based approaches to institutionalism, as I have made in chapter 1 in reviewing the 
explanations generated by Europeanization research. Their key argument is that the 
divisions within the field have been due more to differences in the level of 
abstraction at which investigators are operating than their ontological difference. As I 
pointed out in the previous chapter, one can see that scholars examining the 
behaviour of individuals working within national administrations or other 
organisations seemed to arrive at structure-centred factors impacting 
Europeanization, while those looking at the behaviour of governments, political 
parties and other organisations tended to arrive at agent-centred factors. Knill and 
Lenchow (2001b) argue that harsh divisions between branches of institutionalism are 
false, and that distinguishing along the lines of agency and structure allows for 
linking in a complementary way. Bearing in mind that the intentional, or agent-
driven, and structural governance interactions are mutually influencing (Kooiman, 
2003, p. 13), I argue that such synthesis is required in a study of governance. After 
explaining why the historical institutionalist idea of path dependency is not suitable 
to an investigation of governance, I elaborate more thoroughly two theories that I 
have already introduced briefly in the previous chapter as institutional fit and 
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opportunity structure. I close this section by reinforcing my argument for synthesis 
between actor-centred and structure-centred explanations. 
3.3.1 Institutional fit 
 
Historical institutionalism defines institutions as the “formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organization structure of the polity 
or political economy” (P. Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 938). According to historical 
institutionalist theory, events or decisions made in certain moments in time create 
institutions that then constrain possibilities from that point forward (Bulmer, 2007, p. 
50). Theories from historical institutionalism suggest that critical junctures in the 
form of key interventions or historical events can create path dependence, 
constraining the behaviour or decisions of actors. Literature in this field refers to 
feedback effects (K. Thelen, 1999) or increasing returns (Pierson, 2000) as forming 
the basis of a process in which patterns or practices are reinforced and virtually 
unchangeable into the future (see also Pierson, 2004; K. A. Thelen & Steinmo, 
1992). Path dependency theory has been rightly criticised for being able to explain 
stability, but not being able to account for various types of change, particularly 
gradual change (Gorges, 2001; B. G. Peters, Pierre, & King, 2005). This makes it 
problematic for examining governance. Within governance, change can occur by the 
intention of the actors, and therefore institutions can also be shaped by action in an 
interactive manner (Kooiman, 2003, p. 16).8 
 
The theory that domestic level response to EU level policy or change depends on 
institutional fit comes from sociological institutionalism. Sociological 
institutionalism adds to the definition of institutions used by the historical branch by 
including the “symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates” involved in 
meaning production for the individuals involved (P. Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947). In 
sociological institutionalism, culture and legitimacy are both highly important and 
influence human behaviour (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000). As I mentioned above, 
according to Kooiman, cultural conditions are key structures that constrain 
governance interactions. The basis for the idea of institutional fit is the logic of 
                                                 
8 Kooiman’s idea of structure is based on Giddens’ work and structuration theory; however as there is 
not space here to delve into a long discussion of structure, I simply remind the reader of the definition 
used above of structure as the material, social, cultural and power context. 
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appropriateness, a term coined by March and Olsen (2004; 1998). They maintain 
that action is often matched with one’s concept of self, identity and perceived role 
within a specific situation rather than necessarily with interests or strategy. If there is 
significant “misfit”, there is potential for change in response to EU policy or EU 
level change (Börzel & Risse, 2003; see also Cowles et al., 2001) or there could be 
resistance to that change. 
 
The institutional fit theory has been critiqued for a tendency to “anthropomorphize 
norms, identities or ideas, and allow them to operate in direct relation to each other, 
without the intervention of actors or the mediation of social structures” (Jenson & 
Mérand, 2010, p. 79). This critique is misplaced as the theory of institutional fit does 
not pit norm against norm or identity against identity, but addresses how the 
appropriateness of decisions or behaviour connected with the implementation of EU 
rules and norms is decided by individuals based on their context. Socially 
constructed norms and identity figure highly in much of the research supporting the 
theory of institutional fit (e.g. Checkel, 2001; Risse, 2005), and these scholars argue 
that domestic level change in response to the EU occurs “through a socialization and 
collective learning process resulting in norm internalization and the development of 
new identities” (Börzel & Risse, 2003, p. 59; see also Checkel, 2005). I argue that 
this represents a limited view of the structures that may be included in considerations 
of appropriateness. 
 
Knill has argued that established practice as well as embedded arrangements within 
the sector are key factors in domestic adaptation to EU policy (Knill, 1997). He 
explains that there can be relationships or practices that can exist that have become 
established or embedded within and among organisations. These can be the “ways of 
doing things” or administrative style of these organisations (see Knill, 2001). Hille 
and Knill (2006) have more recently argued that institutional fit with administrative 
style is less relevant to the NMS because their national administrations are already in 
a transition phase. They argue: 
 
“We can hardly expect administrative traditions in the sense of well-
established administrative styles and structures to be of explanatory 
relevance because these traditions themselves are subject to fundamental 
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changes in the context of the transformation process.” (Hille & Knill, 
2006, p. 540 ) 
 
However it seems that what they now refer to as the quality of the bureaucracy 
represents a combination of administrative style and established relationships and 
practices. Several of the media scholars cited in the previous chapter argued 
convincingly that many of the practices or styles of the past have carried on into the 
present within the audiovisual media sector. The degree of persistence of old “ways 
of doing things” might have implications for how appropriateness is determined by 
individuals in the media sectors. For example, in previous research on PSB in 
Slovenia and Macedonia I found that in Macedonia’s PSB editorial positions were 
still granted according to political party loyalty (Broughton Micova, 2012). This 
could be a source of misfit with the implementation of the EU’s policy towards PSB 
and the use of state aid, which requires independence of PSB from political control 
(see European Commission, 2009a). 
 
In summary, institutional fit has consequences for Europeanization in that the 
implementation of EU rules and norms is influenced by the way individuals judge 
the implementation’s appropriateness. They make these judgments based on the 
structures that form their context, rules and practices. Constructivist scholars have 
rooted these rules and practices in norms and identity (Checkel, 1999a, 2001), and 
Knill (Knill, 1997, 2001; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999) has described them in terms of 
administrative style and how embedded relationships form the “ways of doing 
things”. What appears to be missing in these accounts of structures are the material 
conditions cited by Kooiman (2003) as constraining governance interactions and 
considered important by several of the media scholars discussed in the previous 
chapter (e.g. Picard, 2011; Puppis, 2009). March and Olsen (1998), who first 
proposed the logic of appropriateness, themselves stated that “practices and rules are 
also embedded in resources and the principles of their allocation that make it 
possible for individuals to enact roles in an appropriate way” (p. 948). The literature 
to date has neglected material conditions among the structures behind institutional fit 
or misfit, but as contributors to the assessment of appropriateness, they can be 
included and the theory remains useful in considering how the structural interactions 
of governance may operate. 
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One important critique of this theory is that it undermines the notion of human 
agency. Schmidt (2008, 2010) has criticised the sociological approaches along this 
line for over-emphasising structures or structural determinism. However, this has 
been a problem of deductive research projects that seek to arrive at causal effects and 
treat norms as constructed variables (Jenson & Mérand, 2010). As Aspinwall and 
Schneider (2000) point out, “agent and structure are inextricably bound together – 
the actions of agents are impossible to comprehend without reference to the 
cognitive, culturally-informed ‘institutions’ within which they exist” (p. 9). This 
does not mean that individuals have no agency, but that actions are “context driven” 
(ibid., p. 7) and contexts can change. However the mutability of structures can vary. 
 
Through socialisation or other processes individuals can change their perceptions of 
identity and norms (Checkel, 2001, 2005). Relationships that have become 
established or formal and informal rules that are integrated into the daily practice of 
public administration can also be influenced by human action. Like norms and 
culture, which can be learned or adapted, they are mutable in the course of 
interactions. Material conditions such as population size and economic 
characteristics are not socially constructed and therefore maybe less possible to 
change. Unlike the notion of path dependency that allows only for change as a result 
of exogenous extreme events, the theory of institutional fit can help explain various 
kinds and speeds of change – such as Europeanization  – through interactions 
between agents and structures. However, I suggest the kinds of structures upon 
which appropriateness is based have implications for potential change and the role of 
Europeanization. Therefore, this thesis examines the various structures cited in the 
literature as pertaining to institutional fit as well as material conditions. 
3.3.2 Opportunity structure 
 
Within the overarching categories of state, civil society and the market, there are 
multiple organisations, agencies, companies, and individuals engaged in the 
interactions of governance. As I explained above, within Europe, they operate at 
multiple levels and usually include new mechanisms such as NRA’s and self-
regulatory bodies. They engage in intentional interactions such as the creation of 
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rules and procedures, which are considered institutions by rational choice 
institutionalism. Actors create such institutions in order to realise some value in 
relation to their strategic goals, but at the same time such institutions act as an 
opportunity structure that then constrains the behaviour of all actors (Knill & 
Lenchow, 2001b, p. 195). The opportunity structure theory provides actor-centred or 
agency-based explanations for change and is rooted in the logic of expected 
consequences (March & Olsen, 1998, p. 949) (see also Börzel & Risse, 2003; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). As actors engage in strategic interactions 
based on their preferences, “institutions structure such interactions by affecting the 
range and sequence of alternatives on the choice-agenda or by providing information 
and enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about the corresponding 
behaviour of others” (P. Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 945). Conditions of the opportunity 
structure may also constrain their capacity to take action or power to influence the 
decisions of others. The domestic opportunity structure refers essentially to “the 
distribution of power and resources” (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2003, p. 268) among actors 
that constrains their strategic decisions. 
 
As an example, I return to the Slovenian digital terrestrial television case. Unlike in 
the rest of the region, the law establishing Radio Television Slovenia (RTVSLO) did 
not divest it of its links and transmissions division, responsible for the network 
operation, nor did any successive government choose to take that step. A decade and 
a half later, this gave the broadcaster significant material resources and power when 
time came for digital switchover. Lawmakers then granted RTVSLO its own MUX 
through the digital switchover law for the broadcast of its channels and failed to 
specify what it could do with the remaining capacity (Milosavljević & Smokvina, 
2012; Republic of Slovenia, 2007). The rules granted RTVSLO certain resources at 
the start of the process, and impacted the broadcaster’s strategic choices. They also 
constrained the decisions of commercial broadcasters in terms of their transmission 
options, and the outcomes that Norkring, the operator of the commercial network, 
could expect. 
 
Interactions that might create change are impacted not only by the preferences of the 
actors, but the alternatives they see, their expectations of outcomes, and the 
opportunity they may have to affect or prevent change. As Radaelli (2000) explains, 
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“it all hinges on who is empowered and disempowered (and how)” (p. 123). 
Opportunity structures can change and one of the questions that can be asked in 
terms of Europeanization is whether or not EU policy has changed domestic 
opportunity structures. Knill (2001; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999, 2003) argues that, in 
the face of European policy, domestic actors may either alter the positions they have 
on relevant issues or find that the power they have to influence the outcome of policy 
reform or implementation processes has changed. 
 
The EU’s “negative integration” in terms of opening up national markets has been 
associated with changes in the domestic opportunity structure (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 
1999, 2003; Radaelli, 2002). Knill and Lehmkuhl (2003) specifically linked 
liberalization and de-regulation in specific sectors with changes in the power and 
resources available to specific market players. This means that the removal of trade 
barriers changed the strategic and business opportunities for domestic actors, but also 
their ability to affect their policy preferences. The authors argued that the extent and 
nature of the change depended on the nature of existing opportunity structure, for 
instance whether there was balance or one dominant player, or whether the 
relationship with regulators was contested. According to them, the domestic 
opportunity structure may change in the face of Europeanization, but also might not 
depending on these characteristics. Fontana (2011) has provided further empirical 
evidence looking at “market-making” policies related to the establishment of the 
single market in Switzerland and Belgium. She found that the policies aimed at 
eliminating national regulatory barriers empowered certain actors, particularly the 
executive, eroding to some extent corporatist decision making of these countries. Her 
findings also indicate that the extent of change in the domestic opportunity structure 
was related to the use of the EU by the domestic actors to legitimate their positions. 
 
Similar findings have been produced by scholars looking at domestic opportunity 
structures in relation to positive integration. This is where the EU prescribes policy 
models or regulation as opposed to simply “striking down” barriers and limiting the 
policy interventions that can be taken by national governments (Radaelli, 2002, p. 
121). Empirically, there has been a focus on civil society organisations and examples 
come from the areas of environmental policy and gender equality (Parau, 2008; 
Sudbery, 2010). This research has provided more evidence for the proposition that 
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change in the domestic opportunity structure is less related to the content of EU 
policies or top down mechanisms, but to the “usage” of the EU by domestic actors. 
Usage takes many forms and can include legitimising a group’s position, but also 
making use of financial resources provided by various EU funding mechanisms, or 
specific policy instruments called for in EU policy (Jacquot & Woll, 2004). In some 
cases, civil society groups or other actors were shown to have not had the capacity or 
interest to make use of the EU to influence their position (McCauley, 2011). This 
suggests that the potential for Europeanization to have consequences for the 
domestic opportunity structure may depend on the overall material conditions in 
which domestic actors operate. Their capacity to make use of the EU may depend on 
the financial and human resources with which they start, and the way power is 
distributed within the domestic opportunity structure. 
 
Such material and power conditions may seem like subjects of a political economy 
research project, and it could be argued that they should be studied from this 
perspective. Political economy research assumes a more overtly normative stance 
than new institutionalist research. Mosco (2009, p. 32), drawing on Golding and 
Murdock (1991), claims that a key characteristic of political economy is its 
engagement with issues of justice, equity and the public good and its intrinsic link 
with moral philosophy. Political economists conceive of media as systems for 
production, distribution and consumption of symbolic forms as commodities 
(Garnham, 2000, p. 39; Mosco, 2009, p. 2). With that concept of media systems, 
political economy research then “addresses the nature of the relationship between 
media and communications systems on the one hand and the broader social structure 
of society” (McChesney, 2000, p. 110). It therefore looks at power in that 
relationship at the points of production, distribution and consumption. Some political 
economists view power solely as something exercised by human agents over 
markets. Garnham, however, defines power in terms of structural constraints on the 
actions of agents. He writes that power “is concerned with the ways in which a 
market system . . . allocates resources and constrains behaviour in ways that are not 
under the intentional control of individuals or groups” (Garnham, 2000, p. 39). His 
ideas seem to be complementary to those of Kooiman, but Garnham does not 
consider material conditions as structural constraints, only the systems that have been 
created. 
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Researchers have looked at EU media policy by focusing on media market systems 
and power in this manner. Many argue that it is extending corporate power and 
facilitating ownership concentration in the audiovisual media sector (Humphreys, 
2005, 2009; S. Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 2008). This approach has advantages over a media 
systems approach in the style of Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2008), which is mainly 
descriptive, because of its focus on dynamics of power and particularly economic 
power. Hallin and Mancini’s descriptions of systems fall short of explaining why the 
types of systems they define are the way they are and the mechanisms that sustain 
those characteristics, such as the political parallelism of the polarized pluralist 
models. Both approaches seem to treat the characteristics of the media or market 
system as given, whereas the concept of opportunity structure provides a framework 
for examining the way the distribution of power and resources made available by the 
material conditions is shaped by strategic actors, through laws or the adoption of 
other rules.  
 
New institutionalist research does not tend to examine market indicators or 
ownership structures in empirical studies. In fact, only in rare cases have researchers 
even included representatives from the markets being affected by EU policy in 
interview-based projects (e.g.Versluis, 2007). However, the material conditions in 
the form of financial resources impacting the capacity of national administrations or 
the public bodies charged with implementing EU policy has been explored to a small 
extent (see Falkner, 2010; Falkner et al., 2005; Hille & Knill, 2006). I argue that the 
concept of the opportunity structure described above provides an avenue through 
which to examine some of the material and power conditions constraining 
governance interactions, including those involving the market. 
 
Market conditions define the domestic opportunity structure in terms of the overall 
resources in the sector. I suggest that not only the distribution of power and resources 
among actors is important, but also the overall power and resources within the 
market and civil society that may constrain those actor’s abilities to use the EU to 
affect change. The concept of opportunity structure is that the rules, procedures and 
distribution of power and resources that constitute the structures constraining 
strategic actors are also themselves created by strategic actors (Knill & Lenchow, 
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2001b). This makes the concept it more useful in examining change and both agency 
and structure than that of a media market system. Therefore the “material and power 
conditions” described by Kooiman (2003) as constraining governance interactions 
are revealed in this thesis by examining the domestic opportunity structure, rather 
than through a political economy style investigation. 
3.3.3 Agent and structure centred institutionalism 
 
I have now outlined theories about institutional fit and opportunity structures that 
form the basis for the theoretical framework with which I approach my investigation 
of Europeanization of media governance in Slovenia and Macedonia. Despite an 
apparent division within the field between agent-based and structure-based 
explanations for how institutions function, I concur with those who recommend 
combining the two. Firstly, I described the theory that individuals within 
organisations such as national administrations, NRAs or media companies follow the 
logic of appropriateness and that therefore their institutional context, by which they 
determine appropriateness, may have consequences for Europeanization. The theory 
of institutional fit is that exogenous changes such as EU policy or EU level change 
will have different outcomes at the national level depending on the extent to which 
their implementation “fits” with domestic institutions, defined as established norms, 
values, identities, relationships and practices or ways of doing things. Based on this 
theory, understanding the role of Europeanization within media governance requires 
investigating the structures upon which appropriateness is judged, and considering 
the degree of fit and the extent to which sources of misfit may be mutable. Structures 
like norms, identity and even organisational culture are changeable or negotiable. 
They can influence interactions by enabling or constraining, or they can be changed 
in the course of interactions. I pointed out that other institution-shaping structures 
such as material conditions like populations and economic characteristics may not be 
so easily changed and in this thesis will also be considered in relation to institutional 
fit. 
 
I then explained the theory that within each national context there is an opportunity 
structure that is characterised by the way in which resources and power is distributed 
among the actors. This constrains the behaviour and decisions of actors through the 
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consequences and outcomes they can expect. Europeanization may change this 
domestic opportunity structure empowering some actors and diminishing others, or it 
may not. Current scholarship suggests that the characteristics of the domestic 
opportunity structure. and particularly the ability or interest of domestic actors to use 
the EU to further their strategic goals, are key factors in the extent of such change. 
This thesis will therefore examine the characteristics of the opportunity structures 
within the media sectors in the two cases. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Dente et al. (2011) astutely describe four “pitfalls” of new institutionalism that they 
claim are common in the practice of such research. They claim that authors get 
trapped in institutional determinism and unfounded theoretical conjecture, or 
“find[ing] powerful explanatory institutional variables because this is what they are 
looking for” (Dente et al., 2011, p. 11). Their critique is valid, however I suggest that 
the problems they identify derive from the fact that most institutionalist public policy 
research begins with a policy outcome or variation in policy and then look for 
explanations for it and causal relationships. I take a bottom-up approach defining the 
object of study with a conceptualisation of social-political governance elaborated by 
Kooiman (2003). Kooiman organises the actors of governance into three: the state, 
the market and civil society. He also conceives of governance as consisting of the 
interactions among these three actors. Kooiman’s social-political governance 
perspective sees a clear relationship between structure and agency by directing us to 
look at structural and intentional level interactions. This thesis is an investigation of 
media governance in Slovenia and Macedonia, conceived of in terms of interactions 
involving the state, civil society and the market. 
 
Drawing mostly on the work of Knill and his colleagues, I elaborated on institutional 
fit and opportunity structure. In the first, the actions of individuals are constrained by 
structures such as norms, culture and identity, as well as embedded arrangements 
such as established practice, relationships or administrative style. I suggest that the 
nature of these constraints can help define the role that Europeanization plays, if any, 
in media governance. I also argue that the material conditions to which Kooiman 
refers as constraining or enabling governance interactions should also be investigated 
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among the structures that determine institutional fit. 
 
According to the second theory, some actors create formal and informal rules that 
contribute to the formation of an opportunity structure. Material resources and other 
conditions also define the opportunity structure and therefore the relative ability of 
the various actors to pursue their preferences. If this idea was left only at the level of 
policy preferences, it might paint a picture of domestic actors resisting 
Europeanization, if the characteristics of the domestic opportunity structure granted 
them more power or resources. However, I argue that in the context of EU rules that 
require participation, such as the positive integration type measures aimed at 
encouraging European audiovisual content, the opportunity structure may also 
constrain actors’ ability to participate or comply regardless of preference. I suggest 
that it is useful to explore how this theory works in this context, including looking 
not just at the relative power and resources of the actors, but also the material and 
power conditions constraining all actors. 
  
I have outlined a conceptual and theoretical framework for a bottom-up investigation 
of the role of Europeanization in audiovisual media governance in SEE. I have 
defined governance in terms of its actors and interactions. I also pointed out that 
within these interactions there is a place for the negotiations of norms and tension 
around legitimacy and accountability. This leaves room for potential resistance to 
Europeanization at the national level, but also for domestic level change through 
Europeanization. The theories I presented from new institutionalism offer some 
direction as to how these interactions may play out. At the risk of concept stretching, 
I also suggested testing them more in the direction of the market and material 
conditions, both of which are integral parts of governance. How this will be done 
through the research design and methodology is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Research Design and 
Methodology 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter I proposed that the way to gain a thorough and nuanced 
understanding of the role of Europeanization in media governance in SEE is through 
a bottom-up research using a new institutionalist theoretical framework. I argued that 
investigating the role of Europeanization in such national contexts in this manner, 
rather than assuming EU impact and asking questions about the factors influencing 
it, could help fill existing gaps in the Europeanization literature and our 
understanding of the process. I also made the case that this strategy may reduce the 
risks common to institutionalist research, namely institutional and structural 
determinism. I pointed to two key theories about how institutions work, institutional 
fit and opportunity structure, which I argued were most useful for an examination of 
governance. This project makes use of this theoretical framework in a comparative 
investigation of media governance in Slovenia and Macedonia in order to clarify the 
role of Europeanization. The purpose of this chapter is to outline how this approach 
is translated into the concrete research design of my investigation. 
 
This study relies heavily on elite interviews, but also on secondary quantitative data 
from NRAs, market research companies, and other sources. It also draws on 
historical accounts and analysis from local media experts found in publications by 
domestic civil society organisations. I have used a mixed-methodology research 
design championed by methodologists such as Creswell (1994, 2011) and Tashakkori 
and Teddlie (2003, 2010). These authors reject the inextricability and incompatibility 
of philosophical and epistemological positions from methodology, a view taken by 
Guba & Lincoln (2005) among others. Rather than seeing this mixed-methodology as 
a controversial mix of quantitative and qualitative paradigms (see Bryman, 2012, p. 
628; Plano Clark, Creswell, O'Neil Green, & Shope, 2008), I follow the view of 
Greene (2007) who sees mixed-methodology as a “stance” or “way of thinking” that 
accepts multiple ways of knowing (see pp. 20-24). The stance that this project takes 
is the substantial theory stance in which “what matters most in guiding inquiry 
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decisions is the substantive issues and conceptual theories relevant to the study” 
(Greene, 2007, p. 69). This is basically the same as what Hall and Howard (2008) 
have termed the synergistic approach in which the conceptual framework guides the 
selection of methods. The substantive issues and concepts of governance and 
institutionalism guided my selection of methods in a manner described below, in 
addition to the more traditional mixing for the purposes of triangulation (Denzin, 
1978). 
 
Case studies such as the two conducted for this investigation lend themselves to 
methodological pluralism (Hantrais, 2009, p. 109). They rely on multiple sources of 
evidence and in line with the substantive theory stance, “benefit from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection” (Yin, 2003, p. 14). 
While the depth and complexity of case studies complements the aims of a bottom-
up investigation of media governance, it makes them less amenable to comparison. 
Therefore this investigation is a structured, focused comparison in which 
theoretically guided questions are asked of each case (A. L. George & Bennett, 2005, 
Ch. 3). The cases are Slovenia and Macedonia, two countries of similar size with 
shared recent history and common EU trajectory. The focus of this investigation is 
audiovisual media governance, meaning not the entire media system, but the actors 
and structures of governance as conceptualised in the previous chapter. As I will 
describe in this chapter, I have used the same mix of methods in the same manner to 
examine the media governance in both Slovenia and Macedonia, guided by the same 
central research question and four sub-questions. 
 
In this chapter I begin by outlining how the elements of the conceptual framework 
shaped the research design and the tools used. This first section therefore explains 
the choice of methods. It covers the use of documentary sources, the sampling for 
elite interviews and the choice of secondary data. In the second section, I go into 
detail about the process of data collection and some of the challenges I faced in 
conducting the fieldwork. Here I also discuss the design of the interview topic guide, 
the execution of the interviews and reflect on the implications of my role as 
researcher and the limitations of the methods. In the third section, I discuss the 
comparison of case studies, first explaining the choice of cases and then my 
analytical approach to the data. This chapter concludes with reflections on the 
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execution of a theoretically informed comparison of the Slovenian and Macedonian 
cases. I draw some conclusions about the advantages and limitations of bottom-up 
research in the study of Europeanization and public policy. 
4.2 Mixed-methodology: Multiple Sources, Multiple Angles 
 
This is not a project of comparing media systems, but one that asks specific 
questions about the role of Europeanization in media governance in SEE. Asking this 
question also distinguishes this investigation from the bulk of Europeanization 
research, which looks at the variables impacting the implementation of EU policy or 
adoption of European practices at the national level. Instead it starts by examining 
media governance. The concept of governance as elaborated by Kooiman (2003) 
discussed in the previous chapter, defines the actors, structures and interactions that 
are the subjects of this research. He describes the actors in governance as the state, 
the market, and civil society. It is important to note that in his conceptualization, the 
state is equated with “a public task” (Kooiman, 2003, p. 5), thus including also 
supranational bodies within multi-level governance such as the EU, as well as 
independent regulatory agencies that are common new governance mechanisms in 
the media sector. These actors interact within the constraints of structures, namely 
material, cultural and power conditions.  
 
In the previous chapter, I described the different kinds of interactions and I presented 
two theories from new institutionalism as tools for examining these interactions. The 
theory of institutional fit directed me to look at the norms, established practices, role 
perception, values and relationships of the individuals within the state, market and 
civil society. The theory of opportunity structure directed me to investigating the 
formal and informal rules, the material resources and power relations. Within this 
framework I developed 4 sub-questions from the main research question. 
 
RQ: What is the role of Europeanization in media governance in South East 
Europe?  
 
 What are the rules, practices and routines of media governance? How 
do they interact with EU policy? 
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 How do the actors involved in media governance perceive their roles 
and positions and what norms or values are reflected in these 
perceptions? 
 What is the nature of the relationships among the domestic level actors 
and between domestic actors and EU institutions? 
 What are the material and power conditions within which the domestic 
actors operate and their consequences? 
 
These questions cannot all be answered by one method. To assess norms, values and 
perceptions one needs to speak to people. Rules can be read in law and policy, but 
material conditions must be assessed through economic or other indicators. One of 
the main reasons I argued that a bottom-up approach was necessary was in order to 
capture the complexity that can often be ignored by institutionalist public policy 
research. That complexity is reflected in the mixed-methodology research design. I 
now explain each piece of the mix and its purpose. 
4.2.1 Documentary Research: Accounts, laws and reports 
 
In this project, documentary research served several purposes. I made use of many 
different kinds of documents defining this category in the broader rather than 
narrower sense (May, 2011, p. 194). First of all, in order to begin to describe the 
history and character of the Slovenian and Macedonian audiovisual media sectors, I 
relied on accounts found in reports from the civil society groups mentioned above, as 
well as in the annual and other reports of the NRAs and PSBs. These also helped to 
give some indications of the nature of embedded relationships and characteristics of 
the domestic opportunity structure. These documents are all what Scott (1990) refers 
to as open-published documents, or in other words public. Some of these are 
technically authorless pieces produced collectively within one of the NRAs or PSBs. 
Such documents are not “transparent representations of organizational routines or 
decision-making processes” (Atkinson & Coffrey, 2004, p. 58), but are instead 
representations for a specific purpose. They are the running records (Johnson, 
Joslyn, & Reynolds, 2001) of these public bodies that have legal responsibilities to 
report on their activities. For the most part, these were used as sources information 
on dates, events and descriptive quantitative data. For example, in such documents I 
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was able to find how many licenses were given at what times, or the sources of 
revenue of the PSBs over time. Such documents should not be removed from the 
process of their production or social context (May, 2011, p. 199), nor can they be 
treated absolutely as “firm evidence of what they report” (Atkinson & Coffrey, 2004, 
p. 58). Nevertheless these reports and the data contained within them can be 
considered credible (May, 2011, p. 207; see also J. Scott, 1990) as much of the 
information within is subject to external audit and in some cases parliamentary 
review. The public nature of these documents also means that they are subject to 
public scrutiny and contested if their credibility or validity was in doubt, including 
by broadcasters or other stakeholders. 
 
An example of the considerations that needed to be made in the use of such 
documents can be found in the differences between how I treated the annual reports 
on the market from the BC in Macedonia and how I treated the BC’s report on 
political bias in the PSB. Both reports had clearly outlined sources and the methods 
used in data collection. The market reports aggregated and reported data supplied by 
the broadcasters themselves or that they had reported to the State Revenue Office. 
This data was not controversial or contested by any of those included in the report. 
However, the reports that found significant pro-government bias in the PSB were 
based on analysis of the programmes of Macedonian Radio Television (MRT) by BC 
staff and rejected by MRT management. Knowing that the majority of the 
composition of the BC at that time had been appointed under the previous 
government and considering the potential motivations for initiating such an 
investigation, I corroborated the reports’ findings with similar studies by the OSCE 
election observation missions and the Macedonian Institute for the Media (MIM) 
before deciding to include them and consider them credible. These considerations are 
acknowledged where the data in the reports are discussed. 
 
Among the reports used from civil society organisations such as the Open Society 
Institute (OSI) and the Peace Institute of Ljubljana, many were authored by people 
directly involved in media governance at the time. For example, Sandra Bašić-
Hrvatin was a member of the Slovenian Broadcasting Council, and Vesna Šopar had 
been a Council Member and then served as an external expert for the Macedonian 
Broadcasting Council. Because of this, these reports could be considered accounts of 
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the events and problems of the time. For this reason and because of the “watchdog” 
function played by the organisations that published them, I have tried to be explicit 
about the nature of these sources. I have introduced them as such and then cited them 
as references in connection with the specific information used. In addition, where 
possible, I have corroborated accounts of events with the stories as told by 
interviewees as well. Other reports used include those from the EC and the OSCE. 
EC progress reports are key elements of the EU accession process. It would be naïve 
to accept the accounts and assessments contained in them as absolute fact. 
Nevertheless they represent the impression that the EC had of the reality in each of 
the countries at the time of the report, which is highly relevant in the context of 
Europeanization. The EU norms and policy principles that ostensibly serve as the 
benchmark against which the EC’s assessments in the audiovisual media sector are 
made were outlined in detail in the introduction. The OSCE’s election monitoring 
reports are also imperfect sources, however, the organisation’s methodology is 
internationally accepted particularly in the area of media monitoring during 
elections. I have used their findings to check claims made by interviewees about the 
media in the Macedonian case.9  
 
Laws and other legal documents were used for a different purpose, and treated as 
documentation of formal rules enacted by political actors. Although implementation 
of EU Directives is a core interest of this project, the purpose of this investigation 
was not to assess whether or not EU Directives had been transposed by comparing 
and analysing domestic laws in relation to the EU Directives. Transposition 
compliance is ascertained and reported by the EU for each Directive for Member 
States and as part of the accession process. At the time of my field visits, both 
countries had transposed TWFD, but not yet AVMSD. 10  Instead, I looked the 
changes in media law over time viewing them as intentional interactions that 
establish the formal rules shaping the opportunity structure for the media sector in 
                                                 
9
 Although elections in Macedonia have been heavily and regularly monitored for well over a decade, 
the first OSCE observation of elections in Slovenia was of the early parliamentary elections in 
December 2011 and consisted of a small team of 6 experts (OSCE/ODIHR, 2012). Therefore there is 
an imbalance in terms of the availability of such reports.  
10
 Slovenia transposed AVMSD in November 2011 and a team at the University of Luxemburg has 
produced a consolidated text showing exactly how the Directive was transposed article by article. It 
can be found here: 
http://wwwen.uni.lu/research/fdef/media_law/audiovisual_media_services_directive/national_executi
on_measures/slovenia 
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each case. As is presented in Chapter 6, I considered transposition as determined by 
the EU in terms of its timing in relation to other changes in media laws. I also 
examined the laws in power at the time of my visits to each country in order to 
establish the make-up and official responsibilities of the NRAs and obligations of 
broadcasters discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
In addition to understanding the formal rules of the opportunity structure at that time, 
I needed to be knowledgeable about the laws in each case in order to understand 
many of the references made during the interviews. It also was important to be able 
to identify any contradictions that came up between what was said in the interviews 
and official rules, procedure or policy. I did not critically examine these documents, 
as was done by Trappel (2010) or d’Haenens et al. (2009). As this project was an 
investigation of governance conceived of as interactions among state, market and 
civil society actors, formal rules set out in laws or by-laws were considered to be 
among the many different interactions of governance and not necessarily central. 
Therefore, a critique of the substance of the laws or discourse analysis of the laws 
themselves was not appropriate for this project. Instead, I turned to them as 
documents to establish formal rules and to compare them between the cases. For 
example, in Chapter 7 I compare the rules for content quotas and then discuss the 
other governance interactions such as reporting practices and communication 
between broadcasters and the NRAs. I used official English translations of the 
Slovenian laws available online and Macedonia versions of the Macedonian laws 
also available online. A list of the laws used is at the front of this thesis. 
4.2.2 Interviews: Governance actors  
 
Kooiman (2003) describes the actors in governance as the state, the market, and civil 
society. The identification of the public and private organisations within these three 
overarching categories of actors provided the theoretically driven sampling for elite 
interviews (Flick, 2009). The purpose of the interviews was: 
 
1. to gather information on their practices and ‘ways of doing things’ through 
their own accounts; 
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2. to understand their values, beliefs, priorities and the norms that constrain their 
behaviour; 
3. to gain insight into their perceptions of their roles within governance;  
4. to obtain information about their relationships among each other. 
 
Interviews are the appropriate method for this purpose because only they can provide 
a more in-depth “understanding of the relations between social actors and their 
situation” and insight into their “beliefs, attitudes, values and motivations” (Gaskell, 
2000, p. 39). In the relationship between agents, or actors, and structures as described 
so far, it is important to understand not just objective structural constraints, but also 
those experienced by the actors involved. Therefore actual “conversations” (Kvale, 
1996) with individuals was necessary and not just observations. I conducted elite 
semi-structured interviews with individuals drawn from the actors of governance. 
 
At the time of my fieldwork, in the Slovenian case, the Ministry of Culture was 
responsible for the media and was the line ministry for the Media Act and the Law 
on the Radio and Television Corporation of Slovenia, which covers RTVSLO.11 It 
also had within it a Culture and Media Inspectorate charged with enforcing, among 
others, the Media Act. The NRA responsible for the sector is the Agency for Post 
and Electronic Communications (APEK). At the time of this study APEK was 
responsible for “overseeing the electronic communications market, managing and 
overseeing the Slovenian radiofrequency spectrum, performing tasks in the field of 
radio and television programme service activities and regulating and managing the 
postal services market” (Post and Electronic Communications Agency of the 
Republic of Slovenia (APEK), 2010, p. 7). Attached to APEK are two councils, one 
for broadcasting and another for electronic communications, which have advisory 
and monitoring roles in their respective areas (ibid., p. 8). 12  Interviewees were 
selected from the Ministry Culture and APEK, including its Broadcasting Council. 
 
In Macedonia, the Ministry of Transport and Communications was responsible for all 
broadcast media and electronic communications of other kinds at the time of my 
                                                 
11
 When the government changed in February 2012, the ministries were re-organised and the Ministry 
of Culture was merged with Education, Science and Sport. However, under the new government 
formed in March 2013, media is once again dealt with by a Ministry of Culture http://www.mk.gov.si/ 
12
 For further details on APEK see also www.apek.si/en/   
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fieldwork. Up until January 2012, it was the line ministry for the Laws on 
Broadcasting Activity and on Electronic Communications as well as the Law on 
Macedonian Radio Television governing MRT.13 It no longer has any inspectors in 
these areas as all responsibilities for enforcement were transferred in 2005 to national 
regulatory authorities: the Broadcasting Council (BC) and the Agency for Electronic 
Communications (AEK). I interviewed people from within the Ministry, the BC and 
the AEK. 
 
Within each of these organisations of the state, I selected individual respondents 
based on their position. Within the Ministries, selection was easy because there was 
one head of the right department in each Ministry. Within the Slovenian Ministry I 
also chose the Media Inspector, of which there was also only one. Within the NRAs 
it was more complicated. I downloaded the organisational structures of each agency 
and chose individual positions, for example, the head of programme standards or the 
head of monitoring. In Macedonia where there are several Council Members in the 
BC, I chose the President and then chose other members representing different 
ethnicities and different waves of appointment. 
 
Both Macedonia and Slovenia have a large number of players in the audiovisual 
media market, despite the small size of the countries. In addition to their PSBs, both 
have a few key national level private broadcasters and a multitude of local and 
regional broadcasters, as well as both national and local level cable operators, at least 
one IPTV provider and several providers of satellite packages. 14  In both cases I 
interviewed representatives from the PSB and from private television companies. In 
Slovenia the two most popular national private television channels, PopTV and 
KanalA, both belong to the company ProPlus owned mostly by Central European 
Media (CME), a US dominated investment society (Saura & Enli, 2011), therefore I 
treated them as one when selecting interviewees. In Macedonia, there are strict 
political and ethnic divisions in the national media; therefore it was necessary to 
select interviewees from AlsatM, the Albanian language station, and from stations 
representing different political camps within the Macedonian language media. The 
stations were chosen based on both willingness to be interviewed and trying to 
                                                 
13
 For more details on structure and responsibilities of the ministry see http://mtc.gov.mk/new_site/en/  
14
 Exact figures for existing broadcasters and operators will appear in the empirical chapters. 
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achieve balance between local and national, as well as in the case of Macedonia, 
ethnic balance. In Slovenia it proved difficult to reach local stations and starting with 
a list from the APEK database, I simply began calling until I reached one that both 
answered and was able and willing to be interviewed. In the case of Macedonia I was 
aware that my own past experience with local stations may bias selection, and 
therefore put the names of stations on the floor in a circle and literally spun a bottle 
in order to select which stations to visit. 
 
Civil society related to the media in both cases seems very weak. Through initial 
desk research and asking colleagues at the Faculty of Social Science in Ljubljana 
during a prior visit, I identified only the Peace Institute of Ljubljana, with its media 
programme as being active in the area of media issues from among Slovenia’s civil 
society groups. It conducts research on media issues and publishes studies under its 
OSI funded Mediawatch book series. Its members occasionally publish articles or 
commentary on current media issues. 15  I interviewed the head of the media 
programme at the Peace Institute as a key player in civil society. The Slovene 
Association of Journalists played a crucial role in defending media freedom and 
professionalism among journalists in the early days of Slovenia’s transition (Bervar, 
2001). However, it now exists primarily for the protection of journalists and plays an 
apparently disputed role in the self-regulation of journalists’ ethics (ibid.). Neither of 
these is within the focus of this project and therefore I did not interview someone 
from this organisation.  
 
A very similar situation with the Macedonia Journalists Association at the time 
means that I did not seek to interview its representatives either. From my previous 
work in Macedonia I was very familiar with the civil society organisations in that 
country. The Media Development Center (MDC) in Macedonia was the main civil 
society organisation playing a watchdog role, monitoring and commenting on media 
issues. The Macedonian Institute for the Media (MIM) was primarily an educational 
and training institution; however it now also follows issues related to the media and 
comments publicly.16 The Association of Private Electronic Media of Macedonia, 
                                                 
15
 For more information on the Peace Institute of Ljubljana see http://www.mirovni-
institut.si/Main/Index/en/  
16
 See www.mim.org.mk  
 81 
which had been an advocacy group for broadcasters, collapsed in 2008. I interviewed 
the directors of MDC and MIM. Although civil society is under-represented in terms 
of the sample, this reflects the reality of the situation in both cases. The following 
table summarises the organisations from which I selected interviewees. 
 
Table 4.1 Breakdown of actors in audiovisual media governance in Slovenia and 
Macedonia from which interviewees were selected 
Slovenia 
State 
Ministry of Culture (including Inspectorate) 
APEK (including its Broadcasting Council) 
Market 
Broadcasters (RTVSLO, national, local) 
Operators (one network operator) 
Civil 
society Peace Institute of Ljubljana 
    
  
 
Macedonia 
State 
Ministry of Culture 
Broadcasting Council 
Agency for Electronic Communications 
Market 
Broadcasters (MRTV, national, local) 
Operators (one network operator) 
Civil 
Society 
Media Development Center 
Macedonian Institute for the Media 
 
 
In order to protect the anonymity of those who wished to remain anonymous, I 
cannot provide here a full list of the positions selected within these different 
organisations. In most cases only one person holds each position. Neither in the case 
of the television stations can I give the exact number and names of the chosen 
stations for the same reasons. In Annex 1 there is a list that has been modified as 
necessary to protect the identities of those who did not wish to be named. 
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4.2.3 Secondary data analysis: Market and enforcement data 
 
Secondary data analysis is the use of data gathered by another source and was used 
in this investigation in two ways. The first was driven by the theoretical framework 
and substantive issues of the investigation (Hakim, 1982, p. 16) and aimed at getting 
information that could not be gathered through interviews. The other was as a way to 
triangulate the self-reported information given in the interviews (Cowton, 1998; 
Denzin, 1978; Frankfort-Nachmias, 2008). In both cases, information was taken from 
official sources. I differentiate between the use of secondary data analysis here and 
what could be considered the re-presentation of secondary data from the publicly 
available reports mentioned above. In the latter, I used the data in the same manner 
in which it was originally published without re-analysis. An example of this is the 
number and type of licenses given in a certain year (Table 5.5) or penetration rates of 
subscription services (Table 5.7). Secondary data analysis was conducted when I re-
processed or analysed data from others in some way. Here I distinguish between two 
types of analysis. The first type was the simple re-organisation of quantitative data, 
such as when I used the audience measurement figures from market research 
companies in Chapter 5. The second type differs from using the other’s statistics in a 
new way because it involved coding and classifying information in administrative 
records (Hakim, 2006, p. 154). This was done with the records on enforcement 
procedures taken provided by the NRAs and the details of how I did the classifying 
is discussed where the data is presented in Chapter 6. In several instances, the data 
was not already published in any form, but was requested directly from the owners of 
the data. I go into more detail on the collection and analysis of this data further on, 
but first I will explain the types of data and the purposes for which it was used. 
 
The structures that Kooiman (2003) cited as constraining the interactions of 
governance are material, cultural and related to power. From interviews designed to 
access information on behaviour, norms and values, it is possible to gain insight into 
cultural conditions. It is also possible to learn about how individuals may perceive 
their own power and that of others, as well as about the relationships of influence 
that may exist among them. However, material conditions must be approached in a 
more positivist manner. Market indicators and other demographic information can 
give a picture of the resources available to the market and to the state. One of the 
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limitations of relying on secondary data is that there may be a gap between the 
available data collected by others and the kind a researcher wants for his or her 
research purpose (Frankfort-Nachmias, 2008, p. 279). For example, in both of these 
cases, the exact kind of advertising market data over time that I would have like to 
have was not available. It was not possible for me, as a lone researcher with limited 
time, to attempt to gather such data myself, particularly from the past. It also seemed 
that the exact advertising data that I would have liked to have was not even 
adequately or consistently maintained by the broadcasters who would have had to be 
the original source of such data. However, I did find credible data that was close 
enough to what I wanted and collected using transparent and sound methods. I was 
able to rely on it as some indication of the power conditions among individual 
organisations within the audiovisual media market and the resources available to 
them. 
 
Audiences are the main currency for television stations and the generator of 
advertising revenue (Doyle, 2002, p. 12) and therefore, audience measurement data 
is an important indicator of the relative positions of companies within the market. 
Advertising income as a whole shows the material conditions under which all players 
in the market operate. At the same time, the population and tax base are important 
determinants of the resources available to the state, and in these two cases for the 
PSBs, both of which were partially dependent on license fees drawn from that tax 
base. This meant using official census data as secondary data, which is very common 
in social science and especially comparisons between or among states (Frankfort-
Nachmias, 2008, p. 277). I started with the intention of finding at least audience 
measurement data and if possible, data on advertising revenues or shares, which were 
necessary in order for me to answer Sub-RQ4. On the issue of subsidies for 
audiovisual works, for instance, I had not planned on examining data on production 
grants. However, when the issue of production capacity and achieving European 
works quotas came up in the interviews, I decided to see if I could get relevant data 
to complement the story being told in the interviews. The types and sources of 
market data are listed in the table below. 
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Table 4.2 Types and sources of market data used 
Data Type Source 
Reach of TV stations in 
Slovenia, 1996-2001 
Research data from 
private agency 
Mediana, Slovenia   
Reach of TV stations in 
Slovenia, 2002-2011 
Research data from 
private agency 
Mediana, Slovenia   
Ratings of TV stations in 
Slovenia, 1999-2011 
Research data from 
private agency 
AGB/Neilson Media 
Research Slovenia 
Sources of Revenue for RTVSLO, 
2007-2011 
Administrative records Annual Reports of RTVSLO 
Audience share for TV stations 
in Macedonia, 2003-2011 
Research data from 
private agency 
AGB/Neilson Media 
Research Macedonia 
Households using cable, 
satellite & IPTV in Macedonia 
Research data from 
national regulator 
Annual reports on the 
Broadcasting Market, 
Broadcasting Council of 
Macedonia 
Audience share of foreign 
channels 2006-2010 
Research data from 
national regulator 
Annual reports on the 
Broadcasting Market, 
Broadcasting Council of 
Macedonia 
Sources of Revenue for MRT 
2008-2011 
Administrative records Annual Reports of MRT 
General economic indicators 
(GDP, Net monthly wage, 
Unemployment) 
Research data from 
government agency 
State Statistical Offices of 
Slovenia and Macedonia 
Gross Value of TV advertising in 
Macedonia 2010 
Research data from 
national regulator 
Annual reports on the 
Broadcasting Market, 
Broadcasting Council of 
Macedonia 
Gross Value of TV advertising in 
Macedonia 2010 
Research data from 
private agency 
Mediana, Slovenia   
Total Revenues of PSBs 2010, 
2011 
Administrative records Annual Reports of MRT & 
RTVSLO 
Total Revenues of non-PSB 
stations in Macedonia 2009, 
2010 
Research data from 
national regulator 
Annual reports on the 
Broadcasting Market, 
Broadcasting Council of 
Macedonia 
Total Revenues of non-PSB 
stations in Slovenia, 2010 
Research data from 
private agency 
Mediana, Slovenia   
Total advertising revenue 
reported by television stations 
in Slovenia 2010 
Research data from 
University 
University of Ljubljana 
Department of Journalism 
Total advertising revenue 
reported by television stations 
in Macedonia 2010 
Research data from 
national regulator 
Annual reports on the 
Broadcasting Market, 
Broadcasting Council of 
Macedonia 
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Triangulation through the use of secondary data was mainly a matter of “adding one 
layer of data to another to build a confirmatory edifice” (Fine, Wies, Wesseen, & 
Wong, 2000, p. 118) in order to validate or contradict data provided in interviews. 
This was mainly in relation to the enforcement practices described by those 
interviewed within the NRAs. Interviews have certain limitations; one of which is 
that they place the emphasis on verbal accounts, or what people say they do, rather 
than on actions (Kvale, 1996). As I wanted to learn about the informal rules and 
practice of governance (Sub-RQ1), I did not want to rely solely on what the 
interviewees from within the NRAs said that they did in terms of their interactions 
with the market. Therefore in addition to triangulating among interviews both within 
the NRAs and by interviewing those in the market, I also sought out data on the 
decisions and measures taken against broadcasters by the NRAs. This included 
APEK and the Media Inspector in Slovenia and the BC in Macedonia. This data 
came in different forms and required more significant analysis in order to identify 
trends in practice. I go into detail on the analysis done on this data below. 
4.2.4 Method choices 
 
The mixed-methodology research design of this project consists of three methods: 
documentary research, elite-semi structured interviews, and secondary data analysis. 
Interviews were chosen in order to provide information about how individuals 
engage in governance interactions. Interviews with individuals working in the NRAs, 
the broadcasters, the operators and civil society organisations etc. took the 
investigation into the lower level of abstraction which is concerned with how 
appropriateness is determined within the domestic context. Documents and 
secondary data served the investigation at a higher level of abstraction, in which the 
interest is in the way strategic actions of organisational actors are constrained. 
Documentary research was used in order to establish the development of the media 
sectors and actors of governance, tracing changes to rules and relationships or 
practices that became embedded. It was also used to identify the formal rules in place 
at the time of the investigation. Secondary data analysis had two purposes, namely 
providing a picture of material and power conditions and serving to validate or not 
information given by interviewees about NRA practices. The next section explains 
the process of collecting the data for these three methods. 
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4.3 Data Collection: Field and Desk 
 
The process of data collection for this project was extensive. It began with desk 
research, which continued throughout the project. The most significant data 
gathering exercise was the execution of the semi-structured interviews, which 
involved stays of one month in each country. Before this I conducted a pilot project 
in both Slovenia and Macedonia related to PSBs, which was extremely useful in 
preparing for the interviews for this study. Assembling secondary data was done 
mainly after the interviews and was more of a struggle than expected, regrettably as 
much for the owners of the data as for me. In this section, I will go into detail on the 
methods of data collection, the challenges and the implications for the project.  
4.3.1 Assembling documents 
 
A significant amount of desk research went into gathering the reports, accounts and 
laws mentioned above. Most were available online in a mix of English and Slovenian 
or Macedonian. For Slovenian documents I mostly used English translations. This 
was acceptable as I was not doing semiotic or other kinds of textual analysis on 
them, but simply using them for the information contained within. I am able to 
comprehend written Slovenian to a certain extent and therefore was able to make use 
of some documents available only in Slovenian such as the reports on European 
Works violations in Chapter 7. As I speak and read Macedonian fluently, I mainly 
used the Macedonian version of documents for that case. This difference has to be 
acknowledged because reliance on English in a non-English environment can 
introduce a selectivity bias (May, 2011, p. 215). This could mean that I had access to 
more documents for the Macedonian case than the Slovenian case. However, this 
study required specific types of documents from specific sources – the state, the 
market and civil society. The corpus from which to draw documents was already 
small. Thanks to the near universality of English in Slovenia and my basic 
comprehension, the chances of leaving out a desired document because of language 
were reduced. For example, I still found and made use of the annual reports of the 
Media and Culture Inspectorate despite the fact that they exist only in Slovenian. In 
addition, there was no need for selection or sampling of documents from these two 
cases as there was little available in general. All the publications of the civil society 
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groups mentioned and all the EC reports were used, as well as all annual reports from 
NRAs and PSBs. 
 
Surprisingly there were more documents available for Macedonia for two reasons. 
Firstly, EC reports were available for Slovenia only up until accession in 2004, 
whereas they continue to be produced for Macedonia. Secondly, the BC in 
Macedonia has been much more prolific in generating reports than Slovenia’s APEK. 
They have released not only annual reports on their own work, but also from 2006-
2011, they produced annual reports on the broadcasting market as well as incidental 
reports from their monitoring. This accounts for why there are somewhat more 
figures and data presented in the history of the sector for Macedonia in Chapter 5. I 
did my best to maintain a balance and match data for data between the two cases. 
Because much of the information is not otherwise available anywhere in English, I 
did decide to include some that I could not match with similar data for the Slovenian 
case.17 
4.3.2 Interview tools and process 
 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews are usually conducted based on topic guides that 
direct the conversation toward providing information necessary for answering the 
research questions. These guide the interview, but give interviewee flexibility to 
express what he or she thinks is important to explain patterns or behaviour (Bryman, 
2012, p. 471). I took the theories from institutionalism through which I wanted to 
examine the governance interactions in each case and used them to create interview 
topic guides. As these were discussed in some detail in the previous chapter, I will 
not explain them again at this stage. Drawing on the theory of institutional fit I 
needed to look at norms, values and established practice, or ‘ways of doing things’. I 
also needed to find out how the individuals perceive their own roles and resources as 
well as how they interpret formal and informal rules. I first set out the questions that 
I need interview data to answer. 
 
                                                 
17
 It was not within the means or scope of this project to reconstruct the history of the sector through 
news stories over the last two decades or other extensive archival research. 
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As these are not questions to be asked directly of interviewees, I developed interview 
topic guides based on what might lead to information being useful in answering these 
questions. The theoretically based questions to be asked of the data were important 
also because of the comparative nature of the project, and formed the basis for my 
coding of the interview data. I made one basic topic guide that was modified only 
slightly for each type of actor. Because interviewees should feel relaxed and that the 
interview is a pleasant experience (Frankfort-Nachmias, 2008, p. 220), I was careful 
to place questions I thought might be more sensitive nearer to the end, but made sure 
to finish with something unthreatening. I also left questions relating directly to the 
EU, EU policy or relations with European institutions for the end in order to see 
whether or not anything related to the EU came up spontaneously. I tested the topic 
guide in a test interview with a contact at the BC in Macedonia whose position was 
not among those selected for interviews. This interview was not used in the corpus 
but helped me to see where there was a need to clarify and trim in the topic guide. 
The table below illustrates questions I wanted answered with the interview data. The 
topic guides can be found in Annex 2. 
 
Table 4.3 Themes and questions used to design the topic guide 
Themes Questions  
Rules & 
Practices  
What are the practices, rules and routines that make up media governance related 
to audiovisual media service? 
How long have they existed and how do people feel about them? 
How do they get changed & how often? 
Power & 
influence 
What actors feel they are able to influence policy or regulatory decisions and 
how? 
Have actors perceived a change (since start of SAA in each country) in their 
respective ability to influence policy and regulatory decisions and to what do they 
attribute this? 
To what do they attribute power (economic strength, political influence, 
popularity…)  
Embedded 
relationships 
What long-term relationships exist between domestic actors (organisations and 
individuals within)? 
What long term relationships exists between domestic and European level actors 
if any (organisations and individuals within)? 
Culture & 
Norms 
What are the normative positions individuals hold in relation to the media, the EU 
and regulatory practice? 
To what extent are decisions or practices attributed to "the way we do things 
here" or national character/culture? 
How much do they differentiate between themselves or the domestic institutions 
and "European"? 
Values & Self- How do people perceive their role within their organisation? 
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perception What values are expressed by individuals when talking about their roles, their 
work and their institutions? 
How often are value-based judgements referred to as the basis for decisions or 
actions? 
To what extent do people make a difference between "European values" and their 
own or those they feel dominate in their institutions? 
 
I was fortunate to have the ability to pilot the process of conducting semi-structured 
elite interviews in both Slovenia and Macedonia before starting the fieldwork for this 
project. The pilot phase consisted of five semi-structured interviews within MRT in 
Skopje and three within RTVSLO in Ljubljana and Koper. The purpose of the study 
was to investigate how people within the PSB management interpret the mandate and 
purpose of their PSB.18 Interviews took place in Macedonia in April 2010 and in 
Slovenia in July 2010. This was followed by another visit to Slovenia in August 
2011, in which I met with the Director of APEK in order to ensure that access to the 
agency for interviews and data would be possible. Lessons learned during this pilot 
study, in which I explored the role of PSB in each country, were extremely useful.  
 
For one thing this study allowed me to test the practicalities of conducting such 
interviews, namely accessing the right individuals and language. One lesson learned 
in this regard was that, although interviewing through a translator was possible and I 
could understand a surprising amount of Slovenian, dealing with transcription and 
analysis afterwards was a challenge. I decided that all my Slovenian interviews 
would have to be done in English and was very lucky that this turned out not to be 
any kind of limitation in terms of selecting interviewees. All of those whom I 
intended to interview felt comfortable doing it in English. In cases in which an 
interviewee got stuck for a word or expression or did not understand, it proved 
always possible to switch momentarily into the regional lingua franca of Serbo-
Croatian. The use of English has some implications in terms of analysis that are 
discussed further below. 
 
Secondly, the pilot gave me insight into the impact of my own role as a researcher. 
One of the common criticisms of interviews is that subjectivity can be introduced by 
the respondent or by the interviewer. One way of looking at this is that the 
                                                 
18
 The results of this small study were published as a separate research project (Broughton Micova, 
2012).  
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respondents are “constructing knowledge around questions and responses” (Fontana 
and Fey, 2000, p. 647), and that setting and power dynamics can also impact this 
construction. This makes it important to conceive of the interview as a conversation 
(Kvale, 1996) and acknowledge the roles that both interviewer and respondent play. 
In designing this project, I was keenly aware of the fact that my long term residency 
in Macedonia and the nature of my professional position while there must be dealt 
with. Many of those whom I interviewed either knew me or at least knew of me from 
my former role as Head of Media Development and Spokesperson of the OSCE 
Mission to Skopje. I was concerned that this might unduly influence the interviews in 
Macedonia. What I learned while doing the PSB study, which proved to be the case 
throughout the interviews in Macedonia, was that I needed to allow for more time at 
the beginning of the interview. Before getting into the topic guide, I had to first let 
each person “catch me up” on what had happened since I was last there and voice 
concerns about the state of things as they would have in my former role. This was 
made the flow of the interviews somewhat different from the Slovenian ones in 
which personal concerns about the state of things came up more towards the end 
after a certain rapport was established. In the Macedonian interviews I also had to be 
more persistent in explaining my role as a researcher. 
 
All of the interviews were conducted face-to-face in the interviewees’ offices or 
place of work. They were conducted in April and May 2011. I spent one month in 
Slovenia graciously hosted by the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of 
Ljubljana, and one month in Macedonia. In accordance with the LSE ethics policy 
and good research practice, I created a consent form and got the consent of each 
interviewee at the start of each interview. Each was given the option of remaining 
anonymous, being named, and being named but only if I check with them again 
before publication.19 It would have been legitimately difficult to make many of the 
interviewees anonymous as there was only one media inspector in Slovenia and one 
head of the BC in Macedonia, etc. As Flick (2009) suggests, elite or expert 
interviews can be problematic in that the respondents are chosen because of their 
positions and are engaged in their professional capacity rather than as individuals. 
Interviewees may be concerned with protecting the image of their institutions, 
                                                 
19
 All those who appear as named in the thesis either gave consent at the outset or confirmed prior to 
submission once presented with how it would be used in situ.  
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particularly when it comes to questions related to institutional practice. I understood 
this, and also that it might be exacerbated by encouraging them to go ‘on the record’. 
Additionally, I thought there were chances they might feel inclined to try to make a 
good impression and appear compliant if they perceived my research to be about 
implementation of EU policy. I tried to counter this in two ways. Firstly, I was 
careful not to frame my project in relation to EU policy implementation when I 
introduced it. Secondly, I tried to build a rapport in a non-judgemental atmosphere, 
and as Kvale (1996) suggests, use deliberate naïveté or a “presuppositionless stance” 
(p. 33). This was harder to achieve with Macedonian interviewees, but was helped by 
the fact that I had been away for two years. 
 
In the end I was able to interview nearly all the people I had planned to interview. I 
would have liked to get one more local or regional station in Slovenia simply as an 
additional validation of the situation of smaller stations in the country, but was not 
able to find someone in the time that I had. In Macedonia the only one that I did not 
get an interview with was with the person from the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. Unfortunately, after I had planned and scheduled my fieldwork in 
Macedonia the government called early parliamentary elections. The individual with 
whom I had intended to speak told me that he had been given strict instructions not 
to speak with anyone about broadcasting until after the elections. I tried to follow up 
with him on two consecutive visits but was avoided in a polite but unmistakable 
manner. I was concerned that the nearness to the elections would influence the 
content of the interviews. It did in some cases lead to diversions, but I was able to 
steer people back to the topic guide eventually.  
 
Two of the interviews ended up being joint interviews. In Slovenia I had to interview 
the Media Inspector along with the Chief Inspector of the Media and Culture 
Inspectorate. This turned out to be useful as she had only started two months prior 
and her supervisor had more insight into past practice and relationships. I treated 
them each separately, however, in my analysis. In my interview at TV Sitel 
Television in Skopje, I had arranged to meet one person, but was presented with both 
the head and deputy producer who insisted on being together. Again I treated them 
separately in the analysis. All of the interviews were recorded, and I took notes. At 
the end of each day of interviews or immediately after each interview if there was 
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time, I made notes on the key points and my own thoughts in a field diary. This 
proved useful in the analysis stage. 
4.3.3 Gathering secondary data 
 
The approach of this project welcomed the subjectivity of the interview as a way to 
understand how the individuals engage with governing interactions and constraining 
conditions. I turned to secondary data to help uncover the material and power 
conditions and character of the domestic opportunity structure (Sub-RQ4), and as 
another source of information on regulatory practice (Sub-RQ1). In some cases, the 
use of secondary data can be problematic because the information will not 
necessarily have been gathered for similar research purposes. This is why Hakim 
(2000) makes a distinction between secondary data analysis on research data and the 
analysis of data from administrative records. This project relies on both. When using 
someone else’s data it is important to consider the original purpose for which it was 
gathered, who was collecting it and how it was gathered (Stewart & Kamins, 1993, 
pp. 18-20). Except for the data on subsidies, the market data I gathered was 
generated through research and for a similar purpose. This was to illustrate financial 
or commercial value or resources, or to show relative positions in the market in 
relation to audiences or advertisers. The first data I sought came from audience 
measurement. Such data was not available for the entire period from 1991-2011, 
because market research companies did not start collecting this data until the late 
1990s in these countries. The purpose of their research is to provide quantitative data 
on audience attention that can be used to attribute value to the broadcasts of 
television stations (see Napoli, 2003). This data is sold to broadcasters and 
advertising agencies as the basis for media planning and advertising valuation. As 
such, it is a key determinant of the resources and power available to actors in the 
market. 
 
In larger countries there may be several different companies providing this 
information, however in Macedonia only one provides regular audience 
measurement and in Slovenia there are two, but only one providing ratings data. In 
both Slovenia and Macedonia, the agencies that collect this data were willing to 
make it available to me for research purposes. More discussion on the methods used 
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by these companies appears in Chapter 5 along with the data. Though I was not able 
to cover the last two decades in their entirety, I used the data available in Macedonia 
and in Slovenia there is consistency between the two sources in the time periods that 
they overlapped. This data serves as the accepted “coin of exchange” (Napoli, 2003, 
p. 19) in the market for television advertising.  
 
The measure generally used by marketing agencies for planning television 
advertising in these countries is the Gross Rating Point (GRP), which in these two 
cases is generated by AGB Nielson Media Research using their Peoplemeters 
technology that records data from household television sets. I did not consider the 
lack of choice in data sources to be a problem, as I was not so concerned with the 
accuracy of the exact numbers of viewers counted because this data is used by 
advertising agencies and television stations in the advertising market an important 
factor in determining the prices stations get for their ad time. In the following 
chapters there is evidence that in Macedonia, political affiliation plays a role in 
determining the distribution of government advertising budgets to broadcasters, so 
their audience data is far from a perfect indication of the distribution of resources and 
power within the market. Nevertheless, it does give a good indication of the relative 
strength of the market players in relation to each other and to foreign competition. 
 
Data on advertising revenues proved more difficult to attain. In Macedonia, the BC 
had been collecting some information based on self-reported income from the 
broadcasters and the gross value of broadcast advertising based on published price 
lists. In Slovenia some data was available for gross value and I was able to obtain 
unpublished data gathered by a team at the University of Ljubljana on advertising 
revenue. There are inherent problems with both ways of measuring the audiovisual 
advertising markets, but they are regularly used as indicators. In Slovenia and 
Macedonia no alternatives exist as yet. For information on the state subsidies 
provided for audiovisual media production, I contacted the Slovenian Film Centre 
(SFC) and the Macedonian Film Fund (MFF). The SFC provided the data I needed 
via email from their record. The MFF data was available mostly on their website and 
they answered additional questions by email. Unlike the other market data, this data 
was what Hakim (2000) refers to as administrative records, not assembled for 
research purposes, but part of each organisation’s own documentation. As public 
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institutions spending public money, the SFC and MFF are required to maintain 
records on the projects funded and funds allocated. It can be accepted as credible 
because it is subject to audit and public scrutiny, but its purpose is simply reporting. 
My purpose in using this data was to learn something about the resources, as material 
conditions, constraining this interaction between the state and the market. This meant 
that I added another layer of classification and interpretation of the data on who 
received support and in comparing the support given that was not part of the sources’ 
purpose for collecting the data. 
 
The data on enforcement practice by the NRAs was also data from administrative 
records, but the purpose of gathering this data was triangulation with information 
from the interviews. The type of data that I needed in this case is what Hakim refers 
to as “statutory decision-making” and although she defines this type in terms of 
legislation or regulations related to individuals and service delivery, the same 
characteristics apply here where regulations related to media companies are at stake. 
The data related to enforcement, is kept routinely and errors are usually minimal 
(Hakim, 2006, pp. 132-134). However, this data is not often publicly available and in 
these two cases proved somewhat difficult to obtain. What I wanted to get was a list 
of all the measures taken by APEK, the Media Inspector and the BC from 2006-
2011. I wanted to know what violation was observed, what rule it broke and what 
action or decision was taken.  
 
In Macedonia this kind of data is kept meticulously by the legal department of the 
BC, but it took many months of reminding before I was able to get the extract from 
their database. Although this type of data is kept routinely, as I discovered, the 
routines of comparable public agencies can still vary significantly. However, as part 
of my investigation was into practice, this in itself became part of the story. In 
APEK, the system was different and records not kept in the same way. Data was 
given cumulatively for each year and it required a significant amount of 
correspondence with the Head of Monitoring in order to ensure I had the most 
possible information on the decisions and had understood and presented it accurately. 
The Chief Inspector of the Media and Culture Inspectorate in Slovenia said that the 
previous Media Inspector had kept meticulous records of the actions taken against 
broadcasters but that she could not give me the records. I was directed towards the 
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annual reports of the Inspectorate to the Ministry, which I was able to obtain in 
Slovenian by contacting the Ministry’s freedom of information contact point. The 
data was presented as aggregates and slightly differently each year, which made 
analysis somewhat difficult, but they were not willing to give me a full list of all 
cases. 
4.3.4 Matching tools and data 
 
In summary, three data collection processes were part of this project. The first 
consisted of assembling reports from civil society actors and public bodies from the 
period since independence. The second was conducting semi-structured elite 
interviews with individuals working in the state bodies, civil society groups or 
companies in the market. The third was gathering secondary data both from research 
and from administrative records from private and public sources. The entire period of 
data collection lasted approximately from September 2010 until May 2012, when the 
last secondary data was received. The interviews were conducted in April and May 
2011. The reason for this extensive and varied data collection process was the choice 
of a mixed-methodology informed by the bottom-up approach to this investigation. 
Though it may appear disparate and messy, the collection of data was guided by the 
institutionalist theoretical framework and the need to answer the four Sub-RQs listed 
above. This structure was even more apparent and vital in the analysis during which 
the two cases were compared. 
 
4.4 Analysis: Comparing Cases 
  
This investigation consists of two case studies. Each was treated as an independent 
unit, but the same categories and types of data were gathered from each one so that 
they could then also be compared. Case studies allow the researcher to get deep 
insight and investigate complexity (Stake, 2000). Blatter and Haverland (2012) have 
argued that case studies, particularly in the context of “small N” comparisons are 
particularly suited for overcoming the structure-agency problem of whether or not 
social science “should start with the behaviour of individual agents or with the 
constituting and regulating functions of social structures” (p. 7). At this point 
comparative case studies are already common in Europeanization research, but it has 
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been argued that often these have resulted in studies that are overly descriptive and 
not theoretically informed (Haverland, 2008, p. 64). This project was not intended to 
result in deeply descriptive yet isolated cases studies.  
 
Instead, it aims to answer specific questions about the role of Europeanization in 
governing media systems in SEE. The intention was to make the findings more 
robust by including more than one case (Yin, 2003, p. 133). Some good bottom-up 
studies have been done in one country on single policy areas that have produced 
findings offering causal related explanations for those cases. Examples include the 
works of Sudbery (2010) and Parau (Parau, 2008), whose empirical findings support 
the hypothesis that Europeanization partially depends on the capacity and willingness 
of civil society actors to use the EU as a legitimiser of their aims. My question 
centres on clarifying the role of Europeanization rather than identifying causal 
mechanisms, and my aim was to deal with the complexity of the domestic 
environment. Focusing on only one case limited the generalisability of findings. I 
wanted to be able to draw some conclusions in relation to the shared characteristics 
of these cases because such comparison highlights the irregularities therefore 
requiring explanations for them (Ragin, 1987, p. 16), so where I expected similarities 
and did not find them it led me to look for other explanations. 
 
I engage in a structured focused comparison (A. L. George & Bennett, 2005) of the 
two cases in specific areas determined by my theoretical framework. This means 
essentially asking the same question of both cases. In a review article for the journal 
Political Studies, Richard Rose (1991) explains this type of approach: 
 
“Whereas case studies may arrive at concepts and generalizations at the end 
of research, comparative analysis of more than one country requires the 
specification of concepts at the beginning in order to identify what is to be 
examined in different national contexts. The narrow-gauge comparison of 
two countries makes it possible to test broad hypotheses against rich 
empirical materials. Since a single author can normally undertake all the 
field research for studying two countries, there is consistency in the use of 
concepts and in the evaluation of empirical evidence.” (p. 455) 
 
If these cases were radically different there would be too many possibilities for 
difference and explanations for such difference. The choice of Slovenia and 
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Macedonia is one of comparable cases, in other words, cases that are similar in many 
ways but may be different in the key area and are analysed in a manner restricted to 
the question at hand (see Lijphart, 1975). They are comparable meaning not that they 
are identical, but that they are similar in terms of specific attributes (Rose, 1991, p. 
448). Slovenia and Macedonia are similar in their smallness, in their common 
Yugoslav history and in their EU trajectory. Their audiovisual media systems 
emerged from the same common system and they share other characteristics since 
independence on which there is more detail in Chapter 5. One important difference 
between the two is their stage in the process of EU accession. This had two 
implications. As Macedonia was still in the pre-accession process while Slovenia 
was no longer, it provided an opportunity to explore the consequences of EU 
conditionality found to be so important in the literature. It also influenced my 
expectations and hypotheses going into the investigation. Because Slovenia was 
already a Member State and having been in the region for some time, I had the 
impression that Slovenia was “the good child” of the former Yugoslav states, and I 
expected the media system to be closer to ideals held by the media scholars discussed 
in Chapter 2. In my systematic and structured comparison I did not expect to find as 
many similarities as I did. 
 
The sections above described how I approached the two cases with the same strategy 
for sampling and interview guides. They also explained in relation to documentary 
sources and secondary data how I attempted to gather similar data in the same 
manner in both cases. The moment of comparison is in the analysis. In this section, I 
explain the coding and interpretation of the interview data and the analysis conducted 
on the secondary data from research and from administrative records. I also discuss 
the limits of this comparison, the possible outcomes and the degree to which any 
findings may be generalisable beyond the two cases. 
4.4.1 Coding and interpreting interview data 
 
The bulk of the data gathered for this project was in the form of interview transcripts. 
The analysis of these interview transcripts was by far the biggest task of this 
investigation in terms of working with data. Therefore I devote some space here to 
explain the process in full. There are many ways to approach interview data (see 
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Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; A. Fontana & Frey, 2000). I conducted a structured thematic 
analysis. I used a mixture of theory driven and inductive ways of coding (Boyatzis, 
1998, Ch. 2), with the coding guide operating on two levels. This ability to move 
back and forth between deductive/theory-driven coding and inductive coding is one 
of the benefits of thematic analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2008). This method 
is different than a purely inductive approach, in which the researcher allows themes 
and sub-themes to emerge from the interview data (Bryman, 2012, pp. 579-580). 
This was a conscious choice made in order to maintain the structure and focus of the 
comparison. I began with topic coding (Richards, 2005, p. 88) drawn from the five 
themes in column one of Table 4.3 above. As a way of testing these codes, I first 
used these to code my interview notes. In the process, I refined the codes to slightly 
simpler categories and added two more topics that seemed to come up frequently in 
the notes. The table below illustrates the changes: 
 
Table 4.4 Deductive Theory-driven codes for first level of transcript coding 
Original codes Revised codes 
Rules & Practices  Rules 
Power & influence Practices 
Embedded relationships Relationships 
Culture & Norms Power & influence 
Values & Self-perception Cultural norms 
 Values 
 Smallness 
 Post Socialism or transition 
 
The codes in the second column above were then applied to the interview transcripts. 
I directly transcribed the Slovenian interviews, which took place in English. I could 
do so quickly as most interviewees spoke slowly and it also gave me the chance to 
fill in any of the moments where we had clarified using Serbo-Croatian. The 
Macedonian interviews were more difficult for me to handle alone. I type much more 
slowly in Macedonian and generally the interviews were longer, containing large 
periods of unrelated conversation because of my history in the country explained 
above. The recordings of interviews with people who had given me blanket 
permission to use their names I gave to a professional in Skopje who did the 
transcription. Those who had asked to remain anonymous or to give permission to 
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use their name only after seeing the data in situ I could not give to anyone else. 
Within Macedonia’s small population, people are often connected in unexpected 
ways and interviewees might have been recognised. Most of these I transcribed 
completely as well directly into Macedonian. However others were partially 
transcribed. Where there are chunks of conversation that are not useful, it is 
acceptable not to transcribe those parts as long as they are listened to again after 
coding to make sure they are irrelevant (Bryman, 2012, p. 486). My strategy was to 
make short summaries in English or Macedonian of the part that was not verbatim 
transcribed and listen to them again after coding. 
 
Coding was done manually with coloured markers and then the excerpts were 
physically reorganised according to codes with duplications made where necessary. 
From this point on, the coding was inductive. Within each of the categories, I looked 
for themes continuing to treat the Slovenian case and the Macedonian case 
separately. Because comparison starts with the logic of the matrix (Rose, 1991, p. 
454), I then created a table for each category identifying commonalities and 
differences within each theme between the two categories. In the table, the numbers 
of the transcripts in which the theme could be found. This can be seen as a form of 
the “word tables” based on a uniform framework that Yin (2003, pp. 133-134) 
recommends for synthesising in two-case comparative studies. The use of common 
interview guides and asking the same questions of the data from Table 4.2 above 
proved useful to this process. The table formed the basis for many of the findings 
discussed in the chapters below and the similarities and differences are explicitly 
pointed out. 
4.4.2 Analysis of secondary data  
 
As I mentioned above, secondary data in this project was used for two different 
purposes and consisted of two types of data. For the first purpose, the 
characterisation of material conditions and the domestic opportunity structure for 
both types of data were used. Data from market research companies was from 
research collected according to internationally recognised methods, such as day after 
recall or the use of Peoplemeters. This type of data was used largely in its original 
form. Analysis consisted of establishing trends over time by comparing multiple 
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years, and in some cases, converting absolute values to percentages for easier 
comprehension. Similarly used was basic demographic and economic data from 
national censuses or other surveys conducted by the respective national statistics 
offices. The other kind of data was administrative data, namely the financial reports 
of the PSBs from each country. It is important to remember that this is self-reported 
data and the context of it is the PSBs’ public obligations of transparency and 
accountability. I argue the fact that this data is subject to additional scrutiny from 
other public bodies adds to its credibility, which can otherwise be a problem in the 
use of some kinds of administrative data. Like the market research data, the analysis 
consisted of collating multiple years to identify trends and calculating percentages 
from absolute values in order to ease comparison. 
 
The other purpose in using secondary data was in order to triangulate reports of 
regulatory practice from interviews with people from the NRAs. For this purpose 
only data from administrative records was used and as I described above, this data 
was in different forms. The data I received from the BC in Macedonia was a list of 
all decisions taken by the Council against broadcasters from January 2007 through 
October 2011. Each entry contained the following information: the name and type of 
broadcaster, the article and law violated, the nature of the violation, the decision 
taken by the BC, whether a court case was raised by the BC or the broadcaster and 
the outcome. As the number of individual types of violations was great, I created 
categories and coded the individual cases. For example, both the showing of a film at 
an inappropriate hour and failing to adequately display the rating of a programme 
were coded in the category called “protection of minors”. I also coded for the rule 
broken and the type of enforcement measure chosen, entering all of the codes into 
SPSS along with the year and kind of broadcaster. The codebook for this process can 
be found in Annex 5. Using basic cross-tabulation, I then was able to see what 
categories of violations and measures were used over time.  
 
In Slovenia, the data I received from APEK and that I found in annual reports from 
the Media Inspector did not consist of lists of individual cases of violations, but 
aggregated data for each year. This meant that it was not possible to isolate for what 
type of violations measures were taken. In addition, the options for both APEK and 
the Media Inspector in terms of measures that could be taken against broadcasters 
 101 
were much fewer than for the BC in Macedonia. No coding or processing in SPSS 
was necessary or possible. I simply reorganised the data in order to compare the 
decisions or actions taken across the years and identify the recorded referrals 
between APEK and the Inspectorate. The differences in the enforcement measures 
possible and in the manner of record keeping between the regulators in Slovenia and 
Macedonia meant that direct comparisons of the data were not possible. Instead, the 
tendencies of enforcement practice were identifiers for each case and the cases 
compared at the level of the answers to Sub-RQ1 about rules and practices and Sub-
RQ3 about relationships. 
4.4.3 Comparison: Focus and limits 
 
At the first level of analysis the Slovenian and Macedonian cases were each treated 
separately. Interview transcripts were analysed thematically in a two-step process 
that combined deductive coding and inductive coding. Secondary data from both 
research and administrative records was analysed within each case in order to answer 
the Sub-RQs and triangulate information from the interviews. I have not gone into 
detail on the analysis of documentary data, but this was used in conjunction with the 
other kinds of data to re-construct the histories of media governance in the two cases. 
Using the contemporary accounts from civil society and public actors as well as the 
laws themselves, I formulated the timelines and the narratives found in Chapter 5. In 
a structured focused comparison, the interview data was compared at the level of the 
deductive categories of practices in answer to Sub-RQ1, norms and values in answer 
to Sub-RQ2, and relationships in answer to Sub-RQ 3. Fundamentally the two cases 
were compared in terms of the answers arrived at for the four Sub-RQs. This resulted 
in the identification of similarities and difference upon which the findings presented 
in this thesis are based. The diagram below illustrates the process and points of 
comparison.  
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Figure 4. 1 Illustration of points of comparison 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
Though there have been several calls for bottom-up approaches to Europeanization 
research (Bulmer, 2008; Dente et al., 2011; Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009; Radaelli, 
2002; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2008) it is hard to find examples of this type of approach 
operationalised into an empirical project. Those that do mostly use a process tracing 
methodology that follows a particular policy issue and looks for the causal factors at 
moments of domestic level change over time (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009). Good 
examples of this approach can be seen in Natalini’s investigation of Europeanization 
in Italy (2010), in Parau’s study of environmental conservation advocacy in Romania 
(2008) and quite recently, Zartaloudis’ research on employment policy in Greece and 
Portugal (2013). These researchers have admirably placed Europeanization alongside 
other potential causes for domestic level change without assuming its influence. 
However, I have not taken as my object of study particular policy change.  
 
Instead, I have defined the starting point of my investigation as media governance. 
Media governance as an object of study and therefore basis for comparison is a 
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theoretically defined category (Ragin, 1987, p. 7), as described in the previous 
chapter in terms of interactions among actors and structures. This approach 
necessitated a mixed-methodology research design that incorporated qualitative and 
quantitative methods as different ways of knowing. The mixture of methods also 
allowed me to investigate at the level of individuals and at the higher level of 
abstraction involving interactions among companies, organisations and other actors. I 
have taken a substantive theory stance to mixed methodology. Therefore, the 
methods chosen for data gathering and the analysis were all guided by the conceptual 
and theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3. Using the Sub-RQs derived from 
this framework, I first analysed each case and then conducted a structured focused 
comparison in the hope of finding and generating a hypothesis about the role of 
Europeanization in media governance in SEE. 
 
Generalisability is an issue with this kind of in-depth case study. A comparison of 
two states is not generalisable to a very large number of states. The findings of this 
research cannot be claimed about all European states or probably even all small 
states in Europe. My study on PSB in Slovenia and Macedonia already found 
strikingly contrasting situations to those found by Trappel (2010) in his study of PSB 
in Austria and Switzerland. Some degree of generalisability to small states in the 
region of South East Europe, particularly of ex-Yugoslavia or perhaps even other 
parts of Eastern Europe may be reasonable.  
 
The mixed-methodology approach and the diverse sources of data means that I may 
have cast the net wider than was necessary for answering my specific research 
questions, however this was done so consciously. The media systems of these two 
countries are highly under-researched. The country surveys produced as part of the 
Open Society Institute’s Television Across Europe and Mapping Digital Media 
projects provide useful information. The Peace Institute of Ljubljana has produced 
several publications on specific issues in the Slovenian media. These are important 
resources and will be referred to in the chapters to come. However, they are in effect 
snapshots of the specific period or issues taken through the normative lens of those 
organisations. As I mentioned above they can be seen as accounts of the events and 
issues of the time with acknowledgment of the respective viewpoints. Therefore, 
although my research design was primarily focused on answering the main research 
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question, I was also conscious of the need to fill a gap in available information about 
media governance and media systems in the two countries. It was a challenge to 
decide at what point to stop gathering data, especially for secondary data. Essentially 
that point came when it appeared that data sources were exhausted.  
 
As I mentioned above, more secondary data and reports were available in the 
Macedonian case. At the same time, my own previous knowledge of the situation in 
Macedonia was greater because I had worked there on media issues for many years 
prior to conducting this investigation. This was both a challenge and an advantage. 
The main challenge I had to deal with was the potential bias that might be introduced 
due to my deeper knowledge of the media system in Macedonia. I attempted to 
compensate by mainly starting my analysis with the Slovenian case, a strategy 
reflected in the organisation of the proceeding chapters. The slight unevenness in the 
available data and in my previous familiarity with the cases as well as the general 
plethora of varied sources of information made it vital to stick to the structure and 
focus of the comparison and the research questions.  
 
Another challenge was in the way I handled the analysis of data in the Macedonian 
case. In the interviews with those from Macedonia there were a few occasions when 
the interviewee discussed something that I had been a part of in my previous work. 
In these situations I relied on the interviewees accounts. In general those accounts 
matched my own recollections and often what people told me reinforced my own 
understanding or prior knowledge of how things worked. However, I was cognizant 
of the need to allow myself to be surprised and this did happen on several occasions, 
especially as I got deeper, or behind the scenes, of what I had observed previously. 
For example, although I had worked with the BC in Macedonia for several years and 
the organisation I worked for provided support to it in the form of monitoring 
equipment and external experts to help with strategy documents, I was never familiar 
with the internal daily practices of monitoring and decision-making within the 
Council. 
 
I had also expected more instances in which practices or relationships that I knew 
about from my previous experience in Macedonia, such as those between political 
parties and broadcasters, were not evidenced in the data. To the contrary, I was 
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surprised at some of the things people freely talked about in the interviews. Being a 
familiar face, and perhaps the impression that interviewees might have had that I was 
already acquainted with the situation, I think contributed to them being remarkably 
uninhibited in discussing their own decisions and practices. Having previous 
experience in the region also helped me access and engage with people in the 
Slovenian case. I had common acquaintances with many of the people I needed to 
interview and did not have any difficulty accessing people there. Common 
acquaintances and cultural and historical references, helped in understanding what 
people were talking about and move conversations along in the interviews. For 
example many interviewees made reference to certain programmes popular in the 
region, such a reality show from Belgrade’s TV Pink, as examples or used the 
Croatian public broadcaster HRT as a reference point for comparison, and the fact 
that I knew what they were talking about was a distinct advantage. It was also 
beneficial to have some knowledge of where to go to find secondary data, and my 
connections in the region helped me access sources that otherwise might have been 
difficult. For example, my connection at AGB Neilson Market Research Macedonia 
was able to put me in touch directly with the right person to speak to about getting 
access to the audience data from AGB Neilson Market Research Slovenia.   
 
For data gathering, my familiarity with the region and connections from the decade I 
had spent there prior to undertaking this research was a definite advantage.  
Nevertheless, it was a tremendous task to gather and analyse the many different 
kinds of data used in this investigation. This kind of bottom-up investigation needs a 
broad reach in terms of methods and data and in-depth theory driven analysis. To 
conduct such a project on a large N comparative project would require a significant 
amount of time and vast resources. If undertaken by multiple researchers, it may lose 
the consistency in the use of concepts referred to by Rose (1991) in the quote above 
that is possible with a single researcher. The conclusion from my experience in 
conducting this investigation is that bottom-up research on Europeanization is 
appropriate for single or small N case study based projects. Starting with a clear 
conceptualisation of governance can be a good place to begin that I argue is also 
suitable because it encompasses the rules, practices, norms and ‘ways of doing 
things’ that are the subject of Europeanization. However, I warn that there is a high 
risk of messiness in such a project, of being drawn in too many directions chasing 
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new angles. I cannot say that I achieved it perfectly, but I can say that I learned that 
strict adherence to theoretically driven questions – structure and focus – are 
fundamental to ensuring a bottom-up investigation can make a substantive 
contribution and most importantly ever be completed. 
 
 
 107 
Chapter 5: Media Environment and 
Regulatory Framework 
5.1 Introduction 
 
After the collapse of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Macedonia as newly independent 
states had the responsibility and the opportunity to redefine their respective media 
systems. Under Yugoslavia, the audiovisual media were synonymous with Yugoslav 
Radio Television (JRT), which was essentially a network of eight regional radio 
television centres. Though each centre produced its own programming and had its 
own channels, there was a great deal of shared content and most production was 
centred in Belgrade and Zagreb. Like most other European countries emerging from 
communism or socialism, Slovenia and Macedonia did not attempt to devise 
completely new models. Instead, as Splichal (2001) argued, they were part of a trend 
of generalisable imitation of Western practices. This was characterised by rapid 
liberalisation in the media sector, with slower changes in the public bodies and 
regulations at the heart of governance of these media systems.  
 
Across Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the freedom to launch private 
media was not so much granted by the new governments as it was seized 
independently once it was clear there were no longer barriers (Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2003). This was certainly the case in Slovenia and Macedonia, where policy makers 
later had to institute regulation and governance systems for markets already full of 
players. It was shortly after this period that authors such as Splichal (1994, 2001), 
Jakubowicz (2004), Sparks (1995) and others began to point out the problems they 
saw in these media systems such as persistent political control over media and 
unfettered commercialisation. Splichal (2001) pointed a finger at the West’s liberal 
market approach arguing it contributed to commercialisation (see also Jõesaar, 
2011), while others suggested that EU integration may help erode old mechanisms of 
political control over the media (Bajomi-Lázár, 2008; Jakubowicz, 2007b, p. 250). 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief history of the audiovisual media sectors 
in each country and describe the rules and state actors in media governance at the 
time of my investigation. This chapter primarily draws on the theory of opportunity 
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structures and considers the possibility that, as suggested in the literature, 
Europeanization may play a role in changing the domestic opportunity structures, 
particularly through negative integration (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2003). As I will show, 
I found little evidence of Europeanization contributing to the opportunity structures 
that exist in these audiovisual media sectors. Instead, I present evidence that 
liberalization began well before steps were taken towards EU membership and 
largely independent of EU policy. At the same time, I demonstrate that in both cases, 
political decision-makers have adopted formal rules distributing power and resources 
among state bodies involved in media governance in a way that may complicate the 
“diffusion and institutionalization” of EU rules and norms (Radaelli, 2002, p. 108).  
 
In the next section, I describe the evolution of the two audiovisual media sectors. I 
show how certain rules – or sometimes lack thereof – in each case, as well as other 
conditions or decisions, have shaped the opportunity structures of the media sectors. 
I begin to identify the actors in media governance in each case and the distribution of 
resources and power that constrain the outcomes that these actors can expect from 
their strategic actions. For example, this section will start to provide evidence on the 
rules and material and power conditions that contributed to RTVSLO and ProPlus 
being in positions to eliminate the competition of MTG’s TV3 and create an 
untenable position for DTT operator Norkring. In keeping with the concept as 
explained in Chapter 3, looking at the opportunity structures in these cases rather 
than just the existing market system or media system draws attention to the actors 
that have shaped these structures and their strategic goals in doing so. There are 
significant differences between the two cases in the way the audiovisual markets 
developed, yet some common trends emerge. Rapid liberalisation after 
independence, instability in legal frameworks and fierce competition, including from 
foreign channels, are common to both.  
 
Perhaps the biggest difference between the two cases is in the position of their PSBs. 
In the third section, I explain the laws related to governance of the audiovisual media 
sector in force at the time of my fieldwork in April and May 2011. Here I identify 
some of the key formal rules shaping the opportunity structure in each media sector 
at the time, providing an overview of the responsibilities and powers of the relevant 
public bodies and arriving at some answers to Sub-RQ1 about rules and Sub-RQ4 
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about material and power conditions. Changes to these arrangements made by the 
Law on AVMS in Slovenia in October 2011 and by the Amendment to the Law on 
Broadcasting Activity passed in July 2011 in Macedonia are not included. I briefly 
describe these changes and make some suggestions as to their implications in my 
conclusions. Understanding laws as intentional interventions that shape the domestic 
opportunity structures, I find that the legal frameworks in each country left 
significant room for political influence over the regulatory system, and in the 
Slovenian case limit the power NRAs have to regulate the market.  
5.2 Two Decades of Independent Media Systems 
 
Within Yugoslavia, broadcasting was in the hands of the state and of the party. Very 
quickly after independence, both Slovenia and Macedonia went from essentially 
having one broadcaster that operated a few different channels, to having a multitude 
of broadcasters.  I do not use the word multitude frivolously. Each country has a 
population of just over 2 million, yet as of June 2012, Slovenia had 81 television and 
90 radio stations and Macedonia had 75 television and 87 radio stations, including 
PSBs. 20  Despite this abundance, just a few players have captured most of the 
audience share and advertising income. The sharp difference between the two cases 
is that in Slovenia this elite group includes the PSB, whereas in Macedonia, the PSB 
has been relegated to the margins of the market. In addition, the level of 
concentration in Slovenia appears more severe than in Macedonia, and Slovenia has 
had significantly more foreign capital investment in its market than Macedonia.  
 
This section provides a unique history of the last two decades of the audiovisual 
media sectors in these two countries. It draws on accounts from reports made by civil 
society groups, some of whose authors were also interviewed for this project. Many 
of these reports present views coloured by the normative positions of these 
organisations and therefore express disappointment or frustration with increasing 
commercialisation and persistent political involvement in audiovisual media. 
Conscious of this position, I have tried to distil from these accounts the events and 
                                                 
20
 The most recent information for Slovenia can be found at http://www.apek.si/registri and for 
Macedonia at 
http://www.srd.org.mk/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=38&Itemid
=27&lang=en.  
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issues of the time. I have also combined them with secondary data from market 
research companies and reports from APEK, the BC and the PSBs, as well as some 
recollections from those interviewed. The interview data used here is minimal. The 
few references in this chapter to interview data come from the category of responses 
coded as “practices” that referred to past practice and are used only to fill in detail on 
or corroborate events evidenced in the documents.  
5.2.1 Slovenian audiovisual media  
 
At the time of independence, the Slovenian broadcasting market consisted of 
RTVSLO, the successor to the former Yugoslav State Broadcasting system, and 
Yugoslavia’s first commercial broadcaster Kanal A, which began broadcasting just 
before dissolution, as a television station covering the capital. It also had 19 small 
local or regional radio stations founded and operated by local branches of the 
Socialist Alliance of Working People and essentially formed a second public 
broadcasting network (Bašić-Hrvatin & Petković, 2007, pp. 23-24). Albeit 
minimally, cable networks had already begun to operate, offering multi-channel 
packages with many foreign channels. Some people had satellites and people in some 
parts of the country had access to Italian or Austrian free to air television, simply 
because of geography. Very shortly after independence, the state began offering local 
licenses for television and radio and the number of stations grew rapidly. Legislation 
and regulatory frameworks came later and appear to have been trying to catch up 
ever since.    
 
Post-independence Slovenia 1991-2001 
 
The post-independence boom in commercial broadcasting in Slovenia was almost 
exclusively local. Without any national strategy in place, the Telecommunications 
Office began granting licenses for the use of frequencies in 1993, for free, and for an 
unlimited period of time. According to civil society observers, this was done in the 
name of democracy and under public pressure, but the result was that all the 
important frequencies were given out to commercial broadcasters before the first 
media law was in place (Bašić-Hrvatin et al., 2004, p. 18). They were all local except 
for radio Ognjišče and TV3, stations connected to the then Christian Democrat Party 
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that received their licenses only days before the first Mass Media Act was passed in 
1994 (Bašić-Hrvatin & Milosavljević, 2001). During this period the essentially 
public local and regional radio stations, continued to exist owned mostly by state 
funds such as the Pension and Disability Fund or Development Fund (see Bašić-
Hrvatin & Petković, 2007). The Mass Media Act of 1994 established the 
Broadcasting Council and a legal basis for licensing but did so in the midst of an 
already fragmented market full of small local broadcasters. Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin, 
one of the members of the first Slovenian Broadcasting Council, and her then 
colleague at the University of Ljubljana, Marko Milosavljević, wrote in 2001:  
 
“The newly established supervising authority, the Broadcasting Council, 
which in accordance with the [Mass Media Act] became responsible for 
license allocations, thus ‘inherited’ a depleted frequency fund, a chaotic 
ownership situation in the newly founded media companies, and 
inadequate (or even non-existent) program plans which served as the 
basis for allocating broadcasting license[s].” (Bašić-Hrvatin & 
Milosavljević, 2001, p. 15) 
 
Frequencies are a national resource and the license rules determine the division of 
these resources. The fact that, in Slovenia, the rules allowed for licenses to be bought 
and sold easily, and licenses were given for an unlimited time, had consequences for 
the opportunity structure in the media sector. The process of consolidation within the 
market began very quickly. ProPlus’ PopTV, now the country’s most popular 
television station began in 1995. It took off with an investment by American-owned 
Central European Media Enterprises (CME) in ProPlus, which acquired 78% of the 
company alongside two Slovenian companies (Sparks, 1999). ProPlus started to 
build a national network through agreements to provide programmes and sell 
advertising on behalf of local stations (Bayer, 2002, pp. 21-22). ProPlus acquired 
Kanal A in 1999 from its local owners and the Scandinavian Broadcasting System, 
which had acquired approximately a third of the company in 1997 (Terzis, 2007). 
Kanal A had struggled since its inception, and according to observers from The 
Peace Institute, ProPlus turned it into a dumping ground for re-runs and second rate 
foreign programmes (Bašić-Hrvatin & Milosavljević, 2001). The radio market 
displayed similar trends, with larger companies buying out smaller stations to form 
national networks, but without foreign investments (see APEK, 2009, pp. 14-15). 
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These started with the unofficial practice of broadcasting the same programme on 
multiple local stations, but have since been allowed to register as networks. 
 
One of the problems with the 1994 Act identified by Bašić-Hrvatin and others in 
civil society and academia was the lack of sanctions or penalties connected with the 
provisions in the act, particularly in the area of media ownership (see Bašić-Hrvatin 
& Milosavljević, 2001, pp. 40-49). The Broadcasting Council proposed changes to 
the Mass Media Law in 1997. This initiated a four-year process that included several 
proposals and a change in government, before it finally ended with a new Mass 
Media Act in 2001. An earlier draft received was criticised heavily when reviewed 
by experts for the CoE in 1999 (Bayer, 2002; Thompson, 2000), however the 2001 
Act basically implemented the rules derived from the TWF Directive and 
Convention was considered largely in line with the acquis by the EC (European 
Commission, 2002). It also included the option for local stations to be classified as 
non-profit or stations of special importance that were then able to apply for funds 
from the Ministry of Culture to support public interest productions. Most 
significantly however, the 2001 Act eliminated the Broadcasting Council as it was, 
ostensibly to combine the telecommunications and broadcasting regulators into one 
agency. The agency had been established under the Telecommunications Act 
adopted in May of that year. The new institution, the Agency for Post and Electronic 
Communications (APEK),21 still had a statutorily independent Broadcasting Council 
attached to it bearing some responsibility for that sector. These changes meant the 
abolishment of the old council and appointment of new members as well as the 
transfer of former Broadcasting Council staff to the new Agency. As I elaborate 
further below, the new rules not only changed the distribution of power at the time, 
but also facilitated government influence over regulatory bodies into the future.  
 
The position of RTVSLO in the market changed drastically over this early post-
independence period, as it no longer had a monopoly. Internally, it continued to 
function largely unchanged, although without the backbone of the larger Yugoslav 
system, until 1994 when the RTV Slovenia Act was passed, establishing a governing 
council made up largely of representatives appointed by civil society. According to 
                                                 
21
 Until 2004, it was called the Telecommunications, Broadcasting and Post Agency of the Republic 
of Slovenia (ATRP) 
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observers from The Peace Institute, this proved to be the beginning of a turbulent 
period that saw the governing council often at odds with the trade union and even in 
battle with the National Assembly over the appointment of a managing director (see 
Bašić-Hrvatin, 2002). Amidst these troubles and accusations of corruption and as the 
local commercial stations consolidated through networking, RTVSLO’s position 
withered. Though it remained one of the biggest players in the market, it gradually 
lost both audience share and advertising revenue to the new networks, primarily 
ProPlus’ PopTV. The following table shows the reach of the national television 
stations based on day after recall surveys from 1996 until 2001. 
 
Table 5.1 Reach of national television stations in Slovenia 1996-2001 based on day 
after recall - percentage of total sample answering to the question “what did you 
watch yesterday for at least 15 minutes?”.  
 
Source: Mediana, Slovenia 
 
This shows the gradual growth in the popularity of PopTV and the slow decline in 
the audiences of the public channels of RTVSLO over this period. Kanal A existed 
throughout this period, but begins to appear in the audience figures only after its 
acquisition by ProPlus and subsequent reformatting. The licensing rules and the way 
the frequency resources were distributed, helped define an opportunity structure in 
the Slovenian audiovisual media sector that empowered large commercial players 
and enabled the concentration of resources into the hands of a few actors in the 
market. By the end of this period, the domestic market was concentrated into the 
giant ProPlus and the PSB RTVSLO while marginalising a large number of smaller 
broadcasters. Historical institutionalists might explain this as a path dependent 
process stemming from the licensing rules. However, I argue this explanation misses 
out the political interests involved in shaping the structure in this manner. The 
licensing rules could have been changed many times, as during this period political 
leaders did not shy away from changing formal rules in order to change the 
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Broadcasting Council and move its powers to the newly established APEK or to 
change the management of RTVSLO. 
 
Slovenian broadcasting 2001-2011 
 
A centre-right government took power in Slovenia for the first time in 2004. The 
new coalition quickly proposed amendments to the Law on RTVSLO to have a 
higher percentage of the broadcaster’s governing council appointed by the National 
Assembly, and with some direct party representatives. This passed with a very 
narrow margin in a 2005 referendum, and civil society observers argued that this 
meant that the new RTVSLO council had complete control over the appointment of 
the managing director who was given additional powers over programming (see 
Bašić-Hrvatin & Petković, 2007, pp. 144-148). The result of this was yet another 
shake up of upper management in RTVSLO, after which a large number of 
prominent journalists left the main news team. Despite all the shake-ups at the top, 
RTVSLO has largely held its ground in terms of the Slovenian viewers. PopTV 
remains more popular than either of the public national channels and there has been a 
slight decrease in RTVSLO’s popularity in the past three years. However, the 
channels of RTVSLO remain the only serious domestic competition for ProPlus’ 
channels. The table below shows the reach of the major television channels available 
to Slovenian audiences from 2002 to 2011 based on day after recall surveys. 
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Table 5.2 Reach of television stations 2002-2011 in Slovenia based on day after 
recall - percentage of the total sample to answer "yesterday" when viewers were 
asked, "When did you last watch..." 
 
Source: Mediana, Slovenia 
 
This table shows that Kanal A enjoyed a nearly two-fold increase in reach over this 
period, and the reach of TV3 also grew consistently. This data also shows the reach 
of the big international channels here as remaining pretty stable and the Croatian 
channels losing ground. The figures for audience share based on data collected 
through in-home Peoplemeter devices attached to televisions, tell a slightly different 
story in terms of Kanal A and the foreign channels, but the same gentle decline of 
popularity for the main PSB channels. 
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Table 5.3 Share of total television audience for stations in Slovenia 1999-2011 
based on data from home Peoplemeter boxes in a sample of households 
 
Source: AGB Nielson Media Research Slovenia 
 
Table 5.3 shows that the combined audience shares for the three RTVSLO channels 
together and the two Proplus channels together have both been decreasing. Similarly,  
in Table 5.2, the position of TV3 has been mostly increasing, hovering at about 5% 
in the last four years. As described at the outset of this thesis, despite these figures, 
TV3 stopped broadcasting in February 2012 after Modern Times Group, which had 
bought the station in 2006 decided to close the station (Slovenian Press Agency, 
2012; STA, 2012a). While the audience share figures for the Croatian channels 
mirror those for reach in Table 5.2, the data in Table 5.3 also shows a steady increase 
in the share of “other TV stations”. This group includes the regional and local 
stations, but primarily the multitude of foreign channels in addition to National 
Geographic and Discovery available through subscription services. The 
telecommunications sector in Slovenia was not considered liberalized by the EU 
until 2001, because of the monopoly that Telekom Slovenia held in fixed and mobile 
phone markets until January of that year (European Commission, 2001a, 2002). 
However, as can be seen in the audience share registered for channels available on 
subscription services in Table 5.3, this did not seem to present a barrier to the spread 
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of cable and other multi-platform services. By 2003, already 56% of households had 
cable subscriptions (Milosavljević, 2007, p. 436). By 2012, the penetration of multi-
channel subscription services was over 80%, though cable providers had lost some 
market share to IPTV, with penetration at about 40% each for cable and IPTV (SEE 
Digi.TV, 2013, p. 16). Many of these channels offer Slovenian subtitles operating 
almost as “local affiliates” of the transnational versions (Milosavljević, 2007, p. 
437), and several also have localised advertising in the Slovenian language or even 
from Slovenian firms. 
 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that ProPlus’s channels maintain the strongest position in 
terms of viewership, despite an overall decrease, but also that the RTVSLO channels 
come in a relatively close second. The size of ProPlus is much more sharply reflected 
in the advertising market. 
 
Figure 5.1 Breakdown of the total annual GRP Slovenian national television 
stations (not including GRP attained by smaller or foreign channels) 
 
Source: Based on the absolute values provided by AGB Nielson Media Research Slovenia. Note: 1999 figures 
begin with 1 May 1999. 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates that ProPlus’ holds by far, the bulk of the television advertising 
market to the extent that it can be calculated. The figures above represent the 
percentage of the total number of Gross Rating Points (GRP) 22 achieved by these 
stations in each year. This means it does not indicate actual advertising revenue, as 
various discounts and deals may impact the real income generated by GRP. In the 
last 4 years, TV3 showed steady increases, but seems to have done more to erode the 
                                                 
22
 The absolute values for GRP used do not include public service announcements or self-promotion 
by the channels in order to give a picture for commercial advertising.  
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position of the RTVSLO channels than those of ProPlus. Audience shares and GRP 
shares can be seen to describe the way a large portion of the financial resources 
available in the television market is distributed among the various actors in the 
market. They illustrate how important the rules on advertising are in shaping that 
distribution and how political leaders can interact with the market by changing those 
rules. For example, despite TV3 being out of the market as of early 2012, its share of 
advertising budgets is not likely to return to RTVSLO since the law on AVMS 
reduced advertising allowances for the PSB in October 2011. Advertising revenue is 
not the only financial resource in the market and the rules shaping the Slovenian 
opportunity structure still ensure a stable income for RTVSLO. 
 
The core of RTVSLO’s funding remains the license fee, which at the time of writing 
was still consistently collected, unlike in Macedonia as will be explained below. 
Advertising has been making up less and less of RTVSLO’s overall revenue, but 
with three national and two regional television stations and the same in radio, it 
remains the second largest player in the television market and one of the top three in 
radio. 
 
Table 5.4 Three main revenue sources for RTVSLO as a percentage of total 
revenue 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from data presented in the Annual Reports of RTVSLO from 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, and 2011 
 
Slovenia may have 81 registered local, regional and national television stations 
operating on various platforms. However, considering the license fee and the 
distribution of GRP shares shown in Figure 5.1, it is clear that RTVSLO and ProPlus 
hold the lion’s share of the financial resources in the country’s television market. By 
the time of writing CME owned 100% of ProPlus, which operates the national free to 
air channels PopTV and Kanal A as well as several cable or IPTV only channels, 
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having bought the 3.15% that had remained in Slovenian hands from the company’s 
Director of Adriatic Regional Operations in 2006 (Central European Media 
Enterprise, 2007, p. 120). As mentioned in the introduction, Swedish MTG owned 
100% of Prva d.o.o, which had the national free to air license for TV3, but closed 
down its operations and ceased broadcasting in March 2012 (Modern Times Group, 
2012, 2013). Shortly after, Pink SI, a Slovenian subsidiary of one of Serbia’s Pink 
TV, rebranded itself as TV Pink 3 (Agencija Medias, 2012) in what seems like an 
attempt to assume the position of the collapsed TV3. Pink TV’s version of TV3 is 
not free to air, however, and at the time of writing, it remained to be seen if the 
rebranding would move the station onto the charts from its previously negligible 
position in the market. Therefore the channels broadcasting nationally and free to air 
are those of RTVSLO and those owned by CME through ProPlus. Regional private 
stations with the special status of non-profit public interest channels receive some 
small state subsidies that are discussed further in Chapter 7, but have minimal 
audiences and advertising revenue.  
 
The rules shaping the opportunity structure in Slovenia have privileged the PSB and 
allowed easy concentration formation that the first foreign investors, CME, were able 
to use with their local partners to establish a dominant position in the market in the 
form of ProPlus. At the same time, the spread of multi-channel subscription services 
has led to an expansion of audiences for foreign channels with consequences for the 
already minimal resources, in the form of audience attention and advertising income, 
available in the domestic market. The evidence indicates that this was well underway 
before the country came into line with the EU’s liberalizing TWFD and 
Telecommunications Package Directives. Based on the history presented here, I 
argue that the trends identified – domestic concentration forming and increased 
competition from foreign channels – have occurred independent of the process of EU 
integration. No major changes can be seen in the Slovenian audiovisual sector 
specifically associated with the adoption of TWFD or EU accession. 
5.2.2 Macedonian audiovisual media 
 
Macedonia got an even later start than Slovenia in providing a legal basis for the 
regulation of its audiovisual media market. Though it separated peacefully from 
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Yugoslavia in 1991, the country was affected by the blockade against its largest 
trading partner, Serbia, during the Yugoslav war, and by diplomatic conflicts with its 
neighbours. In the early period of the Macedonian audiovisual sector, the opportunity 
structure was characterised by a lack of formal rules. Private broadcasters popped up 
like mushrooms with only frequency permissions for their individual transmitters 
from the Department for Telecommunications in the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. Some estimated that the number of broadcasters reached as many 
as 250, including radio and television (Ciunova-Suleska, 2007, p. 145). This was 
paralleled by a rapid increase in the number of local cable operators providing multi-
channel subscription services. A few strong players emerged and as the market data 
presented in the section will demonstrate, the material resources of the Macedonian 
audiovisual media sector are mostly in their hands, while the public broadcaster 
MRT has lost out the most. 
 
Post-independence Macedonia 1991-2001 
 
Most of those who started broadcasting in the period of the legislative vacuum were 
local or covering only parts of the country. However, two national television stations, 
A1 TV and TV Sitel, and two national radio stations, Antena5 and Kanal77, cobbled 
together national networks. These were already well established by the time a law on 
Broadcasting Activity was finally passed in April 1997. The law established the 
Broadcasting Council (BC), but the government retained the power to grant 
concessions to broadcasters, meaning the BC’s role was essentially advisory. One 
estimate was that by 1997, there were 95 television and 200 radio stations operating, 
but no one knew exact numbers (M. Jordan, 1997). Biljana Ilievska of the Agency 
for Electronic Communications (AEC) worked in the Ministry of Transport and 
communications at that time. According to her, the practice of the Ministry at the 
time was that frequencies were granted on the basis of the transmitter or repeater 
devices, in the same manner to broadcasters as to radio taxi operators.  
 
The figures for allocated frequencies, therefore, were not indicative of the number of 
radio or television stations. Concessions for broadcasters with associated frequencies 
began being granted in September 1997. The number of interested parties suggests 
that the estimates above for broadcasters existing in 1997 were not far off. The first 
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call received 190 applicants including 6 for national licenses, and the second call 
received 49 additional applicants including one for a national license (Broadcasting 
Council of Republic of Macedonia, 1998). The BC managed the tender process and 
made proposals, but in accordance with the law, it was the government that made the 
final decision on the allocation of frequency resources. More than half of the 
applicants received concessions. 
 
Table 5.5 The first broadcasting concessions granted in Macedonia in 1998 
 
Source: Broadcasting Council of Rep. of Macedonia 
 
The figures above represent the concessions granted to private broadcasters. The 
country was still left with an excessive number in relation to its population (Ciunova-
Suleska, 2007). The 1997 law also established a governance structure for MRT and a 
funding mechanism based mostly on a license fee collected through electricity bills. 
Unlike in Slovenia, where they were privatised, in Macedonia a small percentage of 
the license fee was allocated to support local public broadcasters, most of which 
were those that had been run by the Socialist Alliance of Working People of 
Yugoslavia. Therefore at this time, the PSB system included MRT’s three television 
and three radio channels as well as 29 local public radio stations, twelve of which by 
2000 were also broadcasting television (Broadcasting Council of Republic of 
Macedonia, 2000). Also unlike in Slovenia, in 1998 the Macedonian government 
separated the links and transmissions department of MRT into a new public company 
Makedonska Radiodifuzija (MRD) with a separate law creating a publicly owned 
network operator whose main task was to transmit the channels of MRT. 
 
Throughout this period, commercial broadcasters grew steadily in the market. The 
few national stations and those local stations based in Skopje dominated, but some 
local stations also grew in terms of production capacity and programme content. 
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According to civil society reports, much of the development of these local stations 
was due to assistance programmes and various projects from the international 
community, which decreased rapidly after 2002 (Šopar, 2005, 2008). The 1997 law 
also established a fund for production projects of public interest. Under this law, the 
BC made a proposal based on the results of a public call for proposals to the 
Government, which made a final decision on the recipients. Though civil society 
monitors claimed this fund produced low quality outputs and was politically 
influenced (Šopar, 2005, p. 1214), as a formal mechanism for the distribution of 
resources for production, it was key to the survival of many small stations. 
 
Initially, the opportunity structure of the audiovisual sector in Macedonia was 
defined by the lack of formal rules governing relations between the state and the 
market. When political leaders established these rules they ensured that the power 
over the distribution of crucial material resources, namely frequencies and license fee 
revenues for private production, remained in the hands of the government. The 
material conditions of the domestic market were changed by external inflows that 
helped boost the position of some market players. However, unlike in Slovenia 
where this took the form of large-scale foreign commercial investment, in Macedonia 
it came in the form of short term assistance or project grants, and therefore did not 
result in a long term foreign presence in the market. 
 
Macedonian broadcasting 2001-2011 
 
Already by 2003, one of the first two national concession holders, A1, had more than 
twice the audience share of MRT’s first channel. A1’s position was eroded slowly, 
especially after Kanal 5 and Telma, previously local Skopje stations, became 
national and the Albanian language station AlsatM was launched at the national 
level. A few local stations did not survive. Nevertheless in 2004, there were 5 private 
national television stations and 53 local television stations (Broadcasting Council of 
Republic of Macedonia, 2008). As the commercial stations grew, MRT declined. By 
2006, there were five private national television stations, the three channels of MRT, 
and 50 local television stations with 11 of the former local public stations continuing 
to broadcast illegally (Broadcasting Council of Republic of Macedonia, 2008). There 
was no regular audience measurement in Macedonia throughout the 1990s, so it is 
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difficult to assess the relative positions in the in that period. However from 2003, the 
data on average annual audience share shows MRT’s popularity declining steadily. 
Increasingly, people resisted paying the license fee, and even well before it was 
privatised in 2005, the electricity company began openly giving people the option of 
paying the fee separately, i.e. not paying it at all (see data Broadcasting Council of 
Republic of Macedonia, 2008, p. 37 ). MRT sank steadily into debt and financial 
crisis as it continued to lose audiences to commercial broadcasters. 
 
Table 5.6 Average audience share of total viewership for national terrestrial 
television stations in Macedonia 2003-2011 23  based on data from a sample of 
households 
 
Source: AGB Nielson Media Research Macedonia 
  
The process of drafting a second Law on Broadcasting began near the end of 2000 
with an initiative by the National Media Working Group of the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe (Šopar, 2005). Having signed the CoE’s Convention on 
Transfrontier Television and the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the 
EU obliging it to implement TWF, the Government of Macedonia officially began 
the process of making a new Law on Broadcasting in 2004. At the same time, a new 
                                                 
23
 In the diary method, a sample of households are chosen and asked to keep a diary of what they are 
watching at 15 minute intervals for a week. When Peoplemeters are used, the devices are installed on 
the main television in a sample of households and record data on what channel is being watched.  
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Law on Electronic Communications was drafted with assistance from the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) as part of its support for World Trade 
Organisation compliance (USAID, 2013).24 Both laws finally passed in 2005. The 
Law on Electronic Communications radically liberalised the telecommunications 
market, eliminating the local cable monopoly system and the monopolies in fixed 
and mobile telephony. It also finally moved the regulation of this sector out of the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications, establishing the Agency for Electronic 
Communications (AEC). This change in the formal rules ostensibly represented a 
major change in the distribution of power in the sector, but as I will elaborate in the 
next section, the government retained a high level of influence over the new 
regulator.  
 
The 2005 Law on Broadcasting Activity finally gave the BC complete statutory 
independence and the power to grant and revoke licenses. It also gave the BC some 
sanctioning powers and eliminated the fund for productions in the public interest that 
had previously been used to distribute resources to private broadcasters. Before the 
final version was sent to Parliament, drafts of the law were reviewed three times by 
experts from the EC and appointed by the CoE and Stability Pact.25 The law was 
deemed to be largely in line with the acquis with the Commission warning of the 
need to insure stable independent financing for the PSB (European Commission, 
2006, p. 32) However as in Slovenia, the new law meant that a new council had to be 
appointed and as I will show below, the political parties in government still retained 
influence over the selection. 
 
                                                 
24
 Also reported in the following internal USAID documents: 
 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacf743.pdf 
http://tcb.eads.usaidallnet.gov/docs/car/2005/macedonia.pdf 
25
 The expert on behalf of the Council of Europe and Stability Pact was Karol Jakubowicz who 
reviewed three versions of the law. The last review was done by him at the experts of the EC’s DG 
Information Society “Analysis and Review of the draft law on broadcasting activity of ‘the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ prepared by the Ministry of Transport and Communications” 
Strasborg ATCM (2005)005 can be found here http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/ext/fyrom_en.pdf 
while the previous ones were: “Comments on a draft Broadcasting Law of ‘the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia’”, ATCM(2003)017, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe, 28 July 2003; “Analysis and review of Draft Law on broadcasting activity of ‘the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’” Working version prepared by a working group 
ATCM(2004)031, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, 23 
November 2004) 
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One of the first things that the new BC had to deal with was the transfer from 
concessions to licenses. This was a golden opportunity for a culling of broadcasters 
based on technical standards or some strategy for the market. However, according to 
Zoran Stefanoski, who was a BC Council member at the time, the period in which 
the transition had to be made was short and was also interrupted by BC’s obligation 
to monitor the 2006 elections. He recalled that in order to save themselves the 
trouble, the Council Members decided to essentially transfer all concessions to 
licenses by inviting all concession holders to apply and granting licenses to all who 
did. This meant that the distribution of frequency resources made under the period in 
which it was done by government decision was maintained. The only reduction in the 
number of broadcasters came from the elimination of the local public broadcasters, 
which were forced by the 2005 law to either privatise or close. In 2008, the Council 
granted another eighteen national television licenses by giving license for broadcast 
on satellite to stations aimed at the domestic market via re-broadcast through cable 
(Broadcasting Council of Republic of Macedonia, 2009b). Despite the wealth of new 
national stations, A1 and Sitel televisions remained dominant through 2010 as shown 
in the Table 5.6 above. In 2010 a financial investigation of all the companies owned 
by A1’s owner led to the eventual bankruptcy of the company. A1 lost its frequency 
as a result of the bankruptcy and ceased to broadcast in July 2011. From the data for 
2011, it appears that TV Sitel and Kanal 5 benefited the most from this closure as 
they each gained 3.67% and 4.01% of the audience share respectively. 
 
As the largest commercial stations battled it out among themselves, cable and IPTV 
expanded rapidly. The Law on Electronic Communications liberalised the market, 
broke down local cable monopolies and allowed bundled services. Research 
commissioned by the Broadcasting Council in May 2007 and June 2009 showed that 
a majority of the population subscribed to multi-channel services. By the end of 
2012, 84.5% of households used some kind of multi-channel service including 
satellite (SEE Digi.TV, 2013, p. 13). 
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Table 5.7 Penetration of subscription services in Macedonia – percentage of total 
households using each 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Annual Reports on the Broadcasting Market 2007 and 2009 from the 
Broadcasting Council of Rep. of Macedonia 
 
Despite the expansion of multi-channel services, the audience share for foreign 
channels in most recent years has been falling, from more than a quarter of audience 
share in 2007 and 2008 to just over one fifth in 2010. 
 
Figure 5.2 Percentage of audience share of foreign channels in Macedonia 2006-
2010 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Annual Reports on the Broadcasting Market 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 from 
the Broadcasting Council of Rep. of Macedonia 
 
The new laws of 2005 may have upset the balance among commercial broadcasters 
only slightly, but the Law on Broadcasting proved disastrous for MRT. Despite 
warnings from the OSCE, CoE experts and the EC, that such a model was likely to 
fail26, the political leaders dictated through the law that MRT must take control of the 
collection of the license fee itself, something that successive directors failed to do 
                                                 
26
 See the comments on draft laws cited in the previous footnote, particularly the last analysis 
AATCM(2005)005 pages 22-23. See also the report from the OSCE Representative of Freedom of the 
Media (OSCE Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, 2006, pp. 142-143) 
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effectively (Beličanec, 2009; Broughton Micova, 2012). From 2006 to 2010, the 
largest portion of MRT’s income had come from the state budget because of the 
problems with the license fee and extremely low amounts of advertising income. An 
amendment to the law in 2008 decreased the fee by more than 50%, but that did not 
help. Some improvement can be seen in 2010 when MRT began cracking down on 
legal entities such as hotels and restaurants. However, another amendment to the 
Law on Broadcasting in 2011 finally obliged the Public Revenue Office to collect the 
license fee, which had a significant impact. 
 
Table 5.8 License fee, budget transfers and advertising as percentages of the total 
revenue of MRT 
 
Source: Calculated by the author from the absolute values contained in the annual financial reports of MRT for 
2009 and 2011 
 
It is clear from the data above that advertising contributed little to MRT’s revenue 
between 2008 and 2011, which is likely related to its low ratings. As shown in Table 
5.6 above, by 2011 the total share of the 3 MRT channels was not even 10%. Private 
broadcasters dominate the advertising market, however, it is challenging to assess 
their financial situation or establish shares of the advertising market. According to 
civil society reports, discounts are common and often stations advertise the other 
businesses owned by their owners, or even external companies, on the basis of 
compensation with goods or services instead of cash (Beličanec & Ricliev, 2012, p. 
66). In the last few years, the BC has attempted to assess this based on self-reported 
data provided by the broadcasters, cross-checked against their annual reports sent to 
the Central Registry.27  
                                                 
27
 One can see from the figures here that not all licensed local stations have reported income, implying 
that either they have not had any income fulfilling the reporting requirements or are not compliant 
with reporting. Although this may mean the data is impacted in that some local station income is 
missing, it can be assumed to be minimal as the missing stations falling into this category would be 
very small to be reporting no income or not even tracked by the Central Registry. 
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Table 5.9 Breakdown of reported advertising income of private television stations 
in Macedonia 
 
Source: Calculated by the author based on absolute values reported in Annual Reports on the Broadcasting 
Market 2007, 2008, 2009 from the Broadcasting Council of Rep. of Macedonia 
 
Only in 2009 did the BC’s data breakdown the individual absolute amounts for the 
national terrestrial stations of advertising income and these figures showed that A1 
reported 42% of the total and TV Sitel and Kanal 5 each reported 17.3% of the total. 
This means that in 2009, the top 3 national channels received 76.6% of the reported 
advertising, which would indicate a concentrated market with A1 as the dominant 
player. The BC’s 2010 report did not include data from A1 because by 2011, A1’s 
records were seized as part of the investigation by the financial inspectors and 
bankruptcy process mentioned above. Although the closure of A1 is likely to have a 
significant impact on the market, at the time of writing it was not clear yet how its 
market share would be redistributed. 
 
Neither the changes to the rules on licensing nor those on the status and structure of 
the BC from 2005 resulted in little change in the distribution of resources or power 
among the major market players. Smaller commercial media saw their resources cut 
by the elimination of the fund of productions, but their reported advertising income 
remains steady. Even the liberalization of the telecommunications sector, which 
represented a major change to the rules defining opportunity in the sector, has not 
resulted in an overall increase in the audience share for foreign channels. The major 
change in this period was that the 2005 rules on the license fee created an 
opportunity structure in Macedonia in which the PSB was severely disadvantaged 
with major consequences for it in terms of material resources. Although the rules 
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were changed again in 2011, the relative positions of the market players may take 
some time to adjust, if at all. In general, the data shows a greater diversity of players 
in the Macedonian market than the Slovenian, however, the imbalance in audience 
and advertising shares between national and local is similar. I found no evidence that 
the trends in the market were impacted by the adoption of TWFD in 2005 or the 
achievement of candidate status. 
5.2.3 Liberalization and concentration 
 
For both Slovenia and Macedonia, the story of the last 20 years is one of frequent 
changes to the rules defining their domestic opportunity structures in the audiovisual 
media sector. Each has seen three different institutional arrangements for the 
regulation of audiovisual media, and liberalization in broadcasting and 
telecommunications have been key processes of the period. Both started with only a 
ministerial department licensing frequency use, subsequently forming Broadcasting 
Councils, and then changing into yet a third variation. In both cases, the audiovisual 
sectors were first characterised by a lack of rules, the immediate breakdown of 
former state monopolies and rapid expansion of commercial stations. The Slovenian 
opportunity structure was then shaped by licensing rules that enabled easy 
concentration formation and rules that protected the privileged position of the PSB. 
The Macedonian licensing rules were changed twice, but with little consequence for 
commercial stations; however the PSB’s material resources were drastically 
impacted by changes to the rules on its financing. While RTVSLO enjoyed steady 
revenue from the license fee and a solid position in the advertising market, MRT saw 
its audience shares plummet and was dependent on direct transfers from the state 
budget. The numerous local broadcasters in both Slovenia and Macedonia maintain 
almost negligible percentages of audience share and receive minimal advertising 
income. 
 
One thing that can be observed in both cases is that the developments in the markets 
show steady trends that appear unaffected by EU related developments, such as the 
adoption of TWFD or progress in the accession process. It has been argued that the 
liberalising and market opening policies of the EU are particularly damaging to small 
state’s media systems, making them vulnerable to inflows of foreign channels (Meier 
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& Trappel, 1991; Puppis, d'Haenens, Steinmaurer, & Künzler, 2009; Trappel, 1991). 
This argument implies that Europeanization plays a role through EU rules 
influencing the domestic opportunity structures so as to disempower domestic 
broadcasters in relation to foreign ones. However the evidence here does not support 
this explanation. In Slovenia, the data shows foreign channels increasing in audience 
share and eating into the domestic advertising market. However it also shows that 
this process began long before the country’s laws were aligned with EU rules 
indicating that it cannot be convincingly linked to Europeanization.  
 
The provisions of AVMSD provide a mechanism through which Member States can 
appeal against the direct and obvious targeting of their jurisdiction by stations 
located outside of it (Council of European Communities, 2010, art. 4); however, at 
the time of my fieldwork no action was planned to make use of this mechanism.28 EU 
rules that shape the European opportunity structure ostensibly empower domestic 
actors to redistribute resources within the market by establishing a mechanism for 
appealing against and removing this form of disloyal competition, but domestic 
actors lacked the capacity to make use of this for reasons discussed more in the next 
chapter. In Macedonia, the spread of foreign channels through multi-channel services 
also pre-dates the country’s 2005 alignment with EU policy on television and 
telecommunications. Also countering any potential claim that EU rules had the 
influence suggested in the arguments above was the evidence presented here from 
the Macedonian case that changes in the opportunity structure stemming from further 
liberalization in the telecommunications sector were heavily influenced by US bi-
lateral efforts, and that in recent years the position of foreign channels in the market 
has actually decreased. 
 
In this section I have given brief histories of the audiovisual media sectors in 
Slovenia and Macedonia and provided a picture of the media environments in which 
Europeanization processes might be taking place in these two cases. I have just 
argued that there is little evidence of Europeanization playing a role in the 
                                                 
28
 Both Vojko Stopar, Head of the Media Directorate at the Ministry of Culture and Tomaz Gorjanc, 
Head of Monitoring at APEK talked about the problem of foreign channels targeting the Slovenian 
market and carrying Slovenian advertisements, however when asked if any action was being taken, 
both were aware of the AVMSD provisions, but confirmed that the government had no plans to make 
use of it. 
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development of these environments. The next section focuses in detail on the formal 
rules establishing the regulatory frameworks for audiovisual media in Slovenia and 
Macedonia at the time of my field research. It looks at the responsibilities and 
powers assigned by law to the various public bodies charged with regulating the 
market players operating in the environments described above. This examination 
outlines the formal rules defining the regulatory bodies and their functions and 
discusses how these constrained their ability to intervene in the market and the 
expectations that regulators and market players could have of the outcomes of their 
actions. 
5.3 Rules Designating the Powers and Resources of NRAs 
 
This section explains how responsibilities and powers are distributed among the state 
bodies dealing with the audiovisual media sectors according to the laws in each state. 
This section will identify the various regulatory bodies and explain how they were 
organised at the time, when I spoke to those involved in April and May 2011. The 
examination of these formal rules at this time is important for two reasons. Firstly, it 
is crucial to understanding the consequences and outcomes actors such as media 
companies or NRAs could expect from their actions within each opportunity 
structure. Secondly, these formal rules partly define the context for individuals 
working within these state bodies, within which they determine the appropriateness 
of their behaviour and decisions. The information presented here is based primarily 
on the laws that were in force at the time. In Slovenia that was the 2001 
Telecommunications Act and the Mass Media Act of 2001, as amended in 2006. In 
Macedonia it was the Law on Broadcasting Activity and Law on Electronic 
Communications, both from 2005. References to the specific articles are noted 
throughout the section. 
 
Both Slovenia and Macedonia had regulatory arrangements involving several 
institutions. It was pointed out above that these arrangements and the divisions of 
power have changed often in the last 20 years. In my examination of the laws in both 
cases, I found that the independence of the regulatory bodies could be questioned 
based on the formal rules. 
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5.3.1 The rules and actors of Slovenian media governance 
 
The situation I describe in Slovenia dates back to the 2001 Mass Media Act with 
minor changes brought by the 2006 amendments. Additional changes were made 
with the Law on AVMS in October 2011, however they fall outside of the scope of 
this section because they took place after the interviews and will be only touched 
upon at the end of the chapter. The 2001 Act merged the regulation of postal 
services, telecommunications and broadcasting into one body, the Agency for Post 
and Electronic Communications (APEK), but not completely. There was still an 
independent Broadcasting Council with authority in some matters attached to APEK, 
and the power to impose penalties rested with an Inspectorate under the Ministry of 
Culture. Other institutions also played various roles in relation to the regulation of 
broadcasters. 
 
APEK and the Slovenian Broadcasting Council 
 
APEK is the largest of all the bodies regulating Slovenian audiovisual media, led by 
a General Director (GD) appointed by the government after a public call for 
applications. At the time I was in Ljubljana for my fieldwork, an Acting General 
Director had been in place for nearly one year. The process of selecting a permanent 
GD was being run by the Minister for Higher Education, Science and Technology 
who had just re-advertised the post. The 2001 Mass Media Act made the 
Broadcasting Council statutorily independent from APEK, however it received its 
budget from APEK and relied on APEK for “technical, expert, financial and 
administrative support” (Republic of Slovenia, 2001, art. 103). The seven members 
of the council were appointed directly by the National Assembly based on a public 
invitation for a term of five years (ibid., art. 100). Although the government and the 
Assembly have direct control over the appointment of the GD and the Broadcasting 
Council, the five-year term means that there can be overlap in terms of political 
influence. This did not stop APEK from being ranked lower on independence by the 
INDIREG study for its lack of an independently selected board (Hans Bredow 
Institute for Media Research et al., 2011, p. 291). 
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The Broadcasting Council was not set up as a board of APEK. The law limited its 
role largely to giving opinions, which are non-binding to the institutions that receive 
them. The Broadcasting Council gives opinions or makes proposals either to APEK 
or the Ministry of Culture on: 
 
1. “the issue, transfer and revocation” of licenses for broadcasting; 
2. the selection of broadcasters to get frequencies; 
3. the limitation of concentration in change of ownership questions; 
4. criteria for the types of broadcasters and in-house production; 
5. the list of events of public importance. (Republic of Slovenia, 2001, art. 
100)  
 
The 2001 law gave the Broadcast Council the power to approve or give agreement, 
in the tendering of frequencies for the purposes of broadcasting (ibid., art. 104a) and 
for the “regulations laying down the procedures” for issuing and changing licenses 
(ibid., art. 100).  
 
Since the 2001 law, APEK makes the decisions that can be challenged in court. 
Although it is also responsible for postal services and, since April 2011, railroads, at 
the time of writing most of APEK’s resources were devoted to the supervision of 
telecommunications and broadcasting. In addition to a department charged with 
monitoring the use of spectrum, it also had inspectors with the power to fine anyone 
using the spectrum in a manner contrary to law. It managed the registration of 
network operators such as cable companies, which is an administrative procedure. 
The licensing of broadcasters was done irrespective of frequency, whereas licensing 
for terrestrial broadcast followed a different procedure requiring a tender. According 
to the law, interested parties submit an application and APEK “shall” issue the 
license if they fulfil the criteria (Republic of Slovenia, 2001, art. 105). This could 
imply a absense of discretionary power to say no other than for incomplete 
applications. APEK was responsible for monitoring the programme of broadcasters 
in terms of compliance with standards, advertising limits, content quotas and license 
format. In the 2001 Mass Media Act, it had the following sanctions at its disposal to 
use when violations were noted: 
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1. issue a written warning with an order to correct the problem within a 
stipulated period of time between one and six months 
2. suspend a license for a maximum of three months 
3. revoke a license (ibid., art. 109) 
 
Many of the violations are connected to monetary fines in the penalty clauses of the 
Mass Media Act. However, unlike for telecommunications or postal services, APEK 
did not have inspectors with the authority to fine broadcasters for violation of the 
Mass Media Act.  
 
Ministry of Culture, Media and Culture Inspectorate, and others 
 
The power to penalise audiovisual media according to the monetary fines in the 
penalty clauses of the Mass Media Act was granted by law to the Culture and Media 
Inspectorate.  
 
“Administrative and inspection supervision of the implementation of the 
present Act shall be conducted by the ministry responsible for culture. . . 
Expert supervision of the implementation of the provisions of the present 
Act shall be conducted by the Agency.” (Republic of Slovenia, 2001, art. 
108, 109) 
 
In 2011 the Inspectorate was organisationally within the Ministry of Culture and 
under its budget, but operated independently and from a different location. The 
Inspectorate had a Chief Inspector and one Inspector for Media among others. Based 
on evidence, the Inspector could issue a fine directly and immediately to a media 
company. These fines could be appealed in court, and in such cases APEK could be 
called upon to provide evidence as the expert body. 
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Figure 5. 3 Diagram of the regulatory bodies in Slovenia April 2011 
 
Source: The author, based on the Slovenian Mass Media Act of 2001 
The Ministry of Culture also had a Media Registry and a Media Directorate, which at 
the time of my visit consisted of a Director and three others. All media had to 
register in the Mass Media Registry in order to operate in Slovenia. They had to 
provide evidence of entry in the court register and information such as contact 
details, ownership, coverage area and editor’s name (Republic of Slovenia, 2001, art. 
12). While an applicant could be required to re-submit if there is information 
missing, a medium cannot be refused registry if it fulfils the conditions (ibid., art. 13) 
making it purely an administrative procedure. The Directorate, which was an integral 
part of the Ministry, was responsible for decisions on the distribution of funds from 
the state budget for the support of public interest production. In the 2001 Act it was 
also given the power to approve, or not, changes in ownership and although it had to 
get coverage data from APEK and an opinion from the Broadcast Council, neither 
obliged it in any way in regards to the decision (ibid., art. 58). Those adopting the 
law therefore gave the ministry power over the distribution of resources for 
production and to intervene in relation to the concentration of material or power 
resources in the market. 
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Table 5.10 Table of responsibilities and powers of Slovenian regulatory bodies 
April 2011 
 
Source: The author, based on the Slovenian Mass Media Act of 2001 
 
In relation to potential media concentration in the audiovisual sector, the 
Competition Protection Office (UVK) within the Ministry of Economy had the 
power to act on complaints as it does in any other business sector. An examination of 
their case record showed that though most cases related to media have involved print 
media, the UVK did rule in favour of ProPlus in 2007 in a case challenging its 
position in the advertising market (Produkcija Plus v Televideo, 2007). As with any 
business, financial inspectors, labour inspectors and others also had authority over 
any audiovisual media company. Although there was an Intellectual Property Office, 
it had no enforcement powers, and issues of copyright infringement in the 
audiovisual media sector were dealt with by the courts either as civil cases pressed 
by rights holders or as criminal cases handled by the police and Public Prosecutors 
Office (Slovenian Intellectual Property Office, 2006-2011). 
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5.3.2 Rules and actors of Macedonian audiovisual media governance 
 
The Law on Broadcasting Activity and the Law on Electronic Communications of 
2005 established the statutory arrangements governing the audiovisual media sector 
in Macedonia current at the time of my fieldwork. As pointed out above, many 
amendments to the rules have been made since. Most of the changes related to the 
financing of MRT, and none have changed the responsibilities or powers of the 
regulatory bodies. However, the most recent amendment passed in July 2011, 
changed the rules on the appointment of BC Council Members. This change allowed 
six new Council Members to be appointed under the government at the time. As with 
Slovenia, a review of the legislation raises questions about the independence of the 
regulatory bodies. 
 
Broadcasting Council and the Agency for Electronic Communications 
 
At the time of this research, the main aspects of broadcasting regulation were divided 
between the BC and the Agency for Electronic Communications (AEK) with most of 
the responsibility for broadcasting placed on the BC. According to the 2005 Law, the 
BC had 9 Council Members all appointed by Parliament upon nomination by the 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Inter-University Committee, the Journalists 
Association, and the Parliamentary Nominations Commission (Republic of 
Macedonia, 2005b, art. 26). Though the first selection had staggered mandates, all 
members were appointed for 6 years (ibid. art. 28). The Council Members of the BC 
were fully employed in the BC and were served by a professional staff led by a 
manager (ibid.  art. 30 & 34). The 2011 amendment increased the number of 
members to fifteen, adding the President, the Commission for the Protection of 
Competition, the State Commission against Corruption, and the Association of the 
Units of Local Self-Government to the list of nominators (Republic of Macedonia, 
2011). This meant the inclusion of three state bodies and the association for 
municipal mayors in the list of nominators, and therefore put more power over 
nomination into the hands of the ruling majority. 
 
This was already an issue with AEK, which had two levels of management: a 
Commission appointed by Parliament for five-year terms, and a Director appointed 
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by the Commission (Republic of Macedonia, 2005a, art. 12-16). Decision making 
power rested with the Director, and the Commission served as the second instance in 
cases of appeal. With regard to audiovisual media, AEK was only responsible for 
frequency management, setting technical standards for transmission equipment and 
the registration of network operators providing multi-channel services (ibid. art. 28, 
56, 59 & 76). Though AEK constructs the frequency plan and identifies free 
frequencies for radio and television broadcasting, it was the BC that tenders their 
use. AEK monitored the use of frequencies and has inspectors that have the power to 
seize equipment and issue fines in cases of violations. 
 
The BC was the body that grants licenses to broadcasters and can do so only on the 
basis of a tender, regardless of whether frequency use is in question (Republic of 
Macedonia, 2005b, art. 43). It was responsible for monitoring the programme of 
broadcasters in terms of compliance with standards, advertising limits, content 
quotas, and license format. In the case of violations it could take the following 
measures:  
 
1. written warning; 
2. written warning with the requirement that it be put on air; 
3. temporary ban on advertising and teleshopping from one to seven 
days; 
4. temporary ban on broadcasting of not more than three months. (ibid.  
art. 38) 
 
The law to some extent specified which measures were to be used for which types of 
violations. The BC could also choose to revoke a broadcaster’s license (ibid. art. 64). 
The BC had some authority over multi-channel service providers. These services had 
to register their programme packages with the BC, with confirmation from the 
Ministry of Culture that they had the rights to the channels included in their packages 
(ibid. art. 109). They could be fined for failing to register or changing their offer 
without registering the change, but not by the BC. 
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Table 5.11 Table of responsibilities and powers of Macedonian regulatory bodies 
 
Source: The author, based on the Law on Broadcasting Activity and the Law on Electronic Communications both 
of 2005 
 
Other institutions and their roles 
 
For many types of violations there were fines foreseen in the penalty clauses of the 
Law on Broadcasting Activity. Like APEK in Slovenia, the BC did not have 
inspectors that could act on that law and issue such monetary penalties, yet unlike in 
Slovenia, which had a separate Inspectorate, no other body did either. The BC had to 
charge the broadcaster with a misdemeanour in the misdemeanour court. 29  This 
meant that the courts play a significant role in the enforcement of the Law on 
Broadcasting, whereas for the enforcement of the Law on Electronic 
Communications, AEK had the power in both first and second instance. 
 
In 2011, copyright protection was still a problem in Macedonia (see European 
Commission, 2011a), especially among smaller broadcasters and multi-channel 
service providers. The State Market Inspectorate had inspectors responsible for 
authors’ and related rights and the Ministry of Interior had recently formed a special 
                                                 
29
 Based on changes in 2006 to the Law on Misdemeanours, first instance powers of decision and in 
most cases second instance have been passed to the relevant agencies responsible for the sector. 
Changes to the Law on Electronic Communications were made in 2007 to account for and reflect this. 
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section on copyright. As in Slovenia, the Commission for Protecting Competition 
(KZK) in Macedonia also had some authority over broadcasters. Its list of decisions 
shows that it has ruled in one case of change of television ownership in favour of the 
broadcaster (Decision: On the concentration between Pink International Company, 
Belgrade and K15 Television, Skopje, 2010) and against several radio stations for the 
combined selling of advertising (KZK v. Radio Ros-Metropolis, City Radio, Club 
FM, 2009), as well as in some cases related to cable operators. All audiovisual media 
companies were also subject to inspection by financial inspectors, labour inspectors 
and others. The role of these other inspectors was crucial in the recent closure of A1 
television described above. 
5.3.3 Limited powers and political influence 
 
This section has outlined the formal rules for the state bodies that participated in the 
governance of the audiovisual sectors in each case at the time of the field research 
for this investigation. In Macedonia, technical issues related to the infrastructure of 
transmission were the domain of AEK, and all issues of content and substance were 
the responsibility of the BC, whereas in Slovenia those two functions were combined 
within APEK. However, neither APEK nor the BC had inspection powers over 
broadcasters despite the fact that APEK had them for technical and infrastructure 
issues as did the AEK in Macedonia. In Macedonia, the BC had more options in 
terms of the measures that it could take against broadcasters, but had to turn to the 
courts for enforcement of serious or persistent violations and the use of 
misdemeanour law. In Slovenia the inspection powers to issue fines under the 
misdemeanour law for broadcasting were clearly housed in the Culture and Media 
Inspectorate. 
 
APEK was not completely independent in Slovenia because of the rules for its 
Director’s appointment, and the Culture and Media Inspectorate was part of a 
government Ministry. In Macedonia the rules provide significant room for political 
influence over appointments in both AEK and the BC, especially since the 2011 
amendments to the Law on Broadcasting. This examination indicates that the rules in 
each case enabled political influence over the bodies charged with regulating the 
market either by containing them directly within Ministries giving government the 
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power to appoint Directors as in the case of Slovenia, or ensuring appointments 
reflect parliamentary make-up (see also Jakubowicz, 2007a). The evidence also 
shows that the rules distributing power and resources to the NRAs could constrain 
their ability to intervene in the market and the outcomes they could expect from their 
actions. In neither case was the NRA most equipped to identify violations by or 
problems with market players given the power to make use of the penalties provided 
for by law, though Macedonia’s BC had more options than APEK in Slovenia. 
 
In the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis, laws are considered 
intentional interventions of governance (Kooiman, 2003) through which strategic 
actors, namely lawmakers, shape opportunity structures. They constrain the 
expectations that strategic actors can expect from their actions and my examination 
of the laws in Slovenia and Macedonia establishing the powers, make-up and 
responsibilities of the regulatory bodies indicate two apparent constraints. Firstly, in 
each case, though more so in Macedonia, market players could expect politics to play 
a role in regulatory decisions. Secondly, in both cases they could expect minimal 
consequences for actions that are in violation of the law, and this was more evident 
in the Slovenian case than the Macedonian one as the Macedonian BC did have more 
resources and measures at its disposal than the Slovenian NRAs. The issue of 
enforcement practice is taken up further in the next chapter. 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out the history of the audiovisual media sectors in Slovenia and 
Macedonia and presented the formal rules that define the state level actors in 
governance and constrain their interactions with the market. In doing so, it also 
began to answer some of the research questions posed in the previous chapter. In the 
first section, I identified the rules shaping the opportunity structures in each 
country’s audiovisual media sector in the past two decades (Sub-RQ1) and some of 
the consequences they have had for the distribution of material resources and power 
among the actors (Sub-RQ4). In the second section, I outlined the formal rules that 
determined the organisation and responsibilities of state bodies charged with 
regulating the audiovisual markets at the time of my field research (Sub-RQ1). There 
were differences between the two cases in the rules and the ways the sectors have 
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developed, but there was little evidence that Europeanization played a role in 
defining either. 
 
In the histories presented here, one can see that the liberalization of broadcasting and 
telecommunications markets were the defining processes of this period. As the 
liberalization of both markets is part of EU policy, a top down approach might make 
a link between EU rules and the liberalization that took place in these two cases. 
However looking instead at the development of the audiovisual sectors in these two 
markets as part of a bottom-up approach, one does not see Europeanization playing 
an evident role. In both Slovenia and Macedonia, liberalization of the broadcasting 
market began organically before there were formal rules in place and frequencies – a 
key resource in broadcasting – were distributed widely with little control. In Slovenia 
those in power in the early years established rules that distributed frequency 
resources among many small local players, granting a national license only to one 
station aligned with the church. It can be seen as within the spirit of the self-
publishing tradition recently liberated from a centralised system to grant lasting 
licenses to local media. However, in Slovenia the governing elite remained much the 
same in the early years and it can also be seen to have been within their strategic 
interest to preserve the position of the favourable PSB and other existing media. 
Nevertheless, media markets especially tend toward concentration because of low 
replication costs (see also Doyle, 2002, 2013; Freedman, 2008), and later in Slovenia 
the licencing rules encouraged concentration formation because commercial actors, 
some backed by foreign capital, made use of the easy transferability of frequencies.  
 
In Macedonia, the rules adopted by the political parties in power kept frequency 
distribution in the hands of the government until 2005 and even after this power was 
transferred to the NRA, its decision makers initially maintained the distribution of 
resources by simply issuing licenses to concession holders. In Slovenia, audience and 
advertising shares are concentrated into the hands of ProPlus, the CME-owned 
commercial broadcast company and RTVSLO, the PSB. In Macedonia, the audience 
and advertising shares are mainly split among a handful of national terrestrial 
stations. MRT, the PSB, has been marginalised after being bankrupt by crucial 
changes made in the law related to its financing that radically altered the domestic 
opportunity structure. In both countries, local and regional stations are severely 
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disadvantaged in the distribution of material resources in the market. Also in both 
countries cable and other multi-channel subscription services have spread 
consistently since independence reaching high rates of penetration. This has brought 
in heavy competition from foreign channels into both markets. Telecommunications 
liberalization is part of the acquis, but I did not find evidence of EU influence in the 
expansion of foreign channels as this trend began well before alignment with EU 
rules.  
 
After examining the formal rules constituting the NRAs in each country and 
allocating their powers and responsibilities, I conclude two things. In both cases, but 
more so in Slovenia, the evidence shows that the formal rules limited the powers of 
the NRAs. The power and even the human resources for regulating the actors in the 
market were distributed such that in neither Macedonia nor Slovenia did the main 
regulatory body monitoring broadcasters’ behaviour have the power to use the 
penalties foreseen for violations of the laws. In the Slovenian system, the authority to 
monitor frequency use and programme content was housed in APEK, however 
APEK lacked the inspection power to make use of misdemeanour law and therefore, 
most penalties related to programme content. This was given to an Inspectorate 
attached to the Ministry of Culture in which one person was responsible for media.30 
In Macedonia technical standards and frequency use were supervised by AEK, which 
had direct powers of enforcement. The authority to monitor programme content was 
given to the BC. While it had some measures it could use against broadcasters, the 
inspection power to use monetary penalties was not granted to any agency or state 
body, but could only be used through the courts.  
 
NRAs are key actors in audiovisual media governance. Constrained by the 
opportunity structures in their sectors they interact with market players, other state 
bodies, civil society and other actors. The evidence presented in this chapter 
indicates that the opportunity structures in the Slovenian and Macedonian cases had 
been shaped through laws such that political influence over the NRAs was 
                                                 
30 This was changed in October 2011 with article 39 of the Law on AVMS, which said that APEK 
must carry out the “administrative supervision and inspection” for that Act. This means that APEK 
does now have the power to issue fines under misdemeanour law in relation to the provisions in that 
law, but not the entire Mass Media Act. At the time of writing, APEK was still implementing these 
changes, as its staff members are required to have certain qualifications in order to act upon 
misdemeanour cases.  
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maintained and the NRAs had limited power to interact with market actors. These 
findings provide concrete examples of the mechanisms of control by political elites 
lamented by Jakubowicz, Splichal and other media scholars (Bašić-Hrvatin et al., 
2004; Jakubowicz, 2007b, 2008; Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008a; Splichal, 1999, 
2001). As will be discussed further in the next chapter, these constraints on the 
NRAs also have implications for the implementation of rules and norms in the sector 
that go beyond the socially constructed structures in national administrations 
identified by some Europeanization scholars (e.g. culture of compliance in Falkner et 
al., 2007). 
 
At the same time, the markets evolved such that the vast majority of material 
resources within the market were held by a few main players; in Slovenia ProPlus 
and RTVSLO and in Macedonia the national commercial stations. One can see in the 
development of these markets how the position achieved by ProPlus in the Slovenian 
market and the rules privileging RTVLSO with control over transmission networks 
might have contributed to the situation described above that resulted in the market 
exit of two major European companies, Norkring and MTG. At the same time the 
rules establishing the powers and resources of the NRAs in Slovenia would have 
consequences for the outcomes that strategic actors such as Norkring and MTG could 
expect (see P. Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 945). Are these opportunity structures resistant 
to Europeanization? In the evidence presented in this chapter I did not find evidence 
that European policy contributed to the rules and distribution of power and resources 
defining the opportunity structures in these two cases. However as I discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, within the common market for audiovisual media services, 
the same rules and standards should apply to all market players. In the next chapter, I 
look specifically at the application of common rules and standards within the 
Slovenian and Macedonian audiovisual media sectors, first in terms of their 
reflection in formal rules through laws and then in terms of their implementation by 
those charged with enforcing them. 
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Chapter 6: The Fate of Common Rules 
and Standards 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As I explained at the outset of this thesis, one of the core tenets of EU media policy 
is that there should be common rules and standards for all audiovisual media service 
providers across the market, such as the common minimum programme standards 
contained in the AVMSD. Slovenia is an EU Member State with an otherwise 
excellent record of compliance with the transposition of EU Directives (Knill & 
Tosun, 2009; Sedelmeier, 2008, 2012), yet was the last Member State to transcribe 
AVMSD and did so only under threat of infringement proceedings. Compliance with 
transposition tends to be higher among Candidate Countries (Grabbe, 2006; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Toshkov, 2008); however, Macedonia was still 
being urged to implement AVMSD in recent EU Progress Reports (see European 
Commission, 2011a, 2011b), and, at the time of writing, had yet to do so. Top down 
approaches to Europeanization research start with a Directive such as AVMSD and 
look for variables explaining these delays. Those of the rational actor camp would 
look for influential domestic actors whose policy preferences were in opposition to 
the Directive (e.g. Haverland, 2000; D. Peters, 2001) or in the context of the 
accession process might turn towards an analysis of the credibility of conditionality 
mechanisms and the cost/benefit calculations of domestic actors in relation to the 
policy to be transposed (e.g. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Those in the 
sociological camp would seek explanation in how transposition of the Directive fits 
with the norms, values or compliance culture of the administrations responsible for 
moving transposition along (e.g. Checkel, 2001; Falkner et al., 2007). I had expected 
to find opposition to the EU’s policies or even the EU in general. 
 
Contrarily, in the first part of this chapter I show that the substance of EU Directives 
in this sector is not central to the stories of transposition delays in these two cases. 
Instead, I find that transposition is delayed when it does not line up with the strategic 
use of media law by political parties. The act of changing a law or rule is one of the 
ways actors or agents shape opportunity structures, determining the distribution of 
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power and material resources (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2003). Within this bottom-up 
study of media governance, the transposition of Directives is examined among the 
other intentional interventions of government (Kooiman, 2003, pp. 13-14) that 
change the rules for other strategic actors. Even in the instance in which the EU’s 
threat of infringement proceedings against Slovenia seemed an apparent case of the 
conditionality of EU membership obligations forcing transposition, I make the case 
that it was also used to legitimate changes in the distribution of power and resources 
among actors in line with the interests of outgoing political leaders. These tendencies 
could solely be attributed to the relationships between political parties and media 
deemed typical of Southern European countries (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, 2008). 
However, the approach of this investigation directed me also to examine the 
“material constraints” on governance interactions (Kooiman, 2003, p. 16), where I 
found the small populations in these two countries generated few human resources 
for policy making with consequences for the processes of changing media laws. 
 
After transposition, another aspect of the institutionalisation of common rules and 
standards can be considered their enforcement. As pointed out in Chapter 2, this area 
beyond transposition has been little explored by Europeanization scholars. In the 
second part of this chapter, I submit evidence that there is generally weak 
enforcement of rules and standards in broadcasting in both countries, but that this 
cannot be only attributed to inefficiency or administrative capacity (Falkner et al., 
2005). Building on the elaboration of the distribution of powers and resources 
described in the previous chapter, I show that one explanation for the lack of 
enforcement in Slovenia is that the system was designed by political leaders for weak 
enforcement. However, in Macedonia, the data indicates that established 
relationships between political parties and the media create an environment in which 
leniency towards all becomes the most appropriate choice for those charged with 
enforcement. In both cases, I find evidence that a tendency towards leniency can also 
be linked to the values and self-perceptions of those within the regulatory bodies. 
These findings indicate that in these two cases, there is resistance to Europeanization 
in the form of institutional misfit with the implementation of common rules and 
standards within the audiovisual media sector. 
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This chapter relies on various sources of data and examines governance interactions 
at both higher and lower levels of abstraction (Knill & Lenchow, 2001b). The next 
section remains at the higher level, looking at the changes of laws over time in each 
case and juxtaposing these with major political changes. This section draws on the 
laws themselves as evidence of how formal rules were changed, on reports from civil 
society groups and international institutions, as well as on interviews with some 
individuals who were involved in legislative processes. Interviewees were asked 
about their role, if any, in policy making, who makes decisions and how decisions 
are made. The interview data in this section draws primarily on answers to those 
questions. This is not a study of compliance, but of changes to formal rules as 
governance interactions. Therefore, as pointed out in Chapter 4, laws are not 
examined for compliance with EU rules, but compliance is accepted based on the 
reports of the EU. One of the limitations of this investigation is that I was not able to 
interview political party members who actually voted on the changes at various 
points in time, but in treating political parties as strategic actors in governance, I 
assume their overall motivations are either to get into government or to stay in 
government. 
 
After this, the chapter moves into the lower level of abstraction examining the 
practices, values, priorities and relationships of individuals. This section relies on 
interview data and draws on the answers respondents gave to questions about the 
rules applicable to the sector as well as their personal everyday practices and those 
within their organisation. It also uses the administrative records of the NRAs on 
enforcement measures taken to triangulate the self-reported behaviour in the 
interviews from NRAs with the official records of action taken and reports of those 
on the receiving end. The practices that I describe indicate that there is also 
resistance to the enforcement of common rules and standards in the market. 
However, I then present instances from each of the cases in which there was a push 
from domestic actors to implement EU rules. 
 
Based on this evidence, in conclusion I argue that although I found almost no 
evidence of opposition to EU rules for the audiovisual media sector, the opportunity 
structures in each of these countries are resistant to Europeanization as the diffusion 
and institutionalisation (Radaelli, 2002, p. 108) of formal rules and standards, except 
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when this aligns with the interests of lawmakers. I further conclude that, in Slovenia, 
the national rules determining the powers and resources of the NRAs also 
contributed to resistance at the level of post-transposition enforcement. This 
resistance I also attribute to institutional misfit in both cases, though more so in 
Macedonia where the appropriateness of decisions or actions were also determined 
based on the entrenched political relationships of individuals and media. I conclude 
that Europeanization does play some role in influencing the domestic opportunity 
structures where it aligns with the strategic interests of domestic actors and these 
actors make use of the EU to further them. 
6.2 Media Law and Politics: Shaping domestic opportunity structures  
 
I reviewed previously a large body of Europeanization literature that focused on 
variables explaining variations among states in transposition compliance. Many of 
these relied on the policy preferences of actors or the costs and benefits of 
transposition in light of EU conditionality. However, by taking a bottom-up approach 
I found that in each of these two cases, the domestic opportunity structures were 
resistant to the adoption of common EU rules not because of opposition to them, but 
because of the importance of media law to political leaders and because of the size of 
the countries. Before I start to present the evidence indicating the connection 
between media laws and politics in each case, it is important to introduce the 
respective political environments. Slovenia has been described as a ‘partitocracy’ in 
which highly centralised political parties seek to control various aspects of the social 
system (Kuzmanić, 2002; Tomšič & Prijon, 2010). This description is fully 
applicable to Macedonia as well. 
 
In Slovenia the division is between “left-liberal” and centre-right”, which roughly 
reflects also a division between those who were part of the “old” political elite and 
those who are “new” or were not part of the former Yugoslav system (see Makarovič 
& Tomšič, 2009; Tomšič & Prijon, 2010). The Social Democratic Party (SD) and the 
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) are the main forces in the left-liberal camp, 
led currently by former Prime Minister and SD leader Borut Pahor, while the centre-
right groups are, among others, the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and Slovenian 
People’s Party (SLS) with SDS’ Janez Janša as their lead figure (Tomšič & Prijon, 
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2010). Since independence Slovenia has mostly been governed by left-liberal led 
coalitions. The centre-right lead by Janša held power only for one term from 2004-
2008, and held power again briefly when it emerged to form a government after the 
2011 early elections. 
 
Macedonia’s political environment is similar, but with the added element of ethnic 
divisions to go with the old/new or left/right divisions found in Slovenia. The Social 
Democratic Party (SDSM) is the successor party to the “old” communist political 
elite, with its leader Branko Crvenkovski leading the left political block. The right is 
dominated by VMRO-DPMNE, led by current Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. The 
multiple political parties of Macedonia’s smaller ethnic communities are aligned 
with one or the other of these two options, most in long term coalitions that run 
together in elections. The Albanian political parties on the other hand, are 
independent from the two main Macedonian coalitions and are themselves divided 
into two main parties, one of which must be wooed into coalition with the winning 
Macedonian party after each parliamentary election. 
 
As the left and right have battled it out in each of these countries over the last 20 
years, there have been few years without a draft media law in progress. I argue the 
reason for this is the strategic importance of media law for political parties and the 
material constraints on governance actors for policy-making in these small states. In 
this section, I first demonstrate that media law is a tool through which political 
parties manage their relationships with domestic media. I then present evidence that 
within these small states other governance actors, namely market players, civil 
society organisations, and the NRAs and civil administration as state bodies have 
limited material resources and power to engage in policy-making or rules changing 
within the sector. 
6.2.1 Media Law as a Political Tool 
 
One of the characteristics of “partitocracy” described above is that following each 
change in government, there is a struggle for control over major institutions. 
Successive governments attempt to gain control of the NRA and the PSB, and to do 
so in a way that may last past the next election. This is one of the first ways media 
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law is used as a tool and creates a diversion from other changes, such as 
implementation of EU Directives. In Slovenia, I found that PSB was the target rather 
than the NRA, but this is most likely because as mentioned in the previous chapter, a 
government minister already appointed APEK’s director and the Media Inspector 
was a civil servant within a Ministry. Similarly, in Macedonia, PSB was the first 
target, but laws were also changed in order to gain control of the NRA. 
 
Media law to gain control 
 
The 2005 Law on RTVSLO was passed just months after the centre-right coalition 
came to power in Slovenia for the first time since independence. This law 
restructured the governing bodies and both replaced and extended the powers of the 
Director. According to a report by the Peace Institute of Ljubljana, this resulted in 
several centre-right supporters being appointed to these bodies and even drastic 
changes to editorial and journalistic personnel particularly in the newsroom (Bašić-
Hrvatin & Petković, 2007, pp. 147-148 & 154-155). A similar thing was attempted 
by the next government, a left-liberal coalition, delaying the transposition of 
AVMSD. Four of those interviewed for this thesis were part of the expert 
commission recruited by the Ministry of Culture to work on a new Mass Media Act 
by this new government. All explained that they first found themselves given the task 
of working on an amendment to essentially undo the changes made with the 2005 
Law on RTVSLO. One of these commission members recalled:  
 
“When they started to work seriously on the media legislation they 
realized that they should first, for purely political reasons, first change 
the law on RTV Slovenia in order to make it possible to influence the 
leadership - to put the right persons in the right places and so on. So 
they first started the procedure of changing the Media Act and then they 
stopped it after the first phase and instead of presenting a new draft, 
they presented a new draft of RTV Slovenia act . . . many of us were 
really surprised when we all of a sudden we have in front of us the RTV 
Slovenia act and not the media act.” (interview, Anonymous 1, April 
2011) 
 
This indicates that in Slovenia, the efforts to gain control over the PSB meant that 
changes to the Law on RTVSLO took precedence over the Mass Media Act, which 
included AVMSD-related provisions. In the timeline below, one can see that changes 
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often closely follow parliamentary elections such as the Mass Media Act in April 
2001, the Law on RTVSLO in July 2005, and the working group tasked to revise the 
law on RTVSLO in spring 2009. The last two in particular followed changes of 
government between right and left. 
 
Figure 6. 1 Timeline of media law changes and elections in Slovenia since first 
laws 
 
Source: The author 
 
 
In Macedonia the practice of using media law to gain control of the BC and the PSB 
is more apparent. The 2005 Law on Broadcasting Activity changed the status and 
appointment process for members of the BC, resulting in a new set of Council 
Members being appointed. Roberto Beličanec of the Media Development Centre 
(MDC), who was involved in the drafting of the 2005 law, recalled that in the 
appointment processes that followed, two proposed members were directly 
connected to SDSM, the governing party at that time. Following the 2006 elections 
during which VMRO-DPMNE gained absolute control of the Parliament, the 
government amended the Law on Broadcasting Activity, changing the management 
structure of Macedonian Radio Television (MRT) and reducing the license fee 
(Republic of Macedonia, 2007), thereby deepening the PSB’s financial dependence 
on the government (see also Broughton Micova, 2012). In the timeline below, one 
can see that the most recent changes have even occurred within a month of 
parliamentary elections. In 2008, there were changes to MRT, and immediately 
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following the 2011 elections, the number of BC Council Members was expanded 
from nine to fifteen (Republic of Macedonia, 2011). 
 
Figure 6.2 Timeline of media law changes and elections in Macedonia since the 
first law 
 
Source: The author 
 
 
Media law as carrot, stick and hot potato 
 
The other thing that one can notice from these two timelines is that media laws rarely 
get changed before an election. As I explained in Chapter 3, national laws are part of 
what defines the domestic opportunity structure, and one of the ways the state 
interacts with the market and civil society is through the intentional interventions of 
laws. I offer two complementary explanations for this that, although requiring a mix 
of metaphors, both point to the political sensitivity of media laws in these two cases. 
The first reason is that in some ways, it is useful for political parties in power to have 
media laws underway, but not resolved, providing them with both carrots, such as 
potential subsidies and sticks such as advertising limits. The issues dealt with by 
media law provide both an opportunity either to currying favour with or remind 
private and public media who is in charge. For example, in each of these cases, 
provisions related to the fate of local broadcasters and the question of how much 
advertising will be allowed on the PSB were key topics and open for change. At the 
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same time, media laws can be dangerous to handle prior to an election as in these 
environments they deal with difficult issues such as language and identity. 
 
In Slovenia, according to all five of those interviewed who had been directly 
involved in the drafting process, the fate of local broadcasters was one of the main 
points of conflict and negotiation in the drafting of the new Mass Media Act. Many 
local and regional broadcasters have special non-profit status and the right to apply 
for funds from the Ministry of Culture. The drafting process was marked by the 
struggle over whether this status would be maintained, what level of funding would 
be available, etc. In Macedonia, battles over subsidies for local broadcasters and the 
fate of local public broadcasters characterised the last drafting process, and according 
to Beličanec who participated at the time, so was the amount of advertising allowed 
on the PSB. It was very difficult to find out to what extent these issues were part of 
the process to revise the Law on Broadcasting Activity underway during this 
investigation, as the person leading the process was not allowed to consent to an 
interview. 
 
In addition to the controlling mechanism of leaving issues relevant to the financial 
health of media unresolved, I suggest that media laws can also be hot potatoes for 
incumbent parties in these two cases because language and identity come into play. 
In early 2011, the Macedonian Ministry of Transport and Communications released a 
partial draft of a new law, which included the implementation of AVMSD. This was 
harshly criticised by some media and civil society groups because the draft seemed 
to backtrack on the language rights of minority groups (Foundation Open Society 
Macedonia & Macedonian Centre for European Education, 2011; R., 2011). The 
Minister was a Macedonian from VMRO-DMNE and the incident created tension 
with the party’s main coalition partner, the Albanian DUI, as well as an outcry from 
opposition parties of various ethnic groups. In May 2011 during the immediate lead 
up to parliamentary elections, strict orders had been given by the Minister not to 
even discuss the law until after the elections.
31
 During the 2005 drafting process, it 
had been the issue of Albanian language representation on MRT and quotas for 
                                                 
31
 I had intended to interview someone within the Ministry and was told that an interview would not 
be possible until after the elections as the person had strict instructions not to discuss broadcasting 
with anyone. 
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domestic language production, particularly for music, that sparked protest in the 
press and in the parliament. 
 
The quota issue is also quite familiar to the Slovenians. When the AVMSD was 
adopted in Brussels, Slovenia was just under a year away from general elections. 
According to one person involved in the process at the time, the then centre-right 
government was not interested in tackling such a sensitive issue as the media law 
before the elections. It seems they were not naïve in leaving it for the next 
government. Vojko Stopar, the Director of the Media Directorate in the Ministry of 
Culture who was tasked with leading the process, recalled what happened when 
suggestions were made to reduce quotas: 
 
“There were organised protests with hundreds of musicians that said that 
these quotas must be higher because our government must protect domestic 
music production. We must fight against firms from Austria and Germany 
who are implementing music in our programmes. And on the other hand we 
have media, especially radio owners, who said domestic music is of poor 
quality, we will lose our audience if the quotas go up.” (Interview, April 
2011) 
 
Debates about national level content quotas often involve nationalist sentiments, 
identity, and arguments about protection of or loyalty to domestic production and 
artists (Bekkali, 2006; Broughton Micova, 2013; Iosifidis, Steemers, & Wheeler, 
2005). One can surmise that Slovenian and Macedonian politicians are not interested 
in getting stuck between domestic media and popular artists on national identity 
issues in the lead-up to an election. Quotas for the broadcast of domestic music 
appear to get the most attention during such debates, including those in 2011 on the 
unsuccessful draft Mass Media Act (Smokvina, 2011). 
 
A Slovenian exception 
 
The story of Slovenia’s failed Mass Media Act and the early elections in 2011 
initially looks like an exception in that a law was proposed right before an election, 
and therefore merits closer examination. I find convincing evidence that this 
exception does not negate the argument that media law is used as a political tool. As 
this happened after I had been in Slovenia to conduct the interviews, I rely here on 
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accounts provided in reports for the European Audiovisual Observatory and news of 
the time. The SDS-led government sent a draft new Mass Media Act, which 
incorporated the transposition of AVMSD, to the National Assembly in July 2011. 
This should have been the middle of its term, but it was already a minority 
government, having suffered a split in the coalition earlier in the spring. The law was 
rejected. The government quickly produced a new draft law for the purposes of 
implementing the AVMSD (Smokvina, 2011). A vote of no confidence in September 
led to the President calling for early elections (Voice of America, 2011), so a lame 
duck parliament adopted the Law on Audiovisual Media Services in October 2011. 
 
Though only ostensibly aimed at avoiding infringement procedures over AVMSD, 
the new law also gave more power to the regulator and reduced the advertising 
allowance on RTVSLO (Republic of Slovenia, 2011, pp. art. 28,29 & 32; Smokvina, 
2012). Neither changes to the powers of the regulator or a reduction in the 
advertising allowance for the PSB were part of AVMSD transposition. However this 
law, which had to be passed lest the country face penalties, provided a last 
opportunity for an outgoing political elite to use the media law tool. In the process 
leading up to the Law on AVMS there had been flip flops on the issue of advertising 
on RTVSLO. In April 2011, the person interviewed from RTVSLO was incensed 
that the draft Mass Media Act reduced RTVSLO’s ad time and did not extend to it 
the AVMSD’s relaxation on product placement. The initial draft of the Law for 
AVMS did not initially include further limitations for RTVSLO (see Smokvina, 
2011). Nevertheless, the final law did reduce the advertising time allowed to 
RTVSLO and it also transferred inspection powers and the ability to issue penalties 
from the Media Inspector to APEK (Republic of Slovenia, 2011, p. art. 39; 
Smokvina, 2012). I suggest that it is not surprising that two months before snap 
elections, the strategic interests of the largest commercial broadcaster were given 
priority. 
 
Why did the Slovenian government break the pattern and push through a media law 
right before parliamentary elections? The obvious answer is that the country was 
about to face charges in the ECJ for infringement of the AVMSD, which points 
towards EU conditionality. The threat of penalties cannot be ignored, but the 
transposition was done by a minority left-liberal government that knew it was going 
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to lose, and could theoretically have left an ECJ case for a successor to handle. I 
suggest that after failing to pass a new Mass Media Act and facing early elections, 
the SDS government used conditionality as an excuse to transfer additional power to 
APEK whose director it had just appointed to a fixed term and diminish the position 
of RTVSLO, which by tradition would fall under the influence of their successors. I 
find evidence for this in the way that the Law on AVMS goes well beyond 
implementing AVMS within the particular political context. It seems the outgoing 
SDS government made use of the credible threat of EU infringement procedures to 
pass a law that would leave the opportunity structure in a more favourable condition 
for its time in opposition. 
 
I have argued here that in Slovenia and Macedonia, political parties use media law to 
gain control of NRAs and PSBs, to preserve their influence over local media, or 
otherwise affect the domestic opportunity structure in their favour and maintain their 
relationships with domestic media. I explained that, in these two cases, media laws 
can also be politically dangerous because of the chances of touching on issues of 
national identity, so parties in government will avoid them in vulnerable pre-election 
periods. I suggested that the apparent act of desperation by the previous Slovenian 
government is an exception to the pattern of media law making, but does not 
disprove the claim that the pace of transposition of EU rules in the media sector has 
little or nothing to do with EU policy and much to do with the strategic use of media 
law by political elites. But why is it that issues such as the organisation of the NRA 
or PSB governing bodies, or even how much advertising can be on the PSB, can be 
so easily reduced to political deals? 
6.2.2 Too Small for Law and Rule-making 
 
Policy makers and other stakeholders are faced with multiple dilemmas and 
negotiations in the course of rule-making. This requires the work of individuals. At 
this point, I do not go into the structure-centred explanations for the behaviour of 
these individuals in the context of institutional fit. Here, I treat these individuals as a 
resource for state actors, as one of the material conditions that constrain the 
interactions among the state, the market and civil society (Kooiman, 2003). As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, when coding the answers in interview transcripts to 
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questions about involvement in policymaking and decision making into the 
theoretical categories of “relationships” and “practices”, I found so many 
spontaneous references to the size of these two countries that I created another 
category called “smallness”. The interview data shows the relationships and practices 
described by those individuals within the three governance actors and the references 
to the small size of these countries, many of which overlap with the other two 
categories. ProPlus’ Cene Grčar summed up many of the statements about size 
succinctly: “you know Slovenia is not a big country and there are not a lot of people 
who know a lot of things about certain fields” (Interview, April 2011). According to 
him and to Brankica Petković of the Peace Institute Ljubljana, there are between 10 
and 20 people in Slovenia who can talk about issues of media policy or strategy. In 
Macedonia no one gave a precise figure, but the number is probably about the same, 
as I found this limitation myself when determining whom to interview. 
 
The size of state bodies: NRAs and public administration 
 
In fitting with the conceptualisation of governance used in this thesis, “the state” as 
an actor, comprises several bodies. Firstly, in each case there was a ministry 
responsible for the audiovisual media sector. In Slovenia, this was the Ministry of 
Culture and in Macedonia, the Ministry of Transport and Communications.32 At the 
time I conducted the field research for this project in each of these Ministries, there 
was a department or sector responsible for the sector consisting of one head and two 
or three assistants. In Slovenia, the Media Directorate also handled all matters related 
to print press and other media. In Macedonia, the sector for Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications did not deal with print press, but handled all matters related to 
telecommunications. Beličanec in Skopje said: “When the whole audiovisual policy 
and policy for electronic communications falls on one person who has two assistants 
- end of story” (Interview May 2011). Even if the one person is as Beličanec 
described, “knowledgeable and relatively high quality”, this is still a limitation. 
 
                                                 
32
 In each case the sector responsible has since been moved. In Slovenia the Ministry of Culture was 
replaced by the Ministry of Science, Education, Culture and Sport in February 2012, but was later 
moved back. In Macedonia the Sector was moved to the Ministry of Information Society and Public 
Administration.  
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According to its Acting Director Miha Krišelj,33 APEK is an administrative body 
without the competence to take a position or be very active on policy or strategic 
matters. He argued that the Broadcasting Council attached to APEK34 does have this 
power and should play such a role. President of the Slovenian Broadcasting Council 
Dejan Jelovac, explained that his Council was very limited in the extent to which it 
can engage because it lacks its own administrative support. He said, “the main 
problem is that I haven’t my own, it means people engaged by the council and they 
are devoted to help the council with expert analysis and so on” (Interview April 
2011). APEK did not have a division for research or the capacity for analysis outside 
of its monitoring and other regular duties. APEK’s Head of Monitoring Tomaz 
Gorjanc found this a challenge in his work:  
 
“I think Western European countries are quite different. Especially 
bigger countries, they have bigger offices they are dealing with more 
analysis more monitoring more regular monitoring. They are ahead of us 
when we are talking about regulation. They have more detailed 
regulation, especially on protection of minors. They have more different 
documents or executive acts. They have more analysis on some fields so 
they can make some more general decisions from some product that 
arises in media practices.” (Interview, April 2011) 
 
APEK and Slovenian Broadcasting Council had little capacity for the kind of 
research and analysis that could lead to long term strategic contributions or the kind 
of detailed policy that, for instance, Gorjanc found missing in terms of programme 
standards. One individual from APEK was involved in the working group on the new 
law convened by the Ministry of Culture, but as an individual expert and not as a 
representative of APEK. 
 
The BC in Macedonia did have two people working in research, and published 
regular reports on the broadcasting market as well as a few ad hoc reports. The 
Programme Department headed by Emilija Janevska also produced detailed 
instruction documents and acts on programme standards and other content related 
issues that were then adopted by the Council Members. However, Cvetanka 
Mitevska, Head of the Legal Department, said that her small team did not have time 
                                                 
33
 Miha Krišelj has since left APEK for personal reasons and was replaced.  
34
 See chapter 5 for structure of Slovenian NRA 
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to engage with policy issues or changes to legislation as its time was taken up by 
administrative functions related to HR and procurement as well as court cases in 
which the BC is involved. Janevska and Chief of Staff Andriana Skerlev-Čakar 
participate on behalf of the BC in the group that had been convened a few times35 to 
work on a law to replace the Law on Broadcasting Activity and implement AVMSD. 
Skerlev-Čakar stated that the BC had been given the task of working on the 
programme standards because the Ministry lacked the capacity in that area, but that 
they had not been given or were involved in other areas of the draft text. The BC had 
more capacity than APEK for research and analysis of the market and contributing to 
policy detail on programme standards. Nevertheless, just as in Slovenia, the capacity 
of the NRA for engaging with larger policy issues and legislative changes boiled 
down to the expertise of a few individual staff members, who had been working on 
the broadcasting sector for many years. 
 
The size of market players 
 
In both cases there is evidence of limited capacity within the industry to engage in 
policy debates or strategic discussions. Janevska reported that getting broadcasters in 
Macedonia to contribute to the development of detailed policy on programme 
standards or new rules is difficult, an experience shared by Biljana Ilievska, 
responsible for the broadcasting spectrum at AEK. The lawyer for one broadcasting 
company participated in several such meetings and said that a journalist or even 
technical staff would sometimes come from other stations. When asked what the 
effect of that was, this person answered:  
 
“Well the Broadcasting Council has been transparent. They called 
everyone in, got feedback and did their duty. It’s not their fault nor can 
they do anything about the fact that the broadcasters don’t send 
appropriate people or have no clue. . . Often they ask my opinion and 
they’ll back me because they see me as being on the side of the 
broadcaster, so they’ll agree with me rather than the arguments of the 
BC.” (Interview, May 2012) 
 
In Macedonia none of those with whom I spoke from broadcasters were aware of 
AVMSD or involved in the process of changing the Law on Broadcasting in any 
                                                 
35
 The respondents could not recall if it had been 3 or 4 times.  
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way. This was surprising as except for the two producers from TV Sitel, all, 
including those from local stations, had personally been involved in the process 
leading up to the 2005 law through the Association of Private Electronic Media, 
which has since collapsed. The Head of the Legal Department of MRT, Todor 
Malezanski, was aware of the new EU directive, but not involved directly in the 
working group for the new law. He said that his role also covers HR and all other 
legal matters for MRT leaving him little time to engage in policy discussions or 
drafting. This was a sharp contrast to the conversation with Dejan Siljanovski from 
the IPTV, telephone and internet provider Makedonski Telekomunikacii, which is 
owned by Deutche Telekom. He was well informed on the drafting process and 
claimed to be directly involved. He was also head of an entire team devoted to 
regulation and law within the company, which shows that the foreign-owned 
telecommunications company had much more resources to devote to policy 
engagement than the broadcasters. 
 
In Slovenia, the situation was similar. Krišelj explained that the lack of contribution 
from the market hinders the regulator’s ability to develop more detailed policy or 
creative policy solutions:  
 
“We are fighting all the time to reach and to have more expert solutions, 
but the problem is really the lack of expertise in the media market. I 
mean it’s a problem. The big stations they know very well about the 
media law and the situation but the small broadcasters they really don’t 
know much. It’s a common problem of the small market we 
have.”(Interview April, 2011) 
 
He said that when they try to develop a new by-law or act the only ones to respond 
are PopTV and RTVLSO. When asked with whom he would consult about how to 
implement new product placement provisions, for instance, he answered Cene Grčar, 
the in house council for ProPlus. Grčar, who has been active in lobbying efforts at 
the European level in the Association of Commercial Television and was well versed 
on the AVMSD, also spoke of the fact that he and people from APEK consult on 
strategic matters. He also participated in the working group organised by the 
Ministry of Culture. Štipe Jerič of RTS Maribor demonstrated awareness of the 
provisions of AVMSD and said that local television stations were represented by one 
person in the broader group and consulted on the draft law by a member of their 
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association. Nevertheless, Milosavljević who participated in the smaller drafting 
group said that although they can put pressure on decision makers, local stations are 
weak in terms of expertise. He explained. “They know how to put pressure on those 
that decide about the money, but they don’t have any sort of legal department or 
research teams or expert teams or this sort of thing; it’s more intuitive” (Interview, 
April 2012). The person from RTVSLO’s legal department was unhappy that no one 
from RTVSLO was involved and that the PSB was only nominally represented by an 
individual who had long since retired from RTVLSO, but could not say who should 
have been. Like in Macedonia, the resources of market actors for engaging with 
policy processes in Slovenia appears concentrated in the knowledge of a few 
individuals tied to the main commercial broadcaster and there is very little expertise 
among the rest. In both countries, this has consequences for the ability of market 
actors to impact the rules shaping the opportunity structures in the audiovisual media 
sectors. 
 
The size of civil society 
 
Whereas in larger countries there may be many associations, organisations, and 
advocacy groups that specifically follow media issues or are large enough to get 
involved in media policy processes in so much as it might relate to their specific 
interest,36 this was not the case in Slovenia or Macedonia. In each case there was a 
journalists’ association descended from the one that existed under Yugoslavia, along 
with some newer breakaway groups, but at the time of my field research, no one 
group had emerged as a significant player in policy making or drafting processes.37 In 
both cases, resources within civil society are minimal and based on the expertise of a 
few knowledgeable individuals. 
 
In Slovenia, the main organisation following media issues was the Peace Institute of 
Ljubljana, which is involved in several international networks and participates in the 
domestic policy debate. At the time of my research and writing Brankica Petković 
was Head of Media Policy and the editor of the organisation’s MediaWatch series. 
                                                 
36
 Note, for example the number and broad array of organisations responding to the UK 
Communications Review: http://www.culture.gov.uk/consultations/8636.aspx  
37
 This has since changed in Macedonia, where the Association of Journalists has reformed under new 
leadership and is now engaged in dialogue with the government over violations of press freedom. 
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She reported that the organisation works closely with academics such as 
Milosavljević of the University of Ljubljana and Bašić-Hrvatin of the University of 
Kopar/Capodistria, who have both authored work published by the Institute. Pektović 
participated in the working group assembled by the Ministry of Culture as did the 
two academics. Stopar, who referred to them as the “media experts”, said he was 
very pleased with their contribution and knowledge. Petković, however 
acknowledged that legal and economic expertise was lacking in this combination:  
 
 “The expert group this time and in general the expert community is 
dominated by social and political scientists who have no clue what it 
means to have a media business and what it means to develop a piece of 
legislation that could be applied by judges or lawyers . . . If we take the 
part of the legislation on state subsidies or on concentration or those on 
advertisements - those affecting the media economy - we could always 
hear from those in the industry that you cannot do it, because there was a 
guy saying that most of the people sitting around the table had never in 
their lives had to take care of the salaries and stuff . . . The accusation is 
rather relevant.”(Interview, April 2011) 
 
Slovenian civil society that is included and engaged in media policymaking 
processes is therefore limited in the contribution it can make not only by the fact that 
the numbers are few, but also by the profile of the individuals involved. 
 
In Macedonia, there were two main organisations active on media policy issues in 
Macedonia: the Media Development Center (MDC) and the Macedonian Institute for 
the Media (MIM). The Foundation for Open Society Institute in Macedonia has also 
generated some reports, but primarily acts as a donor supporting minority media, 
collaborative projects and other activities.38 According to the MDC’s Beličanec, his 
organisation had been quite active in the development of the 2005 Law on 
Broadcasting and then following the BC’s implementation, but since then had been 
less active. The organisation consists of Beličanec and his colleague Gazmend Ajdini 
with one or two assistants for varying periods of time. Although they remain 
involved in international networks, Beličanec’s involvement in an anti-government 
campaign and the appointment of Gazmend Ajdini to the board of the Agency of 
Electronic Communications has created some “conflicts of interests” according to 
Beličanec. MIM had been primarily an education and training institution for 
                                                 
38
 See http://soros.org.mk/default.asp?lang=eng&menuid=10  
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journalists. Biljana Petkovska, Director of MIM, said the organisation began publicly 
engaging in discourse about media policy issues both in order to fill the gap left by 
the withdrawal of MDC, and because one individual who had previously worked for 
the BC had joined their teaching team giving them the human resources to do so. 
Since then MIM has conducted research on MRT, making recommendations for 
future PSB policy that went to Parliament and, according to Petkovska, was 
preparing to make comments on any draft law that may be circulated.  
 
Within civil society, the industry and the state bodies, the resources for engagement 
in policy process, for research and analysis aimed at developing policy or 
contributing to strategy or vision for the sector, are limited to a handful of 
knowledgeable individuals. There are notable gaps in each of these two groups of 
“people who know things” that are similar. The respective private sectors were 
represented almost exclusively by large national players, and the PSBs also lacked 
the capacity to contribute. The “media experts” from the civil society groups and 
academia may have been knowledgeable in key areas, but lacked legal or economic 
expertise. The government departments in both Slovenia and Macedonia were very 
small, and the NRAs ill equipped to produce the kind of research and analysis that 
could be useful to policy and strategy formation. 
6.2.3 Resistance, but without opposition, to EU rules  
 
The resistance to transposition of EU rules that I have described above is not a form 
of “resistance through the back door” (Falkner et al., 2004) because of an objection 
to the policy by domestic policy makers. Nor is it a matter of “veto points” such as 
opposition groups objecting to the policy (Haverland, 2000). In Slovenia, Stopar said 
the directive was not controversial at all. Grčar, the lawyer for the most powerful 
television company in Slovenia, was eager for the implementation of AVMSD, 
whereas in Macedonia representatives of television stations interviewed showed no 
awareness of it, much less policy preferences in opposition to it. Instead, the 
evidence presented here indicates that the delays in the transposition of EU common 
rules and standards fell by the wayside because the domestic opportunity structures 
in each case were resistant to rule changes that did not match the strategic interests of 
political parties in their use of media law to influence the domestic media. 
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Based on the evidence above, I conclude that media laws in Slovenia and Macedonia 
are tools for exercising political party interests, and this limits the role that EU laws 
related to media can play. This could be explained by the political parallelism used 
by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2008) to describe the media systems of Southern 
Europe. However, in these two cases I argue the size of these countries and small 
numbers of individuals within the various actors also contributed. The size of these 
countries and their populations are significant material constraints on the actors of 
governance, namely the resources in terms of knowledgeable individuals. The 
evidence here indicates that market players are little able to contribute at the level of 
expertise, except for the main national broadcasters. NRAs and national 
administrations lack resources, and there are few voices in civil society. Although for 
the reasons described above the AVMSD was not transposed at the time of my field 
research, both countries had legislation in line with the TWFD that came before it. 
The next section looks at governance interactions involved in the enforcement of 
common rules and standards in the market, among them those derived from the 
TWFD. 
6.3 Ineffective Enforcement  
 
In the previous section, I described resistance to the transposition of common EU 
rules and standards for the audiovisual media markets. Nevertheless, in both 
Slovenia and Macedonia the precursor to AVMSD, the Television without Frontiers 
Directive (TWFD), was transposed in domestic legislation by 2001 in Slovenia and 
2005 in Macedonia. This allows for an investigation into what happens after 
transposition. Looking at implementation of directives related to labour laws, Falkner 
and Treib (2008) found evidence of weak enforcement due to problems with 
institutional capacity, including within the judiciary and civil society. In examining 
enforcement as interactions of media governance in Slovenia and Macedonia, I also 
found evidence of weak or ineffective enforcement, however, the roots of this appear 
to be more complex. In Slovenia the way powers and responsibilities are distributed 
by law to the bodies within the regulatory framework as described in the previous 
chapter was a significant limitation on the enforcement actions of the NRAs. 
Looking at the level of individuals within governance actors, I also found that 
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prevailing attitudes towards the media and the perceptions that individuals within the 
NRAs had of their roles contributed to weak enforcement. This section presents 
evidence from the interviews in the coding categories of “practices”, “values”, and 
“relationships”. Within these codes, the statements related to enforcement and 
everyday operations of the NRAs were extracted. In addition, statements related to 
the values and priorities for the audiovisual media sector are compared across the 
NRAs and between the two cases. 
 
A tendency towards leniency is more clearly evident in the Macedonian case, where 
the resources of the NRA for identifying violations and the powers granted to it by 
law were greater than in Slovenia. In Macedonia, the weakness of the regulator was 
associated by those within the NRA with a perception of its role as educative rather 
than punitive, but I suggest that considerations of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 
2004) in the context of entrenched relationships with political parties also played an 
important role. As I explained in Chapter 3, the way individuals perceive their roles, 
the established relationship, and the administrative cultures or ways of doing things 
are part of what determines institutional fit in the course of Europeanization. In the 
end, I argue that there is resistance to the enforcement of common rules and 
standards in the market because of institutional misfit, and in the Slovenian case, the 
material and power constraints on the NRAs as governance actors. This does not 
apply only to those rules stemming from EU Directives, but to rules and standards in 
general. 
6.3.1 Formal Rules, Resources, and Institutional Practice 
 
The regulatory structures in Slovenia and Macedonia differ significantly. Slovenia 
has a converged NRA, the Agency for Post and Electronic Communications (APEK). 
However, as described in Chapter 4, the power to enforce the Mass Media Act, in 
which TWFD was implemented, was actually divided between APEK and the Media 
Inspector housed in the Ministry of Culture. This means that the “inspection powers” 
to impose fines and enact penalties on broadcasters was in the hands of the Media 
Inspector, until the amendments aimed at implementing AVMS passed in October 
2011, and moved some of them to APEK. The process of transition was still 
underway at the time of this writing, so it was not yet clear what it would mean for 
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enforcement. I can only refer to the system that was in place for the decade prior. 
That system was established by the Mass Media Act in 2001 and replaced the 
Broadcasting Council that had existed since 1994. One respondent who had worked 
for the first Broadcasting Council explained that it had been very vocal and active, 
something also mentioned by Grčar from ProPlus, and that the Council was actually 
replaced with a converged regulator because it had gotten too strong.  
 
According to Gorjanc and Krišelj,  APEK only has had sufficient recording 
equipment for monitoring broadcast content in place since the beginning of 2011. 
Gorjanc complained of being understaffed and said that APEK had moved mainly to 
complaints based monitoring as it was more manageable and effective given their 
resources. They used outsourcing to monitor advertising time and for the programme 
schedule data required to double check the self-reported information on European 
quotas. There are also limits to their power to act once a violation has been identified 
stemming from the formal rules established by law. According to Gorjanc, they are 
bound by lengthy procedures that stem from generic administrative law:  
 
“We have procedures and we are not capable to make shorter procedures 
because everything is prescribed by the law. We should give him 
[broadcaster] our results and he should comment and then there are also these 
procedure problems. He can avoid picking up our post for days. You know 
we send it to him and demand a response in 8 days, but he can just not pick 
up the post for 15 days. After 15 days it is automatically received from his 
side. That’s three weeks immediately . . . but we have to wait. We can’t go on 
with the procedure because we have to wait for his comment.” (Interview, 
April 2011) 
 
APEK had recently tested this by using a shorter procedure in the case of content 
unsuitable for minors in a reality TV show. However, as Gorjanc and Krišelj each 
explained, they then lost an appeal against the decision in court because the full 
procedure had not been followed. The second limitation was in the measures APEK 
could take. Without the “inspection powers”, APEK had only administrative 
measures at its disposal, namely warnings and temporary or permanent revocation of 
licenses. Gorjanc forwarded all violations to the Media Inspector who had the power 
to impose the penalties. There was only one individual serving as Media Inspector. 
The Media Inspector, who had recently moved to the position from a different 
inspection role, explained that the caseload was extreme because the procedures that 
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she must follow under the misdemeanour code are also extensive. These accounts 
indicate that the enforcement practices of APEK and the Media Inspector were 
largely shaped by the limited resources and powers granted to the NRAs by law. 
 
The formal regulatory arrangement in Macedonia was very different, and the BC, 
which was responsible for enforcing the Law on Broadcasting Activity, had for many 
years had extensive technical capacity for monitoring. The three employees of the 
BC as well as Vice President of the Council Milaim Fetai, with whom I spoke 
separately, described well-practiced routines for monitoring and identifying 
violations involving standard templates. The procedures up to the moment of taking 
a measure against a broadcaster can be fast. Similarly to APEK at the time, the BC 
was also not able to impose fines directly. However, it had significantly more other 
measures at its disposal, some with clear financial implications for broadcasters. 
 
Table 6.1 The measures that each NRA can use in cases of violations by 
broadcasters 
 
Source: The author from the Mass Media Act of Slovenia and the Law on Broadcasting Activity of Macedonia 
 
Both APEK in Slovenia and the BC in Macedonia seemed able to monitor for 
violations of the Mass Media Act or the Law on Broadcasting respectively, though 
APEKs complaints based system was likely to identify fewer (see tables below), and 
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its technical capacity was only recently developed. However, APEK’s capacity to 
enforce the law was, at the time of my visit, limited by the rules on its internal 
procedures and those that defined the measures it could take. The Media Inspector 
had various financial penalties at his or her disposal, but effectiveness was limited by 
the fact only one person was dedicated to that position. In contrast, Macedonia’s BC 
had a number of measures that it can take against broadcasters, even though it was 
also not given the power to impose fines directly but had to go through the courts. 
While the explanations found by Falkner and Trieb (2008) in terms of institutional 
capacity seem to work for the Slovenian case at least at some level, they appear 
inadequate for the Macedonian case. This does not mean that there was better 
enforcement of the law and therefore EU Directives in Macedonia, however. 
Successive EU progress reports (European Commission, 2009b, 2010, 2011a) have 
cited a lack of implementation of the Law on Broadcasting, but even more telling is 
that all respondents from television stations39 spoke of ineffective, lax or inconsistent 
enforcement by the BC and did not perceive the institution as a strong regulator. 
Unlike in Slovenia, weak enforcement practices can only be slightly attributed to the 
formal rules establishing the NRA’s power and resources within the opportunity 
structure. 
6.3.2 Informal Rules, Relationships and Perceptions  
 
In each of the cases, I found that, in addition to the formal rules and the technical or 
human resources available to governance actors, there were a variety of informal 
rules, established relationships, values or perceptions of roles and identity also 
connected to the practice of enforcing rules and standards for audiovisual media. 
These are the structures that form the context in which individuals making decisions 
within the governance actors determine what decisions and behaviour are appropriate 
(March & Olsen, 2004). Here again there are differences between Slovenia and 
Macedonia, but leniency seems to be a characteristic of both. The evidence for this I 
found both in the interviews, and the data that I was able to access on the actions 
taken in response to violations by both APEK and the BC. 
 
                                                 
39
 One caveat is that the representative from MRT felt that the BC was hard on the PSB, but not on 
anyone else.  
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In Slovenia, enforcement power was divided between APEK and the Media 
Inspector, but the Mass Media Act did not specify how the process should work.40 A 
relationship was established such that the Inspector did not act on a violation related 
to broadcast media without a final formal decision from APEK. According to Krišelj 
and Gorjanc, this began after PopTV won a court case with the argument that the 
Inspector should not have acted without “expert” confirmation from APEK that a 
certain violation took place. This was confirmed by Grčar, who had argued the case 
for PopTV. Gorjanc hoped that this arrangement would change with the new 
Inspector who started in early 2011, however when I interviewed her and her Chief 
Inspector, she expressed the same understanding as her predecessor. Stopar of the 
Ministry of Culture described the problem: “they are just sending cases to each other 
and say: it’s not our jurisdiction it’s yours and the inspector says no I cannot do 
anything without your opinion. And so nothing happens” (interview, April 2011).  
 
This description may be an exaggeration, but the relationship between APEK and the 
Inspectorate as described by both sides seemed to be based primarily on formal 
communications in the form of notifications and requests, with the occasional phone 
call. The mismatch between identification of violations by APEK and action by the 
Inspector can also be seen in APEK’s data on measures taken. 
 
                                                 
40
 The Media Inspector was also responsible for other aspects of the Mass Media Act that do not 
overlap with APEK such as the right of reply or any rules related to print media and acts 
independently on these issues. 
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Table 6.2 Data reported by APEK on measures taken based on monitoring 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data provided by APEK 
 
 
Although Gorjanc said that all APEK’s decisions were forwarded to the Media 
Inspector, they do not appear to have all resulted in action. The annual reports of the 
Culture and Media Inspectorate (IRSKM) give some data on the cases handled by the 
Media Inspector. The data shows that cases related to broadcasting and the remit of 
APEK were only a part of the load handled by the one Media Inspector. Both the 
data from APEK in Table 6.2 and that of the Inspectorate from Table 6.3 below 
indicate that, despite the formal nature of their relationship, an increasing number of 
cases were being handled in combination. 
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Table 6.3 Cases handled by the Slovenian Media Inspector 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from annual reports of IRSKM 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 
 
 
The data in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 also shows that neither APEK nor the Inspector had 
been particularly aggressive in the use of the measures available to it, more often 
choosing warnings rather than penalties. In this period APEK only twice used the 
stronger measure of temporarily revoking a license for a few hours. Table 6.3 shows 
the Media Inspector more often made use of the official reprimand or warning rather 
than fines. Cases receiving none of those 3 measures were either discarded because 
no violation was found or the case expired, or were still in process. Although exact 
data was not available, fines issued by the Media Inspector do not seem high enough 
to be a deterrent for the large broadcasters. Grčar stated that his station often just 
pays the fine rather than try to fight a case, because it is only “a few thousand euros”. 
The new Media Inspector said she was aware of this problem, and speculated that the 
large stations just calculate the fines into the cost of the advertisement. 
 
In addition to being limited by the formal rules determining their powers and 
procedures, the effectiveness of the two bodies charged with enforcement also 
appears to be have been complicated by the established relationship between the two. 
At the same time, both tended to use the lesser of the measures available to them. I 
argue that this can be at least partly explained by the values and priorities of the 
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individuals involved, however as this argument also applies to the Macedonian case, 
I will first describe the enforcement practice there as well. 
 
In Macedonia, the tendency towards leniency within the BC was much more 
pronounced. Unlike in APEK, where measures are decided at the level of the Head of 
Monitoring, in the BC the Council Members decide what action to take based on 
evidence of violations presented to them by the staff. At time of the interviews, the 
Council Members had voted several months earlier and withdrew the “rulebook” that 
set out the order in which measures should be used. BC President Stefanoski 
explained they had reached the point where they had to give severe penalties for 
what they considered small violations, such as overstepping advertising limits or not 
publishing the ownership details of the station.  
 
The data illustrated in Figure 6.3 below on the measures taken since 2007 shows a 
decline in the number of overall actions taken until this change was made. The 
records also confirmed that the most severe punishments, dealt out in 2009 before the 
change, were to local stations for administrative violations. Small stations may not 
have the human resources and skills to stay on top of administrative obligations, but 
there were also indications that the BC was less inclined to hit the larger stations 
with severe penalties. One interviewee from the BC staff related an incident during 
this period in which the owner of one national television close to the government 
came to the BC offices and threatened Council Members until an advertising ban for 
his station was withdrawn. 
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Figure 6.3 Types of measures taken against broadcasters for violations 2007-2011 
 
Source: Calculated by the author based on list of all decision provided by the BC 
 
 
As the data on 2011 in Figure 6.3 show, with the freedom to once again use the 
softer measures, the BC quickly resorted to issuing notifications and warnings again. 
The misdemeanour charges made in 2009 that appear here in orange were all related 
to the 2009 election campaign. As one can see from Table 6.4 below, the greatest 
number of violations are generally in relation to advertising limits and the protection 
of minors, both covered by TWFD. The fact that, by the end of September 2011, the 
figures already exceeded those from 2008 suggests that the warnings and 
notifications issued earlier had done little to encourage changes in behaviour. 
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Table 6.4 Categories of non-election related violations acted upon by the 
Broadcasting Council 2007-2011 
 
Source: Calculated by the author based on list of all decisions provided by the BC 
 
Despite the repetition of the same types of violations and repeat offenders, the 
Council Members of the BC were clearly choosing to make use of minimal 
sanctions. I offer one explanation for this that I find also applies to the Slovenian 
case. 
 
As March and Olsen (2004; 1998) have argued, within public bodies such as the 
NRAs, decisions and behavioural choices depend on the extent to which the 
individuals concerned deem them appropriate depending on their values and 
perception of their own role and that of their organisation. Therefore, one possible 
explanation for the tendency towards leniency could lie in the values and priorities 
expressed by the individuals. My examination of these shows an interesting picture 
that also explains some of the problems with enforcement. 
 
In APEK, each of the individuals with whom I spoke stressed the administrative 
function of the institution and purpose of providing information or data to the 
Ministry noting that APEK had no discretionary powers. It was mentioned often that 
certain procedures such as granting of licenses, changing of licenses or status or 
format were purely administrative and as long as the process was followed and 
documentation was in order, APEK had no reason to say no. In other areas such as 
the granting or revoking of special status or changes in ownership, the role of APEK 
was simply to provide the Ministry with information and this was described by three 
people as simply a question of numbers and percentages. The majority of 
respondents expressed a view that their job was to protect the public, particularly 
minors. Nevertheless, four out of five of them also spoke of protecting domestic 
 175 
broadcasters. Even the Media Inspector, though she did not clearly express 
protecting domestic media as a priority, said that what she thought she should be 
doing more of in her role was prevention activities, so that broadcasters would not 
make mistakes leading to violations. The table below shows the value and priority 
statements made in response to questions about the most important thing they do or 
should do. 
 
Table 6.5 Values and priorities expressed by individuals in the NRAs in Slovenia 
and Macedonia 
 
Source: The author based on interview responses in April and May 2011, all mentioned by at least two 
individuals within the group, except in the case of the Media Inspector who was only one person 
 
BC staff in Macedonia mentioned the protection of minors and the elimination of 
hate speech together as of equal importance. This suggests a similar assumption of 
the role of protecting the public as was expressed by the civil servants within APEK 
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and the Media Inspector. However, among the four Council Members of the BC, 
except for hate speech, their concerns were more for the media or for the image that 
the country projected to the outside in terms of copyright. 
 
In Macedonia, the BC’s Council Members adamantly stressed the BC’s role as an 
educator rather than an enforcer of law. When asked how they decide what sanctions 
to use, BC Vice President Fetai explained: “Here we are careful, very careful . . . 
there exists a view that we should be more in the function of education than 
punishment” (interview, May 2011). Council Member Stole Naumov insisted that 
many violations occur because of lack of knowledge and that the BC’s priority 
should be education, a view also echoed by BC President Stefanoski. There was 
some evidence that the BC was perceived this way by broadcasters. Both Mitrevska 
and Janevska of the BC staff described the assistance and advice they give to 
broadcasters on the procedures and standards or rules with which they must comply. 
As I interviewed Janevska she received calls from stations about the election 
coverage rules, one from a local station owner who she said had called daily since 
the pre-election campaign started because he had received a penalty during the 
previous election. Both Selver Ajdini from TV Hana and the two producers with 
whom I spoke from TV Sitel also stated that they frequently call the BC staff or even 
Council Members with questions about compliance, especially in elections. Only 
Irena Arnaudova from TVM expressed frustration rather than appreciation for the 
BCs approach, citing its leniency as one of the major problems for local stations 
because non-compliant competitors are never punished. 
 
Arnaudova explained that this leniency towards stations that do not meet standards or 
comply with the law, allows stations to exist at the local level that are active mainly 
during election campaigns for political purposes, but have little other function. 
Although he himself was appreciative of the BC’s “educative” approach, Ajdini of 
TV Hana also complained of the same problem, saying that there are “one man 
show” televisions that serve only to carry political messages and meet none of the 
other requirements as a broadcaster. While it may be that there was a sincere belief in 
the BC’s role as an educator among Council Members, this information raises some 
questions about the BC’s lenient approach. 
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In the Macedonian case I also offer another explanation for the leniency of the BC, 
which may have existed parallel to some genuine beliefs that it was the best 
approach. The Council Members of the BC were appointed in staggered terms by 
Parliament, some directly and some after nomination by the Association of 
Journalists or Inter-University Council. This means that the Council can be made up 
of individuals appointed under different governments. Political divisions within the 
council were clear at the time of the interviews with two Council Members accusing 
each other of being political pawns (for different parties), and another freely 
admitting his loyalty to the party that arranged his appointment.41 Considering that as 
Ajdini and Arnaudova explained, many of the media are politically affiliated (see 
also IREX, 2009; IREX, 2010, 2011; Šopar, 2008), this seems to have led to a 
situation in which it was safer for no one to be punished. One Council Member 
described how decisions on sanctions were made: 
 
“If it comes to, let’s say, temporary ban on advertising, there are those in the 
Council who say ‘if we do that then we should also punish these guys, 
otherwise the media will come out and say why didn’t you punish the 
neighbour – that’s the mentality here – why am I punished and not the 
neighbour. So it ends up that we make certain concession so we don’t have to 
punish also the neighbour.”(Interview, May 2011) 
 
In order to avoid punishing the stations connected to political allies, it was judged to 
be better not to punish anyone. Perceiving and presenting the institution as the 
benevolent educator while avoiding strict enforcement seemed to be the safest and 
most appropriate behaviour for the Council Members; and the outcome of that 
position is reflected in the enforcement data. 
 
In APEK the Director is appointed by a minister, however, those making 
enforcement decisions, namely Gorjanc and his team, were civil servants whose 
positions are secure and were not dependent on the will of political parties. While the 
actions they deemed appropriate may have been determined by their own values and 
perceptions of their roles, there was no evidence that they were further constrained 
by entrenched relationships with political parties, despite the indications discussed 
further in Chapter 7 that many stations in Slovenia have strong political ties as well.  
                                                 
41
 For obvious reasons the individuals names are not cited here. 
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6.3.3 Market driven enforcement exceptions 
 
In looking at the enforcement practices of the regulators in each of these cases, two 
instances were uncovered that can be considered exceptions to the patterns identified 
above. In the first instance, the combination of a market driven initiative and 
leniency on the part of the regulators was actually contributing to the application of 
common rules and standards, and in the other, a similar initiative was encouraging 
more energetic enforcement by the regulator. In both of these instances there is 
evidence of market players using the EU to legitimate action (M.-C. Fontana, 2011; 
Jacquot & Woll, 2004) that supports their strategic aims. 
 
In Slovenia, although it was not transcribed yet in law for the reasons discussed 
above, parts of AVMSD were essentially already being implemented in spring 2011. 
Implementation was being led by CME-owned ProPlus as the company decided that 
its stations would comply with the new rules contained in the Directive. The lawyer 
from ProPlus explained that he was aware of the new rules and considered EU law to 
be a higher authority than domestic law. According to Jerić, the smaller stations 
including his had followed suit. The regulators then chose not to enforce provisions 
in domestic law that were going to be relaxed once AVMSD was transposed into 
domestic law, particularly those related to advertising limits. The arguments of three 
of those interviewed from APEK were that it was not fair to the Slovenian 
broadcasters to make them follow the old rules when the new rules were beneficial to 
broadcasters. In this case, the existence of EU level rules and the domestic actor’s 
knowledge resulted in changes in the expectations domestic actors could have for the 
outcome of their actions. Essentially, they could air advertisements more frequently, 
and use product placement in certain programmes, just like the channels coming in 
from other European countries on subscription services, without the expectation of 
repercussions for violating national law. 
 
In Macedonia, the one thing that seemed to be energetically enforced by the BC was 
protection of copyright. In the Law on Broadcasting Activity, article 77 states that 
broadcasters provide programming with author’s rights regulated and must be 
prepared to provide documentation, and articles 109 and 111 obligate operators of 
subscription services to provide packages based on regulated author’s rights 
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(Republic of Macedonia, 2005b). Although in comparison to the long list of 
programme standards and other obligations on broadcasters this does not figure 
heavily in the law, the Council Members expressed it as a top priority (see Table 
6.5). Three of them went into great detail describing the measures being taken in co-
ordination with the police, market inspectors and other agencies against cable 
operators re-broadcasting channels illegally. Arnaudova, from one of the local 
stations, said that she had been calling for stricter enforcement of copyright for years 
because of the unfair competition she faced, but to no avail. The reason behind the 
sudden crackdown was difficult to isolate, but the EU accession process did seem to 
play a role. The BC’s Fetai explained that “intellectual property is one of the basic 
principles that within Europe is strictly respected…and one of our main obligations 
is respecting copyright” (interview, May 2011). Copyright infringement was referred 
to as a problem in several EU progress reports (European Commission, 2010, 2011a, 
2011b).42 
 
The BC’s efforts to police the copyright violations by cable operators are helped 
significantly by monitoring done by Makedonski Telekomunikacii, the IPTV 
provider. Siljanovksi, its Director of Regulatory Affairs was most involved, and for 
him copyright protection was also a top priority. Owned mostly by Deutsche 
Telekom, it is one of the largest rights-holders for premium content channels. 
According to him, the actions taken in co-operation with the BC and other 
institutions to protect copyright were important because they were norms in the 
acquis and important for the image of the country. He explained: “we as country 
must prove that we can care for and respect copyright” (interview, May 2011). The 
BC may have been looking for a politically safe cause to affirm their position as 
regulator, and Telekom could have a variety of other reasons for making an ally of 
the BC, in addition to the stated goal of improving the image of the market in which 
it was heavily invested and the obvious benefits of eliminating unfair competition. 
Nevertheless, they both called upon EU rules and the instrument of the Progress 
Report as the justification for stricter enforcement. The evidence suggests that the 
BC and Makedonski Telekomunikacii used the existence of EU rules to change the 
outcomes that market players could expect from actions in the market in a similar 
                                                 
42
 Copyright is covered under Chapter 7 of the acquis on Intellectual Property Law and therefore 
covered in Progress Reports.  
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manner to the way broadcasters in Slovenia used EU rules to justify non-enforcement 
of national law. 
6.3.4 No one plays the “Bad Guy” 
 
In the Slovenian case, the evidence indicates that weak enforcement until now of all 
rules and standards applying to the audiovisual sector stemmed primarily from the 
formal rules establishing the powers and obligations of the two different bodies 
charged with enforcement. I argue that the system was designed by political leaders 
for ineffective enforcement and helps create an opportunity structure in which the 
NRAs have little power or resources. In addition to what appears to be an intentional 
design flaw in the Slovenian regulatory system, I also found evidence in the practices 
described by individuals and shown in the administrative records of enforcement 
decisions that the potential of the system was not maximised. The values and 
priorities expressed by those involved in these practices indicated that those 
responsible for regulating the behaviour of market players did not view themselves 
as enforcers and were not inclined to be strict with domestic broadcasters, except 
perhaps in relation to the protection of minors. Enforcement was further constrained 
by the established relationship between APEK and the Media Inspector, which 
seemed to exacerbate the limitations of the legal division of powers between the two 
bodies.  
 
The people working in APEK generally said they did want the institution to have 
some more power than it had, but this was more in relation to ensuring diversity in 
the market and the provision of varied content. Based on this evidence, I argue that 
there was a degree of institutional misfit between the implementation of common 
rules and standards in the market and the values, practices, self-perceptions and 
established relationships within the NRAs in Slovenia. However, in the instance of 
some of the most recent changes to EU rules contained in the AVMSD, the tendency 
towards leniency because of their limitations and the structures within these 
institutions contributed to the application of the common rules and standards. This 
occurred when private broadcasters called upon the EU rules in relation to 
advertising limits as more authoritative than the domestic legislation that was not up 
to date with the rest of Europe. 
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In Macedonia the evidence shows a more pronounced and self-declared tendency for 
weak enforcement of all rules and standards, despite the fact that by law, the NRA 
was given more power to take action against errant broadcasters than in Slovenia. 
Therefore, in this case I find that resistance to the implementation of common rules 
and standards was less a matter of agent-centred divisions of power within the 
opportunity structure and more a matter of institutional misfit. Similar to the civil 
servants in Slovenia, the staff members of the BC expressed their priorities as the 
protection of minors and the abolition of hate speech. On the other hand, the Council 
Members of the BC expressed different priorities, and consistently described their 
role as educator rather than enforcer. I also found in the accounts of Council 
Members, BC staff and others evidence that, in determining the appropriateness of 
their decisions, Council Members also considered their own and others’ relationships 
with political elites. Where the Council Members were prepared to be strict was in 
the enforcement of copyrights on cable networks, for which they had a major 
initiative underway in collaboration with the IPTV operator Makedonski 
Telekomunikacii. The justification for this initiative according to those in both 
organisations was the EU and its rules on copyright. 
6.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter presented evidence of resistance both to the transposition of EU rules 
into domestic law and in their enforcement in Slovenia and Macedonia. One possible 
explanation for such resistance, given in several top down studies of the 
implementation of EU Directives, is opposition to EU policy by decision makers 
with the power to veto policy change (Haverland, 2000) or even “through the back 
door” (Falkner et al., 2004) by those responsible for post-transposition 
implementation. However, counter to my expectations, I found nearly no evidence of 
opposition to the provisions of EU policy among any of the governance actors. In 
both cases, the only criticism of EU rules or standards that any respondent made was 
that the fifty per cent quota for European works was difficult for domestic 
broadcasters to achieve. Looking at the changes of rules over time (Sub-RQ1), I 
found similar practices in the two cases of successive governments using media law 
changes as a mechanism for controlling the NRA and the PSB. This could simply be 
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attributed to the characteristics of polarised pluralist media systems (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004, 2008). However, in this bottom-up investigation of the interactions of 
governance, I examined human resources among the material conditions constraining 
actors (Sub-RQ4). I argued that in the small populations in these two countries, there 
were limited human resources spread among the governance actors that contributed 
to otherwise technical issues of media policy being left to political dealings. 
 
My examination of the practices related to enforcement (Sub-RQ1) showed that the 
NRAs in both countries were lenient and generally not strongly enforcing any rules 
in the audiovisual sector, among them those deriving from EU Directives. Based on 
the evidence presented above, I offer both agent-centred and structure-centred 
explanations for this resistance to the applications of common rules and standards. 
The findings I presented on the values of those in the respective NRAs, how they 
perceive their roles (Sub-RQ2), and the established relationships (Knill, 2001) 
among governance actors (Sub-RQ3) indicated that in neither case, did strict 
enforcement of common rules and standards fit with what decision makers 
considered appropriate. This institutional misfit was more pronounced in the 
Macedonian case where I also found that political relationships, their own and those 
between political parties and media outlets, seemed to condition what BC Council 
Members considered appropriate decisions or behaviour. In the Slovenian case, 
effective enforcement of EU rules, among others, was hindered primarily by the 
formal rules distributing powers and resources to the NRAs, or the characteristics of 
the domestic opportunity structure. I argue that the fact that APEK lacked the power 
to penalise, while the Media Inspector lacked the resources to constrain their 
interactions with the market and helped determine the consequences and outcomes 
that Slovenian market players could expect from their behaviour. In this case, there 
were indications, in the evidence here and in the previous chapter, that political 
leaders had intentionally created an opportunity structure such that the resources and 
powers of the regulators were minimal. This constrained the actions of the regulators 
in relation to the market with consequences for the outcomes that media firms could 
expect from their decisions and actions.  
 
So if media governance in these two countries is resistant to the transposition and 
application of the EU’s common rules and standards for audiovisual media, what 
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does this mean for the role of Europeanization? In this chapter, I discussed two 
instances where mechanisms of EU conditionality came into play, namely the threat 
of infringement proceedings against Slovenia for not transposing AVMSD, and the 
Progress Reports that are part of the accession process for Macedonia. In addition, 
there was the situation of broadcasters in Slovenia choosing to adhere to newer EU 
rules on advertising rather than those still in force in national law. I argue that each 
of these instances was an example of strategic actors using (Jacquot & Woll, 2004) 
the EU as a higher authority, or the existence of EU rules, to forward their strategic 
interests. Other studies observed that civil society groups or political actors use the 
EU to add legitimacy to their cause, enhance their positions or even get additional 
resources from EU sources (eg. M.-C. Fontana, 2011; Luaces, 2002; Sudbery, 2010). 
However, two of the instances described above involve large and foreign owned 
market players protecting commercial interests. CME owned ProPlus and Deutsche 
Telekom owned Makedonski Telekomunikacii seemed able to use EU policy to 
affect change in the domestic opportunity structure to suit these interests. 
 
The evidence presented here indicates that the opportunity structures in Slovenia and 
Macedonia are largely resistant to the diffusion and institutionalisation of common 
rules and standards, and that there is also resistance in the form of institutional misfit. 
However, where the implementation of the common rules and standards from the EU 
is of strategic advantage to domestic players, they may use the EU to legitimate or 
justify changes in the domestic opportunity structure or action to achieve their 
strategic goals. This chapter has treated the rules and standards of EU media policy 
collectively, concerned with their common implementation and application to all 
market players. These rules include those establishing minimum standards for how 
much advertising is allowed and how often films can be interrupted, but among them 
are also rules that mandate that broadcasters produce or procure at least 50% 
European production and 10% independent production. For these rules, compliance 
means not just adhering to the standard, but also producing or participating in 
achieving the quota. The next chapter looks more at participation in this kind of 
positive regulation as well as subsidies and other forms of state intervention within 
media governance in Slovenia and Macedonia. 
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Chapter 7: Participation in EU 
Protectionism 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I described resistance to the transposition and enforcement of 
common rules and standards for audiovisual media markets in Slovenia and 
Macedonia. As I outlined in the introduction, what has been constructed at the EU 
level, and therefore through Europeanization, is to be “diffused and institutionalised” 
(Radaelli, 2002, p. 108) at the national level is not just a list of common industry 
standards, such as advertising limits. Among the rules, policy paradigms, shared 
beliefs and norms (ibid.) is the idea that a European-wide audiovisual media sector 
exists and that it should be nurtured and protected, particularly in the context of 
globalisation or the dominance of US production (Papathanassopoulos & Negrine, 
2011). While this has been characterised as “wishful thinking” (Schlesinger, 1993), 
the preamble of the AVMSD, like the TWFD before it, states that it aims to build “a 
strong, competitive and integrated European audiovisual industry” (Council of 
European Communities, 2010, para. 33). The provisions are intended to encourage 
cultural diversity and “ensure the transition from national markets to a common 
programme production and distribution market” (ibid., para. 2). Two key 
mechanisms for doing this are the quotas for European works and independent 
production and the subsidies for audiovisual production distributed through the 
MEDIA programme. 
 
I referred to these measures in my introduction as European protectionism. European 
quotas are a form of resistance to American domination in the production industry, 
put in place because of concerns for both its impact on European production 
industries and on audiences (Dolmans, 1995; McGonagle, 2008; Schlesinger, 1997; 
Tunstall & Machin, 1999). State subsidies are by definition, a form of protectionism 
and are no less so when used by the EU. The EU’s MEDIA programme aims to 
“strive for a stronger audiovisual sector reflecting Europe’s cultural identity and 
heritage” (European Commission, 2012). This chapter investigates the extent to 
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which Slovenia and Macedonia are part of this EU project to protect European 
production industries and European cultural identity. 
 
This chapter looks at governance interactions around the use of quotas, subsidies and 
support for audiovisual media production in Slovenia and Macedonia. I present 
evidence that European level protectionism is largely irrelevant to the audiovisual 
media services in these countries. In the next section, I examine the use of content 
quotas, first by looking at the formal rules for both EU and domestic quotas in each 
case. I then move to a lower level of abstraction and focus on what Kooiman (2003) 
referred to as the interferences of governance or the everyday procedures, practices 
and even forms. I use data from interviews coded as “practice” and turn to 
administrative records to corroborate the behaviour described. I also present 
interview data from the “values” category in my discussion on the values and 
attitudes related to quotas. I demonstrate that in both cases, and in some very banal 
ways, there is institutional misfit between this form of European protectionism and 
domestic practices and, though to a lesser extent, values. However, the evidence 
indicates that the practices and values with which there is misfit are shaped by the 
material conditions of these small markets. 
 
It has been argued that EU level financial support can change domestic opportunity 
structures by empowering certain actors (Parau, 2008; Sudbery, 2010). In the third 
section of this chapter, I look at subsidies, which in Slovenia includes both EU and 
national level support and in Macedonia covers only national level financial 
infusions into the market. The section dealing with subsidies also relies on interview 
data on practices and values. In two instances, I followed up important points made 
in interviews by checking with administrative records and other secondary data. I 
show that Slovenian producers reap some benefits from EU subsidies by enhancing 
their material resources, but that there is little evidence that this amounts to change in 
the domestic opportunity structure as this support has been still heavily dependent on 
the involvement of RTVSLO. At the time of writing, Macedonia remained outside 
the EU subsidy programme. Examining official and unofficial state subsidies to 
broadcasters, I find evidence that these were closely tied to political allegiance and 
particularly in Macedonia, acted as mechanisms of control by political elites. I found 
Europeanization playing a role in changing the opportunity structure in Macedonia as 
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the EU’s Progress Reports were used to support legal changes to enable the financial 
independence of the PSB, but also present evidence to suggest that this change 
aligned with the strategic interests of the governing political parties. In conclusion, I 
argue that the audiovisual media sectors in these two countries were not participating 
in European protectionism largely attributable to institutional misfit, with the 
exception of the use of EU funds by Slovenian producers. I claim Europeanization 
does appear to have played a role in legitimising change in the domestic opportunity 
structures with consequences for the distribution of resources within the audiovisual 
media sectors, and this also aligned with the strategic interests of domestic actors. 
7.2 Content Quotas  
 
Content quotas are obligations placed on broadcasters to include certain types of 
content in their broadcast programme. At the European level, they are defined in the 
AVMSD, and there are quotas for European works, as defined by the origin of the 
production (art. 1, para. n), and for independent production. Broadcasters are 
required ‘where practicable’ to ensure that 50% of their transmission time is made up 
of European works (art. 16) and 10% is made up of programmes from producers 
“independent of the broadcaster” (art. 17). The European quotas have been criticised 
for being more about protecting industry, particularly the large production companies 
in some of Europe’s larger states, and rather than European culture or cultural 
diversity (see Harrison & Woods, 2001, 2007; Katsirea, 2003). Nevertheless, all EU 
Member States and those in the process of accession are expected to implement these 
quotas and participate in this form of European protectionism. 
 
Both Slovenia and Macedonia transcribed these quotas into domestic law when they 
implemented the TWFD. The EU rules on quotas for linear broadcasting remained 
the same in the newer AVMSD. Therefore, despite the delays in transposition 
described in the previous chapter, both countries were compliant and up to date with 
regard to those rules. In both countries there were also domestic quotas in force. 
Domestic quotas can be formulated in different ways, but essentially require certain 
percentages of domestically produced content (Broughton Micova, 2013). In this 
section, I first discuss participation in European quotas in each case and then 
elaborate on the use of domestic quotas. 
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7.2.1 European works and independent production quotas  
 
In relation to European works quotas, the situations in Slovenia and Macedonia were 
quite similar, but with slight variations in the way the rules are transcribed. In both 
cases almost the exact phrasing of the Directive was replicated in domestic law for 
the definition of European works and for the provision requiring a majority of 
transmission time. In Slovenia this requirement was applied to both national and 
regional television stations. In Macedonia only national broadcasters had to comply. 
In both countries, non-compliance could result in a misdemeanour charge and the 
law also included fines for this violation in its penalty clauses. At the level of law, in 
both countries the European works quotas appear to have been taken seriously, with 
fines prescribed for non-compliance even tthough EU law says they must be 
implemented “where practicable” (Council of European Communities, 2007; 2010, 
p. art. 16). In Slovenia the independent production quota was treated in the same way 
as the European works quota with the exception that where the Directive allows for a 
choice between 10% of transmission time or 10% of production budgets, Slovenian 
law only considered transmission time. In Macedonia the requirement of 10% 
independent production was not applied to private broadcasters. Instead, only the 
PSB had the obligation to spend 10% of its production budget on independent 
production. 
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Table 7.1 European works and independent production quota provisions 
 
Source: The author, compiled from AVMSD, the Law on AVMS (Slovenia), the law on Broadcasting Activity 
(Macedonia), and the Rules for European Audiovisual Works (Macedonia) 
 
In Table 7.1 above it is interesting to note that in both countries, certain types of 
thematic channels were exempt from the quotas. This exemption appears mainly for 
the type of cable-only teleshopping channels, but in Macedonia also applied to 
channels only showing news or sports events. In Macedonia the manner in which 
transmission time was determined was more specifically defined in the “Rules on 
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European Audiovisual Works” such that only certain genres, described specifically 
in another set of “Rules” were considered43. According to the “Rules”, both the 
premier and first repeat of each programme counted towards the quotas. 
 
Monitoring and Reporting 
 
The systems for monitoring European quotas were similar in both Slovenia and 
Macedonia and to common practice across Europe (Graham & et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless because European quotas are annual, the monitoring of them seemed to 
be a challenge for both the regulators and the broadcasters. Both APEK and the BC 
relied mainly on self-reporting by the broadcaster. They did not have the capacity to 
directly monitor the annual output of all stations obliged to comply, though they did 
double-check the self-reported data in some ways. APEK’s Gorjanc explained that in 
Slovenia, reports were received annually in the form of lists of broadcast 
programmes, with time slots, their origin and other identifying information. This was 
corroborated by RTS Maribor’s Jerić, who showed me the table that had to be filled 
out. He also complained about the time it takes to complete because it has to be done 
manually and over an entire year a large number of programmes accrue that must be 
entered. The instructions for the latest version of the table44 issued in 2012 are four 
pages long. Although it was an MS Excel spreadsheet coded to automatically 
calculate the percentages, it still called for detailed information on each programme 
broadcast. This had to be input by the broadcaster and then, according to Gorjanc, 
checked against an external agency’s records of broadcast programmes. It seems 
unsurprising that not all broadcasters manage to report each year. 
 
As only a Candidate Country, Macedonia was not required to report to the EC 
regarding European works or independent production. However, these quotas were 
part of domestic law and Janevska received annual reports from the television 
stations of what has been broadcast according to genre. The forms45 were similar 
tables to those used by APEK, but were further divided by the genres listed in Table 
                                                 
43
 A “Правилник” or “Rules” document is a binding act adopted by the Council of the BC and 
published in the Official Gazette 
44
http://apek.si/datoteke/File/2012/Obrazci_za_vodenje_podatkov/navodila_za_izpolnjevanje_TV.doc
x 
45
 http://srd.org.mk/images/stories/Obrazec_za_audiovizuelni_dela.doc  
 190 
6.1 as those stated in the “Rules” on implementation. The BC in Macedonia faced 
significant problems with getting these reports from the broadcasters according to 
Janevska, yet she does not explain this as intentional non-compliance: 
 
“They are not well staffed and often don’t seem to keep records. 
Sometimes it just seems as if they decide on a daily basis what they’re 
going to put on air, or at least they don’t have some annual planning or 
don’t keep data . . . they have to gather all at the end everything that was 
broadcast because they haven’t kept daily evidence and this is mainly 
because of understaffing.” (Interview, May 2011) 
 
The reporting stations that calculate what portion within each genre consisted of 
European works, and Janevska said her team checks their calculations based on the 
programme lists in the tables. The form is a MS Word document with separate tables 
for each genre, into which the broadcaster must put the details of each programme 
aired from the genres specified. According to Janevska, in 2010 6 of the 15 obliged 
to implement the quotas did not report, and in 2011, only 13 remained with the 
obligation to comply with the quotas yet 9 of them failed to report. 
 
In both Slovenia and Macedonia, the European works quotas were part of 
governance. Independent production quotas were enacted in the Slovenian case, 
though only for the PSB in the Macedonian case. Standardised forms and reporting 
procedures for European works quotas were in place in both cases. However, the 
evidence above indicates that the process of gathering the data and the sheer volume 
that had to be gathered to calculate annual quotas placed a significant burden on the 
broadcasters and on the handful of people in APEK and the BC processing it. 
 
Enforcement and Attitudes  
 
Problems with compliance were handled similarly in Slovenia and Macedonia. In 
recent years, APEK only “alerted” or notified two separate broadcasters of their non-
compliance, TV3 in 2011 and RTS in 2009 (APEK, 2011b). In the list of all 
measures taken against broadcasters in Macedonia between January 2007 and 
October 2011 given to me by the BC, not one was related to European quotas. Only 
in 2012 did the BC begin to issue warnings to those stations that failed to report 
(Broadcasting Council of Republic of Macedonia, 2012b). I cannot draw a direct link 
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between weak enforcement of the European quotas and individual attitudes towards 
them. However in the interviews, those responsible for monitoring in Slovenia and 
Macedonia expressed an understanding that the quotas are challenging for domestic 
broadcasters, and to some extent beliefs that they are not important, or at least not as 
important as domestic ones. 
 
APEK’s Gorjanc said that although he personally prefers European content to 
American and supports the quotas:  
 
“I think you would have to make a compromise in this field. Because we 
are not capable to reach those amounts that are prescribed for Europe. 
We are capable of less, but we should maybe agree on some lower 
amount of works, which we would be capable of. I think we should go 
and make a compromise with stakeholders and the producers and the 
government and make a consensus on what we are capable of.” 
(Interview, April 2011) 
 
Between both cases only one person really expressed complete negativity about the 
quotas, calling them “useless” and claiming that, “for the average person it's the 
same if they are watching an American series or French…Slovenian is Slovenian and 
it's interesting for a different reason. But if you have to choose between French or 
American you will just choose the one that[’s] better.” (Anonymous, Interview, April 
2011). 
 
Similarly to Gorjanc, Janevksa in Macedonia also spoke sympathetically of the 
difficulty the domestic channels have in reaching the European quotas, giving this as 
the reason for the fact that repeats are counted towards the quotas in their 
calculations. She explained: 
 
“We have a problem with meeting the European quotas, and that’s even 
with domestic programmes being included. If it wasn’t for the domestic 
content they would never be achieved. They [broadcasters] have a 
problem. They don’t have the capacity, and if they did have money 
they’d want to buy something else.” (Interview, May 2011) 
 
In both cases those in charge of monitoring compliance with the European quotas did 
not seem to find it appropriate to push broadcasters to fulfil the quotas. Their 
statements show that for most, this was not a matter of a clash of values or rejection 
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of the norms of European protectionism, but an awareness of the material conditions 
under which the broadcasters in these small markets were operating. Their 
perceptions were substantiated by the evidence on practices and accounts of those 
working in the market. 
 
(Non) Implementation 
 
In Slovenia from 2007 to 2009 between five and eight of the ten private channels 
reporting failed to fulfil the quota each year.46 In 2010, only five of the ten private 
television channels reporting met the 50% threshold for European works (APEK, 
2011a). Two of those that did were the channels owned by ProPlus, by far the largest 
and most financially successful broadcaster. Another was the regional station RTS 
Maribor, whose manager Jerić explained that this was because “European is 
Slovenian” and Slovenian content was easy to produce or procure. In 2010, RTS 
reported 66.2% European works and 65.5% Slovenian works. RTS is one of the 
strongest regional channels, founded by the same owners who originally started 
ProPlus, with which it maintains close relations. Interestingly, all the reporting 
stations showed compliance with the independent production quotas. Jerić explained 
how his station and some of the other regional stations achieve this. They simply 
trade programmes, because anything produced outside of the station itself counts as 
independent production. According to the AVMSD, the independent works quotas 
were established with the intention that they “will stimulate new sources of television 
production” (Council of European Communities, 2010, para. 68). In Slovenia 
previous long-standing relationships among stations allow the quota to be fulfilled 
without commissioning or engaging independent producers. 
 
The Macedonian case shows a similar story of stations mainly not complying with 
European works quotas and domestic content, primarily making up the percentages 
that they do achieve. One of the producers from TV Sitel television freely admitted 
that they were not able to make the European quota: “I think we don’t have those 
[European works quota] fulfilled completely . . . for the European ones, we push it a 
bit, but for the domestic ones, the viewers themselves react” (interview, May 2011). 
                                                 
46
 According to the reports prepared by APEK for the EC, in 2007 eight failed, in 2008 it was five and 
in 2009 six did not comply.  
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Previous research I conducted on content quotas in Macedonia over two periods in 
2008 and 2009 found that while the majority (74%) of European works programmes 
were domestic, those that were not were primarily from within the region, namely 
Croatian and Serbian (Broughton Micova, 2011, 2013). The Sitel producer explained 
that it is the dramatic series and soap operas from around the region that bring them 
the highest ratings – at that time Turkish and previously Croatian and Serbian 
dramatic series – more so than more expensive American or Western European 
premium drama. Content from these three countries does count towards European 
works quotas, as even those that are not members of the EU are signatories to the 
CoE Convention on Transfrontier Television; however the practice of using cheap, 
but crowd pleasing dramatic content produces mixed results in terms of participation 
in the EU protectionism. Janevska reported that in 2010, all nine of those who 
actually submitted reports were compliant, but in 2011 only one complied and only 3 
more reported at all. 
 
At the level of laws, formal rules, and even the forms and procedures for reporting, 
both Slovenia and Macedonia appeared to participate in the European project of 
ensuring European works predominance in television. However the interferences of 
enforcement practice and implementation tell a different story. In other studies, 
failures or delays in the implementation of EU rules have been attributed to 
administrative culture (Falkner et al., 2007) or misfit with institutional norms, that 
sometimes can be overcome through socialisation (Epstein, 2005; Grabbe, 2005). 
However in these two cases, the process of monitoring and reporting on European 
quotas did not seem to fit well with the established practices of both broadcasters and 
regulators, primarily because of the material constraints on these interactions. 
Practices have been shaped by the size of the markets and of the market players. At 
the same time, resistance to participation in EU quotas was facilitated by the 
institutional values dominant within the NRAs. Those responsible for enforcement 
found it appropriate to tolerate non-compliance by the broadcasters because they 
were aware of their limitations and are sympathetic. The next section looks at the 
role of domestic content quotas, which affords the opportunity to compare with the 
rules, practices and appropriateness of those. 
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7.2.2 Domestic Content Quotas  
 
Like many countries in Europe both Slovenian and Macedonian law imposed content 
quotas for domestic production on broadcasters licensed within each country. The 
two countries had different approaches to how the quotas are structured. Slovenian 
law imposed a 5% annual quota for Slovenian works, but required a much higher 
percentage of in-house production. Macedonian law, on the other hand, simply 
required that 30% of daily transmission time be made up of programmes originally 
produced in the Macedonian language or the language of a national minority. Table 
7.2 below compares the two different approaches. 
Table 7.2 Domestic content quota provisions 
 
Source: The author, compiled from the Mass Media Act of 2001 (Slovenia), the Law on AVMS of 2011 (Slovenia) 
and the Law on Broadcasting Activity of 2005 (Macedonia) 
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In the comparison above I find evidence that in both countries, policy-makers have 
attempted to design the quotas as forms of cultural protectionism and not just to 
protect the domestic production industry. Language also seems to be a key 
consideration. In Slovenia the definition of Slovenian works is very specific. Not 
only must they be in Slovene language (or one of the recognised national minorities), 
but they had to be individual creations from the fields of literature, science and art. In 
Macedonia, the law only stipulated language as the criteria for the quota, but then 
secondary legislation further defined the types of programmes that qualify by 
limiting the genres that can enter into the calculation. The 30% required by 
Macedonian law not only excluded advertisements and teleshopping as in Slovenian 
law, but also news, sports events and games. The Slovenian quota for in-house 
production can also be seen as linguistic protection since domestic broadcasters are 
not likely to produce programmes in other languages, except the PSB channels for 
Hungarian and Italian national minorities. However, the range of qualifying 
programmes types is broad, and even includes sports events with commentary. 
 
Though organised differently, the formal rules for domestic quotas were similar in 
function to those of the European quotas described in the previous section. The 
practice of implementation, however, does not reflect this similarity. The evidence 
on enforcement and compliance shows that broadcasters adhered more to them than 
to the European works quotas. There seem to be multiple reasons for this. One is that 
as domestic quotas were daily rather than annual, which seems to make them a better 
fit with the practice of monitoring and enforcement. Another is that protecting 
domestic production, and in particular the national language and culture, was of 
greater priority to the individuals making decisions. Finally, domestic content is 
cheaper for the small cash-strapped broadcasters in these markets.  
 
Monitoring and Enforcement 
 
Slovenia’s in-house production quotas and music quotas were both percentages of 
daily transmission time, as were the domestic content and music quotas in 
Macedonia. This means that compliance, or lack thereof was picked up in the regular 
monitoring of individual broadcasters by the NRAs. In Macedonia, Janevska 
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explained that when the BC staff monitors a station, staff members examine a 
recording of 24 hours of the station’s output in relation to all provisions. This could 
include the domestic quotas, advertising time limits, the display of the station 
identification and much more. The enforcement of domestic quotas, which mandated 
a percentage of daily output, fit easily into this routine of the BC’s monitoring. 
Between January 2007 and October 2011 the BC issued 7 notifications, 30 warnings 
and 6 warnings with the obligation to publish to broadcasters in Macedonia for 
violations of the 30% domestic quotas. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, Slovenia’s APEK had recently moved over to a 
complaints-based monitoring system. Previously, according to Gorjanc, they had a 
system of monitoring individual broadcasters periodically and checking their output 
for compliance with a variety of provisions, including daily quotas. Afterwards, he 
said they would simply check for quotas when they had some down time between 
responding to complaints. This did result in measures being taken in cases of quota 
violations. For example in 2006, seven cases were forwarded to the Media Inspector 
by APEK against broadcasters for nine violations related to the daily domestic 
quotas. Seven were related to in-house production and two to Slovenian music and 
five of the cases were against radio stations and two were television channels. 
Sixteen decisions were also taken in relation to quotas in 2010, but the breakdown 
was not available. Gorjanc said at the time of the interview that monitoring for 
domestic quotas had been stopped recently in expectation of changes to the Mass 
Media Act. 
 
This examination of the governance interferences (Kooiman, 2003) of the regulators’ 
procedures and routines shows that domestic quotas were a better fit simply because 
they were mandated on a daily basis. The monitoring of these quotas does not require 
reporting from the broadcasters, but can be done based on the recordings held by the 
regulators. The interferences related to the European quotas involved lengthy 
reporting from the broadcasters and special engagement by the regulators outside of 
their regular routines. This is one very banal example of institutional misfit with 
established domestic practice and ways of doing things, but this misfit stems from 
the smallness of these countries and not socially constructed values or identity. 
However, I also found evidence that in Slovenia and in Macedonia, domestic 
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protectionism is more valued by those making and enforcing the law and smallness is 
part of their perception of identity. 
 
Attitudes and Values 
 
In both Slovenia and Macedonia, the majority of respondents spoke of the need for 
some kind of domestic protectionism. Responses were not as clear in terms of the use 
of domestic quotas as a method of protectionism because of concerns over quality 
and the sustainability of domestic broadcasters. Individuals in both cases expressed 
concerns that domestic content quotas encourage the broadcast of lower quality 
content that can be damaging to the broadcasters in the face of external competition. 
In Macedonia, concerns expressed over the quality and sustainability of domestic 
broadcasters were also connected to a belief that stronger media companies would be 
better equipped to stand up to political influence as much as by fears of competition 
from foreign channels. 
 
In Slovenia among the nine people interviewed47 in APEK and in the Ministry, seven 
in some way said local programming is important. Among these were also some who 
expressed dilemmas about the quotas as a method of ensuring it and to whom they 
should apply. Domestic media were seen by some to have an obligation to contribute 
to the promotion of the language and culture. Stopar of the Ministry of Culture 
explained: 
“There are only 2 million people who speak the Slovenian language in 
this world so it’s very important that we have our media in Slovenian 
language. Secondly I think they should really play their role in the 
popularisation of Slovenian culture and also to educate in the 
achievements of our science or all the other fields . . . It’s a phrase 
‘globalisation’, but I really think that we are attacked by this 
standardisation of cultural patterns.” (Interview, April 2011) 
 
Saša Gnezda at APEK explained that in the tenders for the new DTT licenses, 
applicants had to fulfil higher domestic quotas in order to prevent the DTT network 
from being filled with channels that simply re-transmit. She added that in her view 
                                                 
47
 One interview was with 2 people together, the Media Inspector Sandra Vesel and the Chief 
Inspector of the Inspectorate of Culture and Media, Tamara Javornik. I have counted them as separate 
people in this number, although the flow of the conversation meant that only Tamara commented on 
this issue.  
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this was an indicator of quality. Tamara Javornik, Chief Inspector at IRSKM also 
supported quotas and was particularly in favour of the move to force stations to air 
Slovenian music during the day, rather than fulfilling the quotas in off-peak hours. 
However, others had some concerns that the quotas may actually go against the goal 
of protecting domestic broadcasters. One of Gnezda’s colleagues thought that quotas 
could only be expected of stations that used the terrestrial networks and was 
concerned for the commercial survival of domestic channels in the face of such 
obligations. Stopar explained a similar dilemma he had while revising the quota 
requirements in the draft Mass Media Act:  
 
“Sometimes I think is it [using quotas] right in the name of public 
interest, in the name of supporting domestic production? Do we have the 
right to force private investors or private enterprises with these quotas? 
Sometimes I’m in doubt, but I think that it’s still justified because in a 
market of 2 million people we must do something to maintain our 
identity and cultural identity. So okay I’m for these quotas.” (Interview, 
April 2011) 
 
In Macedonia domestic quotas were not as much on the minds of those whom I 
interviewed. This may have been because they were not just finishing the drafting of 
a new law in which quotas had been contentious. Those that did mention them or 
responded when asked about them felt they were important, but also had concerns 
about their effectiveness. Council Member Boris Arsov at the BC said flatly, “I’m 
against too much foreign content; we need to encourage domestic production” 
(Interview May 2011). However he expressed worry that the domestic quotas in 
place were not specific enough in order to ensure quality. He explained: “at the 
moment fulfilling the quota is easy; you and me sit in a studio and chat for an hour or 
two” (Interview, May 2011). The producers from TV Sitel television, who claimed to 
comply with domestic quotas, also said that doing so was generally easy for them to 
do with their own production. This tendency for studio based talk shows fulfilling 
quota requirements was also identified in the study I did on quota complaint content 
from 2008 and 2009 (Broughton Micova, 2011, 2013) This study also showed that 
55% of the informative programming was overtly political, almost entirely in-studio 
format. This was 16% of total programmes, of which another 35% was news. 
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Andriana Skerlev-Čakar, the Chief of Staff at the BC suggested that perhaps other 
measures would be more appropriate such as incentives like reduced license fees or 
taxes for stations that produce or commission certain kinds of domestic content. BC 
Council Members Stefanoski and Fetai also both expressed concern over the quality 
of domestic broadcasters. Fetai and Council Member Naumov said there was a need 
to make domestic channels more competitive against foreign ones available through 
subscriptions services. However, both they and Stefanoski also argued that having 
financially more secure and viable stations would make them more professional and 
less easy for political parties to control. Domestic content quotas were supported in 
Macedonia by those responsible for enforcing and implementing them, although 
some would like to see them used to encourage higher quality or particular types of 
content. Four of those interviewed did not speak spontaneously about protection of 
content at all, but did about a desire to ensure the survival of domestic broadcasters 
and all four associated this with a need to improve quality. 
 
The evidence indicates that individuals involved in the audiovisual media sector in 
both Slovenia and Macedonia valued domestic content and prioritised it over foreign 
content. There seems to be a paradox though in that the small size of these countries 
and their populations that led these individuals to feel a need to protect their 
language and identity through domestic content also limited the resources available 
for making quality domestic content. Domestic content is cheap, but the accounts 
here show that individuals were aware that domestic music or television studio talk 
shows were not necessarily going to make their channels competitive in the common 
market or more sustainable. Therefore, although their values lead them to prioritise 
domestic protectionism, they were not necessarily convinced that quotas are the best 
mechanism. 
 
7.2.3 Misfit with practices shaped by size  
 
The evidence above shows that European works quotas were generally not enforced, 
and adherence to them by the broadcasters was sporadic in both Slovenia and 
Macedonia. My findings indicate that this resistance to participation in European 
protectionism was due to institutional misfit with what is appropriate in both the 
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NRAs and broadcasters based on their established practices and values. The evidence 
indicates that the small size of these countries and the resulting material constraints 
have been influential in shaping these practices and values. Comparing their 
implementation to that of domestic quotas highlighted that reporting and monitoring 
EU quotas simply did not fit easily into the regular interferences – the practices and 
procedures – of broadcasters or regulators. Domestic quotas, which were daily, could 
be monitored by those in the NRAs without relying on the understaffed ill resourced 
broadcasters in their small markets who struggled to report on annual quotas. At the 
same time, for those working in the broadcasters, decisions about achieving quotas 
were constrained by their limited resources, and domestic content was more 
accessible than other European content, whether produced in their own studio or 
exchanged with another station. 
 
In the statements of the individuals referred to above, it is clear that most of them 
valued domestic content. Those testimonies from the Slovenian case in particular, 
but also in Macedonia, indicated that this valuing of domestic content was rooted in 
the need to protect vulnerable languages and identity. However, I do not find in the 
evidence convincing indications that the valuing of domestic content was a source of 
misfit with European protectionism. Achieving domestic quotas were not mutually 
exclusive to achieving European ones, and it was clear that broadcasters understood 
that domestic content contributed to European quotas as well. I argue that misfit 
cannot be attributed to individuals valuing domestic over European, but could be 
linked to the doubts that several individuals expressed about the effectiveness of 
quotas generally and their impact on the sustainability and competitiveness of 
domestic broadcasters. It was evident in the interview data presented, that most 
individuals with whom I spoke valued and prioritised their domestic broadcasters, 
and this will be supported further in the next section. Neither European nor domestic 
quotas are actually designed to improve the capacity of broadcasters or quality of 
content (see Harrison & Woods, 2001, 2007; McGonagle, 2008). The next section 
examines the governance interactions involved in the form of protectionism directly 
aimed at supporting the creation of content or the budgets of broadcasters. It will also 
show that there was a sharp difference between Slovenia and Macedonia in this 
regard. 
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7.3 Subsidies and similar forms of direct assistance  
 
State subsidies are a form of protectionism common in many industries. Here I use 
the term state in the general sense introduced in Chapter 3, which can refer to the 
various levels and organs of government inside a country, as well as to the bodies 
formed among countries such as the EU. In EU media policy, subsidies exist in the 
form of the MEDIA programme, 48  which is primarily aimed at supporting the 
production and distribution of European films, but also provides some support for 
television projects (see also Papathanassopoulos & Negrine, 2011; Schlesinger, 
1993, 1997). The grants awarded by MEDIA for television productions are given to 
production companies for projects that involve collaboration with television stations, 
distributors and national level support programmes. Slovenia is part of this 
programme and some Slovenian television productions have received support. The 
Macedonian government was still in negotiations for the country to become an 
associate to the programme during my investigations, so Macedonian producers or 
television stations could not yet participate. At the domestic level, both countries had 
film funds for supporting dramatic, documentary and animated films mainly for 
cinematic distribution. Slovenia also had a fund specifically aimed at supporting 
audiovisual production for television and radio. 
 
In the previous section, I intertwined the analysis of the two cases because the 
significant amount of similarity in the way quotas operated meant that a detailed 
comparison was useful. In this section, the two cases will be analysed separately 
because of the significant difference that only Slovenian producers have access to the 
MEDIA programme. I first discuss the use of European and national level subsidies 
in Slovenia. I find that in Slovenia, there was a commitment to local media and 
maintaining local pluralism that was matched with state aid to local and regional 
broadcasters. Next I delve into the use of direct assistance in Macedonia. In 
Macedonia I find this primarily took the form of government support for PSB, but 
there is also evidence that government funded public service ads and campaigns were 
used to inject funds into private broadcasting as well. By comparing these situations, 
in closing I argue that Slovenia to some extent participated in this form of European 
                                                 
48
 The 2007-2013 programme is called MEDIA and follows the MEDIA Plus programme that was in 
place from 2001-2006.  
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protectionism but that it is not clear if there were consequences for the domestic 
opportunity structure because of the role and position of the PSB, RTVSLO. While 
Macedonian producers were not participating and MRT was not in a position to 
contribute to doing so, there is evidence that Europeanization played a role in 
changing the MRT’s position within the opportunity structure. I also argue that the 
domestic subsidies to private broadcasters in both cases amount to political 
protectionism. I present evidence that this is partly a consequence of the power and 
resources of smaller broadcasters, and subsidies were a mechanism through which 
political elites could exert influence over media, most evident in Macedonia. 
 
7.3.1 Subsidies in Slovenia 
 
Those wishing to produce audiovisual content in Slovenia had access to three 
different subsidies that are directly aimed at the audiovisual sector: the EU MEDIA 
programme, the Slovenian Film Centre (SFC),49 and the fund for special interest 
projects that was managed at the time by the Ministry of Culture. Similarly to the EU 
MEDIA Programme described above, the SFC aims to support “film, audiovisual 
and cinematographic activities”, in Republic of Slovenia (Slovenian Film Centre, 
2012). These three represent direct interventions by the state in the audiovisual 
market using public money. It is out of the scope of this thesis to investigate the film 
industry aimed at cinematic distribution in detail, and I focus on how each of these 
relate to the audiovisual media sector as defined in the AVMSD, namely 
broadcasting across various platforms. The evidence that follows indicates that the 
first two forms of subsidies listed above did play some role in the business of 
broadcasting particularly in relation to the PSB. The European subsidies expanded 
the material resources available to domestic market players, but the extent to which 
this amounted to change in the domestic opportunity structure is not so clear. The 
evidence indicates that the fund operated by the Ministry was a form of local, rather 
than national protectionism, and serves to reinforce the relationship between political 
elites and local media.50 
                                                 
49
 The Slovenian Film Centre was founded in January 2011 as the successor to the former Slovenian 
Film Fund. http://www.film-center.si/about_slovenian_film_centre 
50
 As per the Act on the Slovenian Film Centre of 2010 the management of this fund was transferred 
to the SFC from the Ministry in 2012. 
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The European and national subsidies 
 
Although Slovenia participated in the EU’s MEDIA programme, it was not 
mentioned by any of those I interviewed in answer to any of the questions about 
relations with or relevance of the EU. Only when asked specifically about it did 
Stopar from the Ministry of Culture say that he did not think Slovenian television 
producers had been successful in getting support, but that he was not sure. This is a 
strong indication that the fund did not play a significant role in supporting 
audiovisual production for broadcast in Slovenia. Nevertheless, I contacted the 
Sabina Briški at the information office for the European Commission’s MEDIA 
programme via email to check the impression that Stopar expressed. As of July 2012, 
only three Slovenian television productions had been supported since 2003 
amounting to a total of €137,000. Two of these were animated series, and for all of 
them, the independent production companies also had more support from RTVSLO. 
According to Briški, it is very difficult for Slovenian television productions to 
compete for MEDIA funds, because applicants are expected to have the co-operation 
of many strong broadcasters in other countries that also participate in the MEDIA 
programme secured and meet strict criteria. She added:  
 
“But [having a successful application] is not only having the sufficient 
number of [foreign] broadcasters on board. All other segments of the 
application (distributers/sales agents on board, strong international 
potential well presented, good marketing strategy ...) have to be present. 
For Slovenian producers this can be very hard and from this point of 
view and MEDIA TV Broadcasting support is still something quite 
‘unreachable’ for the moment.” (Personal Communication, July 2012) 
 
In addition to those 3 television projects, 26 single project film productions received 
funding to a total of €846,989 and 5 more received support in the form of credit 
guarantees.51 Though primarily aimed at cinematic distribution, several of the film 
productions were also made in cooperation with RTVSLO. Briški believed that 
overall, Slovenian producers had been successful in using the MEDIA schemes 
                                                 
51
 Figures provided by Media Desk Slovenia the official in-country representative of the EU’s 
MEDIA Programme.  
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considering that they are intended to supplement national schemes. “The MEDIA 
support gained by applicants and their audiovisual projects in a country often reflects 
the (in)efficiency of the domestic support system [bold in original],” she 
explained, and added that her office lobbies the Slovenian government for more 
domestic support for audiovisual production (personal communication, July 2012). 
 
Between 2003 and 2011, the SFC contributed to 44 audiovisual productions either as 
the majority financer or as a minority financer of a project largely supported by 
another donor. The number of films supported by the MEDIA Programme was more 
than half the number supported by the SFC. Six of the films on the SFC lists also 
appear on the list of those supported by the MEDIA Programme. 
 
Table 7.3 SFC support to audiovisual production from 2003-2011 
 
Source: The author, calculated from data provided by the Slovenian Film Centre 
 
As Table 7.3 above shows, the total support for audiovisual productions through the 
SFC from 2003 through 2011 was €40,672,329, with those films majority financed 
by the fund receiving nearly €1.3 million each. This shows that national level support 
was more than 40 times the European level support. The entire budget of the MEDIA 
programme 2007-2013, within which producer support is only one of eight activities, 
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is only €755 million for the entire EU and associated countries (European 
Commission, 2012) and two thirds of the funds go to support productions in the five 
largest EU countries (Papathanassopoulos & Negrine, 2011, p. 71). I suggest that it is 
unlikely that the ratio of EU to national support in Slovenia is unusual for small 
states. In the data presented in the table above, RTVSLO appears as co-producer and 
in two cases the main producer, of 64% of the films including all six of those that 
also received EU support. The evidence present in Chapter 5 showed that RTVSLO 
was the second largest actor in the market measured by audience share and 
advertising revenue, and that when license fee was included it receives the most 
financial resources for production in the sector. The data on film productions here 
provides further evidence of the major role RTVSLO plays in the audiovisual 
production industry as a whole. These funds may impact slightly on the material 
resources available in the sector increasing the amount distributed to independent 
producers. Nevertheless, considering that co-financing, secured distribution and 
international partners are all required to make use of the EU subsidies, there is little 
indication in the evidence here that these funds changed the position of RTVSLO 
within the domestic opportunity structure or that of independent production 
companies vis-à-vis the dominant broadcasters. 
 
The special interest in local media 
 
The use of subsidies discussed above supports national projects that are mostly 
cinematic, although often subsequently broadcast. The subsidy aimed directly at 
broadcast media is outlined in Slovenia’s Mass Media Act and is managed by the 
Ministry of Culture. According to Stopar, who was responsible for managing this 
“state aid”, as he called it, the budget is divided into three separate funds, two of 
which are specifically for broadcast media. The first fund is open to both radio and 
television stations that have been granted the status of non-profit special interest 
channels. All of these are local or regional stations that have met certain criteria in 
terms of the type of programming they broadcast. The second is for audiovisual 
works for broadcast media, and independent producers can also apply to this fund. 
These two funds, along with a third, which is open to all Slovenian media including 
print and online, draw from a budget set in the law as 3% of the amount of the 
RTVSLO license fee from the previous year. Ostensibly these are mechanisms for 
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the preservation of local media and local pluralism. Gnezda of APEK, for instance 
argued:  
 
“There should be a way to protect the local broadcasters so that  - not all 
of them - I'm not for that you have to support all of them in any case and 
for any costs - but those that you can find some kind of quality. Those 
should be supported in a way so that they are not in a danger that the big 
market would eat them.” (Interview April 2011) 
 
Stopar was more specific and insisted that there will continue to be some form of 
state aid for local and regional broadcasters in future laws. 
 
“ . . . because we simply must, we must, support our media. I think 
commercial television working on the national level - they will survive, 
but the smaller ones this regional local and televisions, they will all go 
down without this state aid. I think it’s in the public interest to support 
say 10 radio in Slovenia, 3-4 TV stations, 3 central newspapers and I 
think we have 5-6 regional papers, and I think these media should be 
supported. I have enough data to support this financing from the state 
budget for these media because they play some role in their community 
life. They brought some information that national broadcaster can’t . . 
.”(Interview April 2011) 
 
Stopar and RTS’s Jerić explained that the grants go to support specific production 
projects, but both confirmed that these funds are necessary for the survival of these 
local and regional stations. Jerić said that without these funds assured, his station 
may have to convert to a commercial cable-only channel without its own news or 
other production. This vital lifeline for the local and regional broadcasters is spread 
quite thin, however, because according to Stopar, about 30 radio and television 
stations had the special status required to be eligible to apply.52 
 
On the surface, this may seem like a textbook example of public interest media 
policy supporting pluralism, but in Slovenia it is problematic. Local and regional 
broadcasters are closely tied to local political interests. Asked how so many stations 
managed to get the special status, Jerić explained: “Every TV station has got their 
own politicians which push them forward to get the status.” In APEK, three people 
explained that their role in the process was simply to analyse the programme output 
                                                 
52
 As of October 2012, according to APEK’s register of broadcasters, 12 regional and local television 
stations and 15 regional and local radio stations had special status. 
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of the stations applying for the status according to genre and report to the Ministry 
whether or not the right proportions were present. Three of those interviewed spoke 
of the close connection between local broadcasters and local political elites. Jerič 
explained:  
 
“Everybody knows that small media are not completely independent of 
politics because it’s just that every business is bound to some political 
decisions in Slovenia. There are so many state owned companies and you 
don’t even get close to them if you don’t have someone who opens the door. 
They don’t expect a favour, but you know that if you want to do business 
with the company you have to be nice.” (Interview, April 2011) 
 
Jelovac of the Slovenian Broadcasting Council, who was appointed during the first 
right wing government, argued that the policy of subsidising local and regional 
broadcasters simply perpetuated the hold that local political elites have over the 
smaller media. He referred to the support for programmes of special interest as 
“ideological control of the media supported by state money” (interview, April 2011). 
Jelovac spoke of “brainwashing in red” and left wing control over media, but it 
remained to be seen whether these mechanisms would change with a right wing 
coalition in power again. 
 
The fact that Slovenian producers are making use of the European subsidies and 
those interviewed valued support for domestic production, suggests that there is not 
institutional misfit creating resistance in terms of participation in this form of 
European protectionism. Based on the literature cited above (Luaces, 2002; Sudbery, 
2010), one would might expect to see Europeanization playing a role by changing the 
domestic opportunity structure through its financial support to specific actors. 
However, in the Slovenian audiovisual sector, there is not convincing evidence that 
participation in EU protectionism and the support programme has had consequences 
for the distribution of power and resources among domestic actors. If anything, the 
data confirms the strong position of RTVSLO and suggests that EU subsidies may 
strengthen the importance of the PSB in supporting independent production. At the 
same time with smaller stations highly marginalised in terms of material and power 
resources as demonstrated in Chapter 5, domestic subsidies reinforce the 
relationships between political parties and smaller media acting as mechanisms for 
maintaining control. 
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7.3.2 Subsidies in Macedonia 
 
As I mentioned in the outset of this section, producers and broadcasters in 
Macedonia did not have access to European level subsidies for the audiovisual 
sector. The country used to have a fund for special interest production projects drawn 
from the license fee and managed by the former Broadcasting Council, though 
decisions on grants were taken by the government. According to three of those 
interviewed, many local stations survived on those grants, even though similar to the 
Slovenian ones, they were technically for production projects. The fund was 
abolished in 2005, when it was not included in the Law on Broadcasting Activity of 
that year. This left only the Macedonian Film Fund (MFF), which supports 
independent cinematic production, but unlike the SFC in Slovenia did not appear to 
be connected to broadcasting. The governance of the audiovisual sector in 
Macedonia included no official interventions in the form of subsidies to private 
broadcasters. Nevertheless, the evidence I present below indicates that public money 
was still being used to support broadcasters in the country. The government’s ad hoc 
infusions of funds in the PSB and funding of advertising campaigns to distribute 
resources to private broadcasters demonstrate the political nature of protectionism in 
Macedonia. Within this, Europeanization appears to have played a role in altering the 
domestic opportunity structure to change the power and resources of the PSB. 
 
Direct subsidies to production and PSB 
 
In Macedonia there were two kinds of direct state subsidy for audiovisual 
production, but neither goes to private broadcasting. The first is the subsidy through 
the MFF, which provided support to cinematic works aimed at festivals and cinema 
distribution. The MFF was established by the Law on the Film Fund in 2006 and 
started operations in 2008. 
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Table 7.4 Macedonian Film Fund support for productions 2008-2011 
 
Source: The author compiled from annual lists of supported projects published by Macedonian Film Fund 
 
Table 7.4 above shows that what could be considered more “television friendly” 
genres of short films, documentary and animation funded by the MFF in addition to 
feature films. However, the data available from the MFF and a search for titles in the 
IMDB database produced no evidence that private broadcasters or Macedonia’s PSB 
play any notable role in the productions supported by the fund. When contacted, the 
MFF responded that they do not have records of television broadcasts of their 
projects as they track only festival screenings. Unlike in Slovenia, the film and 
cinematic production sector seemed quite removed from the mainstream 
broadcasting sector. 
 
The evidence on the development of the audiovisual media sector in Chapter 5 
indicates that one of the reasons for the lack of PSB involvement in production was 
the long-term weakened financial situation of MRT. This also relates to the second 
form of direct subsidy from the state in the audiovisual market: ad hoc direct 
payments to MRT. MRT has a long history of financial difficulty stemming mainly 
from problems with the non-collection of the license fee. This dates back to 2004, 
when the electric company charged with collecting the fee allowed customers to 
exclude it from their bill payment and culminated with MRT’s failure to collect the 
fee itself after the 2005 law gave it the responsibility (Beličanec & Ricliev, 2012; 
Broughton Micova, 2012; see also Šopar, 2008). By 2008, MRT was in such dire 
circumstances financially that the government intervened with ad hoc financial 
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infusions, and as Table 5.9 in Chapter 5 showed, these transfers represented 90% of 
MRT’s budget that year. 
 
As I have shown elsewhere, this period of ad hoc subsidies had serious implications 
on the political independence of MRT. Editors and general managers speaking in 
2010, stated that they could not be independent as long as they relied on the 
government for budgetary infusions with some admitting their own ties to the parties 
in power (see Broughton Micova, 2012). I was unable to conduct an analysis of MRT 
programmes myself, but the PSB has been the subject of monitoring by the BC and 
by successive international election monitoring missions. The BC conducted analysis 
of MRT’s programmes in 2010 and 2011, and both times the BC’s monitoring team 
counted the number of minutes of coverage in the main television news programmes 
of the following: the central government, the parties of the parliamentary majority, 
the opposition political parties, the civil sector and foreign institutions. Aware that 
there may be credibility issues using secondary data from an NRA in which I found 
evidence of political influence, I also looked at the last two OSCE/ODIHR election 
monitoring reports of television coverage during election campaign periods 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2009, pp. 16-17; 2011, pp. 14-15). The OSCE/ODHIR reports and 
the BC’s monitoring of MRT programmes showed a clear dominance of coverage of 
the central government bodies and ruling political parties during the period of 
financial dependence on the central government.  
 
According to Todor Malezanski, head of MRT’s legal department, the financial 
dependence on the government changed after January 2011, when an amendment to 
the law was adopted such that the license fee is now collected by the State Revenue 
Office. The relationship described above between the government and MRT, clearly 
goes against EU state aid rules and the norms described in the communications on 
the use of state aid in PSB (see European Commission, 2001b, 2009a) and the need 
to ensure the financial independence of MRT was referred to in successive EC 
Progress Reports (see 2009, 2010). Malezanski, who as Head of Legal Services was 
party to some of the accession process meetings with the EC’s subcommittee and is 
active in EBU, said that the repeated mention of the need to stabilise MRT’s 
financing in the Progress Reports was influential in getting the government to change 
the law in regards to the license fee. The data presented in Table 5.9 in Chapter 5 
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showed that by 2011, budget transfers made up only 24% of the total budget. As of 
2011, the state was continuing to subsidise MRT outside of the manner foreseen in 
the Law on Broadcasting,53 but less so than the previous years. 
 
However, the BC’s 2011 monitoring, the findings of which are in line with those of 
the OSCE/ODHIR mission for the election that same year, show that as opposed to 
the government being less present in the MRT news programmes, it received 
significantly more coverage in 2011 than in 2010. This indicates that the increased 
financial independence may not have improved the political independence of MRT, 
or that the years of financial control have left their mark in terms of loyal people 
serving in editorial and managerial positions and other relationships. The monitoring 
by the BC and OSCE/ODIHR, as well as my own research, document the strong and 
persistent influence of the ruling political parties on MRT. Enforcing a levy such as 
the license fee would not be a popular move for the Government. While the account 
of Malezanski indicates that EU pressure played a role in changing the distribution of 
material resources to MRT, I suggest that stabilising the broadcaster through the 
license fee, especially when doing so could be blamed on EU pressure, was also in 
the strategic interests of the ruling parties in government. 
 
Government advertising on commercial broadcasters 
 
While there were official subsidies for film production and budgetary support for 
PSB, there were no official state subsidies for private broadcasters in Macedonia 
aside from the controlled price of spectrum. However, I found evidence of the state 
unofficially supporting certain private media in the form of government financed 
advertising campaigns. The government sponsored campaigns consisting of public 
service announcements or public notices were mentioned by three out of the five 
broadcasters with whom I spoke, as well as criticised by both NGO representatives. 
Irena Arnaudova from TVM and Selver Ajdini from TVHana explained that the 
government-funded advertising was used to prop up one-man show local television 
stations. Arnaudova directly compared the practice to the previous subsidies:  
                                                 
53
 According to the Law, the satellite television channel for outside of Macedonia and the mid range 
radio channels aimed at the neighbouring countries are designated as being covered from the state 
budget, whereas the other activities should be from a mix of mostly license fee, but also advertising 
and programme sales. 
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“So how do those stations survive? This is how they survive. Before 
wasn’t there the Broadcasting Council with those 10% [of license fee] for 
public interest projects? There was. Well now there are the government 
campaigns. The hole left by the cancelling of the BC projects is filled 
with the government’s small change - but for a person who has almost 
zero needs they are enough.” (Interview, May 2011) 
 
Arnaudova complained bitterly about the unfair competition her station suffers from 
another that receives government support, but that according to her, has none of its 
own production and mainly airs music videos except during elections. Another local 
television representative also complained of this kind of unfair competition being 
sustained by the government campaigns even though his station had also been 
recipient of the campaign contracts. He said:  
 
“The small ones exist without fulfilling any standards only if they are 
close to a party, but the bigger ones in this climate function because the 
government advertises on them. If they are with the government they’re 
doing super. I don’t know how to prove it, but I have that experience. 
Now we don’t have them because they are not allowed during the pre-
election period. We stopped them. But there were here also the 
government ads. On the one hand it’s good – they are interesting for the 
public, for instance about breast cancer or professionalization of public 
administration – those are nice things. However to spend that much on 
one television [station] for that kind of information is unacceptable.” 
(Interview May 2011) 
 
These respondents all came from local stations, and spoke of the role of these 
campaigns in sustaining local stations. According to Sašo Ordanovski of Alsat M 
television, government advertising had an even bigger impact in the national market 
in which his station operates:  
 
“About three years ago the government started to aggressively attack the 
television market selectively and politically. One of the key policies of 
this government is changing perceptions. They know that television is the 
most powerful. They have 17 campaigns per week. There were times 
when 17 campaigns were going at the same time. From drugs and alcohol 
to buying new books. That’s money! And now Alsat got 100,000 euros, 
Sitel got 6 million, and A1 got nothing and that creates such a disparity it 
wrecks the market.” (Interview, May 2011) 
  
Both Ordanovski and Arnaudova complained about what this income has done to 
their ability to buy programme rights, saying that prices had tripled for premium 
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content because of the stations that have suddenly found themselves flush. These 
reports of politically motivated government advertising were corroborated across 
several interviewees including by some who were recipients of the support. 
Nevertheless, I decided to try to triangulate using other data because of the 
significance of such claims for the sector and because interviewees could have 
motivations for being critical of the Government. Based on the data from AGB 
Neilson Media Research Macedonia on ad airtime on all the major channels, the BC 
has published lists of the top 10 or 50 advertisers since 2005 in its annual reports on 
the broadcasting market. The Government did not appear in the top ten from 2005-
2007, however in 2008 it was suddenly second on the list behind only T-Mobile, the 
largest mobile operator (Broadcasting Council of Republic of Macedonia, 2009a, p. 
80). In 2009 the government was number 5, but while Coca-Cola and T-Mobile took 
the top two places, the spots immediately above the government were companies 
owned by the owner of A1 television whose ads were broadcast only on that channel 
(Broadcasting Council of Republic of Macedonia, 2010, pp. 107-108). In 2010 the 
Government had fallen down to number 18, but unlike the previous two years, that 
was not an election year. This data appears to support the accounts of the 
interviewees. 
 
In a struggling market government expenditure can help businesses sustain 
themselves until better times, however in this case the evidence indicates that it was 
primarily being used as a mechanism of control. In addition to what interviewees 
described above as politically motivated and imbalanced distribution of the campaign 
income, there is evidence of control in the practices of implementing the campaigns. 
According to Ajdini, whose station had carried many government campaigns, for 
each ad under any media plan given by the Secretariat of the Government, he had to 
provide a notarised statement confirming that it was broadcast according to the plan. 
Another interviewee said that his station had not always been paid for the campaigns:  
 
“We broadcast a campaign from the Ministry of Education about 
registration for secondary school and the system of education – some 
information for students – but since 2009 they still owe us and we can’t 
get paid. They can owe money, and now do I take them to court? They 
can get revenge. 
 
Sally: How can they get revenge? 
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Anonymous 2: Well with an inspection, you know how it is. That still 
exists and psychologically has an impact. There, there’s some money 
outstanding, but here I’ll get some. If I take the Ministry of Education to 
Court, they’ll tell the Secretariat of the Government. 
 
Sally: And? 
 
Anonymous 2: No more ads. It’s finished.” (Interview, May 2011) 
 
In Macedonia the government was subsidising private broadcasters, despite the fact 
that the only legally established mechanism for supporting private audiovisual media 
was the MFF, which appeared to have little relation to broadcast media. The 
evidence indicates that the Government used inflows of funds through a large 
number of advertising campaigns between 2008 and 2010 to solidify their influence 
over private media at both local and national levels. Another intervention in the 
market took the form of ad hoc financial support to the PSB, which significantly 
decreased after a change in the law related to the collection of the license fee in early 
2011. This change to the rules determining the domestic opportunity structures was 
supported by EU pressure to comply with EU guidance on the independence of PSB 
and use of state aid. However, while it seems MRT was able to use the EU pressure 
to further its interest in financial stability, this change also seems to have suited the 
political parties in government who had solidified their influence over the 
broadcaster. 
7.3.3 Subsidies as mechanisms of control  
 
In both Slovenia and Macedonia the state was in some way injecting financial 
support into the audiovisual media market. In Slovenia, producers appeared to be 
participating in the European project of creating audiovisual works and benefiting 
from EU level subsidies to the extent that the country’s production capacity would 
allow. Though television production per se had received very little EU support, the 
fact that RTVSLO was a big player in cinematic production means that both EU and 
state level subsidies into the film industry indirectly supported content for television 
as well. As has been shown in other cases, inflows of financial resources from EU 
sources can change the domestic opportunity structure empowering actors such as 
civil society groups (Luaces, 2002). In the case of Slovenia there was not enough 
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evidence to determine with sufficient certainty if independent producers were 
empowered by the boost to their resources from EU subsidies. To show more 
decisively would have required more extensive research into the relations and 
resources of independent producers in the country, which was not possible within the 
scope of this project. However, the small relative amounts of the EU subsidies in 
comparison to those of the state film fund and the data that showed the heavy 
involvement of RTVSLO in the film productions, suggest that there had not been 
much change. In Macedonia, on the other hand, there was no opportunity to 
participate in the EU level subsidies and domestic support for the film industry 
appears to overlap very little with broadcast media. 
 
In terms of subsidies directly aimed at broadcasting recognised mechanisms of state 
aid for private local and regional broadcasters existed in Slovenia. Although the aims 
of those implementing the support schemes seemed committed to the preservation of 
local media and pluralism, the evidence from others indicates this support also 
perpetuated the influence of local political elites through local and regional media. In 
contrast, in Macedonia there were no official subsidies for private broadcasters, yet 
the government was providing ad hoc financial support to sustain the PSB for several 
years and injected large sums into the coffers of private broadcasters through public 
service campaigns or ads. The political bias of MRT reported by the NRA and 
international monitors and the evidence of political relationships being involved in 
the advertising campaigns on private broadcasters indicate that these served as 
mechanisms of control. MRT’s power and resources were changing, however, in part 
at least to Europeanization in that it is becoming increasingly financially 
independent. The adoption of new rules on the collection of the license fee was 
supported by the repeated mention of MRT’s situation in EU Progress Reports; 
however, as I have argued, this change in the opportunity structure also aligned with 
the strategic interests of the political parties in power. 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
In closing I return first to the question of whether or not these two states were 
participating in the European protectionist project. I found the answer to be a clear 
no for Macedonia, but not so clear an answer in the case of Slovenia. Slovenia’s 
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production industry did participate in the MEDIA programme to the extent that its 
producers were able. The evidence shows that the industry relied significantly on the 
PSB as a backbone of production, despite the fact that most production was 
cinematic and not aimed primarily at broadcast media. Participation in the MEDIA 
programme may be reinforced the position of RTVSLO, rather than changed the 
distribution of resources and power among the actors. Nevertheless, this would need 
to be investigated further with a study that focused more on the film production part 
of the audiovisual media sector. 
 
The evidence presented here showed that broadcasters and regulators in neither 
country were participating fully in European works quotas. Although the associated 
rules in both cases were in line with EU rules, looking at the practices of 
implementation, especially in comparison to domestic quotas, I found resistance 
(Sub-RQ1). This resistance was a consequence of institutional misfit with established 
practices shaped by the small size and related material conditions of both NRAs and 
broadcasters. It was tolerated because to do so was in line with the beliefs and 
priorities expressed by the individuals involved in these interactions (Sub-RQ2). In 
the interview data presented above, it was apparent that although most people did 
value domestic content, this tolerance of non-compliance with EU quotas stemmed 
more from an understanding of the practical and financial challenges of the 
broadcasters. There was greater compliance on the part of broadcasters and more 
enforcement by regulators when it came to national language or domestic production 
quotas. However, those responsible for enforcement expressed doubts about the 
benefits of content quotas in general and the more thorough implementation of 
domestic quotas was more a consequence of institutional fit with the established 
practices of the NRAs and that domestic content could be done cheaply. 
 
In this chapter I also discussed the use of national subsidies and financial support 
from the state for broadcasters. Other than the respective film funds, only in Slovenia 
did an official intervention exist in the form of production grants from the Ministry 
of Culture. In Macedonia there were no official subsidy mechanisms for commercial 
broadcasters, but instead ad hoc infusions for the PSB and injections of cash into 
private broadcasters through state-funded ad campaigns. Looking at the relationships 
among the actors involved in these forms of support (Sub-RQ3), I found established 
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relationships between media and political parties closely linked to these subsidies. I 
argue that these interventions can be considered political protectionism and are 
examples of the mechanisms of control over media by political elites cited by media 
scholars from the region (Jakubowicz, 2007b, 2008; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003; Splichal, 
2001; Sükösd & Bajomi-Lázár, 2003). One change to the dynamics among 
governance actors was the alteration of the rules on the financing of PSB in 
Macedonia, which at least began the process of MRT separating itself from financial 
dependence on the political parties in government. There were indications that 
Europeanization played a role in this change in that MRT was able to use the EU’s 
Progress Report to support its demands for changes to the law. However, the 
evidence showing the extent of government influence over MRT and its continuation 
after the change suggests that financial stabilisation of MRT was also in the interests 
of the ruling political parties that would then benefit from having a stronger and 
eventually more popular broadcaster under their control. 
 
At the level of governance interferences, such as monitoring and reporting practices 
for content quotas, I found resistance to Europeanization that was rooted more in the 
small size of the contexts in which individuals were working that shaped institutional 
practices and values. However, at the level of the opportunity structures there was 
evidence of Europeanization playing some role, impacting the distribution of 
resources and power among the actors in the sector. Although minimally, EU 
subsidies expanded the material resources for independent producers in Slovenia, 
even if the evidence did not indicate that this resulted in a change in their position 
within the sector. In Macedonia, the change in the position and resources for the PSB 
was linked to Europeanization although there was also evidence that this was an 
instance of the EU’s instruments of conditionality being used by domestic strategic 
actors when their interests and the EU pressure aligned. 
 
In the previous chapter and in this one, I have found evidence of Europeanization 
impacting the domestic opportunity structures in these two cases when domestic 
actors have made use of the EU as a higher authority or legitimiser (Jacquot & Woll, 
2004; Sudbery, 2010), and when Europeanization is aligned with the strategic 
interest of political parties. In the introduction, I explained that one of the core tenets 
of EU media policy is that there is a common market for audiovisual media services 
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and therefore no barriers to trade in this sector. This implies that the domestic 
audiovisual media sectors should be open to new entrants and other potential changes 
in the domestic constellation of actors and the distribution of resources among them. 
Inclusion in the common market also places the domestic governance actors within a 
European opportunity structure for the audiovisual sector. In the next chapter, I look 
into the openness of these two markets and their inclusion in the European common 
market. 
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Chapter 8: The Openness of the 
Markets  
8.1 Introduction 
 
The common market is at the very core of the European Union and implies the 
elimination of barriers to trade within Europe. As I explained in the introduction, this 
was taken into the audiovisual media sector by the TWFD, which opened up 
television broadcasting markets and by the Satellite and Cable Directive and the 
Open Network Provision Directive, which opened up markets for cable, satellite and 
other network provision services (Harcourt, 2005; Simpson, 2008). The 
telecommunications and broadcasting markets were formally fully liberalised and 
open in accordance with EU Directives in 2001 in Slovenia and in 2005 in 
Macedonia (European Commission, 2001a, 2006). The audiovisual media markets in 
both countries are legally open and part of the common European market for 
audiovisual media services, but this thesis began with an anecdote from Slovenia that 
suggested its market may not be so open. 
 
In this last empirical chapter, I return to the story told in the introduction of Norkring 
and MTG’s exits from the Slovenian television market. Why did this happen if the 
Slovenian audiovisual media market should be open and fair for both broadcasters 
and network operators as per EU rules? The removal of country specific laws and 
rules that can be barriers to trade as part of the negative integration mechanism of 
Europeanization has been associated with changes in domestic opportunity structures 
(Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999). Did such changes not occur after 2001 when formally, 
negative integration was completed? This chapter looks more deeply into this case 
and the extent to which the Slovenian and Macedonia audiovisual media markets are 
open and part of the common market. 
 
The common and open European market in audiovisual media services implies more 
than just the elimination of laws restricting trade. As mentioned in the introduction to 
this thesis, according to EU rules and norms the open market goes hand in hand with 
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the principles of a level playing field and free competition. The preamble to the 
AVMSD reads:  
 
“Bearing in mind the importance of a level playing-field and a true 
European market for audiovisual media services, the basic principles of 
the internal market, such as free competition and equal treatment, should 
be respected in order to ensure transparency and predictability in markets 
for audiovisual media services and to achieve low barriers to entry.” 
(Council of European Communities, 2010, para. 10) 
 
In Chapter 6, I already argued that in both Slovenia and Macedonia there is 
resistance to equal treatment under common rules and standards because of delays in 
the transposition of the rules under which other European market players are 
operating, and because of weak enforcement of rules in general. I maintained that the 
limited human resources available for policymaking in the small populations of these 
two countries exacerbated the use of media law as a tool by political parties that 
explained transposition delays. In Chapter 7, I showed more specifically that the lack 
of implementation of EU rules for European works stemmed from institutional misfit 
with established practices shaped by the small size of the markets, the market players 
and the NRAs. 
 
Smallness is by definition relative, and when discussing countries several factors can 
be used to establish what constitutes a small state.54 The characteristics of small state 
media systems were identified in the early 1990s by Trappel (1991), Meier (Meier & 
Trappel, 1991), and Burgelman and Pauwels (1992). These scholars were focused on 
Europe, but did not specify exactly which states should be considered small. 
Switzerland and Austria were small in comparison to Germany (Trappel, 1991); and 
Belgium in relation to France and the Netherlands (Burgelman & Pauwels, 1992). 
Since then, Puppis and his colleagues (Puppis, 2009; Puppis, Haenens, Steinmaurer, 
& Kaenzler, 2009) use a population cut off of 18 million to define small states, and 
Lowe and Nissen (2011) use 20 million. In his analysis, Picard (2011) also includes 
GDP as a measure of smallness. His inclusion of an economic indicator is 
appropriate for consideration of media systems because of how important the 
                                                 
54
 For discussions of defining small states in general and the implications of smallness Baehr (1975) 
and Maas (2009) or for specifically within the EU, see Thorallsson and Wivel (2006) 
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economic power of potential advertisers and consumers are for media firms, and the 
potential tax base is for state support in the sector including PSB. Slovenia and 
Macedonia are small both in population and in GDP. They are even on the lower end 
of the scale within Europe in terms of these measures. Therefore this chapter is also 
an investigation of the implications of smallness within the common audiovisual 
media market and the consequences of it for the institutionalisation of the rules and 
norms of openness and fairness in markets. 
 
This chapter first examines the material conditions in the Slovenian and Macedonian 
audiovisual media sector and the extent to which they act as constraints on 
governance interactions (Kooiman, 2003). The material conditions discussed are not 
just financial or technical, but also human resources. This section draws on 
secondary data from censuses, market research companies and reports from NRAs 
and PSBs. It also draws on interview data from the category “opportunity structure” 
in which people discussed the distribution of power and resources, some of which 
overlaps with sections also coded as “smallness”, the category that was added when 
it emerged so consistently as a topic across the interviews. I present information on 
revenues and discuss the consequences of the distribution of resources based on the 
accounts of those working in the market or as observers of the market in NRAs or 
civil society. The evidence shows that there is a notable difference between the two 
cases in the way resources were distributed in the sector; however because of their 
small size, neither was really part of a common market for audiovisual media 
services. 
 
The third section of this chapter focuses more closely on the relationships within 
each of the audiovisual sectors. Some of the relationships between strategic actors 
are defined by laws or other rules shaping the domestic opportunity structure, and 
this section draws upon formal rules in both cases. This section primarily uses 
interview data coded under the category “relationships”. The evidence from 
interviews presented here indicates that relationships between or among individuals 
also help to define those between organisations as strategic actors. Though there are 
significant differences between the two cases, I find in each country within the sector 
there existed what amount to “closed clubs” of domestic players, creating barriers to 
trade and to entry into the markets. 
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In the end, I argue that these markets were open in the sense that foreign channels 
and content can be rebroadcast, but they were not open to foreign capital and 
investment and neither are domestic market actors able to participate in the broader 
European audiovisual media market. For market players and other governance actors 
in these small countries, the European market was not a level playing field because 
of the material conditions of the national audiovisual media sectors. Neither were the 
audiovisual media markets open to investment or new entrants from outside, because 
the established relationships among domestic actors and individuals essentially 
created barriers and make them resistant to change. It has been argued that EU 
audiovisual media policy came about because “larger countries created pressure for 
change and therefore new policies” (Papathanassopoulos & Negrine, 2011, p. 9) and 
that what ended up in policy “represents the interests of larger states, with 
insufficient regard for their smaller counterparts” (Burgelman & Pauwels, 1992, p. 
177). While accessing the benefits of the economies of scale that the common market 
offers might be in the interest of media companies in large states, the evidence in this 
chapter shows that, in these two countries, small size serves as a barrier to the 
participation of their audiovisual media sectors in the common market. Instead, 
unable to compete more broadly domestic actors appear to have closed ranks to 
preserve their positions at the national level. 
8.2 Material Conditions and the Distribution of Resources 
 
In the conceptual model of governance used in this thesis, material conditions can be 
the simple demographic, financial, or even geographic characteristics in any given 
country that constrain governance interactions. It is outside the scope of this project 
to conduct a thorough comparison of the material conditions in these two cases, with 
those in other states in the EU. However, in presenting the material conditions in 
each of these markets, I make reference to some other small European countries that 
may be more familiar simply as reference points. This section relies on secondary 
data from a variety of sources, which are described in more detail as the data is 
presented. To begin with, in the table below are some basic figures about Slovenia 
and Macedonia for the period studied. 
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Table 8.1 Demographic data on Slovenia and Macedonia alongside data from the 
Netherlands and Denmark 
 
Source: State Statistical Office Slovenia; State Statistical Office of Macedonia; Statistics Netherlands; Eurostat; 
Statistics Denmark 
 
In terms of population size, Slovenia and Macedonia are at the lower end of the scale 
within the EU. Among the EU members and Candidate Countries, only Estonia, 
Cyprus and microstates like Luxemburg, Montenegro and Malta have smaller 
populations. Because of the economic conditions these small populations also have 
low purchasing power and provide a weak tax base through which to sustain a media 
market (Picard, 2011). The population size also places other objective limits on the 
capacity of the audiovisual media sector. Eight of those interviewed in Slovenia and 
nine of those in Macedonia spoke spontaneously of the size of the country being a 
constraining factor in the media system. Their accounts below show that the figures 
above are not just descriptors of the environment, but represent real constraints on 
the everyday behaviour and interactions of actors in the sector. 
8.2.1 Financial and human resources 
 
One of the main issues that came up in the interviews in terms of smallness was the 
size of the advertising market. Those working in private stations in both countries 
mentioned that they had no trouble with sticking to advertising limits set out in law 
because they just did not have that much demand for advertising, and prices were 
already rock bottom. Jerič of RTS Maribor in Slovenia said that only PopTV and 
RTVSLO had trouble keeping within the limits of their allowed advertising time. In 
Macedonia, Ordanovski of the national station AlsatM, also said that his channel had 
trouble filling the ad time allowed. In Macedonia, those interviewed from television 
stations also complained about the low price of advertising that they explained as a 
 224 
result of the number of stations competing within such a small market. In both cases, 
I contacted various sources in order to get data information on advertising budgets 
and was told that it is very difficult to get exact figures because of the discounts 
given by broadcasters and alternative forms of compensation used. In both countries, 
figures were available for the gross value of advertising, which is derived from data 
on ad time on air and advertised prices from the broadcasters. In Slovenia, a team at 
the Department of Journalism of the University of Ljubljana recently used data 
obtained directly from broadcasters to arrive at figures for advertising revenue in 
2010, and in Macedonia, the BC had been tracking the advertising revenue as 
reported by broadcasters to them and the Central Register. Table 8.2 below provides 
some available information for the period 2009-2011 from each case that gives a 
rough picture of the financial state of the broadcasting sectors. 
 
Table 8.2 Some financial indicators for Slovenian and Macedonian television 
markets 
 
Source: Mediana, Slovenia; Broadcasting Council of Rep. of Macedonia; Milosavlević et al. (2012); Radio 
Television Slovenia; Macedonian Radio Television 
 
As Table 8.2 shows, Slovenia’s RTVSLO received about five times more revenue 
than Macedonia’s MRT in 2011. However, the total revenue of RTVLSO in 2011 
was still much less than the €125 million that the incoming Dutch Government 
promised to cut from its PSB budget that same year (Government of the Netherlands, 
2012). Figures for 2011 were not available, but in 2010 the total revenue for private 
television was significantly less than that of RTVSLO. With the closure of A1 
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television, which, as the table shows, made a significant contribution in the previous 
year, the total revenue of private television in Macedonia also fell below that of 
MRT. MRT’s revenues at the time were still largely government transfers. The 
dominance of the large national players in terms of revenue is clear in both cases. In 
Slovenia, ProPlus’ revenue was 68.6% of the total for all private stations in 2010, 
which included the income other stations received from the government through the 
subsidies for special interest programmes and other sources. In Macedonia even 
without A1 television, the four remaining national terrestrial stations received 74% 
of the total revenue, leaving little for the more than 60 other licensed channels. 
 
By far most of the revenue for television in both cases comes from advertising, and 
in both cases it is notable that the gross value of television attributed to advertising 
far outstrips the amounts that stations reported receiving as revenue from advertising. 
In Slovenia, the gross value was only just under six times the reported revenues in 
2010, however in Macedonia it was more than 35 times the reported revenues in that 
same year. According to several of those I interviewed and those supplying the data, 
this disparity is due to the fact that the actual rates paid for advertising were 
significantly discounted from the advertised prices (see also Beličanec & Ricliev, 
2012). This means that the actual market value of television ad time was far less than 
on official rate cards. For the sake of reference, while Slovenian and Macedonian 
television stations made just over €69 and €16 million respectively from advertising 
in 2010, the advertising turnover for Danish television stations was 2,256,000,000 
DKK, the equivalent of just over €303 million.55 
 
What do all these figures mean for the Slovenian and Macedonian market actors as 
part of the common audiovisual media market in Europe? The amount that private 
television stations have to spend on production and the procurement of programmes 
is limited by the amount of revenue they can generate from advertising. Though 
RTVSLO and MRT may exchange some programming with other PSBs through 
EBU, there is not much hope of public or private stations marketing Slovenian or 
Macedonian productions to external markets. APEK’s Kriselj remarked about 
Slovenia, “We will never have huge television production. It’s impossible for such a 
                                                 
55
 Figure from Statistics Denmark (http://www.dst.dk/en.aspx) where official source listed as Dansk 
Oplagskontrol, Reklameforbrugsundersøgelsen i Danmark 
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small country with a different language from the neighbours” (interview, April 
2011). His colleague Gorjanc in talking about there not being enough quality 
Slovenian audiovisual works explained:  
 
“We do not have so much money provided for this audiovisual industry. 
For example foreign countries they have big amounts of money that is 
provided for production and we have for example, I don’t know, 5 
million, no, one or two million per year. And a film costs 2 million - you 
don’t even have money for one film. That is our reality and for example 
in some other countries they have, I don’t know, billions – billions of 
Euros for production and you cannot compare.” (Interview, April 2011) 
 
Gorjanc wanted to see more investment from the government in production, but 
insufficient money was only one of the problems. In both Slovenia and Macedonia, 
people with whom I spoke from within the industry and others said that the small 
population also just does not generate enough people for production. In Macedonia, 
Beličanec of the Media Development Center, criticising the BC’s decision to issue 
more satellite licenses argued: “There just isn’t the workforce in Macedonia to 
absorb more professionally” (interview, May 2011). Jankovska from the BC and an 
interviewee from one of the television stations also both explained that broadcasters 
just did not have enough qualified personnel, especially in technical or management 
areas. Ajdini from TV Hana said he had to wear several hats in the station he 
managed, taking care of all the administration as well as playing an editorial role, 
because of a lack of staff. And as Gorjanc explained, in Slovenia the problem is not 
just with the actual broadcasters, but also in independent production. He said that 
while in bigger countries independent production can be an important part of 
industry, in Slovenia “there are maybe just one or two bigger producers and all the 
others are smaller, they don’t even have their own studio . . . They just ad hoc hire 
some studio and get together and make some audiovisual work” (interview, April 
2011). 
 
It is not just a matter of technical and production personnel, however. For 
broadcasters in Slovenia and Macedonia that have to provide 24 hours of content 
each day and fulfil quotas for domestic production, there is also the problem that 
their countries just do not produce enough material – the stars, musicians and others 
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that can generate subject matter or content. One of the two producers from TV Sitel 
in Skopje explained:  
 
“First of all this is a small market and that market doesn’t allow you to 
create that kind of programme that they have say in Serbia. As a 
population we are small, as an intellectual capacity, and the possibility to 
find good guests, good TV hosts in this space is a problem.” (Interview, 
May 2011)  
 
Although this producer in Macedonia believed Slovenia would have less of a 
problem, Slovenians had similar complaints. One of the big problems is having 
enough Slovenian music to fulfil the domestic quotas. The person interviews from 
RTVSLO for this project echoed statements made by others in previous research I 
did on RTVSLO (Broughton Micova, 2012) saying, “the level [quota] for Slovenian 
music is 40% Slovenian music in programmes and as you can imagine we have our 
own programme for classical music – 40% Slovenian classical music isn’t easy to 
get” (Anonymous, Interview April 2011). In both Slovenia and Macedonia the 
audiovisual media industries in general faced limitations of size. The advertising 
revenues and government interventions that fund production were small, but also the 
material and people needed to generate content were also limited. For television 
stations and independent producers facing the kind of competition from foreign 
channels described in Chapter 5,56 the playing field is not very level even if the same 
rules and minimum standards apply to all. These actors were at a disadvantage from 
the start because of the size of their home jurisdiction. Although Europeanization 
may contribute to the removal of formal barriers to trade, the material constraints 
within which these market players operate created others, and therefore resistance, to 
any empowering changes Europeanization might otherwise have brought to the 
domestic opportunity structure. 
8.2.2 Internal competition and competitiveness 
 
Since the monopolies of the former state-run system were broken down, there has 
been competition for the limited financial and human resources for audiovisual 
media services in both Slovenia and Macedonia. In both cases, policymakers and 
regulators were wrestling with how to make domestic media companies more 
                                                 
56
 See in particular Tables 5.2 and 5.3 and Figure 5.2. 
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competitive in relation to foreign competitors, as evidenced by the concerns of those 
cited in the previous chapter from the NRAs and public administration. The nature of 
competition within the two countries was quite different, which provides a chance to 
see the consequences of the two variations for participation in the common market. 
In Slovenia, concentrations formed internally and competition was seen as coming 
primarily from outside. In Macedonia, one could see a higher level of pluralism in 
the market, which caused concern not just in terms of foreign competition, but also in 
terms of the media relationships with political elites. I start by describing the 
situation in Slovenia and then go into detail on the case of Macedonia, highlighting 
the differences afterwards. 
 
Although in Slovenia many broadcasters were licensed early on as local stations, as 
described in Chapter 5, the market became increasingly concentrated. According to 
four of those interviewed in APEK, the main reason for this was the relationship that 
had been established between broadcasters and the state in relation to the frequency. 
This arrangement between the two actors meant that frequencies could be easily 
transferred and were held indefinitely. They explained that at one point, the state was 
simply forced to acknowledge the existence of the so-called networks of smaller 
stations allowing the larger stations to form. Only one person I interviewed did not 
seem to regret this lack of diversity, particularly in radio. APEK’s Igor Funa, 
responsible for spectrum management gave some reasons for why there was little 
interest in frequencies or entrance into the market:  
 
“Television is very different because to run a TV station you need quite a 
lot of money, much more than for radio and then on the other hand 
Slovenia is a very small market and this is maybe the main reason why 
we don't have many TV stations. Years ago when we were using only 
analogue broadcasting one of the reasons the number of stations was 
limited was the number of available frequencies, but since last two years 
we have a lot of capacity on the digital networks but the number of TV 
channels is practically the same. There are many reasons, but the main 
reason is that the market is small. The second reason is that the main 
commercial TV player is very strong, has a big market share, and this 
makes for anybody interested in the Slovenian market a very difficult 
starting position.” (Interview, April 2011) 
 
Stopar in the Ministry of Culture and Jerič from RTS Maribor gave this same reason 
for their views that there was little chance of foreign companies setting up shop in 
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Slovenia to compete with incumbent broadcasters. According to them, the situation 
of the small market and two large incumbents in the form of ProPlus and RTVSLO 
made it “not interesting” to foreign investors. I found that there were also other 
reasons and will go into that in more detail in the next section, but at the same time 
being “not interesting” for investors did not mean that foreign competition was not 
an issue. 
 
Instead, Slovenian broadcasters faced direct competition from channels coming in 
from other jurisdictions and being re-broadcast on subscription services. Stopar, 
Krišelj and others in APEK raised the problem of a new phenomenon of foreign 
channels targeting advertising to the Slovenian market and therefore taking part of 
the potential advertising revenue from domestic broadcasters without having to 
comply with domestic programme standards. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 in Chapter 5 showed 
that the popularity of “other stations”, most of which are foreign channels not 
including the Croatian ones that are counted separately, was steadily increasing over 
the last several years and by 2011 accounted for more than a quarter of audience 
share. I have already shown that the market liberalisation that resulted in the spread 
of multi-channel subscription services in Slovenia cannot be attributed to 
Europeanization. However, there are formal rules in the AVMSD related to 
jurisdiction that provide mechanisms for dealing with such unfair competition and 
maintaining the level playing field (see Council of European Communities, 2010, art. 
4). State level authorities can appeal if channels outside their jurisdiction are 
specifically targeting their national markets. 
 
Although aware of these, according to Stopar in the Ministry of Culture, there were 
no plans to make use of these measures at the time of the interviews as there were 
other priorities. Considering the size of his department and the smallness of the 
NRAs and civil society groups in Slovenia described in Chapter 6, it seems there was 
not much capacity among domestic actors to make use of the mechanism provided 
for in the AVMSD. In most interviews, European level organisations did not come 
up spontaneously in response to questions about with whom they communicate 
regularly or other questions aimed at uncovering their relationships with others. 
Therefore, interviewees were specifically asked about relationships and 
communication with EU level organisations. One person in APEK explained that 
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their relationship with EU institutions consisted mainly of answering questions from 
Brussels. This person added that only one person from the Ministry of Culture has 
participated in the discussions about AVMSD at the European level without 
reporting back to other actors or engaging APEK (interview, Anonymous, April 
2011). Not making use of the EU rules designed to encourage a level playing field 
gave foreign market players access to the resource of the already limited advertising 
market within Slovenia without the obligations placed on Slovenian broadcasters. 
These foreign channels were then in direct competition with the domestic 
broadcasters that operated under the material constraints described in the previous 
section, not just for audience share but also for advertising revenues. 
 
Jelovac, of the Slovenian Broadcasting Council, argued that because of foreign 
competition, the country should focus on developing the competitiveness of a few 
large domestic players, and stop trying to prop up pluralism with government funds 
that he saw as primarily mechanisms for political control:  
 
“In the present law we have so called programmes of special importance 
– look, programmes of special importance (sarcastically). And we 
finance them without any control of the content, but only of quantity of 
output. So we financed several programmes of such types – what’s that? 
On the one side is the directive [AVMSD], it’s a danger that we are 
destroyed by the bigger players. And on the other side you have the 
continuity of the political ideological domination of media. So we must 
find the third way. And that’s what we have to do. That’s our mission in 
small countries: to find the capital that will support the development of 
strong media. Strong in the sense of human resources, of technical 
equipment, so strong in all sense of meaning of strong organisation. And 
on the other hand to have some kind of public support for their mission.” 
(Interview, April 2011) 
 
Although he was among those who regretted the loss of diversity in the market, 
Stopar in the Ministry of Culture, also said that in his view there needed to be fewer 
players in the market supported by state aid allowing for more sustainable regional 
television stations to survive. Based on the market data presented in Chapter 5 and in 
the previous section, I argue that the Slovenian audiovisual media market was 
already rather concentrated with one very large commercial player as Jelovac 
described, whose only meaningful competition was the PSB. Still, the largest player 
in the Slovenian market, ProPlus also seemed to feel the pinch of competition from 
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foreign channels. Milosavljević of the Department of Journalism at the University of 
Ljubljana, who was in the drafting group for a new media act, argued that Slovenia 
does not “have the critical mass” of population to support specialist channels 
(interview, April 2011). However, ProPlus’s Grčar said that his company was so 
eager to start with niche channels like those coming in from outside that they would 
not wait for a law to be passed to allow them. Under the law valid at the time, such 
channels would still have to fulfil all the domestic quotas and other obligations 
applied to Slovenian broadcasters, but Grčar intended the niche channels to be 
without those obligations. With foreign channels not obliged by such quotas eating 
into the already small Slovenian advertising market, I find it unsurprising that, 
according to Grčar, ProPlus found it worthwhile to risk fines rather than wait. 
 
In Macedonia, it was the interviewees from the Albanian language broadcasters who 
were most concerned about competition from foreign channels. Though the situation 
was not the same as in Slovenia where movie and other niche channels were 
providing translation and selling advertising time in the Slovenian market, they did 
describe a problem with the channels coming in from Kosovo and Albania through 
multi-channel subscription services. The demographic characteristics of Macedonia 
mean that according to the last census in 2002, approximately 23% of the population 
shares a language with these two neighbours. Ajdini from TV Hana in Kumanovo 
said that especially as a local Albanian language station, he could not compete with 
the Albanian language programming coming from Tirana and Prishtina. He 
explained that the issue was not so much about advertising, but that he had to 
compete with them for the same pool of artists, musicians and others needed to make 
programmes. 
 
In terms of foreign investment in the domestic market, I also encountered the opinion 
that the Macedonian market was too small and already too saturated to be interesting 
for foreign investors. However, rather than it being attributed to one large 
commercial incumbent as in Slovenia, the main concern was the high, and still 
growing, number of domestic players. The abundance of broadcasters was an issue 
not just because it was perceived as a deterrent to foreign investment, but also as 
inhibiting the quality and competitiveness of the domestic broadcasters. Ajdini’s 
station, which was mentioned above as competing with Albanian and Kosovar 
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channels, is based in a town of just over 70,000 inhabitants. He explained that his 
station could probably survive as a local station with advertising from local 
businesses if it was the only station in town, but that local competitors have driven ad 
prices down so low that it is hardly worth the amount he would spend on phone calls 
trying to get local business to pay the bills. According to Ordanovski from the 
national AlsatM, the competition for viewers and advertising income is damaging the 
quality of the programme offering on all the channels:  
 
“The televisions have entered this race for prime time and ratings and 
they are prepared to broadcast Turkish series from morning to night if 
that’s what gets results . . . we are flooded with programmes with 
questionable quality or structure. . . . very harsh competition imposes 
criteria of survival.” (Interview, May 2011) 
 
These were also the reasons Beličanec of the Media Development Center was highly 
critical of the BC’s decision to issue more licenses to satellite stations. According to 
BC President Stefanoski the mistake was made in 2006, when the BC failed to use 
the transition from concessions to license as an opportunity to cull the number of 
broadcasters and license only the better equipped and more professional of them. 
Instead, he admitted under the pressure of time and interrupted by an election, that 
they made the decision to grant licenses to all who were interested and afterwards to 
try to enforce standards.57 
 
BC Vice-President Fetai defended the decision despite his own dilemmas saying that 
there were people interested who showed they had capital. He said that the BC 
assumed that they had calculated the risk and decided that it should allow for 
“survival of the fittest”. The strategy of the Macedonian regulator has been to give 
out ever more licenses further diluting the domestic resources. All those interviewed 
from television stations, except for the producers from TV Sitel, said that the market 
is just too small for so many broadcasters to survive from broadcasting. But inside 
Macedonia there were still people interested in getting licenses. Stefanoski turned the 
question of why did the BC keep giving out licenses around to ask, “Why is there so 
much interest in having a television station in a country where the advertising pie is 
                                                 
57
 The ex post enforcement of standards failed to materialize. See Chapter 6.  
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miniscule?” (interview May 2011). In a separate interview, his colleague Fetai 
provided an answer: 
  
“Macedonia has an enormous number of radio and television stations, 
private stations alone are more than 100 in this little country. . . We have 
great pluralism in terms of the number, but if you take into account that 
the basic source of financing these should be advertising which depends 
on industry, on the economic development of the country – how big is 
that advertising pie that large and strong that can sustain them. They are 
sustainable those that have advertising and the biggest advertiser in the 
country now is the state, so in some way they become dependent on the 
advertising that is in control of the government. And what’s happened 
since then [1997] instead of having regulation of the market that would 
be normal for an advertising pie that is not growing, we have in the last 
3-4 years fifteen more national televisions through satellite. And these 
terrestrial ones, where what will they live off of I ask you when the 
advertising pie has not grown so as to support more televisions.” 
(Interview, May 2011) 
 
I recall here the discussion of the use of advertising campaigns as pseudo-subsidies 
and as a mechanism of control in Chapter 7. The accounts here indicate that the 
abundance of broadcasters in Macedonia has three consequences. Firstly, the high 
level of internal competition makes the market unattractive for foreign investors. The 
two producers from TV SITEL television gave several examples of foreign investors 
that had started to invest in television, but withdrew after seeing it was not profitable. 
The most recent attempt was one by Serbia’s PINK television which ended when the 
investor never paid for the license, essentially giving up the channel it had bought 
into (see  Broadcasting Council of Republic of Macedonia, 2012a). Secondly, in 
Macedonia, the four national broadcasters who received most of the advertising 
income available in the market still did not have enough income to produce quality 
programmes to compete with foreign channels. Thirdly, the thinly distributed 
resources spread among the multitude of smaller broadcasters, leaves them 
dependent on other sources of income that are often connected to political allegiance. 
 
Without even delving into issues of convergence and competition from non-linear 
content from various sources, broadcasters in Slovenia and Macedonia face 
competition from linear foreign channels based in other jurisdictions. The nature of 
internal competition within these markets differed significantly in that Slovenia had 
one very large private station and a strong PSB, whereas Macedonia had several 
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national private stations and a weak PSB. In neither case did it appear that the model 
was overcoming the limitations of the material conditions in the country. In the 
Slovenian case, for which EU rules provide mechanisms to help level out the playing 
field, the evidence suggested that domestic actors were not able to make use of these, 
making them somewhat irrelevant.  
8.2.3 Uninteresting markets and uncompetitive market players 
 
In both Macedonia and Slovenia, the material conditions in which broadcasters and 
other actors of governance operated were characterised by limited financial and 
human resources due to the small size of the two countries. Advertising revenues 
were low and concentrated among the national terrestrial television stations in each 
case. Because of the small populations and economic conditions the bases for the 
license fees were small as well as the overall tax bases, limiting state intervention in 
the form of PSB and subsidies. In both cases, the human resources needed in terms 
of qualified personnel to work in broadcasting and production, were also limited. 
These findings were expected based on the existing literature on small state media 
systems and small media markets (Burgelman & Pauwels, 1992; Picard, 2011; 
Puppis, 2009; Trappel, 1991, 2011). What the investigation of material constraints in 
these two cases also showed was that financial and technical resources were not the 
only constraint. Another issue was the ability of these small countries to generate 
content in terms of musicians, artists, events, locations, or generally subject matter 
for programmes. In addition to discouraging foreign investors, these conditions 
limited the capacity of domestic market players to participate in the European 
audiovisual media market as contributors of content. It also restricted the ability of 
domestic players to compete with others in the common market, the foreign channels 
that are re-broadcast in Slovenia and Macedonia. 
 
In Slovenia because of the relationship established between licence holders and the 
state in the early years after independence, concentrations formed with the result that 
two big players, one of which is the PSB, dominated the television market. Several 
of those with whom I spoke in Slovenia felt that larger, stronger domestic 
broadcasters would be better able to compete with foreign channels. However the 
evidence here suggests that being a big fish in a small pond does not help when the 
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small pond becomes part of a lake. Slovenia’s ProPlus was still struggling to 
compete with foreign channels, prepared even to break the law in order to gain some 
advantage, and the audience data in Chapter 5 showed that foreign channels were 
increasing in popularity. This indicates that in Slovenia, despite the high level of 
concentration in the domestic television market, the small size of the country still 
presented a barrier to trade, making the domestic opportunity structure resistant to 
the change that might be expected in the course of Europeanization. 
 
In Macedonia the domestic opportunity structure developed such that there was more 
pluralism and competition within the domestic market. The Macedonian NRA’s 
strategy of allowing survival of the fittest and the marginalised position of MRT 
meant there were no “strong” broadcasters. The evidence presented here indicates 
that this resulted in stations that struggled to produce quality programming and were 
dependent on sources of income that had political strings attached. Although the 
fierce competition and extremely limited potential revenues in the Macedonian 
audiovisual media sector may made it unattractive to foreign investors, there had 
been attempts from media companies in neighbouring Greece and Serbia to invest. 
Those foreign investors quickly withdrew, but the statements of those in the BC 
show that there was persistent domestic interest in launching new media. If there is 
no money to be made, why would anyone be interested in opening a television 
station in Macedonia? The answer to this question I found in further exploring the 
established relationships within the sector. In the next section, I investigate in more 
detail the relationships among actors and find these also contributed to resistance to 
participation in the open and common market for audiovisual media services. 
8.3 Relationships in Slovenian and Macedonian Audiovisual Media Markets 
 
Following the discussion above about the material conditions and the distribution of 
financial and human resources that define the opportunity structures in Slovenia and 
Macedonia, this section examines more closely the relationships among the actors of 
governance, including at the level of individuals. In this section I present further 
evidence that the Slovenian and Macedonian audiovisual media markets were 
resistant to the foreign investment and European level competition that is part of 
participating in the common audiovisual media market. The evidence here comes 
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primarily from interviews data coded in the category of “relationships” and one can 
see that the interviewees describe both their own personal relationships as well as the 
inter-organisational relationships among actors in the market, the state and civil 
society. For example, television station managers spoke of their personal 
communication and relationships with the president or director of the NRA and of 
their company’s relationship with the NRA or other state actor. In these descriptions, 
the lines between the individuals making decisions and behaving on the basis of the 
logic of appropriateness and organisations operating as strategic actors based on the 
logic of consequences (Börzel & Risse, 2003; March & Olsen, 2004) begin to blur.  
 
In both Slovenia and Macedonia I was told that “everybody knows everybody” by 
several of those interviewed. The small numbers of individuals working within the 
governance actors of audiovisual media in both countries was also demonstrated in 
Chapter 6 in relation to the ability of the various governance actors to engage with 
policy and rule making. As I have shown above, there are significant differences 
between the two cases in terms of the way power and resources were distributed 
within the national audiovisual media sectors. I have already presented evidence 
demonstrating that in Slovenia, ProPlus and RTVSLO were the largest players in the 
television market with an overwhelmingly large share of both audience and 
advertising.  
 
In this section, I examine the relationships surrounding these two companies and fill 
in the details of the story with which I started this thesis. From the Macedonian case, 
the data discussed so far has testified to the strong links between political parties and 
media companies through financial dependence, and even indicated that political ties 
were part of considerations of appropriateness for decision-makers in the NRA. This 
section examines more closely the relationships within the audiovisual media sector 
in this country and the dynamics between political elites and media. The differences 
between the cases raise questions about what the implications of plurality are in such 
small markets. However, in both cases I find that the relationships in these two small 
audiovisual media sectors, in which distinctions between individual relationships and 
inter-organisational ones are slight, contributed to making them resistant to 
Europeanization. I just argued in the previous section that the material constraints of 
these small markets act as barriers to trade and to changes in the domestic 
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opportunity structure that Europeanization could bring. Here the evidence indicates 
that the established relationships in these small states did so as well, and domestic 
actors used those relationships to protect their positions and their interests, be they 
profit-based or political. I begin with the situation in Slovenia and follow with the 
Macedonian case, expanding afterwards on the implications of the findings from the 
comparison of the two cases.  
8.3.1 Relationships in the Slovenian audiovisual sector 
 
As I have described before, the fact that licenses were unlimited and easily 
transferable helped make it possible for ProPlus, with a key infusion of foreign 
capital, to establish a dominant position in the market in terms of rating and share of 
advertising. Despite being owned by CME, ProPlus was not considered a foreign 
company in Slovenia. After my third interview, which was with Grčar of ProPlus, I 
began asking the remaining interviewees as well as other people I met if they 
considered ProPlus to be Slovenian. Not one of them answered negatively. The 
majority said that although the capital was foreign it was run by Slovenians and 
produced in Slovenian. ProPlus was started by local media professionals who 
although no longer part owners, have remained involved in its management for the 
last 15 years. 
 
One can expect an incumbent broadcaster to have advantages over new broadcasters 
for a variety of reasons. However, the new network operator for digital terrestrial 
television (DTT) did not expect broadcasters to be a barrier to its entry into the 
provision of transmission services. When I interviewed the Director of Norkring 
Slovenia, Roman Smirdonik, he was frustrated and angry with both RTVSLO and 
ProPlus. Norkring won the tender to build the commercial free to air DTT network in 
Slovenia expecting that the commercial channels that were allowed on RTVSLO’s 
MUX during switchover would move to its network upon completion. According to 
Smirdonik, Norkring planned to have ProPlus’s channels and the three regional 
channels in addition to those it did have: TV358 and TVPink.si, both foreign-owned. 
Since then, Swedish MTG pulled out of TV3 citing a failure of regulators to ensure 
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 TV3 existed before as a station run by the Catholic Church; however when it was bought by 
Swedish Modern Times Group in 2008 it was completely re-launched. 
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fair competition that meant it was unable to capitalise on its consistently increasing 
ratings (STA, 2012a). Although at the time of the interview Smirdonik said that the 
company was preparing a case for the European Courts, Norkring pulled out also in 
February 2012 (STA, 2012b). As the evidence below will show, the Slovenian 
market was closed to these new entrants because the opportunity structure gave 
power and resources to ProPlus and RTVLSO enabling them to essentially drive the 
newcomers out, but also because individuals deemed it appropriate to their political 
and personal relationships to allow it. 
 
Unlike most other countries in the region, in Slovenia the government never chose to 
divest the “links and transmitters” from RTVSLO into another public company. The 
Law on RTVSLO and the Digital Broadcasting Act, which granted RTVSLO a 
digital MUX ensured that important transmission resources were distributed to 
RTVSLO. RTVSLO retained the privileged position of controlling its own signal and 
more importantly, owning the transmitter positions across the country. The law 
implementing digitalisation in Slovenia granted RTVSLO an entire MUX (Republic 
of Slovenia, 2007) thereby ensuring that it maintained its position of both 
broadcaster and network operator after analogue switch off. In addition to the role of 
political elites when it comes to the PSB described in Chapter 5, this arrangement 
helped define RTVSLO’s relationship with other market players. ProPlus may have 
had a very competitive relationship with RTVSLO in terms of ratings and 
advertising, but would have been a customer for the decade and a half that it had its 
own analogue terrestrial network. After switchover ProPlus would simply have 
switched from paying co-location fees to paying carriage fees to RTVSLO’s division 
of links and transmitters. Also, according to Smirdonik, Norkring’s biggest expense, 
one that Norkring intended to cover by serving RTVSLO’s competitors in the market 
for viewers and advertising, was the co-location fee paid to RTVSLO. A clarification 
of the Law on Digitalisation or a competition ruling on RTVSLO’s pricing could 
have forced the PSB to host only its own channels on its MUX. 
 
However, two other types of entrenched relationships seemed to work against 
Norkring and TV3: one on the personal level among individuals and another between 
ProPlus and the political establishment. First of all, the individuals representing 
Norkring did not appear to be moving in the right circles. The evidence for this was 
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both in how people described the situation and their own behaviour. Smirdovnik, for 
example, said that while he had learned a great deal since starting with Norkring, he 
did not communicate much with those in the media part of broadcasting. He 
explained: 
 
“More or less we as a MUX operator we deal more or less on the 
technical side, so we don’t have too much to deal with media people – 
real media people. Of course, we do have to understand media, but we 
are just on the very low end or I don’t know where, how to say, we are 
somehow connected but not so much in media.” (Interview, April 2011) 
 
Smirdonik said he had applied several times in writing to APEK requesting them to 
investigate RTVSLO’s pricing schemes and each time RTVSLO issued new prices 
and the process took a long time. Smirdonik expressed understanding that the 
investigation might be difficult and that APEK might not have influence over the 
law. However, the “real media people” with whom I spoke did seem to have a 
different relationship with the regulator.  
 
For example, RTS Maribor along with the 3 other main regional channels had signed 
an initial letter of intent to be on Norkring’s network. Its Director Jerić, who said he 
had good relationships with all of APEK’s previous directors and knew the current 
one quite well, reported that he often just phoned up the director when he had 
concerns. Most recently, he said, these had been about Norkring sending him 
invoices. Jerić and the other regional stations were also lobbying for their stations to 
be given public service status, and therefore a permanent position on RTVSLO’s 
MUX. I already described the unique influence of regional and local televisions on 
law making because of their connection to local politics in Chapter 6, but having 
relationships among “the real media people” is not just a question of that kind of 
direct political clientelism. APEK’s Funa was responsible for frequency management 
but claimed to have many friends working in broadcasters. Although he seemed to 
almost be rooting for TV3, he was not optimistic about their potential because he 
thought they were not building the necessary relationships. He explained:  
 
“There are maybe 200 people that work for them [ProPlus] and there are 
two terrestrial channels and then one in cable. This is a whole system – a 
lot of people, a lot of social networks, a lot of people that know 
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politicians that talk to politicians and make sure for them. But TV3 on 
the other hand have only a few people who are actually involved in 
preparing content and they actually are not involved in anything else. 
They have playout. They have some limited local production. They are 
not present on social events, they are not interested in whatever is 
happening here in Slovenia.” (Interview, April 2011) 
 
He said these personal relationships are not essential, but they are if you want to 
influence legislation or “to have some friends that maybe you will need sometimes”. 
ProPlus’s in-house counsel Grčar, who was previously head of its legal department 
for nearly 15 years, said that he did not need connections or want too many. The fact 
that his reason was because then people want things, attests to what such 
relationships mean in terms of assumptions about what is then appropriate behaviour. 
It also shows that within that environment, he was one with power and resources, 
who could be expected to be asked for things more than one who needed to rely on 
the power or resources of others.  
 
Although some were unhappy about its tabloid style and commercialism, not one of 
those interviewed said that ProPlus demonstrated political bias in its programming. It 
was viewed as independent of the influence of politics. According to Grčar this was 
mainly because the station had foreign owners. Petković of the Peace Institute of 
Ljubljana said that ProPlus’s independence could also be attributed to the fact that 
among its advertisers are all the major foreign companies active in Slovenia. 
According to her, other media have been affected by changes in government because 
they depend on state companies, whose directors change with each incoming 
government. Jerić, whose station was in such a position, concurred. Whether because 
of its foreign owner or its foreign advertisers, ProPlus’ dominance in the market not 
only made it independent, but made others dependent on it. Jerić summed up the 
situation:  
 
“If small media are maybe afraid of political power, political power is 
afraid of PopTV [ProPlus]… PopTV is using its power to tell the 
government you leave us alone, you leave us on MUX A and we don't 
care about Norkring, get'em out of Slovenia...Their interests are 
commercial, so they don't care who is in charge, but whoever is in charge 
they are trying their best to have them under control.” (Interview, April 
2011) 
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RTVSLO had a unique relationship with the state that gave it a privileged position as 
both broadcaster and network operators for others. ProPlus was well integrated at the 
level of personal relationships among the circle of “real media people” in Slovenia 
who have access and influence in the country. The evidence here indicates that 
within the audiovisual media sector in Slovenia, there was a kind of “closed club” 
that left newcomers with little recourse or way in. Personal relationships among 
those within governance actors contributed to this, making it appropriate for 
individuals in decision-making positions to protect this club. Norkring’s Smirdonik 
lamented: “If I say to Golobić [then Minister of Higher Education, Science and 
Technology], look this is not okay and he says, yes you are right and just puts the 
solution in the drawer, what can I do then? (interview, April 2011)”. 
8.3.2 Relationships in the Macedonian audiovisual sector 
 
In Macedonia, the laws defining the opportunity structure had not given MRT the 
same resources as RTVSLO. The links and transmission division of MRT was made 
a separate public company in 1998 by the Law on the Public Company Macedonian 
Radio Diffusion (MRD). Although through a tender and not through law, the 
Macedonian government granted three DTT MUXs to Telekom Slovenia, which had 
also recently acquired one of the country’s mobile telephone operators from Greek 
investors, to operate a subscription based multi-channel DTT service. By law, MRD 
was granted one MUX to provide free to air transmission of the programmes of 
MRT. Digitalisation was not complete in Macedonia at the time of this investigation, 
but at the time the only operator of a DTT network provided a multi-channel 
subscriptions service similar to cable or IPTV. 
 
The accounts from the interviews in Macedonia provided strong evidence that the 
main relationship contributing to the lack of openness in the audiovisual media 
market is the strong bond between political elites and broadcasters. Out of all the 
people with whom I spoke, only four did not complain about the political influence 
over or ownership of the media. Two of these were the BC’s Mitevksa and Ilevska 
from AEK, who spoke only of more technical subjects specific to their jobs, and the 
other two were the two producers from TV Sitel. It was outside the scope of this 
project to investigate the financial connections between politicians and individual 
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media or monitor content for political influence. However, the overwhelming 
perceptions and concurring accounts of those interviewed both from within the 
industry and among those monitoring it, provides ample evidence that the established 
relationships between individual broadcasters and political parties made the market a 
difficult one for any newcomer to enter. 
 
Ordanovski of TV AlsatM explained the nature of these relationships and why in 
Macedonia, it is accepted that television stations do not make money in the market. 
As he explained, television stations are not businesses in and of themselves, but tools 
for the support of their owners’ other business interests:  
 
“Money for the television is part of the business concept…[Business 
owners think] if I make a television I’ll be able to pay off the racket, so 
when Branko [leader of SDSM] comes and says give me 2 million, I 
won’t give you money but I can give you advertising. When Grujo 
[Prime Minister and leader of VMRO-DPMNE] comes to drum up 
something I’ll tell him – listen every evening you’ll be on the main news 
… Before they’d come to ask for cash, which before was given to a 
campaign, for big deals like licenses59 - this way make a television and 
the television is the money with which you operationalize the racket.” 
(Interview, May 2011) 
 
However, according to others interviewed, these relationships are not just about 
protecting business interests. In several cases business interests and political interests 
were closely connected. BC Council Member Naumov explained that there had been 
interest from foreign companies in the domestic market; however they were 
discouraged because the market does not operate like a market:  
 
“They come. Greeks, they come and want to buy but it is not in the 
interest of our owners because what would they be without their media – 
nobody. And for them the medium is not important as a medium, but as a 
tool for their business and political interests, in which the political 
interests are exclusively above the business.” (Interview, May 2011)  
 
Each of the BC Council Members with whom I spoke mentioned the problem of 
political party leaders being directly connected to national television stations, and 
their inability to do anything about it. According to them and civil society observers 
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Petkovska and Beličanec, TV Sitel and Kanal 5 were directly owned by party leaders 
and parliamentarians, who were minor partners in the ruling coalition.60 Beličanec 
argued that without their televisions, Ljubisav Ivanov-Dzingo of the Socialist Party 
and Boris Stojmenov of VMRO-Makedonska would have no political influence: 
“The weight of Dzingo and Stojmenov is a political zero without those televisions, 
and they then turn from reporting to propaganda” (interview, May 2011). These 
owners then put their stations at the service of the coalition to which they belong. 
Because Macedonia’s elections were still internationally monitored, there is some 
clear evidence for this practice. It was documented in the 2011 parliamentary 
elections that immediately followed my interviews by the OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission’s monitoring of election coverage (see OSCE/ODIHR, 2011, 
pp. 14-15). This means that maintaining the status quo was most comfortable for 
both the political parties and the most powerful owners. Petkovska, from MIM 
bluntly explained, “no foreigner can enter the market in Macedonia because the local 
thugs won’t let them in” referring to the owners of the major television stations in the 
country (interview, May 2011). These accounts indicate that in Macedonia, having 
television stations was closely connected to the individual personal relationships and 
influence of politicians and owners. 
 
At the time of writing there had only been significant foreign investment in network 
providers: Macedonian Telecom that offers IPTV; the second largest Cable operator 
CableTel61; and BoomTV, the DTT provider. Germany’s Deutche Telekom owned a 
majority share of Makedonski Telekom and, as mentioned above, Telekom Slovenia 
launched Boom TV after being the only applicant in the tendering of the first 
commercial MUXs. An American and Bulgarian partnership invested in CableTel. 
Relations between these providers and the broadcasters at the time of my interviews 
were far from cordial, and suggested that the larger Macedonian broadcasters were 
closing ranks. All three of those platforms offered only subscription-based services 
and there was no free-to-air digital option at the time. According to both AlsatM’s 
Ordanovski and Siljanovski from Makedonski Telekom, the main point of contention 
was over payment for the rights to rebroadcast the domestic channels. 
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 Examination of the records in the BC’s database show only the companies that hold the licenses, 
but that individuals close to, or related to these leaders listed as Directors of those companies.  
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 CableTel has since been rebranded as Blizoo, but I will refer to it here by the name it had at the time 
of the interviews as this is the way it was referred to at the time.  
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Ordanovski explained that the owners of the national terrestrial television stations, 
except for A1, had recently come together to fight for their interests. They had 
formed a group within the Chamber of Commerce to protect their interests. “We 
have a kind of informal power, personal televisions, because if we all agree to start 
our evening news with someone, he has a problem” (interview, May 2011). Their 
main enemies at the time were the network operators, most of which were at least 
partially foreign owned. He complained that Makedonski Telekom and BoomTV had 
both launched subscription packages offering their channels without even asking or 
considering payment. According to him, this was already causing problems for the 
stations, which were getting complaints from rights holders because the stations had 
only been paying for analogue terrestrial rights. The other issue was whether or not 
changes would be made to allow network operators to also own broadcasters; 
something that Siljanovski reported Makedonski Telekom was interested in doing. 
He argued that his company had the resources to invest in domestic production and 
should be given the chance. According to Ordanovski, the broadcasters were 
prepared to fight back and were planning to establish a separate company to bid for 
the next available MUX. However as he described, the group would not be tackling 
any politically sensitive issues because as he said, each of the stations had its own 
concept and political relationships. This was also a reason he did not see the group 
expanding to local or regional channels, since accounting for every owners’ 
relationships would get too complicated. 
 
The national broadcasters’ battle with the network operators was temporarily on hold 
due to the elections because, according to Ordanovski, all their owners were involved 
with political parties. Nevertheless, Siljanovski felt that the decision makers were 
more likely to favour the television stations. When interviewed, he was about to head 
to a meeting with the Prime Minister, and Makedonski Telekom is still 40% owned 
by the state. However, when asked whether those relationships helped the company’s 
case against the broadcasters he replied. “It doesn’t matter. We can’t bring them 
5,000 votes” (interview, May 2011). His statement suggests that Macedonian 
decision makers would find it appropriate to protect the broadcasters, at least the 
ones that provided political support to the party to which they belong. 
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The accounts above support the evidence presented in the previous chapters of the 
strong link between political parties and media. This look at the relationships in the 
audiovisual media sector however, shows the importance of the individual 
relationships between media owners and political elites, who were sometimes one 
and the same, and suggests that media companies in Macedonia were the means for 
managing those relationships. These findings indicate that in Macedonia, there was 
also a “closed club” within the audiovisual media sector to which media owners and 
political elites belong to the exclusion of others. Like in Slovenia, I suggest that this 
club represents a barrier to the open common European market in audiovisual media 
services. 
8.3.3 Resistant relationships in national clubs  
 
In both Slovenia and Macedonia, the relationships in the audiovisual media sectors 
resembled closed clubs of actors with vested interests in the maintenance of the 
status quo. Though some of these actors were competitors in the national market, 
their strategic interests combined with the personal relationships that existed in these 
small environments to ensure that their national market was closed to outsiders. 
These findings therefore indicate that the established relationships in these cases 
presented additional barriers to trade and to foreign investment in the domestic 
markets. 
 
In Slovenia within the circles of “real media people”, regulators and politicians, 
ProPlus and RTVSLO co-operated over the MUX that RTVSLO was granted. They 
succeeded in closing down Swedish owned TV3, which was the first channel to hint 
at being a threat to their positions in the market, along with the Norwegian owned 
network operator that carried it. The evidence above also suggests that this process 
was, if not enabled, then at least not hindered by individuals within the NRA and the 
Government for whom inaction was the most appropriate behaviour in this case. 
There were indications that ProPlus’s position in the market gave it influence over 
politicians and helped it maintain the status quo. 
 
In Macedonia, political party relationships with media companies were so close that 
in some cases, political elites and media owners were one and the same. Where they 
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were not, the accounts indicate that individual relationships between business owners 
and political elites were managed through their media. These individual relationships 
were intertwined with the strategic interests of their other businesses and political 
parties. However unlike in Slovenia, in these relationships it seemed that the political 
parties had influence over the media, rather than any one media having influence 
over politicians. 
 
In the evidence presented here from these two small countries, relationships among 
individuals within organisations were difficult to separate from relationships between 
or among the organisational actors. This makes it difficult to maintain the distinction 
between the higher level of abstraction in which the logic of consequence functions 
and the lower level in which individuals follow the logic of appropriateness. Where 
an individual television owner uses his television station to maintain his personal 
clout within a political coalition, or a network operator can close down because its 
director does not have relationships with the “real media people”, what is the 
likelihood that EU rules and norms will play a role? 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
Technically, the Slovenian and Macedonian audiovisual media markets were open 
according to law and part of the common European audiovisual media market. In 
both cases, foreign channels could be received freely through various multi-channel 
subscription services and enjoyed audience shares between 20% and 25%, with the 
highest percentages in Slovenia. However, the evidence presented in this chapter 
indicates that this was where openness ended in the audiovisual media sectors in 
these two countries. With respect to the participation of domestic actors in the 
common European market and to foreign investors or media companies entering the 
national markets, there were barriers to trade stemming from the material conditions 
in these small states and the established relationships within their respective 
audiovisual media sectors. 
 
Looking at the material and power conditions related to media governance in these 
two cases (Sub-RQ4), I find evidence in each case that the actors of governance were 
constrained by the small size of the country and the resulting limited resources. This 
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finding is in line with the characterisation of small states’ media markets in the 
literature, which emphasises their small advertising markets and low potential for 
utilising economies of scale (Berg, 2011; Lowe, Berg, & Nissen, 2011; Picard, 2011; 
Puppis, 2009). There were not just limitations on financial resources stemming from 
the small advertising market or tax base, but also there were limits on the extent to 
which these small states with small populations could generate material for content. 
There was a lack of human resources both in terms of the number of skilled people 
that could be engaged to work in the industry and in the potential of these small 
populations to generate content in the form of artists, musicians, or interesting 
subjects. In both cases foreign competition was perceived as a threat, and regulators 
and policy makers expressed concerns for the sustainability of domestic 
broadcasters. 
 
There was a clear difference between the two cases in the way resources and power 
were distributed within the audiovisual media sectors at the national level. In 
Slovenia, the domestic opportunity structure enabled the growth of one very large 
private television company. This company was owned by the one foreign media 
company that got in early on and was able to capture the domestic market. In 
Macedonia, there were a number of national private companies that had captured the 
bulk of advertising and audience, but no one private channel was particularly strong 
and no foreign investors had lasted. Though several of those cited above thought that 
having fewer stronger broadcasters was more likely to produce ones that could 
compete with foreign channels in light of the limited resources, the evidence 
suggested that in both cases, these material conditions still represented a barrier to 
the free and fair competition of Slovenian and Macedonia broadcasters beyond their 
national markets. These broadcasters were therefore not able to take advantage of 
any economy of scale that having access to a larger European market might offer. 
The data presented above contained recurrent claims that in Slovenia, the domestic 
broadcasters were facing unfair competition from re-broadcast channels from outside 
Slovenia that went against EU rules. Nevertheless, the governance actors within 
Slovenia seemed unprepared to make use of the EU rules to address this problem. 
 
Trappel (1991) argued that small states media systems were more vulnerable to 
takeovers of domestic companies by foreign media companies from larger markets.  
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There had been several attempts by foreign companies to enter audiovisual media 
markets in these two cases, including the failed MTG investment in Slovenia and 
attempts by Greek and Serbian companies to invest in television stations in 
Macedonia. Although failed investments can often be explained by general economic 
factors or poor business calculations, the evidence on relationships within the 
audiovisual media sectors indicates that in both Slovenia and Macedonia, “closed 
clubs” of domestic players were able to use their established relationships to keep 
newcomers out. It might seem obvious that whether their goals were profit or 
political influence incumbent broadcasters would be opposed to new competition 
within the market. The rules of the common market are intended to prevent acts that 
jeopardise free and fair competition, but in these two cases the evidence indicated 
that these national “clubs” were a source of resistance to any change that might be 
expected from the EU rules. The Slovenian club was defined by the relationship of 
the PSB to the state, and a circle of influence dominated by ProPlus, which had 
power over political elites. In the Macedonian case, within the entrenched 
relationships between political parties, even individual politicians, and broadcasters, 
it seemed that media were tools for managing these relationships. 
 
What then is the role of Europeanization? It is hard to find any evidence of 
Europeanization playing a role in the relationships and dynamics described here. As I 
have discussed before, looking at the domestic impact of EU policy, Knill and 
Lehmkuhl (2003) outlined three mechanisms of Europeanization. One of them is the 
influence of EU policy on the domestic rules of the game, which they referred as 
“altering the domestic opportunity structure and hence distribution of power and 
resources between domestic actors” (Lehmkuhl, 2003, p. 258). Based on the 
evidence presented here, I find that the distribution of power and resources in both of 
these audiovisual media sectors was not influenced by European open market rules, 
and that there was resistance to Europeanization stemming from the material 
conditions found in these small states. Top down approaches to Europeanization 
focused on the implementation of specific EU directives have considered the 
distribution of power and resources in terms of the ability of certain strategic actors, 
political actors or civil society groups, to influence policy and their policy preference 
for or against the EU rules (e.g.Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Luaces, 2002; Sudbery, 
2010). However by taking this bottom-up approach looking at the material and 
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human resources as well as the relationships in the sector in which EU rules might 
play a role in governance, I have identified resistance to Europeanization that is 
unrelated to the policy preferences of actors on any particular Directive. What it does 
seem related to is size. Based on the evidence here, I argue that being a small state, 
defined both in terms of population size and economy, limits the extent to which the 
rules aimed at creating an open and level common market can have consequences for 
the state’s audiovisual media sector. 
 
One of the sources of resistance to change identified in this chapter was the nature of 
relationships within the sector, which were characterised by personal favours or 
loyalties, political influence and connections. Another mechanism of 
Europeanization could be socialisation or social learning (Checkel, 2001, 2005) into 
more “European” culture that did not include cronyism or clientelism. It might be 
tempting to attribute the closed nature of these national markets to an administrative 
culture that tolerates such behaviour and finds it appropriate. With a solid body of 
literature focused on national administrations and the implementation of EU policy 
(e.g. Falkner et al., 2007; Grabbe, 2005; Knill, 2001), one could accept that 
conclusion and look for solutions in the socialisation of those in the NRAs and 
ministries. However by also engaging with the market players in the sector and 
looking at relationships among multiple governance actors, I found evidence that 
these phenomena were not just based in social constructs to be changed through 
learning new cultural norms, but in these small environments were closely tied to the 
strategic interests of actors.  
 
This chapter does not end by highlighting an instance where, despite the general 
resistance found, Europeanization is playing some role. Instead I conclude based on 
the evidence here, that the common market for audiovisual media services is not an 
open, fair or a level playing field for these two small states. In the next chapter, I will 
review the various forms of resistance identified in this and the previous chapters, as 
well as the small role that I did find Europeanization playing mentioned in Chapters 
6 and 7. I will discuss the implications of these findings both for academic progress 
in the field of Europeanization and in the study of media governance and for EU 
audiovisual media policy. 
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Chapter 9: Europeanization meets 
resistance 
9.1 Introduction 
On 25 November 2010, police and financial inspectors raided the offices of A1 
television, Macedonia’s first privately owned and until then most successful national 
television. The station’s owner, Velija Ramkovski, was charged with tax evasion and 
fraud. A1 was just one of Ramkovski’s many businesses, which included a chain of 
mini-markets, import companies and three daily newspapers and the businessman 
had a history of shifting alliances with the leading political parties (Dimovski, 2010; 
Lutovska, 2012). A1 had been known for its news programme and as a relatively 
neutral voice until Ramkovski formed a political party in 2006 to oppose the then 
SDSM government’s agricultural policy. He was openly supportive of the VMRO-
DPMNE government until falling out with the Prime Minister allegedly over his 
handling of a failed dairy plant (Dimovski, 2010). With key members of its 
management in detention and under investigation, A1 lost its frequency and ceased 
broadcasting on 31 July 2011, shortly after declaring bankruptcy. Ramkovski is now 
serving a 13-year prison term, having been sentenced in March 2012, along with 19 
former employees including the ex-director of A1 television. The government’s 
handling of the case drew harsh criticism from the OSCE Representative on Freedom 
of the Media (OSCE, 2011b). The EC raised concerns about the “proportionality and 
selectivity” of the government’s actions against A1, along with the channelling of 
funds to uncritical stations in its 2011 Progress Report (European Commission, 
2011b, p. 16). 
 
These events took place during the fieldwork for this thesis. With all the relevant 
individuals in pre-trial detention, I was not able to interview anyone who worked at 
A1 television, nor was the person in the responsible government department allowed 
to speak to me about media issues. Nevertheless, this story, described in international 
media and documented in OSCE and EC reports, is a harsh example of the close and 
even personal, relationships between politics and media in Macedonia discussed in 
the previous chapters. The A1 story adds support to the case made in the previous 
chapters that, despite more than a decade of EU accession processes and candidacy 
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since 2004, the Macedonian audiovisual sector did not operate as an open and free 
market in which common rules and standards apply to all as foreseen in EU treaties 
and directives. When starting this investigation I had expected Slovenia, already a 
Member State and known in the region as the “good kid” of the former Yugoslavia, 
to be very different. The evidence presented in the preceding chapters, including the 
experiences of Norkring and MTG with which I started this thesis, indicate that the 
situation in Slovenia was remarkably similar. I identified a few key differences, the 
most prominent of which were the position of ProPlus that gave it a power over 
politics different from other media and the financial independence of the PSB. 
Nevertheless the Slovenian audiovisual media sector showed signs of being prone to 
unfair competition, without the application of common rules and standards, and not 
participating in a common audiovisual media market. 
 
Problems with clientelism, concentration and threats to media freedom, are not 
uncommon in Southern Europe or the countries of the former Eastern bloc. However, 
I argue that by reducing the problems of media governance in these countries to 
corruption or “undemocratic” political culture, one misses important aspects of the 
complex nature of these environments, limiting one’s vision for potential solutions. 
As I mentioned in my introduction, there have recently been calls for the EU to get 
more involved in media freedom and pluralism issues, and the Commission is 
considering its potential competence in this area. I maintained that in this context, it 
is important to understand what role EU policy in the media sector has had in 
national contexts, particularly from the parts of Europe known to be problematic. 
The aim of this thesis was to contribute to this understanding by investigating 
the role of Europeanization, or what could be called EU-ization, in audiovisual 
media governance in Slovenia and Macedonia. 
 
I attempted to achieve this aim through a mixed method examination of the 
interactions of media governance in these two countries. I found Europeanization 
playing a small role in that EU rules were used by domestic actors, mainly market 
players, to legitimise or advance their strategic interests. The few instances mainly 
involved large actors involved in some kind of European level or network, and two 
were linked to conditionality mechanisms, namely infringement procedures and the 
accession Progress Report. What I found much more characteristic of these two cases 
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was compelling evidence of resistance to the diffusion and institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, shared beliefs and 
norms of the EU (Radaelli, 2002, p. 108).62 This resistance took a variety of forms, 
but contrary to my expectations, I did not find evidence that this was rooted in any 
kind of conscious or intentional opposition to EU media policy or EU rules and 
norms for this sector. It was not a simple matter of non-compliance with EU rules. 
Instead, I found media governance in these two cases was resistant to 
Europeanization because of the size of these small countries, and, though to differing 
degrees, due to relationships between political elites and media. As evidenced in the 
preceding chapters there were instances in which this resistance manifested as non-
compliance with transposition deadlines for directives, such as in that of Slovenia 
and the AVMSD; however it also appeared as an inability to participate, such as 
demonstrated in Chapter 6’s discussion of European protectionism. The closed 
nature of the markets was only partly attributable to apparent non-compliance with 
EU competition rules.  
 
This concluding chapter first summarises the forms of resistance identified in the 
course of this investigation by returning to each of the four sub-questions that guided 
the investigation. Next, I offer some explanations based on the evidence for why this 
resistance exists. I then return to the main research question and discuss the rather 
limited role of Europeanization that I found in these two cases. Following this is a 
section that covers what this resistance and the reasons for it mean in a more 
theoretical context. I discuss the implications for thinking on Europeanization and on 
media governance. The motivation for doing this project was an interest in and 
concern for the media systems in small states in South East Europe. Therefore, I 
close with some reflections on what aspects of these findings from this region are 
relevant to audiovisual media policy. 
9.2 What forms of resistance? 
 
The term resistance does not necessarily imply agency to that which is being resisted 
or to the resistor. Europeanization as a process itself does not have agency. However, 
according to the conceptualisation of governance used in this thesis, in a situation of 
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 See full definition of Europeanization in the introduction.  
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multi-level governance such as in Europe, the EU Treaties and Directives are 
intentional interventions by the state,63 as are national level laws. The enactment of 
law is an exercise of agency. Therefore, there is agency behind EU policy, which is 
the intention to implement the rules, norms, policy paradigms, etc. that have been 
agreed upon at the EU level. In my introduction I outlined what these rules, norms 
and policy paradigms were for the audiovisual media sector based on the EU treaties, 
Directives and other documents. Without getting into the minutiae of the provisions 
of the Directives that apply to this sector, I broadly grouped these rules and norms 
into those that aim to ensure that: common rules and standards apply to all actors 
across the common market for audiovisual media services; that European production 
and distribution is protected and nurtured; and that within the common European 
audiovisual media service market, there is free and open competition within a level 
playing field.  
 
What follows is a return to the four sub research questions that guided this 
investigation. In the summary answers to these questions, I show how much of the 
resistance I identified can be explained by institutional misfit with the practices and 
established relationships that form the contexts for individuals working within media 
governance actors. The evidence summarised here also demonstrates that the EU 
related changes that were identified, were the results of strategic action by actors 
aimed at altering the distribution of power and resources within the two domestic 
opportunity structures, both of which were otherwise largely resistant to externally 
driven change. 
9.2.1 RQ1: What are the rules, practices and routines of media governance? How 
do they interact with EU policy? 
 
The formal rules governing each audiovisual media sector are part of what defines 
the distribution of power and resources within the sector. They dictate the limits on 
advertising, the main source of income for most broadcasters. They establish the 
financing system for PSB and in some cases, the prices that can be charged for 
transmission or interconnection. They also determine what tools regulators have at 
their disposal to interact with those in the market. According to the theory of 
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 I remind the reader that in Chapter 3 the “state” was defined conceptually as an actor with a public 
task and not necessarily as a nation-state government.  
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opportunity structure that I explained in Chapter 3 and refer to throughout the thesis, 
these rules constrain or enable the behaviour of strategic actors (Knill & Lenchow, 
2001b, p. 195), determining the options they see before them and the outcomes they 
can expect from their choices. They also are created by strategic actors, for example 
adopted by political parties in parliaments, who do so in line with their interests. 
 
At the time of my field research, the formal rules governing the audiovisual media 
sectors in Slovenia and Macedonia were not yet in line with the most recent EU 
rules, because in neither state had the AVMSD been transposed into domestic 
legislation. Both countries still had laws that were compliant with the TWFD that 
had come before it. In terms of advertising standards and limits, the protection of 
minors, quotas for European works and independent production etc., there was little 
difference between the two cases. On both cases domestic laws were in line with 
TWFD, so the domestic laws differed from the current EU Directives to the extent 
that TWFD differed from AVMSD. Therefore, the domestic broadcasters were 
subject to different rules than other European broadcasters, many of which were re-
broadcast in Slovenia and Macedonia. Because of this, in the summer of 2011, 
Slovenian and Macedonian broadcasters were still subject to advertising limits that 
had been relaxed in other countries by 2009 or even earlier. 
 
In Slovenia, the broadcasters were aware of this disadvantage, and according to the 
two people interviewed from private stations, they were already operating largely 
according to the new standards contained in the AVMSD. At the forefront of this 
move was ProPlus, whose lawyer was well versed in EU policy. He explained that 
the station found the new rules beneficial and deemed them to supersede those of 
national legislation. According to two people in APEK, this practice was being 
essentially condoned by the regulator, with the justification that to enforce old rules 
would be unfair to the domestic broadcasters who must compete with foreign 
channels. The domestic actor’s (ProPlus’) knowledge of the EU level rules and 
interest in using them resulted in changes to the rules defining the distribution of 
resources within the market before political leaders got around to bringing them in 
line with the EU. Therefore in Slovenia, although in relation to advertising and some 
other programme standards the old rules still applied formally, informally, the new 
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ones were in place. There was no evidence of this phenomenon in Macedonia, where 
none of the private media seemed aware of the new rules at all. 
 
Each country had European works quotas transcribed in law and also had formal 
rules that set out domestic content quotas. Though the domestic quotas were 
formulated differently in the two cases, in both, these rules linked content quotas 
with language and national identity. I had expected to find objections to the 
European quotas and clear prioritising of the domestic protectionist measures. 
However as described in Chapter 7, there was little evidence that people in the 
audiovisual media sector viewed EU quotas as counter to domestic protectionism or 
avoided compliance and enforcement because of opposition to them. When I 
compared the practices and routines around the implementation of EU and domestic 
quotas by broadcasters and NRAs, I did find problems with compliance by 
broadcasters with EU works quotas both in terms of fulfilling the quotas and 
reporting on them to the NRAs that were not matched by similar problems with 
domestic quotas. However, I could not link this to any opposition to the EU quotas.  
 
Although people expressed a need to support and favour domestic content, they did 
not see EU quota rules as counter to such goals any more than the domestic quotas, 
which several people doubted were effective in supporting domestic content. 
Looking at the practices in the market, it seemed that non-compliance with EU or 
domestic quotas was more attributed to limited resources. The simple fact that EU 
rules apply quotas annually, rather than daily like the domestic ones, made them 
incongruent with the routines of both broadcasters and NRAs. Broadcasters with 
whom I spoke complained of the time and human resources required to fill in the 
forms and keep track of the annual quotas, which was a significant challenge to their 
limited resources. Daily quotas on the other hand were checked by the NRAs 
independently of the broadcasters simply through the regular recording and checking 
of a 24-hour period. Because of this, fulfilment and enforcement of daily quotas 
aligned better with the size-constrained practices of both broadcasters and regulators. 
This may seem like a banal issue, but is a clear example of resistance due to 
institutional misfit between participation in the EU’s protectionist content quotas and 
the established domestic routines and practice. 
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Another set of formal rules examined were those establishing the functions and 
powers of the countries’ NRAs described in Chapter 5. As I demonstrated, the rules 
dividing powers and resources between APEK and the Media Inspector in Slovenia 
made for a system in which neither of these bodies could be a strong, effective 
regulator. By law, the BC in Macedonia had many more enforcement powers at its 
disposal, but still did not have the power to make use of the monetary fines foreseen 
in the law. In both cases, I found the formal institutional arrangements and 
appointment systems enabled political influence. Looking at practices in the 
regulators, it was clear that there was weak enforcement in general of common rules 
and standards, including those derived from EU Directives.  
 
In Slovenia, this seemed to stem primarily from the constraints on NRAs because of 
the formal rules. Those in APEK also expressed views that it was not appropriate to 
be very strict with media, but there was no evidence that this was connected to 
political relationships. The perceptions of roles within the NRAs are discussed 
further below, but here an important difference between the two cases in terms of 
practice, was that in Macedonia weak enforcement could mostly be attributed to 
what the BC Council Members considered appropriate to their perceived role as a 
regulator, and to the political relationships in the sector, including their own personal 
ones. According to all the BC Council Members interviewed, their practice was to 
avoid issuing harsh penalties despite widespread violations, and they had even 
changed internal rules on enforcement measures in order to maintain this practice. 
The exception to this leniency was their approach to copyright enforcement on cable 
operators, which was done in close co-operation with Makedonski Telekomunikacii, 
the IPTV provider. The justification for this selective enforcement practice given by 
BC Council Members and the representative from Makedonski Telekomunikacii was 
the EU Progress Report. Nevertheless, the application of common rules and 
standards within the market did not fit with the established practice in either case. 
 
The formal rules in both these cases were not up to date with EU rules, while other 
formal rules for the sector contributed to lax enforcement practices, particularly in 
Slovenia. Practices in both NRAs and broadcasters shaped by the material constraints 
of their small size, had consequences both for enforcement and compliance with 
rules. The examination of rules, practices and routines, however, also revealed 
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instances in which the existence of EU rules and obligations were used by domestic 
actors when implementing EU rules also served their strategic interests. 
9.2.2 RQ2: How do the actors involved in media governance perceive their roles 
and positions, and what norms or values are reflected in these perceptions? 
 
As I mentioned above, there were general tendencies for the NRAs to be lenient 
towards the domestic broadcasters. In both cases, those working within the NRAs did 
not seem to perceive their roles as ones that should involve much interference in the 
market or harsh punishments. In Macedonia, three out of the four BC Council 
Members interviewed clearly expressed the view that their role was primarily to 
educate the broadcasters. Both the President and the Vice President said that they 
thought there should be fewer stations in the market so that those remaining could be 
stronger, but, when talking about their approaches to licensing, they did not seem to 
see this as the BC’s role. In Slovenia, no one in APEK made such clear statements 
about the regulator’s role as in Macedonia, yet I saw indications that the dominant 
perception of APEK’s role by those working within the regulator was that of an 
administrator. Three of those interviewed indicated that they wished APEK could do 
more to encourage diversity of content or local media; however, when discussing 
procedures and processes, the individuals with whom I spoke seemed comfortable 
with the lack of APEK’s lack of discretionary powers and its administrative function. 
 
The theory of institutional fit, which implies that domestic change depends on the 
extent to which its implementation fits with what individuals consider appropriate 
based on their existing values and identity in addition to the established practices and 
relationships discussed in relation to other RQs, was developed mainly based on 
research within national administrations. In taking a broader governance approach to 
this investigation, I attempted to identify also some of the norms, values and self-
perceptions held by individuals in the market and civil society as well. For those 
working within the NRAs, it seemed normal to talk about what they thought the role 
of their organisation was, and their particular jobs within the organisation. Those 
from television stations or other market players did not give such direct answers 
related to their self-perception or values. Values and self-perceptions were mainly 
interpreted from the things people said about how they work, what they do, and what 
is important. Although I did this as systematically and consistently as possible, it 
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must be acknowledged that the answer to this research question is more dependent 
on my subjective interpretation as the researcher than the other three. 
 
The most striking thing for me in terms of self-perceptions and values was that an 
overwhelming majority of those interviewed, seventeen individuals, spontaneously 
talked about the smallness of the country and the negative implications of this for the 
media market. In both cases, there seemed to be a perception of national 
vulnerability among people in the public bodies including the NRAs, in the market 
and in civil society. In both cases, interviewees expressed concern for the 
preservation of the national language, culture and broadcasting sector, and perceived 
them as under threat. The majority of those interviewed in some way talked about the 
importance of protecting domestic content and broadcasters, which were perceived 
as vulnerable.64 One of the limitations of this investigation is that I was not able to 
probe deeply into the personal values of individuals around things like corruption or 
favours because of the fact that, as discussed in Chapter 4, it was difficult to offer 
complete anonymity to many of those interviewed. However, I did find surprising the 
ease and nonchalance with which many of the interviewees talked about their own 
political connections or the political influence over the media, such as the regional 
TV manager in Slovenia and the local TV managers in Macedonia, or even some BC 
Council Members. This is not to say that these people approved of it and often it was 
framed as a problem, but their attitudes indicated that it was something common and 
banal enough not to be ashamed of being a part of at a personal level. 
 
The values described here could be seen as protectionist, and concerned with the 
preservation of the national language and culture and shaped by feelings of 
vulnerability because of the small size of these populations. Only one person, Jelovac 
in Slovenia, related his perception of vulnerability to being within the common 
market. It was surprising how little opposition there was to or even discussion of EU 
policy without prompting, and I did not get the impression that people found a 
conflict between EU norms for the audiovisual sector and their values. The sources 
of resistance to Europeanization that I found seemed to be more those aspects of 
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 Here I should qualify that within the Slovenian market, ProPlus was not perceived by others as 
vulnerable, but instead as supremely powerful. However it seemed that in the statements of those in 
APEK and others, there was an assumption that it was not powerful in the face of competition from 
foreign channels and vulnerable to threats from outside. 
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institutional misfit rooted in the regulators’ perceptions of their roles, the established 
practices described above, and the relationships elaborated on below, which seemed 
to be accepted as normal. 
9.2.3 RQ3: What is the nature of the relationships among the domestic actors and 
between domestic actors and EU institutions? 
 
The most distinctive characteristic of the Macedonian case was the apparent 
pervasiveness of political influence. Every person interviewed in Macedonia referred 
to the close relationships between political parties and media, especially the 
influence of the political parties in government. The story of A1 at the beginning of 
this chapter was just one of many told in the course of the interviews. Civil society 
representatives and the BC Council Members commented on the direct relationships 
between individual politicians and major broadcasters. In Chapter 8, the evidence 
presented indicated that these relationships between media owners and politicians, 
operating often at a very personal level, amount to a closed network in which media 
are tools for managing those relationships. I argued that the limited size of the 
market and level of pluralism in the country exacerbated these links, which, the data 
showed, often involved financial dependency. At the same time, the years of 
dependency on ad hoc support from the central government also seemed to 
contribute to the evident political influence over the PSB, MRT. All those 
interviewed from the broadcasters complained about the political ties of other 
broadcasters, while two of those interviewed essentially admitted to their own 
connections. The BC, charged with regulating these politically connected 
broadcasters, itself did not appear independent from political party influence. The 
BC’s leniency towards broadcasters was explained by some Council Members as a 
choice to punish no one in order to avoid having to punish those they did not want to 
have to punish. This was not only because of the political connections of 
broadcasters, but also because of their own. 
 
In Slovenia, the audiovisual media market was largely defined by the relationship 
between ProPlus and RTVSLO, as the two largest players in the market by far. As 
shown in Chapter 5, the position of these two broadcasters in terms of audience 
shares and advertising income far outstripped all other domestic players. The 
interviews with those from both ProPlus and RTVSLO indicated that the relationship 
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was generally one of fierce rivalry, but with one point of mutually beneficial co-
operation over the use of the MUX for DTT that RTVLSO was granted. The timeline 
of legislative changes in Chapter 6 showed that political parties tend to use law to 
influence RTVSLO while in government. The relationship between political parties 
in government and RTVSLO did not appear as strong as those between the 
Macedonian government and MRT, nor was there an element of financial 
dependence. Nevertheless, there were indications that privileges such as the MUX go 
along with a lack of political independence. 
 
ProPlus’ relationships with the government and political parties in Slovenia were 
very different from RTVSLO’s and from those of the smaller broadcasters. Smaller 
stations were reported to be under the influence of political parties because they 
depend on them for support in getting subsidies and advertising from state 
companies, but ProPlus was described by several of those interviewed as having 
influence over politicians. The audience and advertising share data indicated that the 
size of ProPlus in the market would make it important for political leaders to keep as 
an ally. The company’s lawyer claimed that the fact that it had foreign owners 
protected the station from political influence, a view shared by others interviewed, 
and he was included in the drafting committee for the new Mass Media Act. The 
issue of Norkring’s battle with RTVSLO over terrestrial television with which I 
started this thesis was a hot topic during my interviews in Slovenia, yet its director 
reported having no such connections. MTG’s TV3 was described by one interviewee 
as being doomed because its management were not moving in the right circles. The 
relationships of both RTVSLO and ProPlus with the political parties in government 
seemed to contribute to the country being resistant to openness and part of a common 
European audiovisual media market. 
 
The relationships that domestic actors had with European level institutions were 
limited. While civil society groups reported relationships with European level civil 
society, they did not have them with EU institutions. Communication with EU 
institutions in both cases was primarily the domain of central government. Some 
individuals working within APEK and the BC maintained personal contacts with 
people working in the relevant EC Directorate, but interviewees reported that most 
official communication consisted of answering questions sent by the Commission 
 261 
either directly in the case of APEK or through the central government in the case of 
the BC in Macedonia. APEK and the BC were involved with the European Platform 
for Regulatory Authorities, (EPRA), and interviewees from both reported close 
collaboration in particular with other regulators in the region on a variety of topics 
and initiatives. The Media Inspector in Slovenia was not part of these relationships. 
Among the private broadcasters from which I interviewed people in both countries, 
only Slovenia’s ProPlus had any history of European level relationships. My findings 
indicate that none of the domestic actors had strong relationships with EU 
institutions, although regional co-operation was often mentioned in NRAs and civil 
society groups. The private broadcasters, except for ProPlus, appear to be the most 
“out of the loop” of European level relationships. 
 
The findings on relationships indicate that the audiovisual media sectors in Slovenia 
and Macedonia are rather insular. There are close relationships between political 
elites and media, and in the Macedonian case between political elites and the 
regulator. Many of these seem to operate at a very individual level, blurring the lines 
between individual assessments of appropriate behaviour and the strategic decisions 
of governance actors. The story of A1 television that was first used by its owner to 
further personal and business aims and then closed after a personal fall-out with the 
Prime Minister was one of the more extreme examples of the consequences of these 
relationships. Beyond the central government and the main NRAs, there were almost 
no relationships with EU level institutions, and even those of the central government 
and certain individuals in the NRAs were described as mostly EU led. I argue that 
the relationships identified here contributed to make the audiovisual media sectors 
resistant to EU-initiated change in the domestic opportunity structures in these 
countries. 
9.2.4 RQ4: What are the material and power conditions within which the 
domestic actors operate and their consequences? 
 
The limited engagement with European level organisations I found was just one of 
the consequences of the small human capacity in terms of knowledgeable individuals 
in each case. Under developed civil society is a well-documented legacy of the old 
systems in SEE and CEE states (Holmes, 2006, p. 186; Kostadinova, 2012, p. 237) 
so weak civil society actors were expected, but in the audiovisual sectors in Slovenia 
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and Macedonia among the actors of the state, civil society and the market, the market 
players were the least equipped to contribute to policymaking. This is not to say they 
were not able to lobby, or have their perceived interest championed by their political 
patrons when it came to law making. However, interviewees from APEK and from 
both the BC and AEK in Macedonia reported that they got abysmal responses to 
consultations. In Macedonia, the broadcasters appeared particularly left out of the 
domestic policymaking processes, and there was no awareness of the most recent EU 
policy. The very small size of these operations meant that they did not have the 
human resources to participate. I argued that the small size and lack of human 
resources with the governance actors, helped make it possible for political elites to 
use media laws as tools for maintaining influence over the media. 
 
The limited financial resources for business in the audiovisual media sector were 
evident in the data I presented on the various forms of revenue available in each 
country. There was also evidence that this was a factor in the non-compliance with 
European works or independent production quotas, and shaping the practices 
involved in monitoring and reporting. However, the resistance to participating in the 
protection of the common European market for production and distribution was not 
just rooted in the fact that the stations in Slovenia and Macedonia could not afford 
French art films or Danish crime serials. Interviewees explained that qualified 
personnel, talent and even material from which to draw content were limited. Both 
countries have poorly developed independent production sectors. Slovenia was in a 
better position than Macedonia with a relatively well-resourced PSB and one large 
financially stable private television, ProPlus. Slovenian producers were also able to 
access European level subsidies. Smaller broadcasters in Slovenia and all 
broadcasters in Macedonia did not seem to have the resources to contribute much 
production to the domestic market, much less the European one. I therefore 
concluded that the material conditions in these small states represented a barrier to 
trade and to the participation of domestic market players in the common audiovisual 
media market. 
 
There was a big difference between the two cases in the way power and resources 
were distributed within the market. In the Slovenian case, the largest private 
broadcaster ProPlus had captured most of the resources available in the market, and 
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many of those interviewed seemed to think that was necessary in order to compete 
with foreign channels. In the Macedonian market, in which revenues were spread 
thinly across so many broadcasters, even the larger national stations could not expect 
much profit and very few were making any at all. The evidence showed that even 
ProPlus struggled to compete with foreign channels, but that at least it was able to be 
above domestic politics enough to provide politically neutral content, whereas the 
national stations in Macedonia were controlled by political elites. I argue that both 
situations are likely to deter foreign investment, and therefore contribute to resistance 
to the open common market. 
9.2.5 The role of Europeanization 
 
In summary, Europeanization faces multiple forms of resistance in both Slovenia and 
Macedonia. At the level of individuals working within governance, I found due to 
institutional misfit with though more so with the established practices and 
relationships of the individuals involved in media governance, and within the NRAs, 
to their perceptions of their role than to values related to the sector. The notion of 
institutional fit refers to the extent to which change or behaviour fits, or in other 
words, is deemed appropriate to existing structures such as norms and values, 
established practices and relationships, culture and ways of doing things and 
therefore misfit is a source of structure-centred resistance. At a higher level of 
abstraction, the domestic opportunity structures were also resistant to exogenously 
initiated changes to the formal rules, to implementation and enforcement of common 
rules in the markets, and to free and open competition in the common market. This 
was primarily agent-centred resistance in that governance actors set the rules in order 
to achieve certain goals or distribute resources in a certain way. This is not to say 
that the domestic distribution of power and resources were completely unchangeable. 
Where I found Europeanization to play a role were in the instances in which actors 
called upon EU rules as a higher authority to effect some change in the domestic 
opportunity structure or the existence of the EU rules essentially allowed domestic 
actors to expect different outcomes or change the distribution of power. 
 
An example of the first was the case of ProPlus in Slovenia instigating the 
implementation of the new advertising rules of the AVMSD ahead of their 
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transposition into domestic law. There was a similar situation in Macedonia in which 
the regulator and the largest telecommunications operator and IPTV provider 
Makedonski Telekom, used the repeated references to copyright infringement 
problems in the EC Progress Reports as justification for their joint effort to crack 
down on cable operators. Both of these instances involved domestic actors with 
contacts at the European level and knowledge of EU rules and norms being able and 
interested in making use of the EU to further their strategic interests. Change of the 
second type was linked to conditionality mechanisms, namely the EU Progress 
Report in the context of Macedonia’s accession process and infringement 
proceedings initiated against Slovenia for non-transposition of AVMSD. It could be 
argued that these are examples of the effects of conditionality. However, the effects 
of conditionality depend significantly on the perceived credibility of the threats and 
the reward (Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Macedonia has 
been a candidate country since 2004, and its entry into the EU depends on it first 
concluding the conflict over its name with neighbouring Greece. As many domestic 
and international observers have observed, this makes its prospects slim and 
domestic political elites are not only well aware of this, they have ceased to make EU 
entry a serious objective.65  
 
The decision to initiate infringement proceedings against Slovenia for non-
implementation could be seen as the exogenous source of the change in domestic 
legislation that included the implementation of AVMSD. However, looking at the 
context in which this decision was received, the government threatened with the 
infringement proceedings had just lost a vote of no confidence and could have left its 
successor to deal with them. Instead, I argue that rather than simply change resulting 
from EU pressure, these two were instances of alignment between EU requirements 
and the strategic interests of domestic actors. In Macedonia, when the financing of 
the PSB was finally put on the road to stabilisation, as demanded by EU Progress 
Reports, this also seemed in the interests of MRT and of the political parties in power 
that had solidified their influence over the broadcaster. The outgoing political party 
in Slovenia used the threat of EU punishment to push through a media law that 
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 Most commentary on this is in Macedonian, a few recent examples: 
http://faktor.mk/archives/60021; interview with Harald Shenker http://republika.mk/?p=107308; 
Several articles are available in English at http://BalkanInsight.com, though behind a paywall.  
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included several provisions in their interest for a time out of office, in addition to 
those related to AVMSD transposition. It is also noteworthy that both Slovenia’s 
ProPlus and Makedonski Telekomunikacii have foreign owners that operate on a 
European level, and the other two actors in these instances are the BC and the 
Macedonian PSB, both of which are involved in pan-European networks, namely 
EPRA and the EBU. These instances indicate that despite the resistance identified 
above, Europeanization did play a role in changing the domestic opportunity 
structures when making the change also aligned with the interests of domestic actors 
that had the power to make use of them (Jacquot & Woll, 2004). These actors need to 
be “in the loop”, to some extent, at the European level in order for this to happen, 
and to be a position to affect the change. 
9.3 Explaining the limited role of Europeanization in media governance 
 
I have argued that in these two cases, the reasons that Europeanization plays a small 
role in media governance are misfit with domestic institutions and their resistant 
domestic opportunity structures. Institutional misfit has been explained by scholars 
as stemming from a mismatch between the aims or execution of EU policy and the 
values or cultural norms of national administrations, as well as their established 
practices and relationships (Börzel & Risse, 2003; Knill & Lenchow, 2001a). One 
could explain the resistance to change with the argument that the political culture of 
these post-communist or post-socialist countries makes them more resistant to 
change (Börzel, 2011; Mitropolitski, 2012). There was ample evidence in these two 
cases that the relationships with political elites and their actions played a large role in 
defining the institutions of media governance. Several of the practices identified in 
this investigation fit well into Karklins’ (2005 ch. 2) well-known typology of 
corruption in post-communist states, especially into the her categories of obfuscation 
of regulation, misuse of licensing or inspection powers, misuse of legislation, and of 
course corruption of the media.  
 
These have been explained by legacies of the old systems such as the 
“underdeveloped culture of self-motivated political participation” and a left-over 
blurring between the state and society resulting in confusion over public and private 
domains (Holmes, 2006, pp. 183-187). Because of the identified high levels of 
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corruption and clientelism in the region, the work of the media scholars like 
Jakubowicz (2007a, 2007b) and Splichal (1999, 2001) cited in Chapter 2 
highlighting mechanisms of political control in the media sector, as well as my own 
experience in the region, I had expected to find evidence of clientelism and political 
influence over media in these two case. I had doubts about the extent to which these 
would have consequences for Europeanization in this sector, however, because the 
EU’s policy in this sector is more industrial than normative (Harrison & Woods, 
2007). The evidence in the two cases showed that the political relationships among 
governance actors did explain some of the resistance to the application of common 
rules and standards, particularly the transposition of them into law and their 
enforcement, as well as contributed to the closed nature of the markets.  
 
However, based on the evidence in these cases, I argue that to define the 
relationships between political parties and other governance actors solely as 
constructs of a political culture held over from the single party socialist system 
ignores material factors and the strategic interests born from the new multi-party 
system. At the same time, several aspects of the resistance identified, such as the 
practices and values of lower level civil servants around content quotas, or the 
inability of market players to participate in the common European audiovisual 
market did not appear related to these political relationships.  
 
One of my hypotheses when I began this investigation was that I would find overt 
opposition to the EU’s common market in audiovisual media stemming from 
nationalist sentiment and nation building related protectionism. I had expected EU 
policy to be seen more as a threat and Europeanization perhaps as a subset of 
globalisation. Another hypothesis that I had at the outset was that national level 
protectionism might be more vehemently implemented and both contribute to 
resistance to participation in the common market and serve to protect domestic 
market players. Instead the resistance found stemmed not so much from institutional 
misfit with values or norms but from institutional misfit with practices and 
established relationships.  
 
The main conclusion that I take away from the investigation of these two cases is 
that size does matter. Admittedly, this is not a new argument. Ample evidence 
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already exists showing that, within media systems in Europe, small size, defined by 
population and economy,66 results in lower advertising expenditure per capita and 
lower licence fee revenues (Picard, 2011; Puppis, 2009) as well as lower expenditure 
on quality original content (Berg, 2011). What this investigation in these two cases 
has provided is new evidence on how size matters in the context of Europeanization 
and has shown that the consequences of smallness are not limited to financial 
constraints and low production. 
 
Size matters both in shaping the institutions that form the contexts within which 
individuals determine appropriateness and it matters in terms of defining the 
opportunity structures that define the actions of governance actors. I found 
indications that small size contributed to shaping values and practices, and that 
because “everybody knows everybody” in these small countries, relationships within 
the audiovisual media sectors resembled national clubs, closed to outsiders. At the 
same time, I argue that the material constraints of smallness essentially acted as 
barriers to trade and to inclusion in the European audiovisual media market by 
limiting the ability of domestic actors to participate and, combined with the closed 
national clubs I mentioned above, by discouraging foreign entrants or investors. I 
also maintain that the evidence from these two cases indicates that the constraints of 
smallness contribute to, or exacerbate, the perpetuation of the political elite’s 
influence over the media. 
9.3.1 Smallness shaping structures  
 
In this investigation, I found that the size of each country contributed to the shaping 
of the norms, values, practices and routines described above. It has been argued that 
in small media markets, policymakers tend to favour protectionism as better suited to 
preserving national culture and creating a strong industry (Puppis, 2009, p. 14). 
Smallness, and the limited material resources –human and financial – that go along 
with it, is not a socially constructed structure like those usually considered to be 
measures of appropriateness. However, I found evidence in these two cases that 
some of those structures were shaped by the small size of the country. This was 
reflected in the values individuals had for domestic content and broadcasters, and the 
                                                 
66
 For discussions of small states and smallness see introduction to Chapter 8. 
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vulnerability they perceived for their national languages and cultures. What was 
surprising in the data was that these values and priorities did not seem to be 
perceived as being in conflict with or threatened by EU rules or norms for the 
audiovisual media sector. I suggest that this is likely because liberalization and the 
spread of foreign channels in each of these countries are not linked to the 
transposition of EU rules, as was shown in Chapter 5. The perceived threat to 
national media and national identity was more associated with globalisation, and I 
did not find strong evidence that these protectionist values and perceptions of 
vulnerability were behind the institutional misfit identified above. Instead of 
institutional misfit with values or norms related to the sector, there was institutional 
misfit with established practices, routines and relationships in the sector, as well as to 
some extent the self-perceived role of those in the regulators.  
 
As I demonstrated in the preceding chapters, in both cases one of the main reasons 
for the non-implementation of rules by individuals was misfit with the established 
practices of the very small operations in which they worked. In small states, the 
limitations of the material conditions of the market is not just a matter of financial 
resources, but also “professional staff, talent and creativity” (Trappel, 2011, p. 115). 
Market players were limited in terms of production capacity or their ability to 
procure content. However the lack of human resources in particular, the size of their 
operations and the size of the pool of talent from which to draw, also seemed to 
shape practices related to reporting and engagement with policy making. The 
limitations also applied to civil society and state actors. The resistance identified to 
the implementation of common rules and standards or EU protectionist measures did 
not appear deliberate or consciously associated with non-compliance with EU rules 
or norms, but there was evidence that certain practices within the NRAs and the 
market players resulted in institutional misfit. These cases showed that beyond 
transposition, the limited capacity in the administrations responsible for 
implementation and that of the market players to whom the rules apply can be a 
source of resistance. It could be thought of in terms of individuals not just following 
the logic of appropriateness but also the logic of possibility, or that appropriateness 
may be also judged in terms of the resources constrained by material conditions. 
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The evidence in Chapter 6 showed that the enforcement of common rules and 
standards in Macedonia also did not fit with what was considered appropriate by 
decision makers with the regulator in the context of their established relationships 
with political elites and those between political elites and the media. In the 
Macedonian case, individual patronage relationships were revealed between decision 
makers in the NRA and political parties. These could stem from the lack of barriers 
between party and private spheres in Yugoslav times (Holmes, 2006, p. 184), but 
more likely, given the ethnic divisions and extremely personal nature of the 
relationships described are rooted more in the tradition of “big men” and related 
“informal family subsistence systems” and other “informal economic activities” 
typical of the Eastern Balkans (Kanin, 2003, p. 40). In Slovenia, such individual 
political patronage relationships were not evident, however there was evidence of 
relationships between media and political parties based on financial dependency, and 
the decision makers within the NRAs also had very limited powers and resources for 
enforcement as a consequence of the rules made by political leaders. As stated 
above, the role of politics and political elites in these two cases cannot be ignored, 
however, I argue that the extent of their role in media governance is exacerbated by 
the smallness of these two countries. 
9.3.2 Smallness constraining agents  
 
Other research has shown that the policy preferences of political groups, namely 
those opposed to EU policy, can result in delays to transposition depending on the 
number of such veto players and their positions within the domestic opportunity 
structure (Haverland, 2000; Kaeding, 2006). Toshkov (2008) showed that in relation 
to social policy for instance, a predictable left/right split could be seen in the 
implementation of EU Directives depending on which parties were in government. In 
cases looking at environmental or gender equality issues, the focus has been on the 
extent to which Europeanization changes the power of advocacy groups to influence 
those in government (Luaces, 2002; Sudbery, 2010). Policy preferences in relation to 
these areas may be part of winning voter or donor support during elections or 
appeasing lobbyists. Investigating media governance in these two cases I found no 
evidence that the policy preferences of those in government or in opposition towards 
EU policy were relevant, yet the actions and influence of political elites were 
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pervasive. I suggest that this is because the area of media policy is a special case, due 
to media being fundamental to the political process. 
 
It has already been convincingly argued by Jakubowicz (2008), Bašić-Hrvatin and 
Petković (2007) that countries in this region adhere to the polarised pluralist model 
of media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, 2008). A core characteristic of media 
systems in the polarised pluralist category that “there is a strong tradition of 
regarding [the media] as means of ideological expression and political mobilization” 
(p. 90). Media are thus often tools that political parties use to achieve their strategic 
goals, and it follows that where they have influence over media it is in their strategic 
interest to maintain the status quo. A distinction was made in Chapter 2 between the 
theory that mechanisms of control over the media were sustained legacies of the 
former authoritarian system (Splichal, 2001) or in the needs of new political elites, 
who may have held emancipatory ideals, to solidify power in the new democratic 
systems (Jakubowicz, 2007b). Though it is not unique to post-socialist or post-
communist states, regarding media as a vehicle for political mobilization and 
spreading ideology may be connected to the Yugoslav past. However, there was 
more evidence of the strategic use of mechanisms of control born of the new 
capitalist system such as manipulation of advertising budgets and subsidies. What I 
found in these cases was that the small size of the two countries and the limited 
financial and human resources that went along with that exacerbated the role of 
political elites. There were marked differences between the two countries in the 
extent to which political elites had power within the domestic opportunity structures 
and their relevance to the institutions with which there was misfit. 
 
In both cases, delays in the transposition of Directives were consequences of political 
parties in government using media laws to shape the domestic opportunity structure. 
The evidence indicated that one of the reasons that issues such as subsidies for local 
media or the amount of advertising allowed on PSB were left to political deals was 
because of the very limited capacity within the national administrations, civil society 
and particularly the market to engage in policy making. The sheer numbers of people 
with expertise were not enough. I argued that this helped to allow the application of 
the common rules and standards of the EU for domestic market players to be shunted 
aside by the interests of political parties. The exception to this was in Slovenia, 
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where one market player with foreign owners that was large enough in the market to 
be independent from political party influence began to implement some of the EU 
rules. 
 
As the evidence showed, ProPlus is large to the point of near monopoly in Slovenia, 
balanced only by the PSB, RTVSLO, which retains a notable share of audience and 
advertising. The data presented indicated that this position helps place it outside the 
influence of political elites and even gives it power over political leaders. This 
position was not a consequence of Europeanization, but of a transnational company 
investing at the right time and a conducive domestic opportunity structure. In 
Macedonia, no such market player existed among the broadcasters and political 
relationships were crucial to their sustainability, and the smaller stations in Slovenia 
were also dependent on political alliances for their financial survival. There was an 
evident link in both cases between the limited financial resources in the market and 
relationships of dependency with political elites. In Slovenia, ProPlus, whose foreign 
investors had entered the market at a very early stage in its development, used its 
position and relations with other players in the market to keep the market closed to 
new entrants from outside. While this may seem problematic from the point of view 
of media pluralism, the evidence from the Macedonian case indicates that where 
there was more pluralism the market was equally closed to foreign investment. In 
Macedonia, the relationships between political elites and media and the thinly spread 
small amount of potential revenues resulted in the market being equally closed to 
foreign investment. 
 
The evidence in the preceding chapters also highlighted another reason the media 
policy area is special and not the same as other sectors subject to EU rules. Within 
the common market, there is a free and open market for washing machines, in which 
all companies making washing machines compete on a level playing field and by the 
same rules. With the negative integration that led to the opening of the market for 
washing machines, Slovenia’s Gorenje company was able to compete freely in 
Italian, German and other markets, along with Indesit or Miele, or other makers of 
washing machines. This was a significant change in the opportunity structure that 
allowed this major Slovenian company to participate in the common appliances 
market and to capitalise on economies of scale that participating in a larger market 
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allowed. The same kind of negative integration was brought about by TWFD for the 
audiovisual media market, but the same was not true for Slovenia’s ProPlus or for 
any of the domestic broadcasters in Slovenia or Macedonia. Scale is particularly 
important for media companies because the media goods are non-exclusive and the 
initial costs are the same whether broadcasting to 10,000 people or 10 million people 
(Doyle, 2002; Picard, 2002). However, the advertising revenue that can be raised 
from an audience of 10,000 is very different from that which can be raised from an 
audience of 10 million. Broadcasters and producers in Slovenia and Macedonia 
cannot benefit from the common market in the same way that the company making 
washing machines can because of the constraints that the limited human and 
financial resources place on their capacity to produce discussed in Chapter 8. The 
accounts here showed that production capacity in these two cases was not just 
limited by the small budgets and lack of skilled media professionals, but also by the 
extent to which the populations and the material conditions of these small countries 
could generate subject matter in the form of artists, events, locations and stories. This 
restricts them to the domestic markets, and therefore to the limited potential revenues 
and political dependency that goes along with it. 
 
Size also seemed to contribute to resistance through the close relationships among 
actors that often involved individual personal level connections, for example such as 
between an owner of a television station and a political party leader or between a 
media company manager and a person in the NRA. In Slovenia, there was evidence 
that the networks of individual relations among “the real media people” facilitated 
alliances among incumbents and their actions to keep others out. In Macedonia, the 
data pointed towards established connections involving obligations to political elites. 
In both cases, I described these as national clubs that create barriers to entry for 
foreign investors or media companies. I am relating these closed clubs to size 
because of the very personal level relationships involved and because I found the 
limited resources in the market contributing to dependency relationships between 
media and political elites. However, it is possible that this sort of national clubbiness 
exists also in other countries with the common market. I therefore advocate more 
research into the relationships between governance actors, even at the level of 
individuals working with governance actors, in the context of both Europeanization 
and governance studies. 
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9.3.3 The Contribution of these Findings: Markets and Politics  
 
The main contribution of this thesis is in what it shows about the importance of 
markets – their players and size – and about the role of political parties in media 
governance in these two cases. Agent-centred explanations in theories about 
implementation and domestic change in Europeanization research tend to consider 
political parties as actors in terms of their preferences for or against EU policy or in 
some cases general attitudes towards the EU. They are seen as potential veto players 
that can block policy implementation, and opportunity structures are considered in 
terms of the extent to which political parties or civil society groups are empowered to 
push for or against EU inspired changes (e.g.Haverland, 2000; Luaces, 2002). 
Market players have largely been ignored as actors. In a notable exception, Versluis 
(2007) provided some evidence that the readiness of market players can factor into 
implementation of policy. The findings from this thesis indicate that market players 
can be important both in resistance to Europeanization or as change agents – if 
Europeanization coincides with their strategic interests. 
 
The cases studied here also highlight that there can be institutional misfit also at the 
level of markets and the individuals working within them. Recent discussions have 
provided evidence on the effects of “administrative capacity” in Europeanization 
(Falkner, 2010; Falkner & Treib, 2008; Thomson, 2009) focusing on government 
efficiency or that of national administrations. The capacity of market players in these 
two cases was limited by the material conditions of smallness. In the evidence 
presented, there were instances of resistance that could be explained mainly by misfit 
with the practices within market players, even down to the level of reporting to the 
NRAs that were constrained by their limited resources and capacity. A vast amount 
of EU policy generated in Brussels concerns the regulation of markets. Based on the 
evidence from these two cases, I argue that Europeanization scholars should look 
beyond issues of institutional fit with structures within national administrations to 
include those operating within the market. 
 
Based on the evidence in these two cases, I also argue that policy and formal rules 
are not just institutions that have a life of their own. I suggest that formal rules 
should not be considered separately from the strategic interests of those that have 
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agreed upon them. Resistance to the institutionalisation of EU rules and norms was 
not related to the policy preferences of political parties. Instead, it was a consequence 
of the role political parties had in setting the rules that shaped the domestic 
opportunity structure in the audiovisual media sector to maintain mechanisms of 
control over media. I suggest that national laws and other formal rules should be 
considered as instruments of the will and strategic interests of the political parties 
that adopted them, in the same way that those at the EU have been “consolidated and 
agreed upon” at the European level among the Member States (Radaelli, 2003, p. 
118). This has implications in terms of agent-centred explanations in 
Europeanization studies and I therefore argue that more research is needed into the 
role of political parties in relation to their use of laws connected to Europeanization 
and not just their policy preferences in relation to EU policy. Treating law as an 
intentional intervention by those who adopt it, namely political parties in 
government, also has implications for how media governance can be conceived. 
 
Two models of media governance from media scholars were presented in Chapter 3, 
along with one more general conceptualisation of governance from Kooiman (2003). 
Puppis’ (2010) model refers to “government” and Kooiman’s to the “state”. Puppis’ 
model breaks down what Kooiman considers the state to some degree, in that he 
considers NRAs and international bodies, such as the EU or WTO, as extensions of 
government. However in both cases the government and the state are treated as 
politically neutral. They are not broken down into the actors that form governments 
and their interests, and the various bodies of the state, which have their own 
relationships with the actors forming central government. McQuail’s (2005) model 
divides mechanisms of governance into internal, within media organisations, and 
external. Among his external mechanisms is law, however as I have argued here, law 
is an instrument of agency and is therefore not without the intent of those who made 
it. McQuail’s model does not account for the kind of behaviour by those in 
government seen in Slovenia and Macedonia. I therefore propose, based on the 
investigation of media governance in these two countries, that the concept of the 
state and of government in media governance needs to be problematised. I suggest 
that political parties and their relationships with media should be separated out, 
particularly in terms of their rule-making function as part of the government and the 
state and in terms of their relationships with media. 
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Political parties have a life before and after their time in government, and their role 
in media governance can be seen as defined not only by their time as part of 
government. In these two cases there was evidence of political parties using law as a 
tool for control of both PSBs and NRAs. There was also evidence of them directly 
using mechanisms of control over broadcasters, and in Macedonia over decision 
makers in the NRA, even when outside of government. This thesis has provided rich 
detail as to how those mechanisms of control function that suggests they are not so 
much legacies of the authoritarian past, as the strategic use of relationships in the 
context of the new system, which, in the Macedonian case, may also have roots in 
even older ways of doing things. I have argued above that in these two cases, the 
small size of the countries and their media markets contributed to the influence of 
political parties over media, especially by exacerbating relationships of financial 
dependence. In order to further understand the relationship between market size or 
economic factors and political influence over the media, I suggest more research is 
needed into these dynamics in other environments. I advocate more examination of 
the relationship between the role of political parties in governance in different types 
of media systems and countries of different sizes and economic conditions. I suggest 
it may be more useful to separate the state into component parts. These could include 
national administration, NRAs, Parliaments, and central governments - but as 
constituted by political parties with their respective interests. In some cases, as the 
ones studied here, the dynamics among these different parts can be very important to 
understanding media governance. 
9.4 The Implications for Audiovisual Media Policy 
 
This thesis was started out of a concern for the future of media in its cultural and 
public interest role in small states, particularly in SEE. Faced with claims from 
media scholars that media systems in such states are vulnerable (Puppis, 2009; 
Trappel, 1991, 2010) and that Europeanization may be a threat (Burgelman & 
Pauwels, 1992), I had a hypothesis that they were not actually vulnerable because 
they were in some way resistant to the process of Europeanization. I expected these 
two states in particular to be part of a trend of “resurgent ethno-nationalism” 
(Schlesinger, 1993, p. 15), prone to more aggressive national protectionism and 
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generally opposed EU intervention in the audiovisual sector. What I found was 
resistance to Europeanization, but in a very different manner than I expected. I found 
that the media systems in Slovenia and Macedonia are resistant to Europeanization to 
a large extent because they are small and some of the manifestations of this 
resistance may also be making them vulnerable. 
 
For Slovenia and Macedonia the common market for distribution is a reality, not 
because of the EU, but because of their own liberalisation processes. This market is 
not a European one, but a global one. The spread of foreign channels and content, 
often from outside of the EU can be seen as part of overall globalisation processes, 
and, based on the evidence here, I suggest facilitated by the incapacity of the 
audiovisual media sectors in these countries to produce what audiences expect. It has 
been said that the EU “manages the process of globalization for its Member States 
and works tirelessly to prevent the process and its impacts being defined by the US 
or other regional powers” (Papathanassopoulos & Negrine, 2011, p. 10). In the 
audiovisual media sector in the EU, this amounts to the protectionist measures of 
content quotas and subsidies, as well as supposed benefit of having access to the 
larger common market to make use of economies of scale. However, the findings of 
this investigation indicate that small states, defined as small by both population size 
and economic indicators, are being served by the EU’s management in this sector. 
Despite the fact that the EU rules are established to be the same for all actors within 
the common market, within the European opportunity structure Macedonian and 
Slovenia actors are severely disadvantaged by the material constraints of their size. 
Neither EU nor national level rules aimed at protection can overcome these 
constraints. 
 
Evidence from others suggests that while Macedonia and Slovenia may be extreme 
cases because they are near the bottom of the spectrum in terms of both population 
size and economy and have unique languages, other small states are similarly poorly 
served by EU protectionism and lacking in capacity to contribute to the common 
audiovisual media sector. The subsidies of the MEDIA programme overwhelmingly 
go to fund productions in the five biggest EU Member States (Papathanassopoulos & 
Negrine, 2011, p. 71), perhaps in an effort to encourage high quality hits that can 
compete with US premium content. Notable examples from even some of the richest 
 277 
small states involve cross-national co-productions and heaving PSB involvement, 
such as in Scandinavia. Norway is becoming famous for its “slow TV” such as the 12 
hours of a fireplace roaring or real-time boat and train journeys (Lim, 2013) that are 
probably no more likely to appeal to broader audiences across Europe than a 
Slovenian documentary about a mountain village. Even the global success producers 
in some small countries have had with entertainment format has been linked to 
consolidation into larger transnational companies because “small countries are 
limited by the smallness of their domestic markets” (Hill & Steemers, 2011, p. 217). 
While the richer Western small states probably have better records in terms of 
transposition and enforcement of EU rules for the audiovisual media sector, there is 
ample evidence to suggest that resistance to participation in European protectionism 
and in open European markets may exist in other small states. Based on the evidence 
from Slovenia and Macedonia, I argue that EU policy makers should reassess the 
extent to which current policy is mediating the effects of globalization on behalf of 
its members. I suggest that an approach aimed at encouraging development within 
the numerous small markets, rather than supporting potential big European hits to 
compete with US content, would be more effective in the long-term.  
 
The Slovenian case showed that even when a private broadcaster was allowed to 
grow to near monopoly size and the PSB was financially stable with a notable share 
of the advertising market, these broadcasters still struggled to compete with foreign 
channels, and neither was able to take advantage of the rest of the common market. 
Nevertheless, the strong PSB facilitated the use of EU subsidies contributing 
somewhat to Slovenian independent production, and the size of ProPlus and its 
foreign ownership seemed to protect it against the mechanisms of political control 
described by Splichal (2001) and Jakubowicz (2007b, 2008). This was a sharp 
contrast to the situation in Macedonia, in which even the national channels were not 
very viable and showed signs of financial dependency on government pseudo-
subsidies. In any discussions that might lead to EU level policy on media pluralism, 
there is a need to closely examine what pluralism means in small states, and what 
level of pluralism might actually best protect the public interest. The evidence from 
these cases suggests that in very small markets having multiple owners may not be 
sustainable or sufficient to protect media companies from dependency on political 
patrons. Instead policy might be more effective at ensuring a diversity of views and 
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representations in the media if internal diversity within companies and content is 
encouraged through public interest obligations or other measures.  
 
It has been shown in other cases that administrative culture, values, and norms can be 
changed through socialisation or social learning (Andonova, 2005) within national 
administrations or among civil servants. However in these two cases, those did not 
appear to be the main sources of misfit with EU policy. I suggest that this may be 
because EU policy in the audiovisual sector is primarily industrial and relegated to 
issues of managing the common market (Harrison & Woods, 2007). What does not 
fit is the size of these countries and their markets. This is not something that can be 
changed through the social learning of new cultural norms or values. However, the 
evidence from these two cases shows that in the context of the multi-level 
governance of Europe, the rules of the EU can be called upon by domestic actors as a 
higher authority when they align with their strategic interests at the national level. 
The diffusion of rules and norms from the EU to the national level in the instances in 
which Europeanization played a role in these countries, was a matter of national level 
actors making use of them to change the domestic opportunity structure or the 
outcomes they could expect from their strategic decisions. As the EU considers its 
competence in relation to media freedom and pluralism, I suggest it also carefully 
assess the extent to which market players and political actors at the national level 
will associate any proposed measures with their own strategic interest, as the 
findings from these two cases indicate that such links can be crucial to EU policy 
playing a role in the region where there is currently the most cause for concern. 
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Annex 1: List of Interviewees 
 
This list has been modified slightly to protect the anonymity of those who asked to 
remain anonymous. 
 
Slovenia 
Miha Krišelj, Acting Director of APEK 
Igor Funa, Head of Spectrum Management Department 
Tomaz Gorjanc, Head of Monitoring Department 
Cene Grčar, In-house Counsel for ProPlus media company 
Roman Smirdonik, Director, Narking Slovenia 
Vojko Stopar, Director of the Media Directorate, Ministry of Culture 
Dejan Jelovac, President of the Broadcasting Council of Slovenia 
Štipe Jerič of Director, RTS Maribor 
Brankica Petković, Head of Media Policy, Peace Institute of Ljubljana 
Marko Milosavljević, Professor of Journalism, University of Ljubljana 
Saša Gnezda, administrator in APEK (responsible for broadcasting licensing and 
tenders) 
Tamara Javornik, Head of Culture and Media Inspectorate 
Sandra Vesel, Media Inspector 
Anonymous 
Anonymous 
 
Macedonia 
Cvetanka Mitrevska, Head of the Legal Department Broadcasting Council 
Emilija Janevska, Head of the Programme Department Broadcasting Council 
Zoran Stefanoski, President of the Broadcasting Council 
Milaim Fetai, Vice President of the Broadcsting Council 
Biljana Ilievska, Head of Radiospectrum, Agency for Electronia Communications 
Roberto Beličanec, Head of Media Development Center 
Biljana Petkovska, Director Macedonian Institute for the Media 
Sašo Ordanovski, Director of Veve Group (AsatM Television) 
Boris Arsov, Council Member, Broadcasting Council 
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Andriana Skerlev-Čakar, Chief of Staff, Broadcasting Council 
Dejan Siljanovski, Head of Legal and Regulatory Affairs, Makedonski 
Telekomunikacii (Macedonian Telecommunications) 
Selver Ajdini, Director, TV Hana 
Irena Arnaudova, Director TV M 
Producer, TV Sitel 
Deputy Producer, TV Sitel 
Stole Naumov, Council Member, Broadcasting Council 
Todor Malezanski, Head Legal Department 
Anonymous from a television station 
Anonymous from a television station 
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Annex 2: Topic Guides for Interviews 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: National Regulatory Authority 
 
 
I. Role of media, institution & self 
a. View of role of broadcast media 
b. View of role of own institution 
c. View on PSB 
d. Does being a small country make any difference in terms of what 
broadcasting or what PSB should/or can do? 
e. View of EU in relation to media policy. What is the EU’s role? How do 
you feel about it?  
 
II. Rules and Procedures 
a. What are the key rules for broadcasters? How long have they been in 
place? How did they get put in place? 
b. Rules or procedures for communicating with other actors. How long 
have they been in place? How did they get put in place? 
c. Procedures for licensing, monitoring, penalizing How long have they 
been in place? How did they get put in place? 
d. Reporting rules or procedures. How long have they been in place? 
How did they get put in place? 
e. How do actors learn about the rules or procedures? How informed are 
they? 
f. Who makes the rules? 
g. Do more rules come from EU directives or from local law? Which are 
more important? 
 
III. Practices and Routines 
a. Daily or regular work routines 
b. What is practice for information dissemination, within and with other 
actors? How long has it been done that way? 
c. Common enforcement practice – what do broadcasters get in trouble 
for & how is it dealt with 
d. Why do you do things the way you do? 
e. Do you think the way you do things is different from other European 
countries? How “European” is your way of doing things? 
 
IV. Relationships 
a. Who do you communicate with the most inside the organisation? 
Outside? How often and for what? 
b. Who have you been dealing with the longest? Or known the longest? 
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c. How often your work do you end up using personal contact or have to 
deal also with people you know personally? 
d. To what extent were the people you communicate with designated for 
you already when you started? 
e. What do you think are the strongest relationships in the sector among 
actors? 
f. What about relationships with European institutions? 
 
V. Decisions 
a. How is your organisation involved in policy/law making? 
b. Who else is involved, influential? 
c. How are decisions made to grant a license/penalize/conduct ad hoc 
monitoring? Who  makes, on what basis 
d. How do you think these decisions should be made? What should be 
considered? 
e. To what extent is EU policy considered, or are EU institutions 
influential? 
 
VI. Priorities 
a. Most important thing your organisation does? 
b. Most important thing you do? 
c. What is needed for development of media in the country? 
d. What does public need? 
e. How important is it to comply with EU policy? To be part of Europe? 
 
VII. Consequences 
a. How have things changed in the broadcasting sector here since you 
started the process to be part of the EU? 
b. What are the consequences, benefits or problems, from liberalisation 
of the broadcasting and telecoms markets? 
c. What can be/is being done to limit any negative impact? To take 
advantage of any benefit? 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: Non-governmental organisation 
 
 
I. Role of media, institution & self 
a. View of role of broadcast media 
b. View of role of own organisation in the country 
c. View of NRA role and independence 
d. View on PSB 
e. View of EU role in relation to media policy 
 
II. Rules and Procedures 
a. What are the key rules for broadcasters?  
b. How important is it to comply and is there compliance 
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c. Rules or procedures for communicating with other actors like NRA & 
government 
d. How do you learn about rules or procedures? How informed do you 
feel? 
e. Who makes the rules? 
f. Are they fair? Do you find any to be burdensome or discriminatory? 
g. Do more rules come from EU directives or from local law? Which are 
more important? 
 
III. Practices and Routines 
a. Their regular investigation, reporting & communications practices 
b. Are there any self-regulatory practices in the sector? How do they 
work? 
c. Common enforcement practice – perception of what kind of things 
actors are penalised for by NRA or other body?  
d. Do you find it fair?  
e. Do you think the way things are done here is different from other 
European countries? Why? 
 
IV. Relationships 
a. Who do you communicate with the most outside the organisation?  
b. How often and for what? 
c. Who have you been dealing with the longest? Or known the longest 
d. What do you think are the strongest relationships in the sector among 
actors? 
e. Do you feel left out of communication channels? 
f. Do you have any communication with European level organisations, 
EU or advocacy groups or associations, etc 
 
V. Decisions 
a. How is your organisation involved in policy/law making? 
b. Who else is involved, influential? 
c. How are decisions made to grant a license/penalize/conduct ad hoc 
monitoring? Who  makes, on what basis 
d. How do you think these decisions should be made? What should be 
considered? 
e. To what extent is EU policy considered, or EU institutions influential? 
 
VI. Priorities 
a. Most important thing your organisation does? 
b. Most important thing you do? 
c. What else needs to be done? 
d. What is needed for development of media in the country? 
e. What does the public need? 
f. How important is it to comply with EU policy? To be part of Europe? 
 
VII. Consequences 
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a. How have things changed in the broadcasting sector here since you 
started the process to be part of the EU? 
b. What are the consequences, benefits or problems, from liberalisation 
of the broadcasting and telecoms markets? 
c. What can be/is being done to limit any negative impact? To take 
advantage of any benefit? 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: Industry 
 
 
I. Role of media, institution & self 
a. View of role of broadcast media 
b. View of role of own company in the country 
c. View of role of self within that  
d. View of NRA role and independence 
e. View on PSB 
f. View of EU role in relation to media policy 
 
II. Rules and Procedures 
a. What are the key rules for broadcasters?  
b. How important is it to comply? 
c. Rules or procedures for communicating with other actors like NRA & 
government 
d. Reporting rules or procedures 
e. How do you learn about rules or procedures? How informed do you 
feel? 
f. Who makes the rules? 
g. Are they fair? Do you find any to be burdensome or discriminatory? 
h. Do more rules come from EU directives or from local law? Which are 
more important? 
 
III. Practices and Routines 
a. Daily or regular work routines 
b. Are there any internal self-regulatory practice? How do they work? 
c. Common enforcement practice – what kinds of thing have you been 
penalised for by NRA or other body?  
d. Do you find it fair?  
e. Do you think the way things are done here is different from other 
European countries? Why? 
 
IV. Relationships 
a. Who do you communicate with the most inside the organisation? 
Outside? 
b. How often and for what? 
c. Who have you been dealing with the longest? Or known the longest 
d. To what extent were the people you communicate with designated for 
you already when you started? 
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e. What do you think are the strongest relationships in the sector among 
actors? 
f. Do you have any communication with European level organisations, 
EU or advocacy groups or associations, etc 
 
V. Decisions 
a. How is your organisation involved in policy/law making? 
b. Who else is involved, influential? 
c. How are decisions made to grant a license/penalize/conduct ad hoc 
monitoring? Who  makes, on what basis 
d. How do you think these decisions should be made? What should be 
considered? 
e. Do you think the NRA is independent? 
f. To what extent is EU policy considered, or EU institutions influential? 
 
VI. Priorities 
a. Most important thing your organisation does? 
b. Most important thing you do? 
c. What else needs to be done? 
d. What is needed for development of media in the country? 
e. What does the public need? 
f. How important is it to comply with EU policy? To be part of Europe? 
 
VII. Consequences 
a. How have things changed in the broadcasting sector here since you 
started the process to be part of the EU? 
b. What are the consequences, benefits or problems, from liberalisation 
of the broadcasting and telecoms markets? 
c. What can be/is being done to limit any negative impact? To take 
advantage of any benefit? 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: Government 
 
 
I. Role of media, institution & self 
a. View of role of broadcast media 
b. View of role of the government, the specific department 
c. View of NRA role and independence 
d. View on PSB 
e. View of EU role in relation to media policy 
 
II. Rules and Procedures 
a. What are the key rules for broadcasters?  
b. How important is it to comply and is there compliance 
c. Rules or procedures for communicating with other actors like NRA & 
broadcasters 
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d. Who makes the rules? 
e. Are they fair?  
f. How do they get changed? 
g. Do more rules come from EU directives or from local law? Which are 
more important? 
 
III. Practices and Routines 
a. Regular practices of daily work related to the sector 
b. Are there any self-regulatory practices in the sector? How do they 
work? 
c. Common enforcement practice – what kind of things actors are 
penalised for by your inspectorates and how often? (Slovenia only) 
d. Consultation with the industry practice?  
e. Appointments to and Communication with NRA? 
f. Do you think the way things are done here is different from other 
European countries? Why? 
 
IV. Relationships 
a. Who do you communicate with the most outside the organisation?  
b. How often and for what? 
c. Who have you been dealing with the longest? Or known the longest 
d. What do you think are the strongest relationships in the sector among 
actors? 
e. What is the nature of communication with the EU bodies? Do you feel 
equal to other EU countries? 
 
V. Decisions 
a. How is your organisation involved in policy/law making? 
b. Who else is involved, influential? 
c. How do you think these decisions should be made? What should be 
considered? 
d. How does having candidate status and the SAA affect decisions made? 
(Macedonia Only) 
e. To what extent is EU policy considered, or EU institutions influential? 
 
VI. Priorities 
a. Most important thing the ministry does in the sector? 
b. Most important thing you do? 
c. What else needs to be done? 
d. What is needed for development of media in the country? 
e. What does the public need? 
f. How important is it to comply with EU policy? To be part of Europe? 
 
VII. Consequences 
a. How have things changed in the broadcasting sector here since you 
started the process to be part of the EU? 
b. What are the consequences, benefits or problems, from liberalisation 
of the broadcasting and telecoms markets? 
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c. What can be/is being done to limit any negative impact? To take 
advantage of any benefit? 
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Annex 3: Table of Findings from Interviews  
 
 
RULES67 
 
Macedonia Slovenia 
ZRD is too detailed on many things 
&long 
 
but there are also things missing 
27 
 
 
27,36 
ZoM is too detailed and long 13, 19 
ZRD is missing fines for some 
things or very light/weak 
27, 36, 39, 
41 
Fines can be big for some things 
 
But are usually small 
12 
 
 
13 
Rules for licensing are easy, but 
require a tender 
27 Getting a license for programme is 
very easy, can’t be turned down 
basically if you did all the paperwork 
properly.  
11, 13, 25 
There are strict ownership rule 
against political owners and on 
concentration, but they are not 
enforced 
33,34,46 It is a problem that license are easily 
transferable and no detail on type of 
programme in license – so station 
can completely change & 
concentrations formed 
68
 
This is how Proplus (PopTV) was 
formed 
11, 24, 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13, 
DCQ is 30% daily with 2 repeats 
allowed.  
28 5%Slovenian daily, 20-30%i n house 
(dependent on status) 
 
EU quotas (apply to national 
stations only): stations have trouble 
achieving them 
28, 47 EU quotas (apply to national stations 
and regional ones with special 
status), stations have trouble 
achieving them 
15, 16 
EU rules must be adapted to Mak 
environment/mentality 
38, 47, 36 EU rules have been just copy-pasted 
so far and country should use the 
options in them to decide some 
things at the national level 
10, 20, 19 
                                                 
67
 Numbers in the tables refer to the number of voice recording from the interview, where more than 
one recording was made in the same interview only the first number is used.  
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Reporting rules for broadcasters are 
extensive and too long 
41 (42, 
contra?) 
Reporting rules for broadcasters are 
extensive and too long 
13, 23, 25 
Process of making the new law is 
very closed, not transparent, not 
inclusive, inefficient 
28, 33, 38 Process of making the law was 
inclusive,  
 
but final text quite altered 
 
Process not inclusive (those left out) 
10, 13, 
16, 
 
 
10, 13 
 
18, 26 
Regulation of copyrights is weak 
point in law and not enforced 
enough.  
42, 41, 39 Jurisdiction is a problem because 
foreign channels are broadcasting 
with Slovenian subtitles and 
Slovenian ads, but don’t have to 
abide by domestic rules (quotes, etc.) 
10, 15, 16 
It is a problem that fines can only 
be issued by the courts and BC 
must go through court for those 
penalties 
27, 38,41   
BC used to have rules for which 
penalty came next in order, but got 
rid of this so now it is the penalty is 
decided ad hoc 
- Good thing 
- Bad thing 
36, 
 
 
 
 
29, 51 
36, 
  
  All broadcasters must register in 
Media Register at Min. of Culture, 
but easy to do & just requires some 
paperwork 
10, 11, 19 
  APEK has only narrow powers to 
penalise, 
12,  
  The AVMSD already applies even 
though not transposed 
 
The AVMSD is not transposed 
national law has precedence 
 
13, 23 
 
 
12, 62 
  APEK & Inspector must abide by 
administrative procedures & inform 
station of monitoring process, give 
15, 21, 62 
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them a chance to respond, then make 
a decision – takes a long time, if not 
followed decision will be overturned 
in court 
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PRACTICES 
 
Macedonia Slovenia 
DTT is subscription only, national 
broadcasters want their own MUX, 
broadcasters in negotiations (battle) 
with operators over who pays who 
34 APEK has tenders for DTT and no 
one applies for license, lots of free 
capacity 
10 
  APEK monitors what is happening in 
the market through personal 
contacts, what broadcasters are 
saying & asking about 
11, 15 
BC monitors according to annual 
plan (when the just check for 
everything) as well as based on 
complaints or ad hoc on the 
initiative of BC members; EWQ & 
IP monitored annually based on 
reports from broadcasters; DCQ 
checked on a daily level when a 
station is monitored (according to 
annual plan or complaint)  
28, 46 APEK monitors based on complaints 
for most things; plus outsourced 
monitoring of ads which happens 
automatically; 
EWQ & IP monitored annually 
based on reports from broadcasters; 
in house production monitored 
randomly and not current priority 
because due to be reduced in new 
law (!?); and randomly check  people 
complying with special status or 
license requirements and when they 
know ownership has changed or 
something 
12 (21) 
BC records several stations 24 
hours/day & national stations are 
priority 
28 APEK records several stations 24 
hours/day & national stations are 
priority 
12, 15 
BC is lenient with penalties, rarely 
chooses sever punishments, 
especially now that rule on 
consequential penalties were 
revoked; licenses only ever 
revoked for non-payment of license 
36, 46, 47 Never happens that a license is 
revoked, only twice APEK used 
temporary revocation for a few hours 
12,13 
Regulator often organising 
workshops, seminars, etc but 
broadcasters rarely participate 
much 
 
28, 38, 37, 
41, 42, 46, 
47(contra) 
Regulator often organising 
workshops, seminars, etc 
13, 24 
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Broadcaster use connections to 
ensure court cases expire or get off 
with warnings,  
27, 38, 46,  Fines are not so big so sometimes 
broadcaster complains, but usually 
just pays it so as not to bother 
13, 26 
Stations started in free for all and 
then BC chose not to cull when 
transfer from concession to license 
based on any kind of standards – 
this was a mistake 
Yes, but unavoidable b/c of 
deadline 
38, 42, 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
Only local stations allowed at the 
beginning, it was a strategy 
13, 24 
Main violations are advertising 
limits 
28, 47 Main violations are advertising limits 
– it used to be in house production, 
but not any more 
15 
  APEK & Inspector with shared 
responsibility is inefficient – passing 
the buck back & forth 
16, (26) 
Political ads during elections go to 
loyal, but perhaps “one man show” 
stations that otherwise have no real 
programme, which keeps them 
alive until next election – unfair 
competition for serious local 
stations 
41, 42 Stations with special status apply for 
funds in a tender each year from 
Min. of Culture – this money if 
technically for projects, but is 
important lifeline for station survival 
16, 23, 
24, 18 
  PSB law was worked on by same 
group as for ZoM and had to be done 
first- politically motivated 
20, 24 
BC staff prepares all information 
on violation, previous penalties for 
same violation for that broadcaster 
27, 28, 46 Inspector waits for APEK to make a 
decision on a case and give it’s 
“expert” opinion before going forth 
with a fine 
21,15, 62 
  Station’s fulfilling EWQ with 
domestic content, DCQ not so hard 
b/c news counts & IP can be from 
anyone outside – so trade with other 
local TVs is IP content 
13, 23 
  Cases related to Product placement 
are on hold awaiting change in the 
law 
62 
BC gave out satellite licenses on a 
tender but for pgms of general 
33, 42, 41, 
46 
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format aimed at national audience, 
not specialised channels, so now 
essentially 10 more national 
stations 
4 national commercial broadcasters 
have formed sub group in Chamber 
of commerce to protect their 
interests, only A1 left out 
34   
3 national network operators, 
MaxTV(IPTV), BoomTV(DTT) 
and Cabletel signed an agreement 
on fair play practices – copyright, 
VoD practice, only Telekabel 
chose not to  
39   
Selection of BC members is 
politically influenced 
33, 46, 47   
 
 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Macedonia Slovenia 
BC ( and AEK) staff and members 
often answer questions from 
broadcasters or advise on the 
phone, broadcasters feel they can 
call staff or members freely with 
dilemma’s and often consult on 
rules, especially related to elections 
or recently with the classification 
of content re: protection of minors. 
(Even those that don’t have such a 
great relationship with the pres. for 
political or personal reasons) 
28, 34, 37, 
39, 41, 46, 
47 
APEK staff often answer questions 
or advise broadcasters on the phone 
& by email, broadcasters feel they 
can freely call APEK staff and 
consult or confer 
11, 12, 
13, 23 
Both NGO’s currently have little 
contact with the BC – only directly 
with those few members who used 
to be journalists and are not 
involved in drafting the new law 
32, 33, 29 NGO rep was involved in drafting 
new law, but as individual expert, 
close ties with academia, not too 
much contact with APEK  
 
European institutions used to be 33, 39, 41   
 313 
more involved and are not very 
interested now, so not so much 
communication with local 
stakeholders, NGOs 
Relationships among BC members 
is very strained and divided along 
political lines 
36, 29, 51 Relationship between Broadcasting 
Council and APEK is official, and 
has been strained in the past 
18, 21,25 
EU asks lots of questions of the 
regulator and they are often 
answering requests for information 
that come directly or via SEP 
37, EU asks lots of questions of the 
regulator and they are often 
answering requests for information 
24 
Relationship between BC and 
Ministry of Transport is strained  
and between BC and AEK (though 
staff level communicate and 
official requests are responded to 
appropriately) 
36, 28, 37, 
38, 46 
Relationship between APEK and 
Ministry of Culture or Ministry of 
Science is cooperative - both official 
& direct communication/consultation 
- But they can say no, or disagree 
 
Relationship between APEK & 
Inspector is very official and mostly 
on paper. 
11, 24 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
12, 15, 62 
Telekom has a very good 
relationship with the BC, united in 
joint efforts on copyright 
39, 29 Proplus lawyer is influential,  
- involved in drafting law 
- through the courts (changing 
relationship b/t APEK & 
inspector) 
 
13, 
15, 21 
Uses & maintains personal 
relationship: 
- To consult with judges on 
dilemmas 
- To get information & stay in 
the loop with other 
institutions, inc. EU 
- To ease communication and 
getting things done 
 
 
27 
 
28 
 
 
 
39, 46 
Uses & maintains personal 
relationship: 
- With people in APEK and with 
NGOs as part of small club who 
know stuff about the sector, to 
exchange views, share info, 
participate in strategy 
- Avoids them with politicians as 
they expect something 
- To know what is going on in 
the market, who might be 
selling or buying, etc 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
11,15 
Local broadcasters communicate 
regularly, commonly buy 
41, 42 Local/regional television with 
special status have an association 
23 
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programme rights, sell joint 
advertising, co-ordinate before 
election to fix prices for political 
ads 
which was represented in drafting 
process & lobbies, and 3 regional 
stations on MUX A share content 
  A newcomer, from outside the media 
club, has to struggle to break in & is 
not party to information/plans  
14  
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OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
 
Macedonia Slovenia 
Regulator is weak  
- And it serves commercial 
interests 
- And it serves political 
interests 
27 
27 
 
 
32,  
Regulators are weak 
- and it serves commercial 
interests 
16, 15  
MRT is not a player, big 
commercial stations have power as 
influence opinion 
 
“if we agree to start the news with 
you . . .” 
34, 39 Duopoly with PopTV & RTVSLO 
exists and dominates the market. 
There is fierce competition, 
especially over sports rights, and 
 - increased commercialisation of 
RTVSLO 
10, 20, 26 
 
 
 
 
11,15 
Drafting of new law is closed and 
no clear vision 
 
 
28 
 
Players in the marketplace influence 
drafting of the law 
- Local broadcasters 
 
- Big Commercial broadcasters 
(PopTV) 
10 
 
20, 23, 26 
13, 20, 26 
No concentrated power now in the 
market, as former dominant player 
is ruined, 
- Escalating battle for rights 
- Govt/Political parties 
controlling the national 
stations 
 
 
 
34, 41 
 
33, 34, 46 
The biggest player in TV market and 
the second(by far) biggest 
commercial player are foreign 
owned, but they are basically 
Slovenian companies just with 
foreign capital and locals run the 
show. 
PopTV really dominates 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14, 23 
Many channels available on cable 
& unfair competition from small 
local cable operators who pirate 
foreign channels 
39,41,  42,  There is a lot of choice on cable and 
satellite. Lots of foreign channels 
11, 24 
  Have issued almost all available 
frequencies for radio, but APEK has 
little control over how they are used 
11, 24 
  Concentrations forming in the radio 
market because small ones can’t 
survive, forced to sell.  
11, 15, 24 
  Domestic quotas in place would be 
hard to change –patriotic feelings & 
16, 26 
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musicians lobby 
People have individual 
involvement in drafting of new law 
- Telekom 
- One BC member 
- Latas (TV Sitel) 
 
 
 
39 
36 
47 
Experts from University are 
important players in drafting the law 
– social political scientists 
13, 16, 
19, 20 
Government directly is biggest 
advertiser 
32,34, 41, 
46  
Government owned companies make 
up most of the advertisers except for 
on PopTV & RTVSLO where a few 
big international companies are 
present – P&G, Coca-Cola 
19, 20, 
23, 24 
Govt ads and political campaigns 
keep alive small one-man show 
stations that degrade the market 
41,42 (51) Subsidies for programmes of special 
interest support ideologically 
controlled media at local & regional 
level 
18, 23, 24 
It is not easy to enter Macedonian 
TV market, 
Market is small and local big 
players won’t allow it,  - media is 
not a business, but political tool 
Must have a local in charge 
connects to one of the political 
options 
32, 33, 34, 
51 
 
 
 
 
51 
It is not so easy to enter the TV 
market in Slovenia because it is not 
so easy to enter a platform & 
registering in Slovenia is required, 
which carries many obligations, and 
market is full 
21, 24 
Govt. ad campaigns used to “buy” 
loyalty and support loyal 
broadcasters, national & local 
34, 41, 42 Local stations closely tied to local 
politicians and businesses, which are 
also state-controlled companies,  
23, 24 
 
 
 
Lack of enforcement of ownership 
rules means politicians almost 
directly own national  televisions 
33 whereas PopTV can dictate to 
politicians & has independence 
because of position in market and 
foreign capital 
23, 13, 24 
Ministry of Transport is 
understaffed  
And hands tied by Minister 
33, 38 Ministry of Culture is understaffed & 
only one Inspector for all media 
24, 62 
EU carries weight and Progress 
Report matters, helps spur on 
action, ex Copyright enforcement 
or threat of reaction influences 
decisions 
28, 33, 36, 
39, 46, 58 
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Macedonian subtitles respected 
now that Max TV does them 
(Telekom – owned by 
Deutchtelecom) 
28, 39   
Local stations have local power 
and influence local courts 
27, 46   
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CULTURAL NORMS 
 
Macedonia Slovenia 
Public debate is weak and 
participating in public discussion 
held by BD or AEK is low – 
domination of daily politics & lack 
of understanding/capacity 
28, 32, 33 High culture has been replaced by 
sport and pop culture - sameness 
11,15,16 
Lack of rule of law: 
 
- Some stations just ignore 
warnings or penalties 
- Rule of people, not rule of 
law 
39,46, 51 
 
28 
 
33 
Hypocrisy is very present 18 
Culture of showing off – TV as 
show off piece 
33, 51   
Albanians bound by loyalty to 
Albanian cause & each other – 
challenge for Albanian TV to be a 
business, not a cause 
41   
 
 
VALUES 
 
Macedonia Slovenia 
  Diversity of content, different kinds 
of music and types of programme is 
important in the market (missing 
now) 
10, 11, 
16, 18 
Media has value for the people, 
public interest function, democratic 
function 
Local information,  
41, 51 
 
 
41, 42 
Media has value for the people, 
public interest function 
 
-  
-  
- Local information, local media 
11, 15, 
16, 18 
(contra), 
19,  
 
23, 15, 16 
PSB should be public interest & 
have special rules 
36, 58 PSB should be public interest, non-
commercial or not so commercial, 
fill  gap 
11, 14, 
16, 25 
(contra) 
Domestic production is important 36, 42 Domestic production is important (11), 16, 
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25 
Important Rules for broadcasters: 
 
- Hate speech & incitement 
- Ad limits 
- Ownership & concentration 
- Protection of minors 
 
 
28,38, 46 
 
 
28  
33 
 
38 
Important rules for broadcaster: 
- Protection of Minors 
 
- Slovenian language 
 
- Ad limits 
 
12, 15, 
25, 62 V2 
16 
 
62 V1 
Media freedom is important 46, 51 Media freedom is important 13, 19,  
Being European is important 
- Better to be in than out 
- Important to be feel 
European, to belong 
- Not so much 
 
32 
46, 51 
 
38 
Being European is important 
- Better to be in than out 
 
13 
Domestic quotas are important 47, 28 European works important 
- Yes, but should be lower 
- No 
 
15, 16 
25 
Viability of media is important, 
need stations that can survive & not 
“one-man” shows 
46, 41, 42 Viability of media is important,  
Independence of Regulator 32, 33, 46,    
Regulator should not just punish, 
but more educate about the rules 
36, 41, 46    
Copyright is important   
- because EU demands it 
 - because piracy hurts local 
markets 
 
29, 46 
41, 42 
  
 
 
SMALLNESS 
 
Macedonia Slovenia 
Lack of capacity in regulator, not 
enough people, resources 
27, 28, 34   
Everyone knows everyone  
- Means you have to be careful 
- You can always find a 
connection if you need 
28 
28, 33, 
 
Everyone know everyone  
- Makes communication easier 
- Must be careful of people 
wanting favours 
 
11, 23 
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- Use of connections 
undermines rule of law & 
efficiency 
39 
41 
- Means some people have more 
influence 
 
11, 13 
19, 23 
Language must be protected 28, 47 Language must be protected 16 
Small market, dominated by govt 
employment & not enough big 
firms to generate ads 
32, 33,  Small market, local stations can’t 
survive – must sell up 
15 
Too many players in small market 
– competition cannot sustain 
quality 
34, 41, 42, 
46, 47 
Small market with one giant 
commercial & strong PSB, can’t 
sustain pluralism 
11, 20, 23 
Vulnerable? 
- Yes, to internal competition 
and commercialisation 
- No  
 
34  
Vulnerable? 
- Yes, to foreign channels on 
cable aimed at Slovenian 
market 
- No, because not interesting 
market 
 
10,13 
 
 
 
16, 23 
Not enough capacity for 
production/independent production 
28 Not enough capacity for production 
/independent production  
15, 16, 23 
Not enough people who know 
anything about the media sector 
32, Not enough people who know 
anything about the media sector 
13,19, 20 
 
POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION 
 
Macedonia Slovenia 
PSB legacy- MRT has been 
unstable state TV since 
independence, finally getting some 
stability; then can work out if it is 
state or public 
33 PSB has largely not changed how it 
works 
16 
Political parties are legacy of 
transition – centric, undemocratic 
and not transparent 
33, 34, There is still some kind of 
authoritarian tradition 
19 
Things understood in developed 
countries need to be set in 
guidelines here 
51 The laws are changing all the time 18 
Regulator learning together with 
players in the market 
51 Regulator learning together with 
players in the market 
13 
Left & right in post socialist 
countries is a mess 
32, 33 Left & right in post socialist 
countries is a mess 
13 
 321 
  Journalism and  media dominated by 
the left 
- Old elite still in charge 
18, 19 
 
18 
 
 
OTHER STORIES (cross over multiple codes) 
 
Macedonia Slovenia 
Copyrights enforcement now by multi-agency 
efforts (46, 51), by channels checking on each 
other (34, 51), by Telekom monitoring & sending 
information to BC (39) 
 
Big issue for stations at the local level for years 
41, 42 
 
RTVSLO was give a MUX in Law on 
Digitalisation and according to that law can do 
what it wants with it – APEK & BC agreed to 
give temporary permission for commercial 
stations to go to that MUX during building of 
commercial MUX, but now they won’t migrate & 
commercial MUX only has 3 channels.  RTVSLO 
was declared an SNP by APEK and therefore has 
to have only cost based prices and is currently 
investigating charges by commercial MUX that 
the current prices are under cost (dumping). 
PopTV & RTV said they don’t want to go to 
MUXB because prices are higher and coverage 
less. RTVSLO rep was not in the department that 
dealt with it & couldn’t discuss. APEK says it is a 
problem with the law and proposed changes to it 
& that it is in the process of investigating.  10, 
13,14, 18, 23 
Government is spending large sums on 
advertising campaign for various announcements 
or PSAs 
 
These fund are distributed in a non-transparent 
way and are distorting the market in various 
ways: 
- Prices for premium content have gone up as 
national stations that got the windfall entered 
bidding wars 34,42 
- Small local “one man show” stations are 
being kept alive and loyal 41,42 
-  
Right of reply – due to be changed in new law, 
but currently reply can be requested & must get 
same “position & space” in print and 
broadcasting. Currently means politicians and 
companies, even artist getting a bad review get 
the same time/space to respond. 19, 20 
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Annex 4: Interview Transcript Example 
 
(This transcript has not been proofread for spelling or grammar, but is left as it was 
created. It was also the first of two interviews with this individual as it was cut short 
and continued the following day.)  
 
APEK 
06.04.11 
 
First some chat about self and project.  
Presentation of consent form (sound of signing) 
 
S: tell me a bit about what you do 
T: I am head of monitoring department. We have a radio communication department 
that includes monitoring and media content regulation and I’m the head of monitoring 
department 
We are monitoring radio and television content until the new law is going to be 
adopted and then in the new media law we’re going to monitor also all these 
audiovisual media services. Radio tv and audiovisual media service. Linear, so we are 
going to have linear and non-linear services, non-linear services are media on demand 
services, and we are going to have inspection powers with the new media law. Now 
we have only a narrow area of powers because we can now impose only a warning 
and this would be the first step of sanctions and after that the second step is part time 
period revocation and the last level is termination of license. So these are the only 
three things we can do. We do not impose fines or anything like that. If we find out 
with our procedure that there is some kind of violation we put our decision to the 
broadcaster and then the same decision we send to the ministry of culture and then 
they can impose fines.  
S: the Ministry? 
T: yes, and we are responsible for just a part of our media law. The areas that we are 
covering in the media law are advertising, protection of minors, licensing and 
program quotas, from Slovenian, own production and European Audiovisual qutoas. 
Which are prescribed for a year, annual content quotas. Our work is based on appeals 
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of listeners and viewers and of course we are monitoring the programmes by 
ourselves. We look at the programme, or listen to the radio programme and if we spot 
some violation we start with the procedures.  
S: S do you say okay now we are going to monitor the stations from this time to this 
time r how do you decide? 
T: we have different approaches, if there is an appeal for a listener, we go and look for 
the programme. Maybe I can tell you, now we bought equipment which we can tape, 
record 8 programmes 24/7 digitally and so if there is an appeal, if it is a violation that 
comes from one of those 8 programmes it is not a problem because we have these 
programmes for the last 3 months. 
S: so if a person calls and says I saw this on channel X 
T: they have to write down 
S: oh it has to be written 
T: Yes it has to be written.  
S: and then you can go back and look and find it in the recording 
T: Yes we have recorded programme for 3 months, for those 8 programmes, we can 
change of course those 8 programmes, it depends on what we would like to do and 
then if we find out that there are some more problems similar to that appeal then we 
record some other programmes and then we make just a broader action, for example. 
If for example there appeared that there wasn’t enough Slovene music on the radio 
programmes then we record maybe 10 programmes and then we check out how much 
Slovene music 
S: what kind of things do people most often complain about? 
T: In the year 2009 there were some appeals from the area of protection of minors, we 
had problems with Big Brother 1 & 2, there were two seasons and then there was The 
Farm, also a reality show. I’m going to a meeting tomorrow also on reality shows in 
Belgrade there are going to be regulators from three countries, also in Balkans. Its 
going to be, the topic will be this Dvor. Do you know it? 
S: I haven’t watched it. 
T: it’s on Pink TV. So now for example we are dealing a lot, well a lot of our work is 
concentrated on advertising content, because we have the public broadcaster sending 
appeals on the commercial broadcasters and vice versa. And now we outsourced data. 
AGB media services. They are collecting data on programmes, not just advertising 
but also the other programmes. And the service we monitor is advertising, especially 
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advertising because the service they have detects the advertising so that we can look 
in the softward and see, for example what was the amount of advertising in an hour. 
Which is the main important thing, until the new directive was adopted. Because for 
example there is no advertising provisions on the day level. In the current media law 
there is still a provision that advertising shouldn’t exceed 20% per day, but the new 
directive says that it should be only per hour.  
S: and so which is enforeced 
T: well yes, now we have some problems with that, because for instance product 
placement is allowed, but the problem we see is that it should be announced this 
product placement. And no one is announcing it. Some of the broadcasters are already 
using this provision from the directive, but still we are sanctioning this practice as, not 
secrect advertising, but. 
S: aha hidden advertising 
T: hidden advertising, yes,  
S: I think it is surreptitious  
T: yes surreptitious 
S: which is a fancy way of saying hidden, but its in the Directive 
T: Yes, Because the problem for us is that there is no announcement and the viewers 
don’t know that this is product placement. They just saw the product in the show, but 
there is no announcement so for us this is still surreptitious advertising. Because 
product placement is allowed by the directive only under certain conditions. Just in 
certain programmes and it has to be announced and so on and those conditions are not 
put and they are not regulated. They are going to be regulated in the new media law, 
because the directive is not implemented in our media law, we claim that this is still 
surreptitious advertising and we had already one case. We are not . .The problem is 
that we do not have powers over surreptitious advertising because the Min of Culture 
has supervision over surreptitious advertising, so if we detect this kind of advertising  
practice then we record the programme and send an appeal to the Min of Culture. 
There is a media inspector and he is supervision surreptitious advertising. 
S: so he is the one that is supposed to then take action 
T: Yes and he already took action in the case, the time of the world championship in 
football. There were people in the studio with some ads on their T-Shirts and the 
inspector fined them. This was a classic example of product placement and there was 
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no announcement of product placement so they treated this as surreptitious 
advertising.  
 
S: Do you have easy communication with this inspector.  
 
Now there is a new inspector there and we know each other just from the phone. He’s 
in charge I think from the first of March, but we do not have any, I should say not 
very good relations. We are just sending and he is responding. He told me they are 
very occupied with the other areas of the media law because we are just in charge of 
those four areas and he is in charge of all the other parts of the media law, which is 
also right to reply and all other things that are in the media law. SO we are just 
sending if we detect some problem related to the radiospectrum we just proceed our 
findings to the inspector and he tell us what he has done after he has finished his 
procedures. 
 
S: So it sounded like the complaints about programme standards were coming from 
the public, especially about protection of minors. . 
T: Yes, I can go from area to area. About advertising, we can detect a lot of violations 
from our outsourcing software. Those are advertising breaks and advertising quotas 
and most of those advertising provisions we can find out by ourselves with 
outsourcing.  
S: that just goes automatically? 
T: yes the procedure automatically starts. Then protection of minors, yes, we have 
appeals and then we have our findings. It is both. 
S: Do you think the public knows how to do an appeal? 
T: I should say that the public is not aware enough about the provisions on this area – 
that there is any kind of a protection. Maybe they see only all these signs, 15, or 12 or 
whatever, but the problem is also that in our provisions for the protection of minors 
that it is just on violence or pornography. There are no provisions talking about bad 
language or any other kind of content that is the programmes, in the shows. Because 
the problem with the Farm was that there were more appeals about sex, okay this in 
covered, then bad language – the law doesn’t cover bad language, and then was also 
drinking – also it is not covered, and then smoking, you know these hazards. There 
were appeals especially on this. There was a lot os drinking and smoking and bad 
 326 
language in this show, but from our perspective it is not covered good enough in the 
law. It is just violence and sex material.  
 
S: but in the AVMSD it’s also just some minimum requirement 
T: Yes, When I saw this – XXX was pretty much involved in the preparation of this 
new law- I think there is much better regulated the area of protection of minors. 
Because it is going to be in this way that it is not specified in the law what kind of 
material is problematic – just those categories, 18 over 18, under 18, 15, 12 and so 
one etc. – but all the content that is problematic is going to be defined in an executive 
act, so there going to be hazards, bad language, what is kind of a programme is 
suitable for some age group. So I think it is going to be a little bit better regulated in 
this manner. For us it is going to be easier to work when we decide about what is 
proper and what is improper 
 
S: Do you think Slovenian standards are different from tother places in Europe? 
T: hmm that is a difficult question 
S: It wasn’t on my list it just came up now that we’re talking about it 
T: We made a public consultation with the broadcasters and we made some kind of an 
analysis on this topic and we compared Dutch, French German, etc. standards of this 
and I would say that we are quite liberal. One of the most liberal countries is 
Netherlands and I think we would treat quite smiliar this content to the Netherlands.  
S: So you think that even if things change it is still going to be quite liberal. 
T: yes, but I think that now it is even more liberal than it is going to be in the new 
law, because as I said there is no regulation of bad language and so on and now those 
things are going to be in the law. For instance it is not going to be allowed to show 
drinking of young people in the content that is suitable for children under 15. Now 
you have everything. They are showing some very problemtatic films at 8 pm or even 
earlier. Most of the films are just violence, and maybe sex content is broadcasted after 
11, for example, but all the others – especially problematic for me is the violence and 
all these films with young children drinking and drug stuff in the content. They’re 
broadcasting these things at 6pm and 8pm and I think this is not appropriate and there 
should be some kind of warning, the symbol or something. 
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S: And how, as the regulator when you are not monitoring something based on an 
appeal, how do you decide what to monitor. Or what kind of monitoring do you do on 
a regular basis or ad hoc 
T: we have done some things, like advertising on a regular basis, but now we do 
everything ad hoc as things arise. I didn’t finish my description of all the areas.  This 
was in the areas of protection of minors. And audiovisual works and the other 
programme quotas – we do monitoring once a year because these are annual quotas. 
And we check for this once a year and we are now doing the quotas from 2010. 
S: does that mean you have to go through the programme schedules and look at them 
yourself or do they report to you? 
T: they have to make a report and they report to us only quotas and then we start the 
procedures when we check all the quotas that they proceed to us. And then we check 
all the audiovisual works that they sent us. They have to sent to us all the lists of all 
the audiovisual works that were broadcasted and they have to list where it was 
produced, in Europe, if it was produced by independent producer, when it was 
broadacasted, and that is most of it. From this data we decided if some work was 
made by Slovenian producer then it is Slovenian works, or if it was an independent 
producer and we go over all these lists. It is quite a big amount of work. 
S: are the stations pretty good about submitting their reports.  
T: in the last 4-5 years we have received quite a bit of appeals from independent 
producers. They said that those quotas are not correct and that is why we started these 
detailed procedures to check the reported quotas. And now we are doing this every 
year, these detailed procedures with all those broadcasters that have to fulfil the 
quotas. 
S: and that is just national programmes 
T: National and regional, the exception is just local and of course those specialized 
programmes that don’t have Audio visual works, for example information 
programmes, advertising programmes.  
S: So on the one hand you have work on protection of minors, on advertising and on 
quotas. 
T: and we then have also on home production quotas and this is made just through. . . 
S: and by home production do you mean their own in house production or do you 
mean Slovenian production 
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T: yes In house production. And those quotas are checked randomly because we have 
no appeals on this matter, so this is really random. If we saw there is a problem . .  . 
S: So you just say hmm, next week we have some time, lets check 
T: yeah for example. 
S: does that mean that that one gets kind of bumped down to the bottom of the list in 
terms of priorities. 
T: Yes it is not such a priority. Because we also saw that in the new media law it is 
going to be, well now we have 20% per day and in the new media law it’s10% per 
week, so it is a bit lower provision from 20 to 10.  
S: Will Slovenian works stay the same 
T: yes Slovenian works will stay the same, you mean Audiovisual works? 
S:Yes 
T: those stay the same 
S: because you had 20% in house production and then there was something like 5% 
Slovenian works and the European 
T: Yes, European is 20% and then independent production is 10% 
S: what is the reason behind lowering it 
T: good question, we do not know. Maybe XXX knows because she was involved in 
this process pretty much. But the problem is that there was no public discussion on 
these topics. IT was the same with this law. IT was adopted in 2001 and I was already 
working in this area. IT was quite similar today. The only public discussion in this 
new media law was on right to reply, which is not our area of work, and the Slovene 
music. Yeah, the Slovene music was a topic in public discussion because one or two 
years ago it was a problem that the musicians found out that their music, Slovene 
music, was broadcasted on the radio stations during the night. There are provsions, 
daily provision for commercial stations for 20% per day, but because the radio 
stations said that they don’t care about Slovenian music and they tried to avoid those 
provisions and they put the Slovenian music during the night, but they fulfilled the 
provisions. And when one started then all the broadcasters started with the same 
practice and in one moment the musicians they started to protest and then this became 
a topic of public debate. And now in the draft of the new media law there is a 
provisons of 20% during 6am and 8pm. So this is they way how they solved the 
problem 
S: and that is in the past? 
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T: no it is still in process. So that was the only thing, this right to reply and this. Oh 
and also this, well I don’t know if this is important to you because it is not our area of 
work. It was how the editor of the media is appointed. Whether it was to be with the 
consent of journalists or not and also there as some debate on concentration of the 
media, but not a lot. Just in these expert magazines. Aha, and this is one area that I 
forgot. We monitor also the programmes of special importance. This are regional, 
local, non-profit and student programmes. You can apply for this status in our agency 
and then we take a pattern of the programme and we look at the programme and if the 
programme fits all the programme requirement it can receive our licence for this 
special status.  
S: And then you monitor if it keeps up 
T: yes this is again random. And if we saw something in the market – if there are any 
changes – if someone if selling some radio station to some other company, then we 
monitor to see if he is still fulfilling these requirements. There are also some other 
requirements except programmes, the broadcaster should have for example 3 
employees or 3 for local or and 6 for regional and there are also some other not so 
important requirements, the most important are these programme requirements. For 
instance there are some quotas for information programme, cultural programmes and 
so on, some quotas on this matter. 
S: and this is just for the programmes of special interest 
T: yes, just for programmes of special interest 
S: because in the license agreement there is also percentages of what type of 
programmes 
T: Yes this is the last area, the licenses are made especially because of broadcasters 
that are broadcasting terrestrial. On the terrestistial platform because we have those 
public tenders, you know when we give those frequencies, and this was made 
especially for them. So first they had to get this license and then they had to go on the 
public tender with this license and compete with other companies for the frequencies. 
S: DO you monitor if they are actually doing what they said they would do 
T: Yes, we are also monitoring is there is any appeal. There are no appeal from the 
part of the viewers, but there are some appeals from the Broadcating council for 
example. We had one big action back in 2007 when the new broadcasting council was 
appointed and at that time they had a demand to the agency that we should monitor all 
the broadcasters received a frequency in the period of this broadcasting council and at 
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that time there were 17 radio stations, so it was quite a big, really huge amount of 
work for us. So we checked all the quotas, and so on that are stated in the licence.  
S: so they wanted to check what the previous council had done? 
T: they wanted to check that the programmes are still fulfilling the license, but the 
problem is that again, at the end of the process the only thing we can do is the first 
step, which is a warning. And if the requirements are not fulfilled then we should start 
with he second step of the procedure which is as I said part time revocation of the 
license, so we just temporarily is stop the license. And  the last step revocation 
S: and have you every revoked 
T: no 
S: and have you ever done this  temporarily? 
T: Yes temprorarily we have done twice in the last few yearsfor advertising 
S: and did they comply? 
T: Yes, in the second step they complied, but still you know in the third step we 
checked this second sanction and but after that then it is still at the beginning, so after 
the third step it goes back to the beginning and if you again see the violation it is back 
to warning.  
S: I just wanted to check the time 
T: yes it is 4 o clock 
S: then I’ll let you go, I don’t want you to miss . ..  (agreeing the next interview) 
 
Total time: 46:24 
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